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Between policy and reality: A Study of a Community-Based Health Insurance Programme in 
Kwara State Nigeria 
The challenge of accessing affordable healthcare services in the developing countries prompted 
the promotion of community-based health insurance (CBHI) as an effective alternative. CBHI 
has been implemented in many countries of the South over the last three decades for the purpose 
of improving access and attaining universal health coverage. However, the sudden stoppage of 
a CBHI programme in rural Nigeria raised a lot of concerns about the suitability of the health 
financing scheme. Thus, this thesis examines the stoppage of the CBHI programme in rural 
Kwara, Nigeria. Premised on the health policy triangle as a conceptual framework, mixed-
methods approach was adopted for data collection. This involved 12 focus group discussions, 
22 in-depth interviews, 32 key informant interviews and 1,583 questionaires. The study 
participants were community members, community leaders, healthcare providers, 
policymakers, international partner, health maintenance organisation officials and a researcher. 
Findings revealed that transnational actors relied on various resources (e.g. fund and 
‘expertise’) and formed alliances with local actors to drive the introduction of the programme. 
As such, the design and implementation of the policy were dominated by international actors. 
Despite the sustainability challenges faced by the programme, the study found that it benefitted 
some of the enrolled community members. Though, even at the subsidised amount, enrolment 
premium was still a challenge for many. The main reasons for the stoppage of the programme 
are a paucity of fund and poor management. The stoppage of the programme, however, 
signified a point of reversal in the relative achievements recorded by the CBHI scheme because 
community members have deserted the healthcare facilities due to high costs of care. In view 
of these, the thesis notes that short-term policies often lead to temporary outcomes and suggests 
the need to repurpose the role of the state by introducing a long-term comprehensive healthcare 
policy – based on the reality of the nation – to provide equitable healthcare services for the 
citizenry irrespective of their capacity to pay.   
Keywords: Healthcare reform; Healthcare financing; Community-based health insurance; 
Universal health coverage; Social policy; Enrolment; Health benefits; Policy transfer; 
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The healthcare system is a critical institution in society ideally designed to ensure the health 
and well-being of every member of society. This is because the development of any nation 
relies heavily on the health and well-being of its human population (Wiesmann & Jutting, 
2000:1). Many countries consider health policy reform for improving access to good healthcare 
services. The 1960s and 1970s saw a raft of countries winning their independence from former 
colonial powers (John & Taylor, 2003).  The leaders of these newly independent countries 
faced the challenge of providing quality healthcare services to their people and more 
importantly, reducing mortality and the spread of diseases.  
Between 1973 and 1978, the World Health Organization (WHO) was persuaded by China, the 
Soviet Union and certain African countries, on the importance of revisiting healthcare delivery 
“that stressed primary health care (PHC) and the social roots of illness” (Lee, 1997). The 
leadership of the WHO was “impressed by developments in China, India, Africa and Latin 
America that provided healthcare via local community-controlled services” (Gunn et al., 
2008:110). Indeed, comprehensive healthcare programmes which covered the poor were 
successfully implemented in countries such as Venezuela, Tanzania, Sudan and China 
(Bennett, 1979). 
Consequently, in 1978, the WHO and the UNICEF organised at Alma Ata (now Kazakhstan) 
an international joint Conference where all WHO member countries unanimously resolved that 
“health is a fundamental human right”. All relevant sectors must pursue the provision of 
comprehensive and quality healthcare for all through comprehensive primary healthcare (Alma 
Ata, 1978:16). The Declaration was viewed across the world as a success, bringing about the 
establishment of a global template for promoting and delivering quality healthcare services. 
Alma Ata “outlined a strategy that would respond more equitably, appropriately and effectively 
to basic health needs and also address the underlying social, economic and political causes of 
poor health” (Sanders, 2003:2). It further provided the opportunity for WHO member states to 
exchange ideas and knowledge as well as collaborate towards realising the target objective of 
“Health for All by the Year 2000”.  
2 
 
However, it appears that the time coincided with the period of attempts to fix the economic 
crises in Europe and the US. This gave way to the emergence of neoliberal ideas and the 
aggressive neoliberalism in the Western nations. Consequently, it became how foreign 
economic policy was shaped and driven. Neoliberalism became entrenched around the world, 
with an adverse effect on Nigeria specifically, and many countries in the global South. The 
effect imposed so much burden on these developing countries and the ‘palliative programmes’ 
put in place by the international financial institutions led to significant alterations in the 
healthcare system of most of the nations.  
The position of the World Bank became evident in the wake of the neoliberal ascendancy in 
the 1980s and 1990s, and it involved massive personnel and ideational changes at the Bank. 
More broadly, a combination of the adverse impact of the monetary policy in the US to rein 
in inflation – which led to a spike in the interest rate on contracted debt and balance of payment 
crisis – triggered the balance of payment crisis that forced countries to seek the IMF balance 
of payment support. The “World Bank and the IMF initiated the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) as a condition for the balance of payment support and debt relief” (Baum, 
2007:38). The conditionalities required a ‘stabilisation’ of public finance involving deep cut 
in public spending, especially social spending, and long-term liberalisation of the economy 
(privatisation, withdrawal of the state from economic activities and social provisioning – to 
be replaced by the private sector).   
The cut in social spending and retrenchment of public social provisioning triggered mass 
entitlement failure (including declining public healthcare services). The initial effort at 
introducing co-payment for healthcare services did nothing to compensate for the cut in public 
spending. It hit most citizens hard on the back of the general decline in income and rising 
poverty. The response was not to restore public expenditure and investment in healthcare but 
to press for a stratified, segmented, and segregated social policy architecture for health (see 
Fischer, 2018). Countries were encouraged/forced to introduce social (health) insurance, and 
a variety of pre-payment systems outside the top-tier (and middle-tier) social insurance 
scheme. An example of such low-tier (pre-paid) health insurance systems is the Community-
Based Health Insurance Scheme. 
However, to rationalise the ‘imposition’ of the adjustment programme, the World Bank argued 
that such adjustment was “clearly needed for long-run health gains” (World Bank, 1993:8). 
The report also argues that as the government could not provide healthcare service for the 
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entire people, the sector should be opened up to market forces whereby individuals who could 
afford to pay could get value for their money. To further entrench the neoliberal objectives, 
the concept of ‘consumer’ was used in reference to the citizen in the discussion of healthcare 
delivery (see World Bank, 1993:70; Alubo, 1985:331; McGregor, 2001). This is a very sharp 
contrast from the principles envisaged in the Alma Ata Declaration, which declared healthcare 
as a fundamental human right. Though, it is argued that the Declaration was not visionary 
enough to address environmental issues and issues of sustainability (Baum, 2007:36), the 
problems would have been easily accommodated if the Declaration was effectively put to 
work. However, it was crippled by the neoliberal forces. 
The SAPs imperilled the operations of the healthcare sector with the imposition of fiscal 
austerity, reduction in the size of the budget, significant reallocation of intra-sectoral scarce 
resources, and a significant shift in health policy (Sahn & Bernier, 1995; McGregor, 2001:2) 
due to large debt repayment. There were cases where development aids meant for health in 
the developing countries were diverted to repay national debts (Stuckler & Basu, 2009, cited 
in Ruckert et al., 2015:41). The IMF and World Bank did little to clarify the likely impact of 
the programmes (Simms et al., 2001).  
Nevertheless, we can observe significant differences among countries in terms of the 
acceptance of the imposition of neoliberalism (Tinel, 2011:119). For instance, the leadership 
and academic circles in Latin America took note of the prevailing ideas and initiated policies 
that suit their contexts based on their local realities. More so, “unlike Chile, where the military 
government introduced neoliberal market reforms, Mexico and Costa-Rica policy innovations 
in health were home-grown, affecting countries in the region and international agencies” 
(Atun et al., 2015:233). That was easier because the “multipolar global order provided policy 
space for local policymakers to manoeuvre between various policy advice, but this changed 
radically after the 1980s when the policy space shrunk remarkably, and the impulse of policy 
advice became one-dimensional and neoliberal” (Adésínà, 2009:39). Governments were 
reluctant to commercialise healthcare despite their numerous financial problems (Van der 
Geest, 1992:667). Unfortunately, most of these nations could not do much to resist the 
pressure because of the impending ‘economic doom’. 
There was a strong synergy between the WHO and IMF in entrenching the global health crisis. 
In 2000, the WHO set up the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health to examine the 
position of Health in economic development across the world. The report, submitted in 2001 
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recommended donor-financing of ‘intervention programs’ by high-income countries in the 
developing countries (WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health Report, 2001). 
According to Waitzkin (2003:1), the report shifts “emphasis from the social determinants of 
disease, such as class hierarchies, inequalities of income, ethnic origin and racism”. 
Meanwhile, it “is clear that social and economic development is entwined and the level of 
health affects both” (Baum, 2007:35). The report also focuses “on economic productivity and 
diminishes the importance of health as a fundamental human right” (Waitzkin, 2003:1). Also, 
the report seemingly reiterates the argument of Walsh and Warren (1979) that only 
intervention programmes should be donor-funded rather than comprehensive programmes that 
could solve the problems of healthcare delivery around the world. By implication, the donors 
are likely to have the most influence when designing and implementing health policies and 
programmes.    
1.1.1 Healthcare Reforms in Africa since 1980 
 
Like in other continents around the world, health sector reforms in Africa is characterised by 
extensive macroeconomic policies and the implementation of SAPs that required “control of 
public expenditure and changes in public and private sector institutional structures” (Sahn & 
Bernier, 1995:195). “The implementation of the structural adjustment programmes negatively 
impacted the health systems in Africa” (Adésínà, 2007:18). Long-standing policies favouring 
comprehensive primary healthcare and de-emphasising user fees were criticised and jettisoned 
(Gilson & Mills, 1995:216). 
According to Lambo and Sambo (2003:3):  
The adoption of the Three-Phase African Health Development Scenario in 1985 (to 
revive healthcare systems in Africa), the Harare Declaration in August 1987 (to 
strengthen the district health systems based on primary healthcare), and the Bamako 
Initiative in September 1987 (to revive primary healthcare and promote community 
participation) were the earliest attempts made to revive the health systems in Africa.  
The Bamako Initiative, promoted by the WHO and UNICEF (Barry et al., 2009:28), “served 
as a platform for the introduction of user fees and private health provision” (Asakitikpi, 
2015:193). Kainji (1989) cited in McPake et al. (1993:1385) cautioned that the introduction 
of user fees might negatively impact the entire household budget. However, Litvack and 
Bodart (1993:380) ignored the fact that the Initiative could limit access (especially for the 
poorest) and argued that the policy was essential to improve quality of care.  
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The World Bank rationalised the policy that there were indications that people will be able to 
pay based on the prevailing spending at that time (see Akin et al., 1987:31). Regarding the 
poor, the Bank suggested that charges for care should be based on the user’s place of residence 
or that voucher should be issued to the poor based on certification of poor households by local 
community leaders (Akin et al., 1987:31). A decade after the introduction, Dercon and Ruttens 
(1998:16) opined that “it would be advisable to stay away from the general introduction of 
higher charges for primary healthcare, in order not to jeopardise the future health of a large 
part of the population” who cannot pay for care. This is because of the observable adverse 
effects of the reform. Therefore, in the early 1990s, “some countries resorted to the 
establishment of Mutual Health Organisations (community-based health insurance schemes) 
with claims of the increasing availability of resources to enhance access to healthcare 
services” (Willis & Khan, 2009:1001).  
In the mid-1990s, with the coordination of WHO, the Health Sector-Wide Approaches 
(SWAPs) was adopted by many countries for effective coordination and use of various 
financial resources from donors (Walford, 2007:6). Another claim made for the Approach was 
to ensure that donors did not determine or influence the nature of health reforms. However, 
most of the health reform programmes on the continent are under the ‘coordination’ of WHO 
and some other multilateral agencies, perhaps to ensure that the implementation is within their 
desired framework.  Further, in 2000, “Health Policy for All for the 21st Century in the African 
region was formulated and adopted by WHO member states in Africa” (WHO Regional Office 
for Africa, 2000:1). The policy was based on the framework and design of the Global Health 
for All launched by the WHO in 1998 to renew commitments to the principles of the Alma 
Ata Declaration (Ajayi, 2009:18).  
Other major attempts to reform health in Africa include: 
1. The Abuja Declaration by African Union member states in 2001 “to allocate at least 
15% of national budgets to health by 2015” (WHO, 2011:1); 
2. The Addis Ababa Declaration in 2006, to strengthen the interaction between health 
services and the communities being served;  
3. The Africa Health Strategy 2007-2015, to achieve socio-economic development 
through the provision of improved health services;  
4. The Ouagadougou Declaration in 2008, to reinforce the healthcare system through 
effective governance, human resources, delivery of healthcare service, financing, 
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information systems and technologies, community ownership, partnership and 
research, and 
5. The Performance-Based Financing framework introduced in the 2000s, to improve 
health outcomes and reduce health spending and to catalyse comprehensive health 
reform (WHO Regional Office for Africa, 2006, 2018:ix; New Partnership for the 
Development of Africa, n.d.; Ridde et al., 2018).  
 
Unfortunately, all the reforms have not been able to resolve the healthcare challenges in 
Africa. I will take up a more in-depth discussion of health reform later in the next chapter 
(Literature Review).  
1.1.2 Nigerian Healthcare System: a background  
The Nigerian healthcare system has gone through a series of reform. Healthcare reform is an 
important component of nation-building and development. It is often necessitated by the need 
to solve a problem or strengthen the functioning of the health system. Berman (1995:15) 
defined it as “a sustained, purposeful, change to improve the efficiency, equity and 
effectiveness of the health sector”. It “is motivated by the need to address fundamental 
deficiencies in health systems that affect all healthcare services” (Ijeoma, 2006:136). Also, 
reforming healthcare is an iterative process involving several issues that need attention 
(Mechanic & McAlpine, 2010:155).  
However, there are different approaches to achieving health reform. According to Roberts et 
al. (2003:11):  
The broad forces driving health reform in countries around the world are rising costs in 
healthcare, rising expectations (from the government in general and from the healthcare 
system in particular), limits in governments’ capacity to pay the costs of healthcare 
(mainly among developing countries) and growing scepticism about conventional 
approaches to the health sector (i.e. calls for new organisational forms, dismay at poor 
governance and ineffective bureaucratic performance, investigations into corruption and 
inefficiency, and the questioning of old dogmas).  
For Cassels (1995:338), “the components of a health sector reform include decentralisation of 
power and resources; improving the performance of civil service; improving the function of 
national health ministries; broadening health financing options; introducing managed 
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competition; working with the private sector”. All of these are to ensure adequate access to 
healthcare services. 
Although, most of the problems addressed in healthcare reform are institutional, technical, 
and managerial; designing and implementing healthcare reform is, by and large, a political 
process (Lambo & Sambo, 2003:2; Sein, 2000:12). Also, Berman (1995:26) stressed that the 
“political dimensions of healthcare reform require attention that may be far more important 
than the specific technical issues”. Thus, consensus building among all stakeholders is very 
crucial, because successful consensus building on every component of reform process 
facilitates implementation of reform agenda, even in situation of political change (Lambo & 
Sambo, 2003). In some countries, the reforms become more complex due to the presence of a 
wide range of international partners (Sein, 2000:2). 
Saka et al. (2012:51) argued that “there is no consistently applied universal standard 
constituting health sector reform”. Instead, the reform is usually based on the performance of 
existing structures. More so, in the discussion of health sector reform, Berman and Bossert 
(2000) noted that it could involve more strategic and fundamental programmes that touch on 
a significant part of the healthcare system – or even the society at large (“big R” or big 
Reform). It can also involve reforms that address only an issue with a more limited scope of 
change (“small R” or small Reform). In essence, “the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) 
and the Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH) undertake to carry out a comprehensive health 
sector reform in order to reposition the public health sector to be more responsive to the 
healthcare needs of the public” (Eneji et al., 2013:263). 
A clear understanding of the Nigerian healthcare system must be located within the context 
of colonial, post-colonial and neoliberal discourses. Following the colonisation of Nigeria, the 
orthodox (modern) healthcare system was introduced and co-existed with the traditional 
healthcare system. Relating to the conventional healthcare system, we can trace the healthcare 
reforms in Nigeria from the various colonial development plans and national development 
plans designed for the country (Alubo, 1985). Consequently, we can conclude that there have 
been some healthcare reforms in Nigeria with various magnitudes and degrees. The healthcare 
reforms are discussed as follows: 
1.1.2.1 Colonial Reforms 
During the pre-colonial era, in areas that constitute current Nigeria, the people relied totally 
“on indigenous herbal and spiritual knowledge to resolve various health conditions” 
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(Asakitikpi, 2019:2). This was usually part of the leadership structure of the societal system, 
and the healthcare practitioners constituted part of the revered and respected people in society. 
The advent of colonialism marked the introduction of orthodox or Western medicine to the 
country; and the neglect of the traditional medicine was due to its association with evil, 
witchcraft and satanism by the European missionaries (Asakitikpi, 2019:2). 
 
Before independence, a ten-year (first) development plan (1946-1956) was introduced by the 
colonial authorities in Nigeria leading to the establishment of health schools and institutions to 
enhance healthcare delivery (Welcome, 2011:472). More precisely in the health sector, it 
focused on “training of medical personnel, extension of both curative and prevention facilities 
and greater cooperation with voluntary agencies” (Nkwam, 1988:218). As such, it included the 
provision of adequate and potable water supplies as well as other health facilities that could 
protect the people from infections as well as endemic and epidemic diseases (Dibua, 2013:57; 
Utietiang, 2015:10). It was also within this period that the University College, Ibadan (now 
University of Ibadan) was established and commenced with a Faculty of Medicine for 
personnel development in the healthcare sector. However, the plan was partly deficient because 
it was “based on the Western conception of health and illness in which the planning of health 
services was taken to be synonymous with the building of hospitals, dispensaries or medical 
schools” (Itavyar, 1987a:495). Though the plan was not designed optimally, it has its credits 
(Schram, 1971 cited in Beck, 1973:695). 
Also, the plan was hampered by limited financial resources, weak public policymaking and 
exclusion of beneficiaries (i.e. Nigerians) in the planning process (Ibietan & Ekhosuehi, 
2013:299) with negative implications for the health system. Moreover, the social services 
provided at that time were not for the benefit of the common people. This is because, “with 
the high incidence of disease and death, it became non-profitable for the colonial capitalists 
to ignore the need for a healthy skilled workforce. Thus, most of the healthcare services were 
consumed by both foreigners and indigenes in the service of colonial capitalism” (Itavyar, 
1987a:494).  
However, the plan was abruptly ended in 1951 due to the constitutional introduction of 
federalism in the territory (Ibietan & Ekhosuehi, 2013:299) and the regional governments 
launched their different health plans to cover their respective areas of jurisdiction (Anaemene, 
2016:53; Okoli, 2004 cited in Godbless et al., 2019:4). For instance, “five separate 
development plans emerged in 1955—the three Regional Development Plans, the Plan for the 
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Federal Government, and one for the Southern Cameroons which was then part of the 
Federation of Nigeria” (Ekundare, 1971:148).  
The second colonial development plan (1955-1962) laid great emphasis on training at all level, 
from specialists to laboratory assistants (Anaemene, 2016:53). A significant part of the 
administration of healthcare services was under the regional governments (Suleiman et al., 
2017:7), with most funding by the federal government. The colonial development plans 
“became necessary only when the heat of nationalism and the possibility of independence for 
the country become evident” (Ikeanyibe, 2009:200). More so, the plan did not make 
significant achievement. For Iheanacho (2014:51), it could not be regarded as a real plan 
“because it contained mainly a list of uncoordinated projects sited in various regions”. 
1.1.2.2 Post-Colonial Reforms  
As experienced during the colonial era, after independence, there was also no clear-cut 
healthcare plan or reform in Nigeria. However, some short-term healthcare reforms can be 
traced to the National Development Plans [1962-1968, 1970-1974, 1975-1980 and 1981-
1985] (Nigeria Federal Ministry of Health, 2009:19; Scott-Emuakpor, 2010:55; Anaemene, 
2016:54). The first “national development plan (1962-1968) contained the groundwork for the 
promotion of industrial development, building of hospitals in major cities, dispensaries and 
maternity homes in rural towns and villages” (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1970 cited in 
Anaemene, 2016:54). During this period, major projects were executed across many sectors 
(Iheanacho, 2014:52) including clinics, health centres and hospitals (see Okpala, 1980:161). 
The plan was, however, truncated by civil war (1967-1970). 
The second national development plan (1970-1974) improved on the first plan. According to 
Anaemene (2016:54), “the second national development plan focused in part at correcting 
some of the deficiencies of the health delivery services carried over from the first plan”. This 
period featured a rapid expansion in the modern health facilities with an increased level of 
utilisation among the people (Orubuloye & Oni, 1996:302), though, there were still areas 
requiring improvement (Lambo, 1982:119; Scott-Emuakpor, 2010:60). 
The Basic Health Services Scheme (BHSS) was introduced through the third national 
development plan (1975-1980). “The plan was developed based on the insights drawn from the 
performance assessments of the first and second national development plans” (Adésínà, 
2012:294). Its goals included the construction of new hospitals, and expansion of existing ones, 
training of more health personnel and establishment of pharmaceutical and drug manufacturing 
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laboratories (Lambo, 1982:120). According to Omuta et al. (2014:23), some of the goals of the 
programme also “included increasing the proportion of the citizenry receiving healthcare from 
25 per cent to 60 per cent, initiating the provision of adequate and effective health facilities for 
all Nigerians and correcting the imbalance in the distribution and location of health facilities”. 
Asakitipi (2016:32) argued that the “first two decades after independence witnessed the relative 
functioning of public health centres in terms of the provision of essential drugs and access to 
qualified medical officers”. For instance, during this period in public hospitals, there were free 
medical services for all and hospitalised patients were provided with meals (Alubo, 2001:314; 
Asakitikpi, 2019:7). Also, “between 1960 and 1980, hospital beds per 1,000 persons increased 
from 0.42 to 6.4; and there was a gradual drop in the incidents of infant and under-five 
mortality” (Adésínà, 2012:304).  
 
Further, “the fourth national development plan (1981-1985) focused on the preventive health 
services and called for the establishment of a three-level healthcare service [i.e. 
comprehensive health centres – to serve the communities of above 20,000 persons; primary 
health centres – to serve communities of 5,000 to 20,000 persons; health clinics – to serve 
2,000 to 5,000 persons]” (Scott-Emuakpor, 2010:56). As comprehensive as the policy 
appeared to be, unfortunately, the government was not able to implement it effectively because 
it was the period of economic crisis, and when SAPs were imposed on the country (among 
other developing nations around the world). As noted earlier, generally, spending on 
healthcare reduced and campaign for privatisation and monetisation became intense. This led 
to the stoppage of free healthcare and the introduction of user-fees. For Adésínà (2012:286), 
“1980-1985 was a period of policy transition while post-1985 prompted a process of 
institutional decay and erosion of social trust”. The incidence compelled the government to 
reduce health spending and paved the way for private health investors to provide healthcare 
services in the country. In specific terms, the third and fourth development plans were faced 
with the challenge of funding (Ikeanyibe, 2009:201). 
1.1.2.3 1988 National Health Policy and Strategy to Achieve Health for All  
“The National Health Policy and Strategy to Achieve Health for All Nigerians promulgated in 
1988 was the first comprehensive national health policy (NHP) in Nigeria” (Nigeria Federal 
Ministry of Health, 2004). This featured the launch of primary healthcare plan premised on the 
values of the Alma Ata declaration. For effective implementation, “the National Primary 
Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA) was set up in 1992 to extend healthcare delivery 
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services to the rural areas” (Omuta et al., 2014:25). However, the policy suffered “major 
infrastructural and personnel deficit as well as public health management” (Welcome, 
2011:473).  
1.1.2.4 2004 National Health Policy  
In 2004, “the national health policy of 1988 was revised” (Okafor, 2016:3). The policy was 
mainly based on the outcome of “a 1995 National Health Summit of experts, leaders, 
policymakers, healthcare providers and planners, administrators and many other stakeholders 
(local and international) convened to examine the factors that have militated against the 
improvement in Nigeria’s health status” (Nigeria Federal Ministry of Health, 2004:2). A series 
of review followed this, and the policy document was endorsed and released in 2004. The 
document gave attention to “HIV/AIDS, malaria, immunisation, reproductive health, health 
management information system, population, traditional medicine etc.” (Nigeria Federal 
Ministry of Health, 2004: iii). Despite the health objectives contained in the policy and 
initiatives, “efforts at health system strengthening have not had the desired effect, resulting in 
limited healthcare coverage and persistently poor health status of the population” (Nigeria 
Federal Ministry of Health, 2018:1).  
To further improve the healthcare system, health reform was made as one of the social sector 
reforms of the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) 
launched in 2004 (Suleiman et al., 2017:10; Ajala & Alonge, 2009:45; Anaemene, 2016:57). 
Broadly, the strategy aimed to “empower the people, promote private enterprise and change 
the way government does it works but the focus was limited to HIV/AIDS, malaria, 
tuberculosis and reproductive health in the healthcare sector” (Nigeria National Planning 
Commission, 2004:x). Thus, “it did not make a significant impact on the health and standard 
of living of the majority of the people” (Bambale, 2011:15). Generally, the health policy did 
not record a significant achievement, and therefore in 2016, the 2004 national health policy 
was revised. 
1.1.2.5 2016 National Health Policy 
The national health policy of 2016 emerged as a revised version of the 2004 national health 
policy. With a period over a decade (between the two policies), most of the challenges of the 
Nigerian healthcare system documented in the 2004 national health policy (and promised to be 
tackled) are clearly highlighted in the national health policy of 2016, unresolved and perhaps, 
getting worse. In clear terms, the federal government noted that the new policy was necessitated 
by indicators such as “weak healthcare system, the almost total absence of financial risk 
protection, inequity in access to services, weak governance, low confidence of consumers in 
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services provided (especially in public health facilities), lack of proper coordination between 
public and private sectors, poor referral systems etc.” (Nigeria Federal Ministry of Health, 
2016: xiv). Hence, the “policy was introduced to strengthen Nigeria’s health system, 
particularly the primary healthcare sub-system, to deliver effective and comprehensive 
healthcare services to all Nigerians” (Nigeria Federal Ministry of Health, 2016: xiv). 
Essentially, other significant attempts towards health reform in Nigeria include the National 
Health Insurance Scheme Decree (1999), Health Sector Reform Plan (2004-2007), and the 
First National Strategic Health Development Plan Framework [2010-2015] (Welcome, 2011; 
Nigeria Federal Ministry of Health, 2009; Ugal, 2013:4; National Bureau of Statistics, 2015). 
Also, in 2014, the National Health Act was enacted. The “Act (2014) is the first legislative 
framework for the health system, though, it has not properly addressed the gaps in the 
constitution” (Nigeria Federal Ministry of Health, 2016:12). More so, “the basic health care 
provision fund [BHCPF], mandated by the National Health Act of 2014, is meant to provide 
the needed financing so that all Nigerians may access a Basic Minimum Package of Health 
Services [BMPHS]” (Hafez, 2018: ix). This was recently set-up by the government. Put 
together, these strategies and plans are yet to bring about a significant transformation in the 
health sector.  
1.1.3 Health Insurance in Nigeria: an insight 
Health insurance has been under consideration in Nigeria for some time before it was finally 
implemented. The initial effort at introducing NHIS was in 1962, but the effort was not 
followed through (Awosika, 2005:42; Nnamuchi, 2009; Onyedibe et al., 2012:5). However, 
in 1984, the federal government constituted a committee to work on an alternative method of 
health financing, and it recommended the introduction of health insurance (Itavyar, 
1987b:310; Ibiwoye & Adeleke, 2008:220). Indeed, the adoption of health insurance in 
Nigeria is a result of the structural adjustment programme that severely retrenched public 
funding of healthcare. In the 1970s, healthcare was funded through the fiscus. “Per capita 
health expenditure increased from US$18.4 in 1975 to US$61.3 in 1981, but by 2004 it had 
declined to US$1.42” (Scott-Emuakpor 2010:59). There was no indication that healthcare cost 
was considered unsustainable in 1981. The critical question has always been: if Nigeria could 
afford universal access to healthcare in the 1970s, why is it a major problem in the 21st century 
when Nigeria is a far richer country than in the 1970s?  
The formulation of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) commenced in 1993. 
Eventually, the Federal Government established it in 1999, and it became operational in 2005 
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(Nnamuchi, 2009). As opposed to the tax-funded health system, the NHIS programme 
requires the policyholders to pay premiums (with co-contributions from employers for those 
in the formal sector). The claim made is that the programme was implemented to deliver 
affordable healthcare services to all Nigerians (formal and informal sectors) through various 
prepayment schemes.  
However, the programmes developed for different segments of people in the society have been 
ineffective in solving the problems of accessing quality healthcare and catastrophic health 
expenditure (Fonta et al., 2010:122; Welcome, 2011:473; Olakunde, 2012:6; Chubike, 
2013:357; Bamidele & Awobimpe, 2013:2; Asakitipi, 2016:30; Ezeama, 2016:17; Edeh & 
Udoikah, 2017:2384). The Nigerian NHIS has not covered up to 5% of the population since its 
establishment, and rural dwellers are yet to benefit from the scheme (Ejughemre et al., 2015:6; 
Oreh, 2017:160; Nigeria Federal Ministry of Health, 2018:37; Ibrahim, 2018). The relative 
success recorded is among federal government employees. However, “some enrolled federal 
government workers have not begun to pay their employee contributions to health insurance” 
(Nigeria Federal Ministry of Health, 2016:16). Also, many state governments are yet to enrol 
into the scheme, and over 70% of Nigerians are in the informal sector (PharmAccess 
Foundation, 2015a:19; Ejughemre et al., 2015:7; Hafez, 2018: ix). The NHIS makes no explicit 
provision for Nigerians in abject poverty – who cannot raise fund for feeding much less for 
healthcare. Among the enrollees, there are complaints about double deduction from 
government-employed couples and those without children complain about over-deduction 
because they do not have children to fully utilise the package (Nnamuchi, 2009:18).  
Due to the slow pace of coverage by the NHIS and efforts to achieve universal coverage, “the 
Community-Based Health Insurance Scheme (CBHIS) was introduced under the NHIS in 
2010” (Dutta & Hangoro, 2013:1). The CBHIS is designed for providing basic healthcare 
services, particularly, among the rural dwellers and those in the informal sector. It is designed 
as “a non-profit programme for a cohesive group of households/individuals or occupation-
based groups, formed based on the ethics of mutual aid and the collective pooling of health 
risks, in which members take part in its management” (Nigeria NHIS, 2018).  
However, before the NHIS implemented its CBHI policy in 2010 (Dutta & Hangoro, 2013:1), 
the Kwara State Community-Based Health Insurance Scheme became operational in 2007, as 
a joint project of the Kwara State Government and the Dutch Health Insurance Fund through 
the PharmAccess Foundation (in the Netherlands), and Nigerian-based health maintenance 
14 
 
organisation, Hygeia Nigeria Limited. It is claimed that the partnership was to implement a 
donor-subsidised health insurance scheme to bridge the gap between rural and urban dwellers. 
The initial agreement expired in 2013, and a new agreement was signed to span 2014 and 
2018. The Kwara State government was lauded for the effort and received various awards for 
the programme: OECD Finalist Award, Saving Lives at Birth Award, FT/IFC 
Transformational Business Award etc. It was also recognised by the World Economic Forum 
(WEF) as an effective model for improving access to healthcare (PharmAccess Group, 
2016:9). However, in less than a decade of existence, the programme has come to a halt. 
Therefore, this study seeks to examine the factors behind the collapse of the community-based 
health insurance programme in Kwara State, Nigeria.   
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The current promotion of CBHI as an effective and appropriate healthcare financing strategy 
to be adopted across Nigeria requires a critical view. The Kwara CBHI is one of the first in 
Nigeria. At inception, the programme seemed to be thriving with the provision and extension 
of healthcare services in the rural communities. However, at some points, the programme 
faced challenges that threatened its sustainability and growth. Adenusi (2011) identifies 
inadequate enrolment, inability to pay the premium by enrollees, and insufficient healthcare 
providers and quality of service as problems of the programme. Also, there are problems of 
affordability and substandard healthcare facilities (Opowoye, 2014). Specifically, Christian 
Aid (2015) raises concern on the sustainability of Kwara CBHI as a donor co-funded 
programme. This is because of the common trend in donor-funded programmes (which are 
North to South aids) where the donors stop contributing after some time with the expectation 
that the local partner will continue to finance the programme.  
Also, enrolment into the programme stopped in December 2015, and the enrollees enjoyed 
the services till the end of 2016. This incidence has seemingly left the enrollees in considerable 
despair in terms of access to affordable healthcare services. More than 70% (30 healthcare 
centres) of the programme facilities were established between 2014 and 2015, which is an 
indication of expansion. However, the expansion seems to have been in the period that the 
state political leaders were campaigning for re-election. McConnell (2010:350) noted that the 
“choices of government (including the timing of decisions and the symbolism of particular 
action or inaction) have consequences for the reputation and electoral prospects of politicians 
and their capacity to manage political agendas”.  
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Between 2007 and 2016, the programme had enrolled about 140,000 people, and the state 
government provided a part funding of 1.1 billion Naira for the programme (Ahmed, 2018). 
Meanwhile, in 2014, the partners (implementing the programme) renewed their agreement 
which places more financial responsibility on the government. For instance, the government 
was required to contribute 60% of the premium subsidy for 2014, 70% for 2015 and 80 % 
from 2016 to 2018 – approximately 7 billion Naira for the 5-year health plan (see Framework 
Agreement on Kwara State Community Health Insurance Programme, 2014). Recently, the 
state government launched the Kwara State Health Insurance Scheme (KSHIS) with claims 
of ‘replacing’ the CBHI with a state-wide programme (Ahmed, 2018). The new KSHIS 
involves a multilateral partnership of the state government, the federal government, the Dutch 
government and the World Bank. Though it is claimed that the scheme will cover all residents 
in the state, but the experience with the CBHI programme seems to raise concerns about the 
new programme to attend to the healthcare requirements of the people effectively. 
Unfortunately, the considerable investment in the Kwara CBHI programme is not 
commensurate with the outcome. Also, worrisome is the low enrolment figure for nine years 
(2007-2016), which was 139,713 – an average of 15,524 persons per year. Thus, the coverage 
was 4.41% of the state population (estimated at 3,166,513 by the National Bureau of Statistics 
at the end of 2016) when the programme was terminated. This implies that at that pace, it 
would take a very long time (203.9 years) to attain universal coverage in Kwara through CBHI 
even if it is still operational.  
Most of the studies on Kwara CBHI are filled with optimism about the efficiency of the 
programme (see Babatunde et al., 2011; Hendriks et al., 2013; Akande, 2015; Odusola et al., 
2016; Brals et al., 2017). Though, some of the studies identify areas in need of improvement, 
only a few (see Adenusi, 2011; Opowoye, 2014; Christian Aid, 2015) gave adequate attention 
to identifying the challenges capable of impeding its service delivery. Since the collapse of 
the programme, no conscious attempt has been made to investigate the reasons for the sudden 
stoppage of healthcare service delivery. There are many lessons to learn from policy failures 
as are from policy successes. Hence, this study seeks to explain the collapse of CBHI in Kwara 
State Nigeria, essentially, from a political-economic perspective not only for understanding 




1.3 Research Objectives 
The main objective of the study is to examine the collapse of Community-Based Health 
Insurance in Kwara State, Nigeria. The specific objectives are:  
(i) To explore the perceptions of members of the communities about the CBHI programme 
in Kwara State Nigeria. 
(ii) To examine the various elements (actors, content, context and process) that influenced 
the design and implementation of the CBHI programme in Kwara State Nigeria. 
(iii) To assess the funding mechanisms of the CBHI programme in Kwara State Nigeria. 
(iv) To identify the factors that led to the collapse or stoppage of the CBHI programme in 
Kwara State Nigeria.   
1.4 Research Questions 
(i) What are the perceptions of the community members about the CBHI programme in 
Kwara State Nigeria? 
(ii) What are the various elements (actors, content, context and process) that influenced the 
design and implementation of the CBHI programme in Kwara State Nigeria? 
(iii) What were the funding mechanisms of the CBHI programme in Kwara State Nigeria? 
(iv) What are the factors that led to the collapse or stoppage of the CBHI programme in 
Kwara State Nigeria? 
1.5 Limitation of the Study 
The study covered 11 communities (out of the 43 communities where the programme was 
operational) sampled across the three (3) geopolitical zones in the State. The researcher did 
not cover the whole population because of time and financial constraints. However, the 
methodology (i.e. mixed-methods) choice is towards making the findings representative of 
the entire population. This would be discussed further in the methodology chapter (Chapter 
4) of the thesis. 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
There have been contributions to the literature on CBHI in Nigeria. However, this kind of study 
is rare in Nigeria and has not been carried out in Kwara State. Accordingly, this study 
contributes to the literature and existing debate on CBHI programme in the developing 
17 
 
countries and Nigeria in particular. While most available studies appear to focus on ‘success’ 
and sustainability issues, this study fills the gap in knowledge regarding the failure of CBHI 
programme. In specific terms, it broadens understanding about the failure of CBHI in Kwara 
State.  
At the level of policy, this study drives the consciousness of policymakers towards issues that 
are left out of the debate with a view to identifying and adopting a more effective health 
financing strategy. The study also assists policymakers and other stakeholders (e.g. academia) 
in policy planning and implementation. Also, most of the studies on CBHI are carried out using 
solely quantitative or qualitative method. However, the researcher adopts a mixed-method 
approach in carrying out this study.  
1.7 Chapter Outline 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The chapter provides a general background to the study. It also discusses the healthcare 
reforms in Africa since 1980. It further traces reforms in the Nigerian health sector from the 
colonial period to date and gives an insight into the emergence of health insurance in Nigeria. 
Essentially, the implementation of health insurance in Nigeria was due to the cut in public 
spending on social services. Besides, the chapter contains a statement of the problem, research 
objectives, research questions, limitation of the study, the significance of the study and chapter 
outline. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The chapter examines the main health financing mechanisms that have been adopted around 
the world over the years to understand the emergence of the CBHI policy option. It also 
critically reviews the healthcare reform process and healthcare financing strategies in Nigeria. 
The review reveals that there is poor coordination in the healthcare policy space in Nigeria 
with the possibility of veering from the fundamental policy objectives due to external 
interference. Further, it presents a critical analysis of the CBHI programme in Nigeria as well 
as the Ghanaian and Rwandan CBHI Experiences.  
Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework 
The chapter contains the conceptual framework adopted in the study. The Walt and Gilson 
(1994) health policy triangle helps to examine health policies in developing countries. The 
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framework argues that to understand a health policy better, there is a need to critically examine 
the policy content, context, process and actors. 
Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
This chapter discusses the methodology adopted for the study and the theoretical 
underpinnings behind the mixed-methods approach used in the study. Specifically, the chapter 
details the main research paradigms and locates this study within the mixed-methods 
approach. Further, it describes the sampling techniques, the research site, instruments 
employed for data collection and how the data were collected. Again, it addressed the validity 
and reliability concerns in the study. Likewise, the chapter details the quantitative and 
qualitative data analysis techniques. It further includes the ethical considerations, reflexivity 
and fieldwork challenges encountered by the researcher. 
Chapter 5: Design and Implementation of the CBHI Programme  
This chapter focuses mostly on the technical issues in the design and implementation of the 
programme. It commences with the examination of the healthcare situation in rural Kwara 
before the introduction of the programme. It also discusses the design of the CBHI programme 
detailing the healthcare benefits package offered. The chapter further examines the roles of 
the main actors in the implementation of the programme. The main actors were the Kwara 
State Government, the PharmAccess Foundation and the Hygeia Nigeria Limited. Also, it 
explores the process of implementation of the programme. This includes piloting and 
provision of healthcare facilities, sensitisation and enrolment into the programme, expansion 
into communities, engagement of healthcare providers, capacity building for healthcare 
workers, monitoring and evaluation of the programme as well as decision-making. Finally, it 
discusses the main achievements of the CBHI programme in rural Kwara. 
Chapter 6: Perceptions and Experiences of Community Members about the CBHI 
Programme 
The chapter reflects on the perceptions and experiences of the community members about the 
CBHI programme in Kwara State Nigeria. It examines the level of awareness among the 
people about the programme. Specifically, the majority of the people became aware of it 
through family and friends. The community leaders were also enjoined to endorse the 
programme and encourage their people to enrol. This approach enhanced the interest and trust 
of the people in the programme. Besides, the chapter discusses enrolment in the programme 
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detailing the reasons for enrolment and non-enrolment in the programme. It also examines 
how the non-enrollees catered for their healthcare needs when the programme was operational. 
Further, it discusses the delivery of healthcare services under the programme by analysing the 
conduct of the healthcare providers, quality of care, a combination of alternative/traditional 
care and CBHI care, as well as knowledge of the CBHI health benefits package among the 
former enrollees. Though there were complaints, most of the former-enrollees in the study 
were satisfied with the conduct of the healthcare providers and the quality of service. 
Chapter 7:  Funding Mechanisms of the CBHI Programme in Kwara State  
This chapter focuses on the funding strategies adopted for the implementation of the 
programme. Notably, it examines the sources of fund for the programme, affordability of the 
enrolment premium and capacity of government to provide free healthcare services. The 
primary sources of fund for the programme were contributions by the partners (i.e. the Kwara 
State Government and the Dutch Health Insurance Fund) and the premiums paid by the 
enrollees. On affordability, the study found that the majority of the community members could 
not afford the enrolment premium. Further, the majority of the respondents noted that the 
government has the capacity to provide free healthcare for the people. 
Chapter 8: Stoppage of the CBHI Programme in Kwara State Nigeria 
The chapter focuses on the stoppage of the CBHI programme in Kwara State. It examines the 
challenges and moral issues in the programme as it relates to the roles of the state government, 
the health maintenance organisation and the healthcare providers. The challenges include 
stock-out of drugs, reduction in health benefits, inadequate enrolment coverage, low 
capitation, clash of interest between the health maintenance organisation and the healthcare 
providers, long waiting period, preference for non-enrollees, foray of healthcare providers in 
enrolment exercise and abuse of care by the former enrollees. Though the stoppage stemmed 
from these challenges, the chapter further traces the main reasons behind the collapse of the 
programme, namely: non-payment of counterpart fund by the state government and poor 
management. Finally, the chapter examines the healthcare situation in the rural communities 
in the post-CBHI period. 
Chapter 9: Politics of Healthcare Reform: A Case of the CBHI in Kwara State Nigeria 
This chapter discusses the power relations around the introduction and implementation of the 
programme. Notably, it explores how the CBHI policy was offered to the Kwara State 
Government, the alliances between the foreign partners and local actors and how the policy 
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was accepted for implementation in the State. Also, the chapter shows that the policy space 
was dominated by the international partner at the stages of design and implementation. 
Further, the chapter reveals that, to an extent, the stoppage of the programme influenced the 
outcome of the 2019 general elections in the State, particularly in the study communities – 
with the loss of power by the then ruling party. Lastly, the chapter argues for a need to 
repurpose the role of the State (i.e. government) to attain universal health coverage. 
Chapter 10: Conclusion  
This chapter summarises the major findings from the study. In addition, it offers policy 
recommendations and concludes with suggestions for future research. 
1.8 Conclusion 
The chapter provided a detailed introduction to the study. It explained how neoliberalism crept 
into the policy space in the developing countries, especially as it affected the healthcare sector. 
In addition, the chapter examined the healthcare reforms in Africa since 1980 and the 
healthcare reforms in Nigeria from colonial era to date. It also gave an insight into the 
emergence of health insurance in Nigeria. Further, the chapter covered statement of the 
problem, research objectives, research questions, limitation of the study and the significance 







Healthcare financing appears as a major challenge for many developing countries in Africa and 
Asia. Community-based health insurance which is being advanced as an effective model for 
financing healthcare, has generated a series of debate regarding its efficiency in improving 
access to healthcare and achieving universal health coverage. To understand how CBHI 
became a health policy option in Nigeria, this chapter analysed the main health reform models 
that have been adopted across the world over time, the process of healthcare reform in Nigeria 
and healthcare financing in Nigeria. More so, the review paid attention to the neoliberal forces 
behind the various health reform programmes in Nigeria. Also, this chapter examines CBHI as 
a policy with a critical look at the experiences of Nigeria, Ghana and Rwanda.  
2.2 Healthcare Financing Reform 
The main “objectives of the healthcare system are to enhance the quality of care, health 
outcomes, equity in access as well as to contain costs” (Or et al., 2010:271). Specifically, the 
core functions of the healthcare system are stewardship, resource generation, service provision 
and financing (WHO 2000 cited in Cuadrado et al., 2019). Different countries embark on 
healthcare reforms at various points in time to achieve these functions. As noted in Chapter 1, 
healthcare reform became necessary in the LMICs, especially in Africa in the 1980s as a result 
of the SAPs that necessitated a cut in social spending. Meanwhile, the focus was more on 
financing reform – leading to consideration of introducing prepayment and risk-pooling 
mechanisms, among other options – because it is crucial to the overall success of any reform.  
Healthcare financing refers “to the mechanisms used for raising the money that pays for the 
activities in the health sector, including taxes, insurance, and direct payments by the patients” 
(Blas, 2005:11). Also, Obansa & Omisan (2013:230) defined it as the “collection of funds from 
various sources (e.g. government, households, businesses, and donors), pooling them to share 
financial risk across larger population groups and using them to pay for services from public 
and private healthcare providers”. Basically, health financing reform is the strategy adopted for 
sourcing and allocating fund for the healthcare sector. More so, the nature of health financing 
in a country determines the quality of care and behaviour of different stakeholders in the 
healthcare system (Essien et al., 2014:10572). 
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There are different models of healthcare financing reform that have been adopted over time 
towards achieving the objectives of the healthcare system. Essentially, the main differences in 
the various models relate to “how benefits are assigned, how providers are organised, and how 
services are purchased and paid” (Giedion et al., 2013:2). While they are numerous, 
historically, the main models of healthcare financing reforms across countries are social health 
insurance model, tax-based health insurance model, private health insurance model, national 
health insurance, and the out-of-pocket model (Magnussen et al., 2009:9; Reid, 2009 cited in 
Batalden, 2018; Shimazaki, 2013; Lopez-Casasnovas et al., 2015). Though the classification 
may not be perfect, it assists with a better understanding of various financing options that have 
been adopted over the years. As such, the models are further categorised as private mechanisms 
[private insurance and direct out-of-pocket payments] and public mechanisms [tax-funding, 
national and social health insurance] (Beattie et al., 2016:15; WHO 2019:3).  
More so, there may be variation in their implementation from one country to the other. This is 
because the suitability of each model or mechanism is based on the context of each country 
(KPMG International, 2017:16; van der Zee & Kroneman, 2007:1) and in some cases, features 
from different models are combined to come up with a new desired model. For instance, 
Thailand finances the healthcare of those in the formal sector through statutory health insurance 
and those in the informal sector are covered from general taxation (Beattie et al., 2016:35; 
Witter et al., 2017:7). Further, Mathauer et al. (2019:3) noted that “prepayment systems of 
healthcare financing can be broadly distinguished along with institutional design aspects of 
pooling arrangement: nature of pooling (compulsory/automatic versus voluntary) and the 
structure of pooling (single versus multiple pools)”. They added that “these two key design 
aspects determine the redistributive capacity of those funds to support access to needed services 
with financial protection, and they have important implications for efficiency”. The main 
models are, therefore considered as follows:  
2.2.1 Social Health Insurance Model 
The Social Health Insurance System (SHI) started in Germany in 1883 by Otto von Bismarck 
to offer healthcare services to the citizens through insurance and co-paid by employers and 
employees based on payroll deductions (Batalden, 2018). It emerged from various sickness 
funds that were already existing, in the wake of rapid industrialisation. This model of the 
healthcare system was implemented to improve the well-being of the people in the area of 
healthcare. The earliest beneficiaries were employees at railways, power plants, metal works, 
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shipyards, etc., and it was extended gradually towards covering the entire population (Bump, 
2015:32; Merrill, 1994:171). Enrolment is mandatory and often employment-based.  
 
The Bismarck system provides healthcare to all citizens, and the government acts as a regulator 
(Choi et al., 2016:432). Precisely, the state is responsible for those who are not in employment, 
the homeless and the immigrants through general revenues (Savage et al., 2011:27; Gaeta et 
al., 2017:114). The core principles of the SHI-type healthcare systems are “plurality, liberty 
and solidarity” (Fredriksson et al., 2018:2) which allow the users to choose providers and also 
grant the provider the right to practice as they wish, to some extent. Other countries that have 
adopted this model in various forms include The Netherlands, France, Japan, Belgium, 
Indonesia, Nigeria, etc.  
 
The supporters of this model claimed that it offers a variety of providers and an abundance of 
choice to the users (see Or et al., 2010:270). Also, the nature of pooling is compulsory, and it 
makes the overall risk profile of the population to have financial sustainability (Mathauer et 
al., 2019:3).  Additionally, it has less dependence on budgetary allocation for healthcare, and 
it is highly redistributive among participants (Gottret & Schieber, 2006:87). However, 
opponents of the model maintained that it fails to control cost [with negative consequences on 
equitable access] (Or et al., 2010:270: Razum & Va’zquez, 2017:959) and selective purchasing 
(Savage et al., 2011:29). Also, “introducing SHI in economies in which most of the population 
is in the informal sector runs the great risk of widening existing disparities in access to care 
and financial protection” (Kutzin et al., 2009:549). The fact that it is mainly employment-based 
shows the tendency of relative exclusion of those in the informal sector – partly due to the 
sustainability challenge.  
 
For instance, recent reforms in Germany have shifted the costs to users through “user-fees or 
co-payments although the fees are lowered or exempted for those with chronic illnesses, low-
income earners and citizens under 18 years” (Savage et al., 2011:28). While coverage of those 
without employment or income may not be a major problem in the developed nations, it 
constitutes a significant source of concern in the LMICs. Beyond the situation where some 
countries (e.g. Nigeria) are yet to cover the formal sector – after many years of implementation; 
in the LMICs, SHI tends to focus resources on those in the formal sector – that are economically 




2.2.2 Tax-Based Health Insurance Model  
The tax-based health insurance refers to a system where “public sector, including the central 
and local governments, directly provides medical services financed through taxation” 
(Shimazaki, 2013). Put differently, Savedoff (2004:3) defined it as a system “in which more 
than half of public expenditure is financed through revenues other than earmarked payroll 
taxes, and in which access to publicly-financed services is, at least formally, open to all 
citizens”. This model originated in the United Kingdom and known as the Beveridge model. It 
was named after William Beveridge whose report formed the basis for implementing the policy 
in 1942. It emerged from the agitation of the trade union for a better social protection system 
since industrialisation could generate the needed financial resources (Bump, 2015:34).  
 
In the Beveridge model, the government has the responsibility to provide and finance 
healthcare from the state’s budget through general taxation (Batalden, 2018). The model, also 
known as National Health System (NHS), is not based on profit-motivation, and the 
government provides coverage to those who are not in employment (Gaeta et al., 2017:114). 
In other words, it is a system whereby the government provides healthcare coverage for all 
citizens and financed through tax payments (Choi et al., 2016:432). The government has 
greater regulatory power in the sector. The core principles common in these countries are 
“universality and plurality” (Fredriksson et al., 2018:2). The model has been implemented in 
other countries like Cuba, New Zealand, Denmark, Finland, Ireland etc.  
 
Its promoters argued that it ensures equitable access and minimises cost, adverse selection and 
cost-shifting by the insurers and the providers (Or et al., 2010:270). Additionally, it appears 
more progressive because payment is based on income (Magnussen et al., 2009:9) and funds 
are generated from other revenue sources from virtually all the citizens through value-added 
taxes, import duties etc. (Savedoff, 2004:3). However, the system has been criticised that it 
offers a limited choice for patients and long waiting times (Or et al., 2010:269). Also, the 
effective implementation of this model in the LMICs will be difficult because general 
government revenues are crucial for attaining universal health coverage (Kutzin, 2012:867). 
Meanwhile, most of the people in these nations are in the informal sector.  
2.2.3 Private Health Insurance Model 
Private Health Insurance (PHI) model is a profit-oriented model that is often linked to the 
formal sector and offered by multiple insurers that compete for clients (Mathauer et al., 
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2019:8). The healthcare providers fix premium based on their assessment of the risk level 
(Asomani, 2014:4). In PHI, health insurance coverage may be purchased from commercial 
insurance firms; not-for-profit or community insurance entities; and voluntary self-employed 
insurance fund (WHO, 2019:4). The prominent features of this model are private ownership of 
health sector inputs, voluntary, competitive and employer-based or individual purchase 
(Gottret & Schieber, 2006:104; Schieber et al., 2006:226). PHI is exemplified by the USA 
where apart from the Medicare scheme for the elderly (based on social insurance model) and 
the Medicaid scheme for the poor (funded by taxes), healthcare financing is left to the private 
sector (Shimazaki, 2013).  
PHI is common and often co-exists with other models such as the tax-funded healthcare system 
in some countries. Though operated in different ways, PHI is allowed as an additional financing 
mechanism in countries such as the UK and Canada (Gillies, 2003:57) and many other 
countries. The model provides good benefits and protection for those who can afford it, 
especially if it can exclude individuals with high risks (Kutzin, 2013:606). It also diversifies 
the risk of medical expenses through private insurers (Shimazaki, 2013). Further, it allows 
individuals to opt for elective services at their convenience (Gillies, 2003:57) and boycott 
possible delay that is common with the public health system.  
In contrast, the model has a common challenge of adverse selection which tends to exclude 
individuals with high risk. This has implication for equity because the excluded individuals 
may experience inadequate access and high cost of care etc. (Gottret & Schieber, 2006:107). 
More so, due to competition, premiums are based on illness or relative risk rather than income 
or ability to pay (Evans, 2002:37). Though it exists on a small scale in some LMICs, including 
Nigeria, it appears not suitable for them because of the level of poverty in the countries.  
It is also partly in conflict with the overall objectives of UHC because it provides access to few 
fractions of the population at the expense of others (Kutzin, 2013:606; Beattie et al., 2016:35). 
For instance, PHI accounted for over 20% of the healthcare spending in the Bahamas, Brazil, 
Namibia and Botswana in 2016 (WHO, 2018 cited in Mathauer et al., 2019:8-9). Also, “40% 
of total health spending in South Africa is to the benefit of 16% of the population through 
employment-based medical cover” (Kutzin, 2013:606). Also, it becomes a duplication in 




2.2.4 National Health Insurance (NHI) 
In this model (also known as a single-payer model), services are mostly delivered by private 
healthcare facilities and a government-run insurance agency regulates and facilitates the 
collection of funds and payment of bills (Lopez-Casasnovas et al., 2015:153; Batalden, 2018). 
With compulsory or automatic coverage, healthcare services are financed using a single 
national pool by the government through income or general revenues (Econex, 2011:2; Choi et 
al., 2016:433; Mathauer et al., 2019:5). Therefore, entitlement to healthcare services is not 
dependent on citizen’s capacity to contribute (Cuadrado et al., 2019). Countries such as 
Canada, Australia and Turkey have implemented this model. Among the LMICs, Indonesia has 
implemented a single-payer system to provide some services for its large population in the 
informal sector (Beattie et al., 2016:36).  
 
The NHI depends mainly on state participation and regulation (Cuadrado et al., 2019). 
Mathauer et al. (2019:5) explained that the pooling arrangement might take two forms: (i) the 
health ministry pools the fund into the healthcare budget and then allocates to the healthcare 
providers (HCPs) who are to provide equitable access to all with not clear purchaser-provider 
split – examples are Malta and Swaziland; (ii) a separate pooling and purchasing agency 
manages the single national fund with purchaser-provider split – examples of this are Costa 
Rica, Mongolia and Estonia.  
 
Supporters of this model argued that it offers efficiency in ensuring maximum capacity for 
cross-subsidisation towards providing coverage for all with some support from the rich (Beattie 
et al., 2016:35; Mathauer et al., 2019:4). Also, it offers universal coverage of the population – 
right from the start – and a simplified mode of governance with potential for administrative 
efficiency (Gottret & Schieber, 2006:76-78; Econex, 2011:3). However, the model has been 
linked with challenges of cost containment and a long waiting period (Savage et al., 2011:24). 
For example, some services are unavailable in the Canadian NHI culminating in extra costs 
and less satisfaction (Econex, 2011:7). Nevertheless, these could be resolved as the healthcare 
system expands and grows. For this model to be effective in the LMICs, the government must 
have an ideational commitment and also institute plans to raise sufficient fund for healthcare 




2.2.5 Out-of-Pocket Model 
Out-of-pocket (OOP) refers to the “payments made by users for healthcare services at the point 
of use” (Witter et al., 2017:6). The OOP model requires each user or citizen to “pay for the 
medical/health services and products they receive out of their savings [pockets]” (Choi et al., 
2016:433). According to Gilson and McIntyre (2005:762), “OOP payments (which include 
user fees at public sector facilities) are more regressive than any other method of financing 
health care, capturing a higher proportion of income among poor households than wealthier 
ones”. It places the burden of payment on the individual who seeks healthcare service, at the 
point of need (McIyntre, 2012:4). The out-of-pocket (OOP) model according to Batalden 
(2018), exists in countries that do not have an organised system of paying and providing 
healthcare services, where individuals pay for most or all of their healthcare. It appears that no 
country consciously adopts this model of health financing. Still, it emanates from a weak 
healthcare financing system, leaving citizens with no other option than paying out-of-pocket to 
access healthcare.  
Since the imposition of SAPs, this system of health financing is common in the LMICs such 
as India, Nigeria - where the healthcare systems are not viable enough to protect the majority 
of the people. This is because those who cannot afford to enrol in prepaid schemes or where 
the needed care of enrollees are not covered, they have to pay OOP to access healthcare services 
(Gottret & Schieber, 2006:92). In other words, “in systems where there is no universal 
coverage, the portion of the population that is uncovered or only partially covered has to pay 
out-of-pocket for medical services” (Econex, 2011:3). The OOP model may take any of the 
following forms: “individual payment for a visit to a private doctor; official user-fees or co-
payments; payment paid in public facilities to healthcare workers; and payments for drugs and 
other supplies for treatment” (WHO, 2019:3-4).  
This model is the worst because it is based on purchase power of individuals and thereby creates 
a disparity in access and utilisation of healthcare services among the people (McIyntre, 2012:4; 
Deo et al., 2018:45). In 2007, “OOP payments accounted for more than 50% of health 
expenditure in 33 LMICs” (WHO 2010 cited in Asante et al., 2016:2) and its impoverishing 
effects necessitate the adoption of pre-payment mechanisms for healthcare financing in many 
developing countries (Mejia, 2013:232). This model has catastrophic health expenditure and 
has negative consequences for equity in access (Evans et al., 2010, cited in Cuadrado et al., 
2019). The non-suitability of these various financing models for the socio-economic realities 
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in the LMICs led to the introduction of the CBHI option. This is discussed further in the 
proceeding sections of this chapter. 
2.3 Healthcare Reform Process in Nigeria: Behind the Scenes 
 
Health reform “deals with a fundamental change of processes in policies and institutional 
arrangement of the health sector, usually guided by the government” (Sein, 2000:1). Cassels 
(1995:331) noted that health sector reform involves “defining priorities, refining policies and 
reforming the institutions through which those policies are implemented”. However, “existing 
institutions and interest groups often have both the reasons and the resources to oppose change 
vigorously. As a result, it often takes some sort of political or economic shock to begin the 
health sector reform process” (Roberts et al., 2003:4). Also, health reform can be blocked or 
slowed down by issues “relating to control over financial resources (at federal, state and local 
levels), weak regulatory capacity and poor coordination” (Ananaba et al., 2018:1). These partly 
explain the lack of capacity by the Federal Ministry of Health to efficiently supervise the 
healthcare sector in Nigeria because the Nigerian constitution places healthcare on the 
concurrent legislative list. Meanwhile, one of the rationales for decentralisation of 
responsibility is to bring “decision-making nearer to the grassroots and allow those who 
‘understand’ the problems to be directly involved in the planning and execution of programmes 
meant to benefit such communities” (Obansa & Omisan, 2013:227). 
In Nigeria, “there is poor coordination between government, development partners and Non-
Governmental Organisations’ (NGOs) activities, as well as poor alignment to national 
priorities and programmes” (Ananaba et al., 2018:12). For example, Shaw et al. (2015) [cited 
in Ananaba et al. (2018:12)] revealed that “in 2011, 57% of total external financial assistance 
for the health sector was for sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS. Meanwhile, 
Nigeria’s burden of diseases associated with HIV/AIDS/TB was estimated to be less than 
5%”. This amounted to misplacement of priority. It was also noted that Nigeria’s health 
policies do not give adequate attention to the various ways of seeking healthcare (e.g. 
traditional or spiritual healthcare) among the people thereby compromising the principles of 
equity and coverage (Asakitikpi, 2019:10).   
According to Mirzoev et al. (2015), “the achievement of robust health policy reform process 
is determined by policy context; the Ministry of Health’s leadership and governance; 
involvement of policy actors; the role of evidence; and effective use of available resources for 
policy processes”. They argued that “these five determinants are related, and capacity needs 
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exist in relation to each determinant”. Usually, the process for developing healthcare reform 
or national health policy in Nigeria is “initiated by the FMOH through consensus-building 
among stakeholders” (Nigeria Federal Ministry of Health, 2016: xiv). After that, a Technical 
Working Group (TWG) was established, comprising the “relevant officials of FMOH and its 
various agencies, representatives of the development partners, private health sectors, civil 
society organisations (CSOs), regulatory bodies, ministries of health from the states and the 
FCT (Federal Capital Territory) and the academia” (Nigeria Federal Ministry of Health, 2016: 
xiv). The involvement of the various stakeholders is to ensure broader consultation and 
emergence of a robust and comprehensive policy. The group, therefore, meets to examine the 
achievements, weaknesses and challenges of the previous health policies or plans to chart a 
way forward through the development of new policy. 
The implementation of healthcare reform takes the form of introducing necessary health plans 
or programmes. As such, the national health policy document represents “the point of 
reference in providing a sound foundation for the planning, organising and managing of the 
nation’s overall health system” (Nigeria Federal Ministry of Health, 2004:v). Further, it 
constitutes a “suitable framework for the design and successful implementation of 
government-led comprehensive health sector reforms in the country” (Nigeria Federal 
Ministry of Health, 2004:v). Ogundana (2012:440) noted that the 1988 national health policy 
was implemented through “initiatives such as the national health plans, the outcomes of the 
National Vision Committee, the Health Sector Development Framework and Reform 
Initiative, including the efforts made at pursuing the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs)”. In fact, between 1960 and 2009, Nigeria adopted over 24 sub-sectoral health 
policies (Nigeria Federal Ministry of Health, 2009:19).  
Besides, the 2004 “revised national health policy was operationalised through the National 
Health Sector Reform Programme (2004-2007) and the National Strategic Health 
Development Plan (2010-2015 but extended till 2016) and other annual operational plans” 
(Nigeria Federal Ministry of Health, 2016:1). Other sub-sectoral health policies or plans are 
“Reproductive Health Policy, National Health Promotion Policy, Health Financing Policy, 
National Human Resources for Health (HRH) Policy and Plan, and National Strategic Plan of 




Furthermore, the 2016 national health policy is being operationalised through “the National 
Strategic Health Development Plan II (2018-2022) which recognises Nigeria’s aspiration to 
attain Universal Health Coverage (to have one functional Primary Health Clinic per ward) as 
well as consideration for expanding the pre-payment social health insurance, unfinished 
business of the Millennium Development Goals, the Sustainable Development Goals and the 
Global Post 2015 Development Agenda, the renewed Global Commitment for countries to 
progressively attain Universal Health Coverage, the National Health Act, the Economic 
Recovery and Growth Plan (2017-2020) and the National Vision 20:2020” (Nigeria Federal 
Ministry of Health, 2018:i). For oversight and monitoring of the programmes, the 
responsibility rests in the “National Council on Health, Health Partners Coordinating 
Committee (chaired by the Minister), the Development Partners Group for Health and other 
technical/task groups” (Nigeria Federal Ministry of Health, 2016:12). However, there is often 
duplication of functions due to poor coordination among the various groups  (African 
Development Fund, 2002:5).  This is a significant impediment limiting the success rate of the 
reform programmes. 
Notwithstanding the importance of broader consultation in policymaking, where it exists, it is 
imperative to ensure that the ideational basis of the reform is not eroded to achieve positive 
results. More comprehensive consultation in the policymaking process might be reasonably 
based on trust mainly, to make the best decisions.  Groenewegen et al. (2019:1) emphasised 
that the smooth functioning of healthcare systems requires mutual trust between parties 
involved. That is, there must be unity of purpose without ulterior motives. However, in general 
terms, “neoliberalism is more expressive in SSA because the region continues to offer a fertile 
ground for experimentation of policies for contending ideologies of international and 
multilateral agencies” (Ichoku & Ifelunini, 2017:490).  
Specifically, Odutola (2003) [cited in Ajala and Alonge (2009:41)], maintained that donors, 
multilateral and bilateral organisations see health sector reforms or health policymaking as a 
project to “rationalise health programmes, emphasise basic and population health, promote 
economic efficiency and rein in public sector spending while promoting increasing 
privatisation”. Also, Gautier and Ridde (2017:2) argued that “global health decision-making 
primarily involves a wide variety of donors including bilateral, multilateral agencies, and 
international financial institutions (IFIs), as well as non-state actors (i.e. non-governmental 
organisations and private-for-profit entities) and as such, the political voice and power of 
developing nations’ governments tend to be limited”.  
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For instance, Cali et al. (2018:137) noted that “since 2010, United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) has been involved in the development of health 
financing strategies or reforms in eight countries (Bangladesh, Botswana, Cambodia, Haiti, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Vietnam), with the Health Financing and Governance Project 
(HFG) participating in seven countries and Health Systems Strengthening Plus (HSS+) 
involved in Senegal”. Also, “the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) played significant roles in the policy dimensions of programmes such 
as the Partnership for Transforming Health Systems (PATHS) and the Programme for 
Reviving Routine Immunisation in Northern Nigeria –Maternal, Newborn and Child Health 
(PRRINN-MNCH)” (Ananaba et al., 2018:1). Apparently, this provides an avenue to 
influence the decisions in the reform.  
Mostly in the guise of financial and technical support, it appears that Nigeria has not been able 
to insulate its policy initiatives from external interference consciously. According to 
Ogundana (2012:444), “the evolution of the 1988 National Health Policy was indirectly 
initiated by the World Bank and its implementation had been in collaboration with external 
funding agencies such as the World Bank, USAID and UNFPA, among others”. Due to high 
level of influence, “some of these development partners finance health independently and not 
in accordance with governments’ policy thrust leading to inefficient use of scarce resources 
and duplication of efforts” (Uzochukwu et al., 2015:443). Moreover, “total aid financing in 
Nigeria is less than 5% of total health expenditure” and is mainly channelled through vertical 
programmes for tackling specific diseases (Ananaba et al., 2018:1). However, vertical 
approach to healthcare is inimical to the principle of comprehensive healthcare being sought 
by Nigeria or as enshrined in the Alma Ata Declaration. 
Furthermore, the 2004 NHP was framed within the scope of the Health Strategy of the 
NEPAD, MDGs and NEEDS (Nigeria Federal Ministry of Health, 2016:5; Ewurum et al., 
2015:198). However, the NEPAD and NEEDS’ frameworks are products of the neoliberal 
ideology (Adésínà, 2004:142; Obansa & Omisan, 2013:235) and therefore could not provide 
a solution to the challenges of the healthcare sector or cater to the healthcare requirements of 
the Nigerian people. Unfortunately, in Nigeria, neoliberalism has significant implications for 
government policies by de-emphasising favourable government policies and encouraging 
free-market methods (Ogundana, 2012:439). Notwithstanding, there are other factors related 
to the inefficiency in the Nigerian healthcare system. At times, elected and unelected public 
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officials or local actors tend to “deviate significantly from national policy initiatives” (Gros, 
2016:3). 
Also, the 2016 NHP was based on the need to “develop a health policy that would reflect new 
realities and trends, including unfinished agenda of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), emerging health issues (especially 
epidemics), the provisions of the National Health Act 2014, the new Primary Health Care 
(PHC) governance reform of bringing PHC Under One Roof (PHCUOR), and Nigeria’s 
renewed commitment to UHC” (Nigeria Federal Ministry of Health, 2016: xiii). Meanwhile, 
the relevance of some of these global policies to the Nigerian realities is an issue of contention. 
More so, a study by Mirzoev et al. (2014) indicated that international agencies greatly 
influence health policy decisions using ‘evidence’. According to Abbasi (1999) [cited in Blas 
(2005:11)], “blueprints for reform, such as the one presented in the World Development 
Report in 1993 can be, and often are, prepared at a drawing board without adequate empirical 
evidence”. Thus, these agencies tend to direct policy decisions and implementation towards 
their interests. Generally, health sector reforms cannot be very effective without the needed 
leadership and institutional structures (Blas, 2005:93; Obansa & Omisan, 2013:226-227; Saka 
et al.,2012:54; Jowett et al., 2016:3). 
2.4 Healthcare Financing in Nigeria: An Overview  
Over time, various governments have paid lip service to improving the healthcare system in 
Nigeria without sufficient financial commitment. Within the “Sub-Saharan African region, 
countries such as South Africa and Angola spend seven and three times more per capita on 
healthcare, respectively than Nigeria does. The per capita expenditure on healthcare in Nigeria 
pales into insignificance when compared with some developed countries like the United States 
that spends an average of 7,000 US dollars per capita; Switzerland, which spends about 6,000 
US dollars per capita; or an average of 3,600 US dollars per capita among developing 
countries in Europe” (World Bank, 2013 cited in Ejughemre, 2014b:14). This is not a new 
trend in Nigeria. Specifically, concerning the third and fourth national development plans, 
only 1.6% and 4.4% (with populations of 75 million and almost 90 million) of the total 
proposed expenditure were committed to health, respectively (Scott-Emuakpor, 2010:59). 
Also, “an average of 5% was allocated to the health sector between 1995 and 2010, indicating 
a slight increase from the allocations in the 1980s and early 1990s” (Okafor, 2016:3).  
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Also, since 2000, the federal budget for healthcare stands at 7% (Nigeria Federal Ministry of 
Health, 2016:14; Hafez, 2018) and has not exceeded 6% since 2010 (Nigeria Federal Ministry 
of Health, 2018:38), far less than the African Union standard of 15%. This is because “the 
percentage of public expenditure on health stood at 5.4% in 2011; 5.8% in 2012; 5.7% in 
2013; 6.0% in 2014 and 5.5% in 2015” (Nigeria Federal Ministry of Health, 2015 cited in 
Okafor, 2016:3). Worse still, the share of recurrent expenditure in the inadequate allocation is 
usually higher than capital (Ogundana, 2012:442) and often, the amount released falls short 
of the approved budgetary allocation (Nigeria Federal Ministry of Health, 2018:38). 
Consequently, many Nigerians are subjected to out-of-pocket (OOP) and catastrophic health 
expenditure.  
Most health policies and plans in Nigeria usually contain healthcare financing because of its 
critical position in the healthcare system. Specifically, the 2006 health financing policy has an 
“overall goal of ensuring that adequate and sustainable funds are available and allocated for 
accessible, affordable, efficient, and equitable healthcare provision and consumption” 
(Uzochukwu et al., 2015:438). It, therefore, becomes worrisome that despite the existence of 
this policy, among others, Nigeria still faces the problem of healthcare financing. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the imposition of the SAPs was ideological, and it 
negatively impacted the Nigerian health system, particularly in the area of financing. 
Ikeanyibe (2009:201) noted that “SAPs underscored a shift from project-based to the policy-
based planning system and emphasised a private-sector-led economy rather than the 
prevailing public-sector-led philosophy” that was in existence in Nigeria. This led the 
government to retrench public spending on healthcare; and also, the ‘undoing’ of what 
government has built over decades (Fox & Reich 2015:1024). Consequently, “health spending 
as a proportion of federal government expenditure shrank from an average of 3.5% in the 
1970s to less than 2% in the late 1980s” (Ogunbekun, 1991:423). There was also “a drop in 
the quality of care in public health institutions and gradual abolition of free medical services 
through the introduction of cost recovery mechanisms at all levels of healthcare delivery” 
(Anaemene, 2016:56).  
Arguing in favour of privatisation, Ogunbekun (1991:424-425) stated that tax-based financed 
health services (i.e. through general taxation by the government) are at risk in a period of 
recession and foreign aid is an unreliable source of funds.  He added that the competition 
between the private contractors would lead to better quality service, and it will widen 
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consumers’ choices. Consequently, private sector participation in the healthcare system was 
approved, and efforts continued towards introducing health insurance which also became 
operational in 2005.  
In contrast, Alubo (2001:313) contended that the argument of those canvassing for private 
medicine is weak, ignoring Nigeria’s political and economic processes as well as the health-
seeking behaviour of the people. He added that though private medical enterprise was helpful, 
its feature as a business enterprise serves as a significant impediment to the expected goal in 
service delivery. Evidently, privatisation of healthcare provisioning did not end the health 
system crisis in Nigeria because it appears to address, to an extent, the problem of availability 
and access with no effective solution to the problem of affordability and inequity among 
others. More so, “the free-market health financing implemented in Nigeria is devoid of safety 
nets as it is in the United States of America [Medicare] and Singapore [3M programs]” (Essien 
et al., 2014:10573). Also, market systems are characterised by price gouging, unnecessary or 
harmful care as well as weak government regulatory capacity (Lagomarsino & Kundra, 
2008:6). 
Consequently, Asakitipi (2016:33) notes that “the way paved for privatisation marked the 
advent of a highly stratified health system in Nigeria and challenged the role of the 
government as a problem-solving entity”. However, apart from the challenge of cost for the 
poor, the private sector was not able to fill the vacuum created in the health sector. Further, 
“most of them were poorly equipped and lacked essential supplies and qualified staff” 
(Anaemene, 2016:59). Besides, “the poor provision and delivery of public health services and 
the attendant user-fee for almost every item of treatment in the public health system has 
encouraged the explosion of private medical practice in Nigeria” (Ichoku & Fonta, 2006:3). 
Till date, the trend and situation have not changed for good within the healthcare system.  
Ogundana (2012:443) argued that “the recognition that health systems are not just to improve 
people’s health but to protect them against the financial cost of illness partly informed the 
government about the need to alleviate the burden of user-fees (i.e. out-of-pocket payment for 
health) by introducing resource-pooling mechanisms or prepayment schemes”. It, however, 
appears that the shifts from state-dominated to a market-driven paradigm of healthcare 
provisioning led to the implementation of health insurance in Nigeria. Unfortunately, “both 
measures which were driven by neoliberal frameworks [privatisation of healthcare services – 
such that the masses could not afford; and introduction of health insurance – which was mainly 
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employment-based], have negatively impacted the health-seeking behaviour of most 
Nigerians and widened the gap between the haves [elites/upper class and the working class] 
and the haves-not [lower class and the rural masses]” (Asakitikpi, 2019:5). 
The healthcare reform process, which allows for the participation of ‘development partners’ 
makes the health reform programmes susceptible to ‘hijacking’. Gautier & Ridde (2017:5) 
found in their study that donors influenced the emergence of health insurance in West African 
countries, even if it happened within government structures. Specifically, they also found that 
“government ownership of the NHIS programme at the policy formulation stage was mixed: 
there was a clear leadership at the highest level of power (at least for user-fee exemption 
policies and health insurance in Nigeria), but the State’s ability to engage the technical and 
operational levels of government was ineffective, and the State’s coordination efforts when 
designing the user-fee exemption policy was limited”.  
Further, Pettigrew and Mathauer (2016:15) contended that the policy objective of voluntary 
health insurance in Nigeria is for private sector growth. Onoka et al. (2015:1113) argued that 
the contributions of the partners to the design of the NHIS were negative because the 
programme was structured in a way that gave preference to private health insurance and 
promoted purchaser/provider split. He added that the policy favoured the Health Maintenance 
Organisations (HMOs) at the expense of the NHIS managers. Also, parading CBHI as a 
financing mechanism towards achieving UHC has the potential to distract the government 
from expanding publicly-financed coverage and increase general health expenditure 
(Pettigrew & Mathauer, 2016:15). Perhaps, these negative influences are perpetuated in 
connivance with some local stakeholders for personal gains.    
According to Obansa and Omisan (2013:231), Uzochukwu et al. (2015:437), Eboh et al. 
(2016:24) and Anaemene (2016:57), the significant sources of healthcare financing in Nigeria 
are government budget, health insurance (NHIS, CBHI and PHI), OOP (payments for health 
services at the time of illness), foreign aid and debt relief (i.e. heavily indebted poor countries 
[HIPC] initiative). Hafez (2018:24) however reported that “government and the NHIS make 
up only 17.2% of total health financing and OOP spending accounts for 75.2% of total health 
expenditure, making it one of the highest in the world”. This is a significant indication of the 
weakness of the healthcare system and little impact of the government’s efforts. Apart from a 
lack of political will and neoliberalism, Ejughmere (2014b:15) suggests that macroeconomic 
and fiscal instability also account for inadequate public financing of the health system in 
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Nigeria. This is because where macroeconomic policies downplay the need for social service 
provisioning, they also “undermine the microeconomic basis of growth, with tendencies of 
weakening the social and political basis of sustainable economic growth” (Adésínà, 2007:26). 
Though, it can be argued that the economic challenge is a result of the neoliberal policies 
imposed on Nigeria; yet, the need for an effective healthcare financing strategy for improving 
the healthcare system is essential.  
According to the Health Strategy and Delivery Foundation (2019), health financing comprises 
two main functions: “resource mobilisation mechanism (raising money for health) and 
financial management (efficient management of resources)”. Besides, Jowett et al. (2016:7) 
opined that budget allocations to health reflect political commitment but effectively spending 
those funds to strengthen the health system requires a particular focus. This is confirmed by 
Obansa & Omisan (2013:229) that in Nigeria, “increased financial resources for health do not 
necessarily translate into improved health due to poor financial management, weakly 
coordinated pooling mechanisms, poor intra-sectoral coordination, lack of strategic 
purchasing, and unsustainable risk pools”, among others.  
Generally, McIyntre and Kutzin (2016:7) explained the important role of the political-
administrative structure in health financing, “particularly the extent of decentralisation within 
government and the decision-making responsibilities held at different levels. They added that 
if there is a federal structure whereby states or provinces have considerable decision-making 
authority, the extent to which public spending on health is prioritised will be heavily 
influenced by decisions made at this level”. In the case of Nigeria, Obansa and Omisan 
(2013:230) confirmed that “the share of the federal government from the federation account 
creates a lopsided budgeting allocation amongst the three tiers of government and this equally 
affects the allocation from lower tiers of government to the health sector”. This is because the 
federal government can only enjoin but cannot compel other tiers of government on how to 
spend their health budgets. 
For instance, due to weak revenue mobilisation efforts, the 2016-2017 economic recession in 
Nigeria (because of decline in oil price) negatively affected States’ and LGAs’ funding for 
healthcare because they still rely heavily on allocations from the Federal Government (Nigeria 
Federal Ministry of Health, 2018:5). Meanwhile, “the federal government is responsible for 
the collection of nine taxes, States are responsible for collecting 25 taxes and levies, and local 
governments are responsible for collecting 21 taxes and levies” (Hafez, 2018:26-27). All of 
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these have not been able to ease the healthcare financing burden in the country because of the 
ineffective tax system. Notwithstanding, the Nigerian healthcare system suffers several 
obstacles, especially at the local government levels (Welcome, 2011:476).  
Asakitipi (2016:37) noted that “although user-fee for health has a long history in Nigeria, the 
idea of paying in advance for health services in the form of insurance is certainly novel and 
thus needs careful planning and implementation in achieving the desired goal for universal 
health coverage”. For instance, if the insurance option does not provide coverage for the entire 
population, it becomes difficult to attain UHC. Though “understanding the fiscal context of a 
country is essential for understanding the viability of various reform options, particularly 
those involving new or increased mechanisms of contributions for health” (McIyntre & 
Kutzin, 2016:7). Importantly however is that achieving UHC requires the ideational and 
financial commitment of the government to healthcare service provisioning. As such, effective 
health reform and financing will give equity and universality clear priorities from the onset 
such that those living in poverty can benefit.  
2.5 Community-Based Health Insurance: A wider view 
The main motive behind the various healthcare reforms around the world is to “improve the 
functioning and performance of the health systems” (Lambo & Sambo, 2003:1) as well as 
develop a very reliable model of accessing quality healthcare services. Health financing has 
been a bane of the health sectors in most developing nations due to the neoliberal-inspired shift 
towards market provisioning of healthcare. And as discussed above, successful implementation 
of the various health financing models may be difficult in these nations. Instead of considering 
the option of publicly-funded healthcare services provisioning, it was however argued that 
attention should be given to people’s demand for healthcare rather than focusing on their 
perceived needs (see World Health Organization, 2000:xiii). The neoliberals believe that the 
state should not be involved in the management of the “affairs of men” [i.e. people] (see 
Lippmann, 1937:267). For them, it is not a question of affordability but keeping the state from 
matters of social provisioning.  
Hence, the state should merely “determine, arbitrate, and enforce the rules of the game” 
(Friedman, 1962:31). While arguing for economic freedom, Hayek (1944:40-100) recognised 
that competition could hamper the provisioning of some social services but contended that 
people should be ‘freed’ and granted the right to decide among available choices in a 
competitive society. Particularly on healthcare, Friedman (1962) argued that the exit of 
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government from healthcare provisioning would ‘immensely’ enhance service delivery in 
terms of quality, professionalism, choice and business (e.g. charging consumers “separate fees 
for separate services”). This ideological drive necessitates healthcare reforms around the world.  
To this end, the option of health insurance – through different models – has been aggressively 
promoted as an effective solution to the problem of healthcare and achieving universal health 
coverage (WHO, 2010). The new definition of UHC by WHO suggests that the goal is to be 
pursued in a way that people are financially protected. UHC connotes that “all people and 
communities can use the promotive, preventive, curative, rehabilitative and palliative health 
services they need, of sufficient quality to be effective, while also ensuring that the use of these 
services does not expose the user to financial hardship” WHO (2018a). Meanwhile, there have 
been debates among scholars as to the right healthcare financing model to be adopted towards 
the provision of equitable and accessible healthcare services.  
Those promoting health insurance policies believe that the responsibility is too much for the 
government to bear given the global financial instability; hence, the need for a health insurance 
system. For them, healthcare financing systems through health insurance is an effective 
strategy to attain universal coverage and financial protection against catastrophic healthcare 
expenses (Carrin et al., 2005; Schellekens et al., 2007:4; Fonta et al., 2010:109; Devadasan et 
al., 2010; Spaan et al., 2012; Giedion et al., 2013; Fadlallah et al., 2018). Examples of such 
countries are Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, France, Belgium 
and Japan. 
Given the concerns about the suitability of some health insurance models (discussed above) for 
the LMICs, specifically, scholars such as Wiesmann and Jutting (2000), Bennett (2004), 
Lagomarsino and Kundra (2008:66), Badacho et al. (2016), Ezeama (2016:14) and Ahmed et 
al. (2018:13) contended that CBHI is appropriate to cover persons who are in the informal 
sector and in the LMICs, where public revenue is inadequate with extensive reliance on OOP 
(out-of-pocket) expenditure. Gustafsson-Wright and Schellekens (2013:13) also claimed that 
“CBHI policy is an effective instrument towards universal coverage and better alternative 
against out-of-pocket and catastrophic health expenditure through risk-pooling to improve 
access to health care”. Binnendijk et al. (2012:68) opined that CBHI is effective in “keeping 




Some of the countries that have adopted CBHI for healthcare financing are India, China, 
Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Nepal, Guinea, Benin, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Mali, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Ghana, Rwanda, Nigeria, among others. In line with earlier submissions, 
Odeyemi and Nixon (2013:12) noted that the policy serves to guarantee “access to basic 
healthcare services for most people in rural areas”. Similarly, Jacobs et al. (2008) believed that 
CBHI could guarantee better-quality services and bring about more accountable healthcare 
providers. Sekhri and Savedoff (2005:127) also argued that it could assist developing countries 
in developing mechanisms, institutions and capacities for attaining UHC. In this context, UHC 
is understood as one ‘ultimate goal’ in the healthcare system towards which CBHI can 
contribute. Thus, this policy is seen as a shortcut for providing healthcare cover for the informal 
sector and rural dwellers and also a route to attaining UHC. 
In an empirical study, Spaan et al. (2012) found that the services rendered under CBHI are of 
moderate quality. Studies conducted by Carrin et al. (2005) and Weinberger & Jutting (2000) 
also revealed that CBHI programmes could assist in reducing OOP and enhancing access to 
healthcare services. Further, Adebayo et al. (2015:4) found a high level of willingness to pay 
(WTP) for CBHI in LMICs. WTP refers to the readiness to give up a particular amount of 
money to access healthcare services (Lawanson & Ibrahim, 2015:4) under a health insurance 
programme. The high rate of willingness might be due to anticipated protection against OOP 
after enrolment. Purohit (2014:1237) also found in India “that CBHI schemes have proved to 
be effective in reducing catastrophic health expenditure of the people”. 
Since the 1990s, CBHIs have been implemented in several African countries, including 
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania etc. (Odeyemi, 2014). Kebede et al. 
(2014:263) and Minyihun et al. (2019:1) reported 80% and 77.8% willingness to pay in 
Northwest and Northeast Ethiopia, respectively. Generally, in Africa, Rwanda and Ghana 
have been recognised as nations being able to scale-up from CBHI towards universal 
coverage. Specifically, “Rwanda is the country with the highest enrolment in health insurance 
in Sub-Saharan Africa” (Chemouni, 2018:1). This feat was achieved through the 
implementation of mandatory enrolment by all citizens in the programme. Kalisa et al. 
(2015:11) reported that CBHI coverage of the Rwandan informal sector rose from less than 
7% in 2003 to 74% in 2013. Also, in 2004, the Ghanaian health system scaled-up to National 
Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) from the various existing CBHIs or Mutual Health 
Organisations (MHOs). The scheme is financed from a single source. As of 2014, the NHIS 
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covered 40% (10.5 million) of Ghana’s population (Wang et al., 2017:1). I will take up a more 
in-depth discussion of CBHI in Rwanda and Ghana in the next section.  
In Nigeria today, some CBHI schemes exist across various states in the country (Kwara, 
Lagos, Ogun, Anambra, Akwa Ibom, Delta states, etc.). Many studies conducted around the 
country (even where the programme is yet to exist) indicate readiness among the people to 
enrol. Nura et al. (2017) observed the potentials of CBHI in reducing OOP expenditure and 
increasing utilisation among Nigerians. Onwujekwe et al. (2011a:3) found a very high 
(98.3%) acceptability of CBHI as a means of paying for health in a study carried out in South-
Eastern Nigeria, and Banwat et al. (2012:54) found a very high (93.6%) willingness to pay 
for CBHI in North Central Nigeria. Also, Falaki et al. (2017) found 75% willingness to pay 
for CBHI among respondents in Katsina State. Most of these studies examined readiness to 
pay for CBHI if introduced.  
Whereas, there is evidence of mixed reactions among respondents in some studies. Oriakhi 
and Onemolease (2012:95) found in a study in Edo State that 60% of the respondents 
expressed willingness to pay. In contrast, those not willing to pay gave reasons such as “lack 
of trust in the scheme administrators and government policies (which are considered very 
unstable)”. However, among artisans in Osun State, Bamidele and Awobimpe (2013:1) found 
82.4% willingness to pay out of which 74% preferred that the government organise the 
scheme. This signifies a variation in the level of trust in government by different people, 
perhaps, based on previous experience with intervention programmes.  
Nevertheless, the willingness to pay studies may not be a suitable premise to float a CBHI 
scheme. On this, Udeh et al. (2016:11) advised that “determining threshold premium (the 
maximum level of premium that a given proportion of the population covered by the scheme 
will be able to afford based on a pre-determined capacity to pay) gives a clearer picture of the 
affordability and capacity to enrol than a willingness to pay”. This is because the willingness 
to pay is quite different from the ability to pay. A good understanding of this helps in the 
decision to establish CBHI programmes in settings where most people cannot pay owing to 
the level of poverty in Nigeria. Thus, conducting studies on threshold premium makes the 
financial capacity of the people clear before the premium is fixed.   
Regarding the CBHI programme in Kwara State, a study by Amsterdam Institute of 
International Development (AIID) in 2013 found that the programme enjoyed high enrolment 
and that it impacted positively on the health status of the enrollees. The study also found that 
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the programme protected the enrollees against OOP expenditure. The study further indicated 
that there were over 200,000 visits to the healthcare facilities out of which 70% were by 
women and children. Also, Babatunde et al. (2011) found a high level of willingness to pay 
among people in Asa Local Government of Kwara State. In addition, Ameen et al. (2016:1) 
found high level (80.4%) of willingness to participate among artisans in Ilorin Metropolis. In 
the same vein, Akande (2015:9) found a high rate (72%) of the utilisation of Kwara CBHI 
among pregnant women. Generally, the CBHI programme has assisted in building a more 
robust and cost-effective health system in the state (PharmAccess Group, 2016:13). 
Similarly, Brals et al. (2017:990) found that the CBHI programme improved the choice of 
hospital delivery among women in some rural communities in Kwara State as a result of health 
facility upgrades. According to PharmAccess Group (2016:15), the programme led to an 
increase in hospital delivery from 50% in 2009 to 70% in 2013. More so, Hendriks et al. 
(2013:560) found an association between Kwara-CBHI and a significant decline in blood 
pressure among the enrollees. In a more recent study, AIID (2017:15) found that “the CBHI 
program increased healthcare utilisation and reduced out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure among 
the enrollees”. Studies conducted on the CBHI programme relating to hypertension and 
cardiovascular care in Bacita, Edu LGA indicated positive results (see Odusola et al., 2011, 
2014, 2015, 2016; Odusola, 2015). Precisely, Odusola et al. (2014) reported that the CBHI 
programme improved enrollees perception about medications. As claimed by PharmAccess 
Group (2017:4), “the lessons of Kwara CBHI have led to the development of health insurance 
laws in other 17 states in Nigeria”. Invariably, the interest in the CBHI programme by those 
state governments was to adopt an effective policy with the potential of solving their 
healthcare challenges.  
In contrast to the optimistic studies reported above, other researchers have raised some 
concerns about the appropriateness of CBHI for provision of healthcare services and achieving 
UHC. Generally, scholars inclined by Marxian analysis hold the view that the proposition of 
health insurance, including CBHI, is premised on the zeal and motive of the capitalists to 
generate profits. Collyer (2015:43) argued that “a social system should operate to satisfy 
human needs rather than producing profit and compelling individuals to become consumers 
of capitalist commodities”. She added that “the replacement of publicly-provided or publicly-
financed healthcare services by others owned or run by private, for-profit organisations 
presents a serious challenge to the governance of the state in its efforts to produce healthcare 
services based on equity of access, accountability, cost at the point of service and quality of 
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service”. The “implications of commodification are greater inequality of provision and access, 
higher costs and the creation of new avenues for corruption” (Whiteside, 2015:392).  
Despite some significant accomplishments in countries with strong national-government 
stewardship, most CBHI schemes have been limited in scope and success (Okunola et al., 
2016:1). Mulupi et al. (2013) argued against the workability of CBHI in nations with most 
people in the informal sector. This is because “those who cannot afford to pay premiums do 
not get enrolled, leaving the poor and many other vulnerable groups excluded” (Mathauer et 
al., 2017:2). According to Woldemicheal et al. (2016:2), “the proliferation of CBHI schemes 
in many countries in Africa as mainstream healthcare financing mechanisms has triggered 
considerable analytical policy questions concerning its impact in providing access to healthcare 
services and protecting households from financial risks due to illness”.  In the same vein, Tabor 
(2005:5) argued that “CBHI should be regarded as a complement to, not a substitute for, strong 
government involvement in healthcare financing and risk management related to the cost of 
illness”.  
In addition, CBHIs “are usually small fragmented pools with little capacity for redistribution 
of risks” (Mathauer et al., 2017:3). Thus, the reliance of some countries on CBHI as a core 
health financing mechanism might be inappropriate. Further, setting low premium to aid high 
enrolment tends to limit the capacity of CBHI to deliver high-quality service, thereby reducing 
the attractiveness of the programme and financial protection (Mathauer et al., 2017). Members 
will then need to seek medical attention elsewhere for services which are not covered by the 
scheme.  
 
Further still, Kutzin (2012:867) asserted “that no country has attained universal health coverage 
by relying mainly on voluntary contributions and payroll taxes towards insurance schemes 
regardless of the institution facilitating it; hence, general government revenue is essential for 
coverage of informal sector of the population”. In other words, government involvement in the 
provision of healthcare should not be minimal because most of those in need of coverage are 
not in the formal sector. Further, “from the perspective of UHC, whether or not a financing 
scheme improves attainment of coverage objectives for its members is not intrinsically 
important; what matters is the impact of that scheme on the attainment of the objectives for the 




More so, empirical evidence has shown the challenges inherent in the CBHI policy option. 
Panda et al. (2016:1) and Ranabhat et al. (2019:4) identified inappropriate benefits package 
and stringent rules as part of the challenges of CBHI schemes in LMICs, which must be tackled. 
Otherwise, alternative health financing mechanism should be put in place. The design of CBHI 
programmes is such that the more extensive curative cares are not covered. For instance, 
dialysis and some other medical procedures are not covered by the CBHI policy. Acharya et 
al. (2012:51) examined “the impact of social and community-based health insurance” on the 
poor and near-poor, using utilisation, financial protection and health outcome. They found a 
high rate of use of CBHI with no evidence on the reduction in OOP expenditure and no 
significant improvement in health outcomes. This indicates that the programme did not impact 
the health status of the people positively. Apart from the challenge of capacity to pay for 
healthcare, the inability of the CBHI policy to provide a comprehensive health benefits package 
(i.e. access to all kinds of care) tends to alter the meaning and goal of UHC which seeks to 
facilitate access to all types of healthcare services at the point of need. 
In a systematic review, Dror et al. (2016:2) found stringent rules, inadequate legal framework 
and inappropriate benefits package as barriers to the renewal of CBHI enrolment in LMICs. 
Also, Hounton and Newlands (2012:10) challenged the assumption that CBHI schemes are a 
potential means to improve access to healthcare in LMICs. This is because they found no 
“evidence of the cost-effectiveness of CBHI in Burkina Faso, using the net-benefit 
framework”. Meanwhile, Ochoma (2009:208) and Hounton et al. (2012) argued that an 
effective CBHI scheme must be able to improve access to quality care, prevent OOP 
expenditure, reduce mortality and ensure sustainability. Thus, these barriers must be well 
addressed in an effective CBHI scheme.  
Ekman (2004) noted that it is unclear whether CBHI schemes are sustainable in the long term; 
and its sustainability in Africa is strongly linked to the ability to pay (Ejughemre, 2014a:18). 
In some settings in Africa, enrolment and payment of premium for CBHIs are encouraged 
among farmers during harvest time before the earnings are spent on other purposes (Shimless, 
2010). More so, “simply replicating an intervention from one setting to another is likely to fail 
without taking into consideration, the factors critical to its implementation and sustainability” 
(Edwards and Barker, 2014 cited in Fadlallah et al. 2018:2). Also, “many have questioned 
whether African countries have been too eager to adopt Western-styled policies that are not 
necessarily appropriate to their fiscal context” (Fenny et al., 2018:2). In the African experience, 
Noubiap et al. (2014) found poor knowledge about CBHI among informal sector workers in 
Douala Cameroon. Also, low membership renewal rate was found in Ethiopia (Ethiopian 
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Health Insurance Agency, 2015: x) and Parma et al. (2012:1) found the problem of adverse 
selection in Burkina Faso. 
In the same light, in Nigeria, Nura et al. (2017:118) raised concerns about CBHI’s coverage 
of comparatively small proportion of the people “as well as inadequate funding, weak policy, 
lack of political commitment and inadequate infrastructure”. Also, Aregbeshola (2017:43) 
associated CBHI in Nigeria with “poor coverage, poor quality of care, lack of trust and high 
rates of attrition”. Further, Ejughemre et al. (2015:6) observed that “CBHIs are still 
rudimentary in Nigeria and are fraught with implementation challenges, including issues of 
acceptance by the people”. They added that “exclusion continues to be of concern in the 
schemes despite high willingness to pay (WTP)”. However, the experience with most CBHI 
programmes in Nigeria has not been able to positively inform the negative perception and lack 
of trust in the programme. 
Often, reform programmes in Nigeria (including health reforms and CBHI) do not record 
appreciable success such that they can sustain the confidence of the public (Okonjo-Iweala, 
2007 cited in Eneh, 2011). Studies in Lagos State revealed that most people do not have 
confidence in CBHI. In a recent study among pregnant women in Lagos State, Osakede et al. 
(2016:19) reported 65% willingness to pay; however, only 40% of them had trust in the 
programme. Thus, it appears that the remaining 60% who did not have confidence in the 
programme would not join if they have alternative access to healthcare. Regardless of trust, it 
appears that expression of willingness to pay for CBHI is high (as reported in some studies 
above) because the people are faced with the depleted public healthcare system and huge OOP. 
In other words, the researches were conducted in contexts suggesting alternative access to care 
for the people; thus, the findings are dependent on the context of the study. The outcome is 
likely to be different in the context of functioning and free public healthcare service. What is 
often not placed on the table in these studies is the question of the well-functioning publicly-
funded healthcare system. 
Further, on trust, in a more recent study by AbdulRasheed and Aladetohun (2018:19) among 
CBHI enrollees in Alimosho, Lagos State, more than 70% of the respondents did not have 
trust in the programme and believed that it was established as a means of enriching some few 
people. The study also reported that enrollees “were not satisfied with the quality of service 
rendered through the CBHI programme”. In the same vein, Agbo et al. (2019:53) found that 
only a few people (22.1% and 10.6% in Surulere and Ikorodu respectively) had high 
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confidence in CBHI in Lagos. Meanwhile, trust and satisfaction are major factors in the 
acceptance and success of healthcare intervention programmes. Therefore, a shortfall in these 
is capable to negatively influence the decisions of prospective beneficiaries of the CBHI 
programme. Ogben and Ilesanmi (2018:57) found that almost half (44.9%) of the respondents 
“were not satisfied with the overall quality of care rendered” by a CBHI programme in the 
FCT (Abuja). Further, Collins (2015:11) identified low enrolment with the Akwa Ibom CBHI 
pilot scheme.  
Onwujekwe et al. (2009:96) identified successful and non-successful CBHI schemes in 
Anambra State. They found that “enrolment was low (15.5%) in the non-successful 
community (Neni), and higher (48.4%) in a thriving community (Igbo-Ukwu), both less than 
half the target population, and contributions were regressive”.  Uzochukwu et al. (2009:31; 
2015:7) analysed the challenges inherent in the Anambra CBHI programme. Community 
participation, power dynamics, the attitude of healthcare workers and drug acquisition and 
delivery are some of the factors affecting the programme (Uzochukwu et al., 2010:1). 
Generally, Fonta et al. (2010:122) observed that the implementation of successful CBHI 
programme in Nigeria has been difficult. They, however, opined that the programme could be 
temporarily adopted for healthcare needs of the poor pending the full development of the 
NHIS. It, however, becomes worrying to note when NHIS will become effective after many 
years of existence. Yet, the NHIS involves a higher health insurance premium, which is a 
‘threat’ to enrolment. 
For financial sustainability, Onwujekwe et al. (2009:96) advised that subsidies from 
government and donors should supplement payments by enrollees particularly in “poor and 
rural communities in order to ensure equitable financial risk protection”. This is concerning, 
considering the efficacy and suitability of CBHI. This is more so given the level of poverty in 
Nigeria and the financial resources that will be needed to subsidise the payment of the rural 
poor. Also, for improving access and achieving UHC, Onwujekwe et al. (2011b:54) canvassed 
the need to adopt various types of health insurance (SHI, PHI CBHI, etc.) concurrently. This 
suggests that there is a significant limitation in health insurance, especially when only a few 
types are available in a country. Moreover, the efficiency of deploying many types of health 
insurance is contentious. 
Also, Vaughan et al. (2016:405) carried out a benefit incidence analysis on a CBHI scheme 
in Rivers State and found a shift in concentration from the poor to the rich enrollees. The same 
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anomaly was found in studies conducted by Asante et al. (2016:17) on the LMICs, Alkenbrack 
et al. (2013) in Lao PDR and Akazili et al. (2014:1) in Ghana where CBHI schemes were 
established in areas where there was relatively good quality of care. Meanwhile, CBHI 
programmes are primarily introduced to protect the poor and other vulnerable groups against 
OOP expenditure. Invariably, one of the main goals of CBHI to prevent enrollees from 
catastrophic health expenditure is defeated. All these tend to challenge the appropriateness of 
the health policy option. 
The CBHI programme implemented in Lagos State for Market Women by the PharmAcess 
Foundation, alongside the Kwara programme, was faced with several problems which forced 
it to be phased-out in 2014 (Amsterdam Institute for Global Health and Development, 
2015:10). “The main reasons for discontinuing the Lagos programme were overutilisation of 
services, increase in enrolment by high-income persons and administrative challenges” 
(AIGHD, 2015:10). Overutilisation is closely linked to adverse selection, and these tend to 
threaten sustainability; hence, the decision to wind-up the programme.  
Likewise, Kwara-CBHI was not immune to certain difficulties. Adenusi (2011) found that 
enrolment into the programme did not grow as envisaged to achieve the universal coverage of 
communities where it existed. Recently, Gustafsson-Wright et al. (2018:42) reported that in 
one of the communities where the CBHI programme existed (Afon), enrolment between 2011 
and 2013 was relatively stagnant. They added that new enrollees had replaced half of the 
people who were in the enrolment of the programme in 2011. This might be partially due to a 
lack of satisfaction with the quality of service provided. Similarly, Babatunde et al. (2016:26) 
concluded that the CBHI programme did not bring about a remarkable variation in the socio-
economic status of enrollees and non-enrollees in Edu Local Government Area of the state.   
In addition, Opowoye (2014:20) noted distance and inability to pay an increased premium 
from 300 Naira to 500 Naira as barriers. He added that inadequate staffing, substandard 
facilities, the gap in knowledge and skills of clinical and non-clinical staff are part of the 
challenges.  The programme also faced the problem of adverse selection and administrative 
bottleneck (Lawanson & Ibrahim, 2015:11). More so, in a study on hypertension care within 
the Kwara-CBHI, Odusola et al. (2016) found inadequate human, material, and administrative 
resources as factors hindering the delivery of quality care. Equally, Bonfrer et al. (2015:144) 
reported decreased formal healthcare utilisation “among the non-enrollees with a high 
increase in the use of informal healthcare facilities as well as high OOP expenditure”. They 
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found “evidence of crowding-out of the non-enrollees from formal care facilities” Bonfrer et 
al. (2015:144). This is a thing of concern and an indication that regardless of the acclaimed 
success, the policy came along with a negative consequence for the people.  
Also, the ultimate goal of the programme was to expand to state-wide coverage. However, a 
study by Gomez et al. (2015:12) argued that the expansion was less feasible because of the 
inadequate health personnel and infrastructure in Kwara State. Though the premium was 
subsidised, they added that inability to pay among some households could hamper the 
expansion and sustainability of the programme. These suggest that the policy was not 
comprehensive enough to cater to the diverse healthcare needs in the State adequately. Further, 
“the delivery of quality healthcare services in rural areas, where the programme existed, was 
not guaranteed” (PharmAccess Group, 2015b:17) suggesting the possibility of ineffective 
monitoring and evaluation mechanism to measure the adequacy of implementation. 
More so, Bonfrer et al. (2018:62) noted that “the use of government funding to subsidise the 
Kwara CBHI might increase inequity if the non-enrollees continue to pay OOP for healthcare 
and have limited access to necessary quality health services”. They concluded that “it is 
unlikely that this scheme can operate independently of the government funding, by leveraging 
on actuarially fair premium”. Meanwhile, PharmAccess Group (2015b:4) reported that 
starting from 2014, the Kwara State Government was finding it difficult to meet its financial 
obligations towards the programme. This might be a factor in the eventual collapse of the 
programme. The sudden stoppage of healthcare service delivery, therefore, threw the 
possibility of effective state-wide expansion into uncertainty or illusion.  
Before the collapse of the programme, findings have identified areas requiring improvement 
for effective service delivery and satisfaction. For long-term care, as reported by Odusola 
(2015:155), there was a need to improve the financial and organisational structure of the CBHI 
programme. Specifically, he found the need to give adequate attention to “trust in the 
sustainability of care, treatment guidelines, tools for patient education, human resources, 
capacity building, (diagnostic) equipment and drugs, adequate care administration 
infrastructure, quality assurance monitoring, adequate provider payments benchmarking and 
good provider/enrollee relationships” for high-quality care. 
Obamwonyi and Aibieyi (2014:41) identified improper policy formulation, lack of continuity 
and mechanisms for sustainability as some of the factors responsible for policy failure in 
Nigeria. Charan and Paramita (2016:1) argued that failure of health programmes could be 
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attributed to technical insufficiency, administrative inanity and operational incapacity. For 
Odeyemi (2014:1), failure of CBHI can be attributed to the “inability to engage and account 
for the real needs of the beneficiaries”. Uche (2016:28-29) attributed the limited success of 
CBHI in Nigeria to weakness in design, implementation and management. She further argued 
that the sustainability of CBHI requires institutional capacity, effective management skills and 
technical expertise. These suggest that the adequate capacity and preference for the specific 
healthcare needs of each community or country are quite necessary for the success of CBHI 
programmes.  
2.6 Community-Based Health Insurance in Ghana and Rwanda 
2.6.1 CBHI: The Ghanaian Experience 
Origin 
In Africa, Ghana is one of the nations identified with the successful implementation of the 
CBHI policy. In the immediate post-independence, “Kwame Nkrumah’s government ended 
payment for health at the point of use and provided some free healthcare services funded by 
general tax revenue” (Blanchet & Acheampong, 2013:2). However, economic crisis (due to the 
adoption of the imposed SAPs) led to the introduction of user-fees (cash and carry) in the 1980s 
to finance the provision of health services (Jehu-Appiah et al., 2011:158; Fusheini et al., 
2012:1). “In the early 1990s, CBHI schemes were established in Ghana as a self-help initiative 
to meet the healthcare requirements of those in the informal sector” (Adomah-Afari, 2015:824) 
and eliminate user-fees. This initiative operated mainly, through collaboration among Catholic 
missions, health facilities and communities (Carbone, 2011:397). 
After experimenting with the CBHI model in selected settings in the late 1990s, the Ghanaian 
health system scaled-up to NHIS in 2004, from the various existing CBHIs or Mutual Health 
Organisations (MHOs) towards achieving universal health coverage and to eliminate user-fees. 
Essentially, Ghana NHIS was influenced by politics. Specifically, it grew out of the electoral 
promises by the New Patriotic Party (NPP) to take an ambitious move towards implementing 
the programme (Brugiavini & Pace, 2016:4; Blanchet & Acheampong, 2013; Fusheini et al., 
2012:5). This grand vision clearly reflects the positioning of healthcare reform in the overall 
strategic direction of the government (Rahaman et al., 2011:21), “reflecting the demand of the 
people for an alternative to the cash and carry system” (Owusu-Sekyere & Bagah, 2014:188). 
However, the eventual policy direction cannot be absolved of foreign intervention. For 
instance, the Ghanaian Ministry of Health leveraged on the ‘supports’ of USAID and Danish 
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International Development Agency (DANIDA) to increase the number of government-owned 
CBHI schemes from 4 in 1999 to 47 in 2001, 159 in 2002 and 168 in 2003 (Carbone, 2011:397). 
Design and Implementation 
The model of NHIS in Ghana involves “District Mutual Health Organisations (DMOs) for the 
informal sector, Private Commercial Health Insurance Scheme (PCHIS) for the formal sector 
and Private Mutual Health Insurance Scheme (PMHIS) for the affluent” (Fusheini et al., 
2012:7). The scheme is financed from a single source and aimed to cover all residents in Ghana, 
including non-citizens. Health services are “delivered by accredited public, and private 
providers who are reimbursed from a single national fund with no fees at the point of service 
and 90% of its revenue are generated from dedicated taxes [a portion of value-added tax and 
payroll]” (Blanchet & Acheampong, 2013:2). “The indigent, pregnant women, persons aged 
above 70, persons with mental disorders, and children under the age of 18 years are exempt 
from paying a premium” (Agyepong et al., 2016:2). Others are required to pay a premium that 
ranges from GHC7.2 to GHC48 (1.9 USD – 12.3 USD) per head annually, depending on the 
relative development of the area of residence (Jehu-Appiah et al., 2010:158; Amo-Adjei et al., 
2016:2).  
The scheme allows for individual registration and does not mandate family registration 
(Agyepong et al. 2016:7). It claims to “cover 95% of common disease conditions in Ghana. It 
is also claimed to offer inpatient and outpatient services for general, and specialist care, surgical 
operations, hospital admission, maternity care, emergency treatment etc.” (Association of 
Chartered Certified Accountants, 2013:7). The National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) 
generates fund through contributions “from the National Health Insurance levy of 2.5% Value 
Added Tax (VAT) on most goods and services, 2.5% Social Security and National Insurance 
Trust (SSNIT) payroll taxes, NHIF investment income, donor funds and about 5% revenue 
through informal sector enrollees’ premium payment” (Blanchet, & Acheampong, 2013:6).   
Certain initiatives were put in place to address sustainability issues and strengthen the operation 
of the scheme and achieve universal health coverage. In 2007, “Information Communication 
Technology (ICT) was introduced to automate the service for easy access to health 
information” (Brugiavini & Pace, 2016:3) and Ghana-Diagnosis Related Groups was adopted 
in 2008 to reduce cost escalation (Andoh-Adjei et al., 2018:2). In 2012, a new law (Act 852) 
was introduced to replace the earlier one (Act 650) enacted in 2003, to improve general 
administration and service delivery under the scheme. With the new law, operations of all the 
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District Mutual Schemes fall under the National Health Insurance Authority (Teye et al., 
2015:494) towards better services and centralisation. 
Major Achievements 
The Ghana NHIS no doubt, contributes to the health status of its enrollees. Indeed, the scheme 
has been studied and commended by many authors as well as international organisations 
recommending it to other LMICs for replication in their various settings (Carbone, 2011:393). 
It is claimed that the scheme provides healthcare coverage for 37% of Ghana’s 27.4 million 
population (see PharmAccess Foundation, 2016:1) and operates in over 150 districts across the 
country (Alhassan et al., 2016a:2). Wang et al. (2017:8) also claimed that health indicators of 
Ghana improved under the NHIS and outperformed the SSA average on life expectancy at 
birth, maternal mortality, total fertility and under-five mortality. Though contentious, it is 
further claimed that there is high utilisation of the programme among enrollees and it grants 
them financial protection as well as reduced OOP to 29% of total health expenditure (Blanchet, 
& Acheampong, 2013:2). In another study, Brugiavini and Pace (2016:3) found that the NHIS 
increases the chances of utilising healthcare facility for ante-natal and delivery services. 
Therefore, the scheme has improved health-seeking behaviour among the people. 
Weaknesses and Challenges 
Before the establishment of NHIS, the various CBHIs in Ghana have major challenges of 
“small size, limited benefits package, inability to cover all sectors or groups” (Atim et al., 2001: 
xvii) etc. All these challenges were anticipated to be resolved with the introduction of NHIS. 
Still, after the emergence of NHIS, there are various challenges such as equity, long-term 
sustainability, quality of care and coverage (Atim, 2011; Carbone, 2011:393; Blanchet & 
Acheampong, 2013:2). Besides, it appears that there is a dearth of accurate data on the coverage 
of the NHIS. For instance, Wang et al. (2017:1) stated that as of 2014, the NHIS covered 40% 
(10.5 million) of Ghana’s population while Alhasssan et al. (2016b) claimed that as of 2016, 
the scheme covered 40% (26.9 million) indicating conflicting figures. On this, Oxfam 
International (2011:1) cautioned and noted the need for critical methods in calculating the 
coverage of the scheme to avoid inaccurate and misleading statistical data. However, based on 
the coverage, it may be rated as one of the best in Africa. More so, “under the NHIS amended 
Act 852 (2012), every Ghanaian is required to enrol in the scheme, but the constitutional 
provision is not effectively implemented due to large informal sector and weak administrative 
capacity of the National Health Insurance Authority [NHIA]” (Alhassan et al., 2016b:2). 
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According to Yete et al. (2015:501), the Ghana NHIS programme is faced with UHC 
challenges, utilisation challenges and implementation or operational challenges. The UHC 
challenges entail the problems confronting the achievement of universal health coverage. These 
challenges include low enrolment, difficulty in registering individuals in the informal sector, 
the problem of identifying the ‘indigents’ etc. (Okoroh et al., 2018). The scheme has been 
existing for more than 15 years, but there seems to be inadequate awareness and knowledge 
about it. For instance, Wang et al. (2017:22) found that “only 29% of NHIS enrollees are aware 
that pregnant women and children under the age of 18 are exempt from paying the premium 
and are not required to pay OOP”. This might be due to inefficiency on the part of the 
government (i.e. NHIA) to provide adequate information to the people.  
More so, studies carried out by Kusi et al. (2015:2), Kotoh et al. (2018:443) and Alesane and 
Anang (2018:2) confirmed that enrolment in the scheme is on the decline. Among other 
challenges, the decline is related to experience and perception about the scheme.  This is 
because the difference between policy content and implementation affects enrollees’ 
experiences of the scheme and determines their decision to enrol or stay enrolled (Agyepong 
et al., 2016:7). Also, poverty dependency ratios were high and affected enrolment because 
some individuals cannot afford the enrolment premium (Agyepong et al., 2016:7). Further, in 
their study which focused on enablers and barriers to enrolment, Agyepong et al. (2016:2) 
found that health insurance coverage was very slow in Volta region in Ghana because the 
premium was beyond the affordability of most people and that individuals below age 40 “were 
not enrolling because they felt their health risk was low”. Similarly, a recent study by Seddoh 
and Sataru (2018:3) revealed that “respondents between the ages of 41-60 years were twice 
likely to enrol compared with the respondents between the ages of 21-40 years”. This indicates 
that awareness and sensitisation efforts towards healthcare and enrolment are weak.      
In addition, enrollees face specific challenges in utilising healthcare services. The challenges 
involve negative attitudes of healthcare providers, informal fees for health services, long 
waiting times, cleanliness of facilities, emergency services, discrimination in favour of patients 
who would pay out-of-pocket etc. (Dalinjong & Laar, 2012:9; PharmAccess Foundation, 
2016:2). In principle, enrollees are not required to share costs, pay for services or 
pharmaceuticals, however, they are often written prescriptions to purchase non-available drugs 
(Wang et al., 2017:20; Agyepong et al., 2016:11; Yete et al., 2015:504) at pharmacies. 
Therefore, enrollees tend to be disappointed and unsatisfied with the scheme, and these 
generally, influence non-willingness to enrol or renewal of enrolment. Okoroh et al. (2018) 
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found that 6% to 8% of enrolled households made catastrophic health expenditures. Also, 
“OOP payments as a proportion of total health expenditures remain high at 26%, exceeding the 
WHO’s recommendation of 15% to 20%” (Okoroh et al., 2018:1). This shows the level of the 
impediment in eliminating OOP payments, which is a barrier to access and utilisation.  
 
Studies by Dixon et al. (2013:7) and Amo-Adjei et al. (2016:1) on the scheme indicated that 
most people have a negative perception of the programme. In most cases, this is usually linked 
to the quality of service rendered by the scheme. A recent study by Duku et al. (2018:8) on 
Ghanaian NHIS revealed that the enrollees have a negative perception of the programme 
because non-enrollees get better quality of healthcare. Further, it is believed that “the quality 
of service provided by the scheme is unsatisfactory” (Yete et al., 2015:507). However, 
PharmAccess Foundation (2016:1) found that healthcare providers generally perceived 
healthcare services rendered to the enrollees as satisfactory (from a technical quality 
dimension) meanwhile, enrollees expressed disappointment in the quality of service provided. 
In most cases, the negative attitudes of healthcare providers stem from the increased workload 
of attending to many patients, majorly enrollees (Dalinjong & Laar, 2012:9). This is as a result 
of inadequate staffing that could match the high number of visitations. Expectedly, 
mobilisation for enrolment is to be matched with adequate provision of resources (human 
resources and facilities) to cater to the people. 
As obtainable in Nigeria (see Onyedibe et al., 2012:5), Agyepong et al. (2016:7) found that 
“SSNIT contributors (public and private formal employees) preferred to use private health 
facilities rather than government facilities because of quality of care”. Even, “most premium 
exempt groups do not enrol and renew enrolment” (Agyepong et al., 2016:2), perhaps, due to 
issues of quality and satisfaction. More so, “the claim by the decision-makers that the NHIS 
offers a ‘generous’ benefits package that covers about 95% of common diseases” (Amo-Adjei 
et al., 2016:1) ends in mistrust when enrollees are not able to get the healthcare needed. For 
instance, it does not cover vision, hearing, orthopaedic and dental aids as well as antiretroviral 
drugs for treating HIV/AIDS (Wang et al., 2017:20), amongst others. In another study, 
Brugiavini and Pace (2016:3) found that “the NHIS does not have a significant effect on the 
reduction of OOP expenditure at the extensive margin”. This is partly because certain 




Furthermore, the NHIS programme is faced with some problems (nationally) relating to policy 
design, implementation and administration. Despite the various reform efforts, the scheme is 
still faced with financial sustainability. As noted by Wang et al. (2017:1), the “total claims 
payments rose from GHc7.6 million in 2005 to over GHc1.07 billion in 2014 with an annual 
deficit of GHc300 million”. This continues to be a major source of worry to the government. 
Even at that, the scheme is still faced with myriad challenges. Also, in the perception of 
healthcare providers, “satisfaction with timeliness of reimbursement decreased from 
approximately 14% in 2012 to less than 10% in 2014” (Alhassan et al., 2016a:6). Also, as of 
2013, “Ghana has about 11 doctors, nurses and midwives per 10,000 population, less than half 
of the number (23 per 10,000 population) recommended by WHO for attaining MDGs” 
(Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, 2013:18). This tends to limit the level of 
success of the programme because of the inadequate health workforce. 
 
All these challenges tend to suggest a change of policy rather than a review that is characteristic 
of Ghana’s NHIS. Consequently, Oxfam International (2011:1) argued that the healthcare 
system in Ghana is unfair and inefficient, and advised the government to “replace it with the 
tax-based system that would be free at the point of delivery for all, based on rights and not 
ability to pay”. This is because “every Ghanaian pays for the NHIS through VAT, but over 
80% of the people were excluded as of 2011” (Oxfam International, 2011:1). It is very clear 
that the population of enrollees exempt from paying premium is very high - 70% of total 
enrollees as of 2014 (Yete et al., 2015:501; Wang et al., 2017:1) yet, “the scheme has not been 
able to achieve one of its goal of eradicating inequities between the rich and poor in terms of 
access to healthcare services” (Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, 2013:17). 
Thus, the call by Oxfam International for free healthcare for all citizens seems achievable going 
by the cost incurred on those that are exempt from paying the premium in the existing policy 
(see Oxfam International, 2011:7). 
 
The Ghanaian NHIS has financial and operational challenges ranging from “cost, political 
interference, corruption” (Fusheini, 2016:550), “technical capacity, the distribution of 
healthcare facilities and workforce, benefits package, community engagement, monitoring 
mechanism and exemption policy” (Alhassan et al., 2016b:1). Given the various challenges, 
Mathauer et al. (2017:iv) suggested that “for countries with traditional CBHI schemes, an 
option is to integrate or merge existing schemes into a single national pool with decentralised 
arms or closely interconnected pools beyond the community level, which can provide similar 
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benefits packages and act – with national support – as strategic purchasers of health services 
while maintaining local accountability”. Invariably, Ghana appears to have acted in line with 
this suggestion. However, the performance of the NHIS seemingly reveals that the suggestion 
might not effectively lead towards the provision of equal access to health and attainment of 
UHC (with adequate coverage of the poor and the vulnerable groups). The experience in Ghana 
“holds myriad lessons for countries striving to increase access to affordable healthcare, at 
national level financing and risk pooling; the merging of centralised authorities with 
decentralised administration and purchasing of health services from public and private health 
providers” (Blanchet & Acheampong, 2013:2). 
2.6.2 CBHI: The Rwandan Experience 
Origin 
The first form of CBHI in Rwanda (Muvandimwe association) was established in 1966 in the 
former province of Kibungo for the purpose of attending to specific health goals (Kalisa et al., 
2015:15). As experienced in Ghana and many other African countries, the post-independence 
provision of free healthcare services in Rwanda was terminated by the IMF/World Bank 
imposed SAPs, and user-fees was adopted in the 1980s. After the 1994 genocide, which left 
the country with loss of lives and infrastructures, “mutual aid initiatives emerged in the health 
sector as a community response to user-fees in public and mission health facilities” (Diop & 
Butera, 2005:1). As part of efforts to revive and entrench the solidarity among the people, 
CBHI schemes were established in various communities in the country by community 
members.  
The schemes continued to benefit members, “and in 1999, the CBHI also known as Mutuelles 
de Sante was piloted in three districts (Byumba, Kabgayi and Kabutare) with two control 
districts [Bugesera and Kibungo]” (Woldemichael et al., 2016:5). It was established as a 
national policy in 2004 (USAID, 2016:1). Besides the need to provide healthcare for the people, 
especially the poor, the CBHI programme was also used as an instrument of social cohesion 
for promoting national reconciliation and reconstruction as well as promoting self-sufficiency 
(Antunes et al., 2009:59). However, it is argued that the establishment of the programme is 
part of the strategies of the ruling party (Rwandan Patriotic Front) to bring development and 
foster regime legitimacy and deter possible challenge (Chemouni, 2018:93).  
 
Design and Implementation 
In Rwanda, apart from the CBHI schemes which cover individuals in the formal and informal 
sectors, other schemes include “Rwandaise d’Assurance Maladie (RAMA) for the civil 
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servants and employees of state-owned enterprises, Military Medical Insurance (MMI) for the 
military personnel and private health insurance schemes” (International Labour Organization, 
2016:1). Majority of the people are enrolled in the CBHI programme, although, enrolment 
became compulsory in 2006. The programme is claimed to cover 90% of the healthcare costs 
at public and non-profit health centres (Rickard et al., 2018:1604) and enrollees can access care 
anywhere in the country (i.e. patient roaming system) (Kalisa et al., 2015:31). Other health 
insurance schemes are made to contribute financially to the CBHI programme. In policy 
decisions and implementation, the Rwandan government took control above foreign donors to 
the programme (Iyer et al., 2018:204).  
 
Before 2007, “enrolment was on a household basis, and since 2007, enrolment has been on an 
individual basis with each member paying a subsidised flat rate of RwF1,000 (USD1.5) per 
year and co-payment of RwF200 at clinics and 10% at hospitals per episode of illness” 
(Woldemicheal et al., 2016:6). For financial sustainability, in 2010, a three-tier premium 
scaling system (called ubudehe classification) was introduced, following a revision of the 
CBHI policy, whereby households are assigned to one of six categories based on their income 
and assets, and premium ranges from RwF2,000 to RwF7,000 (ILO, 2016:2). This 
classification is further collapsed into 3 CBHI categories and Category I (those living in abject 
poverty and very poor) pays RwF2,000 (3 USD), Category II (poor and resourceful poor) pays 
RwF3,000 (4.50 USD). In contrast, Category III (food rich and money rich) pays RwF7,000 
(10.50 USD) (Iyakaremye, 2012:17). The cost of care for Category I (vulnerable groups and 
the poor) “are fully covered by the government and development partners” (Kalisa et al., 
2015:30). In the enrolment, 24.8% are in category I, 65.9% are in category II, and 0.64% 
constitute Category III (Chemouni, 2018:93).  
 
The CBHI programme delivers services at different levels of need. According to the policy, the 
health centres (provide primary and preventive healthcare as well as pharmaceutical and basic 
laboratory supports), the district hospitals (provide preventive, curative and promotional 
healthcare for patients referred from primary healthcare centres) and tertiary hospitals (provide 
specialised health services for patients referred from districts hospitals) (ILO, 2016:3; USAID, 
2016:4). In contrast to the Kwara and Ghana CBHI, the Rwanda CBHI requires co-payment 





Major Achievements  
Chemouni (2018:1) noted that “Rwanda is the country with the highest enrolment in health 
insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa”. Authors such as Lu et al. (2012:1), Sibomana (2014:38) and 
Jowett et al. (2016:14) commended the programme. In a study on the programme, Shimless 
(2010:14) found increased healthcare utilisation and reduced catastrophic health expenditure 
among the enrollees compared to the non-enrollees. Also, “between 2003 and 2007, the number 
of health centres increased from 88 to 403 across the country” (Kalisa et al., 2015:26). The 
ILO (2016:1) claimed that “as of 2011, 96% of the Rwandan population was covered by health 
insurance and the CBHI had the highest coverage, rising from 7% in 2003 to 91% in 2011”. 
However, Kalisa et al. (2015:36) reported that the CBHI coverage reduced to 74% in 2013.  
Chemouni (2018:91) linked the increased coverage between 2006 and 2012 to “a grant of $34 
million secured from the USAID’s Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(GFATM)”. This facilitated the enrolment of more people, mainly the poor. Furthermore, 
Rickard et al. (2018:1607) found in a recent study that patients enrolled in the CBHI 
programme had decreased the risk of catastrophic health expenditure for undergoing a surgical 
procedure (i.e. peritonitis). This feat was partly achieved through an increased financial 
commitment by the government and donors (Lu et al., 2012:2) as well as community 
engagement and aggressive awareness exercise. 
Weaknesses and Challenges 
The Rwandan CBHI is also faced with a series of challenges. Most of the challenges identified 
in 2010 reviewed Health Insurance Policy are still evident and yet unresolved. Recent studies 
by Rubogora (2017:1), Chemouni (2018:92) and (Mukangendo et al., 2018:3) revealed that the 
enrolment in the CBHI programme is decreasing. For instance, the coverage steadily declined 
to 79% in 2016, from over 90% in 2011 (USAID, 2016:4). This is partly due to an increase in 
premium and reduced quality of care (Rubogora, 2017:1). More so, recent finding by 
Chemouni (2018) that CBHI officials in Rwanda usually tamper with enrolment data to keep 
the figures high is another contentious revelation challenging the claimed ‘huge success’ of the 
programme.  
Similarly, the CBHI Household Survey conducted in 2013 revealed that 67% of Category II 
enrollees did not find it convenient to pay premiums and 22% resolved not to renew enrolment 
in the following year (see Kalisa et al. 2015:38). Also, this category of enrollees often resorted 
to savings or sell household items to finance the premiums (Kalisa et al., 2015:48). 
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Furthermore, 89% of the non-enrolled respondents in the survey were previously enrolled, and 
nearly all of them said they stopped because they could not afford the premiums (see Collins 
et al., 2016:7). This is because, as of 2016, “38.2% of the Rwanda population live below the 
poverty line” (World Bank, 2020a). These question the CBHI’s strength and ability to deliver 
UHC.  
Although Woldemichael et al. (2016:3) admitted that the programme has significantly 
increased out-patient utilisation rates, they expressed some concerns that the subsidised 
premium was not affordable for most poor people, especially large families. On the evidence 
of improved healthcare service utilisation, Kutzin (2012:868) argued that “this is hardly news 
and could not serve as a veritable basis for CBHI policy recommendation because a programme 
can benefit its members at the expense of the rest of the population”. Therefore, “the goal is to 
institute a health system that gives access to the entire population and deliver UHC” (Kutzin 
(2012:868).  
The ubudehe system remains an imperfect mechanism for determining who the government 
pays their premium (Sibomana, 2014:41). The inaccuracy of this system has left some 
individuals uncovered, most of who belong to the low economic status and are not eligible for 
the public subsidy (Musabwasoni & Oudshoorn, 2019:60). Though the premiums are income-
sensitive through the ubudehe classification, nevertheless, “co-payments which are determined 
by healthcare providers remain unaffordable for many poor people” (Wang et al., 2017:368). 
In this regard, Chemouni (2018:95) found that enrolment subscription and co-payment are 
consciously retained by the ruling party and the government to configure the mindset of 
Rwandans away from ‘culture of assistance’ because free things are dangerous. Nevertheless, 
no matter how good, the country seems unripe for this policy decision due to its poverty rate 
and the much reliance on the programme on foreign aids. In a systematic study, Mebratie et al. 
(2013:17), found that “despite the avowed aim of social inclusion, the ultra-poor (exempt from 
payment) did not have access to the CBHI schemes because of inability to bear other costs (e.g. 
transportation) associated with accessing healthcare”. 
Experience at the healthcare facilities seems to be unsatisfactory. In most cases, enrollees 
complained about poor courtesy and quality of service, weak customer care, regular stock-out 
of drugs, embezzlement, over-charging and over-prescription (Habiyonizeye, 2013:30; 
Nyandekwe, 2014; Sibomana, 2014:42; Rubogora, 2017:2). Often, enrollees are sent to buy 
drugs at private pharmacies at a high cost (Kalisa et al., 2015:42).  Further, Woldemicheal et 
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al. (2016:17) found high spending on drugs among enrollees because not all drugs are covered 
by the CBHI programme. The programme which is aimed at expanding access to healthcare 
across the country has not done enough in terms of engaging qualified healthcare workers, 
especially in rural areas. For instance, “the number of people allocated to a nurse is an average 
of 1 nurse to 2,219 people” (Rubogora, 2017:2). Consequently, enrollees had to wake up very 
early and endure long queue hours before medical consultation and treatment (Rubogora, 
2017:2).  
Humuza (2011) and (Uche, 2016:35) decried the heavy reliance on government and donor 
contributions. Similarly, Iyakaremye (2012) and Mukangendo et al. (2018:3) expressed 
concerns about the financial sustainability of the programme. These concerns might be due to 
an inconsistent flow of fund from the government and donor agencies into the programme. 
Moreso, “as per many sub-Saharan African countries, Rwanda is highly aid-dependent” 
(Sekabaraga et al., 2011:61). According to the USAID (2016:2), the programme is funded by 
62% of foreign aid while 38% is generated from domestic sources, with premium providing 
only 18%.  
There is also national advocacy of additional essential services yet to be included in the package 
(Nyandekwe, 2014). This is because there is still an array of healthcare challenges among the 
people that are not covered by the programme. The implication is that only citizens with 
financial capacity (outside the health insurance package) would be able to access healthcare. 
In contrast, others are left to adopt any other source of care. This, however, challenges the 
success of the CBHI policy. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Health reform is a continuous process across countries, and health insurance has been 
implemented for decades, mainly in developed countries. The various health insurance models 
appear not relevant to the realities of developing countries. CBHI is a relatively recent health 
financing strategy recommended for implementation in LMICs, mostly located in Asia and 
Africa.  Specifically, it was employed and targeted towards achieving UHC. Over the years, 
the experience from implementation in some of these countries has generated mixed results 
(positive and negative). 
In some cases, the coverage of the programme remains stagnant while it declines in other 
settings. The worse situation is the kind experienced in rural Kwara in Nigeria where a CBHI 
programme collapsed or ceased to operate. Hence, a need for a closer look at the policy to 
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examine its suitability for Nigeria and other developing countries. Thus, the chapter reviews 
the literature on the different health financing reforms options at the global level. It also 
examines the strengths and weaknesses of the CBHI model of health financing citing 
experiences from Nigeria, Ghana and Rwanda. Again, this review reveals the interplay of 
various forces involved in the shaping of the health reform programmes in Nigeria. Therefore, 
to have a clearer understanding, Walt and Gilson health policy triangle was adopted as a 
conceptual framework. The framework which is discussed in the next chapter will assist in 
understanding the relationships and roles of different stakeholders that implemented the 




















The chapter deals with the conceptual framework adopted in the study. It serves as a guide for 
understanding and explaining the various narratives and discourses emanating from the data 
collected for the study. As noted in Chapter 2, health policy or healthcare reform involves a 
complex and contested process that requires careful and systematic analysis. The ideas and 
goals of actors with the ‘strongest’ ability to influence the process dominates. This, therefore, 
has implications for policy success or failure.  Thus, the framework provides the basis to 
answer the research questions and helps to unpack the various elements that informed the 
design, implementation and stoppage of the CBHI programme in Kwara State Nigeria. 
3.2 Walt and Gilson Model 
This study adopts a health policy triangle, a model developed by Gill Walt and Lucy Gilson, 
as a conceptual framework for framing and analysing the data we collected from the field. The 
model came into existence as a result of the growing crisis in the healthcare system and the 
neglect or limited application of health policy analysis in the developing countries. As a 
“simplified representation of policy reality” (Hagenaars et al., 2017:2), it also seeks to provide 
a detailed analysis of health policy process and how it influences policy effectiveness (Walt & 
Gilson, 1994; Sanneving et al., 2013; Juma et al., 2016).  For Alostad et al. (2019:3-4), the 
model is effective in investigating “the context within which the policy was developed (i.e. 
context for and reasons why the policy was developed); the policy process (i.e. how the policy 
was developed and is being implemented); the policy content (i.e. how the content was 
formulated); and the actors involved (i.e. who were they and what role they played in the 
process)”. These various elements are interrelated and influence each other during the policy 
cycle.  
The model is relevant to the study in that it was developed purposely for “health policy analysis 
in developing countries” (Walt & Gilson, 1994:353). “It acknowledges the non-linearity but 
incremental nature of policymaking and systematically explores the somewhat neglected place 
of politics in health policy” (Sanni et al., 2019:377). Further, it gives “adequate attention to 
uncovering the reasons why particular policies are adopted at the expense of technically more 
efficient alternatives” (Smith-Merry et al., 2007:2). It helps to understand policy success or 
failure. More so, it is partly designed “for analysing data produced in scientific research on 
health” (Alharbi et al., 2016:234) and can be used “retrospectively – to understand the process 
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of health policy reform better – and prospectively – to plan for more effective policy 
implementation” (Walt & Gilson, 1994:355). In this study, however, it is used retrospectively, 
and it serves as a conceptual framework; not a theory because it offers a broad framework for 
understanding the study. Therefore, it is a conceptual device for organising the data obtained 
in the study.  
According to Walt and Gilson (1994:354), “much health policy wrongly focuses attention on 
the content of reform and neglect the actors involved in policy reform (at international, national 
and sub-national levels), the process contingent on developing and implementing change and 
the context within which policy is developed”. They further argued that “the traditional focus 
on the content of policy neglects the other dimensions of process, actors, and context which 
can make a difference between effective and ineffective policy choice and implementation” 
(Walt and Gilson, 1994:353). “The policy setting is ever-changing, as well as relationships 
between partners (including policy networks) and institutions because policy is a dynamic 
process” (Walt & Gilson, 1994:366; Gilson & Raphaely, 2008:295). Thus, there is a need to 
“pay attention to the processes of developing policy as well as how the policy issue arises, how 
decisions are made in the policy development and lastly, how the policy is implemented” 
(Taegtmeyer et al., 2011:3). 
Figure 3.1: Health Policy Triangle 
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The four dimensions of health analysis, according to them, are as follows: 
Context: According to Exworthy (2008:319), “context is the milieu within which 
interventions are mediated; it therefore shapes and is shaped by external stimuli (policy)”. 
Simply put, it involves the situational factors (national and international – events, agreements, 
treaties and resources) that affect health policies. They are historical (legacy of colonialism), 
social, cultural, political (governance structure, the system of accountability and power 
distribution), economic (macro-economic situation and policy), religious, structural, 
administrative (skills and structures), environmental factors (Walt & Gilson, 1994:361; Etiaba 
et al., 2015:2; Gilson & Agyepong, 2018:38; Al-Ansari et al., 2019:193; Sanni et al., 
2019:376) and other systemic factors that may affect the eventual policy content (Buse et al., 
2005:4; Hagenaars et al., 2017:3; Mji et al., 2017:5).  
Put differently, Collins et al. (1999:72) explained that health policies are developed within a 
complex milieu and not in a vacuum, thus, understanding the context assists in the analysis of 
the “issues on the agenda and how the policies are formulated and implemented”. Further, 
they summarised the “context of contemporary health policy reform” into six: “economic and 
financial policy; processes of social and economic change; demographic and epidemiological 
change; politics and the political regime; ideology, public policy and the public sector; and 
external factors”. These factors may be formal or informal (Sumner et al., 2011:5).  
For instance, “the economic context involves the country’s economic status as well as the 
global and local financial situation and conflicting development agendas” (Sanni et al., 
2017:376). Further, the socio-political context of a nation has “a significant influence over 
actors’ values and interests, and consequently, their reactions to policies including their 
opportunities to participate in decision-making” (Gilson & Agyepong, 2018:37). Going 
further, the political context as described by Araujo and Filho (2001:207) is “the space in 
which the flow of power occurs amongst distinct groups in society”. It accounts for “who is 
ruling, who is in support, who is in opposition, who is benefiting and who is losing throughout 
the policy process” (Araujo & Filho, 2001:207).  
Context also includes the neoliberal policy framework that “introduced new tensions into the 
health policy domain” (Walt & Gilson, 1994:357) and mostly pushed through market-centric 
strategies. Hence, context can facilitate and constrain a health policy (Agyepong & Adjei, 
2008:151; Etiaba et al., 2015:8; Mirzoev et al., 2015:62; Seale et al., 2017:2). On health policy 
transfer, Walt et al. (2004:206) noted that complex policies (involving long and iterative 
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process) are often simplified and marketed across the world as ‘global best practice’ 
(especially, to countries with weak healthcare systems) by international agents through policy 
networks. They added, however, that “the process cannot be described as linear, rational, 
bottom-up or top-down, coercive or voluntary, but may display any of those characteristics at 
different points”.  
The policy transfers are usually easy to be orchestrated because the contexts provide the 
opportunities to do so. A common technique employed by international actors for influencing 
health reform is to leverage on their ‘expertise’ to justify and facilitate training programmes 
for policymakers usually channelled along ‘desired’ goals (see Reich et al., 2016:214). This 
is done for a wide range of policymakers across the world, and they are lured into adopting 
particular policies when they embark on reforms. 
In their work, Agyepong and Adjei (2008:151) noted that the individual characteristics of 
health policy actors (responsible for policy formulation) “such as their ideological 
predispositions, professional expertise and knowledge, feedback from similar policy 
situations, position and power resources, political and institutional commitments, loyalties and 
personal attributes and goals form part of the context of policymaking”. This is because all 
these features tend to influence the understanding of the policy context, which is the basis for 
policy formulation. For instance, “the policy context may influence which policy ideas are 
dominant” (Sumner et al., 2011:6) and find their ways into the policy content through the 
policy actors. 
According to Collins et al. (1999:80), “the interpretation of context is not politically neutral - 
it forms part of the political character of the policymaking system”. While interpretations 
based on scientific research evidence (mostly involving the epistemic community who may 
focus on issues of interest to the funders) often appear to be objective. Dobrow et al. 
(2004:213) argued that what constitutes evidence and how we utilise them are affected by 
both internal and external contextual factors. Ideology is given priority over evidence (Baum 
& Fisher, 2014:220). This includes the tactical use of the media to shape and influence the 
understanding and interpretations of policy problems (Katikireddi & Hilton, 2015:126; Etiaba 
et al., 2015:8).  
Consequently, once some actors can weave their preferred goals into the interpretation of the 
policy context, there is a likelihood that it will find its way into the policy content. 
Significantly, the policy context determines what eventually constitutes the policy content, 
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the roles that can be played or cannot be played by the policy actors, and the process that will 
characterise the policy from development to implementation and evaluation. Therefore, the 
context must be well-understood.  
Actors: The actors are in the middle of the framework because they act as the drivers of other 
components in the framework. The framework explains that various actors play important 
roles (‘interest-based’) in formulating and implementing healthcare policies. The roles of 
these actors influence the other processes and outcome of the policy. Thus, success or failure 
of such policy is determined by the actions or inactions of the various actors. Araujo and Filho 
(2001:213) explained that “formulators, implementers, supporters or opposition add their 
ideological values, political views and practical proposals to the process and, by doing this 
they determine the course of a policy process”.  
The actors (state and non-state) include key decision-makers, individuals, organisations, 
politicians, professionals, policy entrepreneurs, global civil societies, networks or groups that 
are influential in decision making (Sumner et al., 2011:5; Gilson & Agyepong, 2018:46) 
within the health policy space. Both for the for-profit private sector (multinational 
corporations) and the not-for-profit organisations are increasingly playing significant roles in 
the health policy arena (Walt et al., 2008:309). According to Walt and Gilson (1994:362-3), 
among other actors, the role of civil service is quite instrumental in the policy arena because 
of the strategic position they occupy, as bureaucrats, in the implementation of reforms; and 
this makes it necessary to focus on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats.  
More often, health policy actors negotiate with a lot of actors at the local and foreign levels 
(Green, 2000:58; Exworthy, 2008:323; Gilson, 2012:29). At times, actors with related goals 
collaborate against other actors within the negotiation space (Liefeld & Schneider, 2012:741) 
to influence the policy decisions. Actors may also include ‘experienced’ individuals recruited 
by foreign actors from local health sectors to represent their agencies and foster their interests 
(Marchal et al., 2009:3). However, the extent to which actors can influence policy depends on 
their interest, actual or perceived power [among other things] (Buse et al., 2005:10; Lister & 
Lee, 2013:74; Katikireddi & Hilton, 2015:131). Moreover, it is quite difficult to assess the 
power of actors which can be tangible (financial, votes, organisational capacities etc.) or 
intangible (control of information, credibility, position etc.) (Bossert et al., 2007:48). 
Meanwhile, non-state actors (mostly international actors) often leverage on the use of their 
knowledge to advance their preferences during the policymaking process “in three ways: 
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instrumentally, conceptually and strategically” (Dolowitz et al., 2019:3). Unfortunately, 
“international organisations and states are rarely challenged by domestic or state actors who 
are expected to alter the power relations towards national interest” (Dolowitz et al., 2019:3). 
This is because in most cases, the domestic actors (i.e. government representatives and others) 
lack the technical know-how or pre-requisite knowledge – even in some developed countries 
as claimed by Howlett (2009:153). As is to be expected, this has a devastating effect on the 
entire policy cycle as it becomes difficult to negotiate gainfully with the other stakeholders 
involved in the policy design (Onoka et al., 2015:1113; Alharbi et al., 2016:236). As a result, 
stakeholders (civil society organisations including advocacy groups, donor agencies etc.) that 
should have limited roles appear to play outsize roles in policymaking (Lister & Lee, 2013:78) 
mainly because of their financial and epistemic powers (Khan et al., 2018:218).  
Individuals within the public service (politicians and bureaucrats) are very influential due to 
their positions and experience. While discussing policy failure and success in developing 
countries, Aryee (2000) [cited in Agyepong and Adjei (2008:152)], identified two kinds of 
unusual state actors (i.e. saints and wizards) that are capable of actualising policy success: “(i) 
progressive and committed politicians and bureaucrats (saints) (ii) supported by appropriate 
policy analysts with available and reliable information (wizards) to manage hostile and 
apathetic groups (demons) from infiltrating the policy arena”. He explained that “demons are 
a very small set of public officials and individuals who engage in corruption or rent-seeking 
activities and they have to be neutralised” to achieve a meaningful result. Further, the demons 
include anyone who seeks to subvert the policymaking efforts at any point from agenda-setting 
to implementation and evaluation. Regarding resistance to health policy implementation, 
Gilson (2019:239) argued that “the task is well beyond the responsibility of health financing 
and policy analysis units in the public sector”. Therefore, a well-constituted team (with the 
necessary expertise) in the public bureaucracy must be directed to develop political strategies 
for managing health policy reform. This shows the demanding nature of successful health 
policymaking.  
Some domestic actors have, however, been able to limit the influence of international actors 
within their policy space in countries like Morroco, Tunisia and Rwanda (Allal, 2010 cited in 
Dolowitz et al. 2019:5; Chemouni, 2018) because they were able to focus on their desired 
goals. More so, Tantivess and Walt (2008:336) found in Thailand that the involvement of non-
state actor (from national and international communities) in agenda setting, policy formulation 
and implementation yielded positive results. They, however, noted that this singular case does 
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not suggest a change in trend from the prevailing negative impact of policy interference, 
mainly by international actors. Besides, the Thailand programme is not a comprehensive 
national health policy reform but an interventionist programme to widen anti-retroviral 
therapy coverage. More often, international actors tend to ‘dismember’ and disorient the 
healthcare systems, especially in the LMICs. 
Content: This refers to the actual policy being designed, including its identified goals. It 
focuses on the various units and elements that constitute the policy agenda. This element “is 
the substance of a policy which details its constituent parts” (Hagenaars et al., 2017:3). Put 
differently, “content refers to the object of policy and policy analysis” (Janovsky & Cassells, 
1996 cited in Exworthy, 2008:316) and policy can “be expressed in a whole series of 
instruments such as laws, practices, statements, regulations etc.” (Buse et al., 2005:8). Sanni 
et al. (2019:376) noted that “content examines the rationale for developing the policy, policy 
objectives, types of interventions (upstream, midstream, or downstream), population-level 
coverage (universal or targeted), implicit or explicit equity goals (improve the health of 
vulnerable groups, reduce health gaps between the most and least vulnerable groups, or flatten 
the social gradient in health across the entire population), and mechanisms through which the 
policy is actualised”. More succinctly, Araujo and Filho (2001:205) noted that policy content 
details the problems aimed to be changed, programmes and projects involved, actions to be 
taken, as well as targets and resources required. Therefore, analysing the content helps to 
identify the “policy's perspective, impact and adequacy of its measures and resources” (Araujo 
& Filho, 2001:205). 
Buse et al. (2005:54) argued that “part of the failure of health reform programmes is linked to 
the undue emphasis placed on the technical content of reform at the expense of the politics of 
the reform process”. Equally, Beland (2009:712) submitted that with political support, 
ideational processes could assist in achieving positive policy outcomes because it helps to 
shape reform agenda, the content of reform proposal as well as reform imperatives and 
ultimately, “shape the ways actors perceive their environment and interests”. Further, he 
argued that if the policy imperatives are well-framed and the inherent values are amplified, it 
becomes possible to take charge of the policy generation space. In some cases, the framing is 
done using mass and social media (see Katikireddi & Hilton, 2015:125) to build wide 
understanding and acceptance among the people.  
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More so, the quality and comprehensiveness of the health policy have significant implication 
for its effectiveness during implementation, notwithstanding the influence of other factors 
involved. It often evolves to resolve healthcare challenge or to improve the status quo. Key 
policy actors are responsible for what constitutes policy content. However, as a result of the 
complexity of the policy space, involving too many actors, it is usually not easy to precisely 
point out the weaknesses of a healthcare system (Marchal et al., 2009:4; Szlezack et al., 
2010:1) to set the appropriate agenda for transformative health reform. Importantly, if the 
context is well interpreted there is a tendency that the policy content will be suitable.  
Process: This refers to the various steps and stages involved in health policymaking. It 
consists of the formulation and implementation of health policy (Srivastava et al., 2018:2), 
relationships among the various “levels of governments, strategies for policy implementation 
and resources implications” (Araujo & Filho, 2001:205). For Buse et al. (2005:13), “process 
refers to the way in which policies are initiated, developed or formulated, negotiated, 
communicated, implemented and evaluated”. In their work, Walt and Gilson (1994:366) 
contended that policy analysis must not ignore the how of policy reform to have a clear 
overview of the health policy landscape, most especially due to the technical orientation of 
the health sector. They further argued that regardless of the rational debates advanced by 
professionals or technocrats during the policy design, the adoption and implementation is 
mainly a political decision. This decision depends on who has the most influence among the 
various actors (which often include the international actors in developing countries in the 
forms of donors, technical partners/advisers, etc.). Therefore, “policy analysis cannot also 
continue to ignore the influence of values and group interests – the who of policy reform – on 
policy choice and implementation practices” (Walt and Gilson, 1994:366). Besides, this 
influence may involve “a variety of goals from the adoption of a new policy to minor 
adjustments to institutional arrangements in current policies” (Weible et al., 2012:1). They 
are orchestrated often, in ways that the influence goes unnoticed. The influence or direct 
involvement of the donors in the nation’s health policy priorities becomes highly significant 
if the countries rely substantially on external funding (Khan et al., 2018:216).  
The form of implementation might be top-down, bottom-up or combination of both (Araujo 
& Filho, 2001:205; Hardee, 2012:8); the stakeholders never lose focus on their interests. The 
policy process also relates to the bureaucratic and administrative responsibilities in policy 
planning and implementation. Therefore, the phases through which the health policy goes 
through determine the policy outcome (success or failure). Weible et al. (2012:6-7) argued 
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that understanding the policy process requires the ability to map out the policy sub-systems 
and macro-system. For them, the sub-systems would include the key stakeholders in the 
healthcare sector at various levels (community, local and national levels) who work 
interdependently. 
On the other hand, the macro-system considers how the constitutional rules, structure and 
culture give room for changes in parts of the system or sub-system (Weible et al., 2012:6-7). 
Therefore, this creates multiple access points for actors to influence health policies. For 
instance, those resisting change may lobby with actors constituting various sub-systems to 
oppose a change at the macro-level. In contrast, those working for change may frustrate the 
successful implementation of health policy in certain places to reveal the deficiencies in the 
status quo.  
As part of the political motives of health policy, Ballart and Fuentes (2019:352) noted that 
“the interest could be electoral (e.g. where re-election of the incumbent party is dependent on 
demonstrating progress in the implementation or reversal of certain policies) and corporative 
(e.g. professionals affected by reforms or changes in the organisation of health services)”. 
Notwithstanding the presence of scientific evidence supporting policy, it might still be resisted 
due to the absence of broad support from the public or actors whose interests are threatened 
(Brownson et al., 2006:361; Bossert et al., 2007:46). Also, Dolowitz et al. (2019:8) cautioned 
that delays in policy process can lead to ‘policy contamination’ and that “the more control one 
actor (or set of actors) has in the policy process and the better positioned they are to guide a 
preferred option through the policy process, the more likely the policy outcomes will be in 
their interest”. Thus, local or state actors (government representatives) are required to be 
active to be in control of the policy negotiation space.   
Given the above, Sanni et al. (2019:386) opined that it is better to use the word Strategy rather 
than Process to clearly expose “how the various stakeholders in health policy make intentional 
choices to maximise benefits in a given policy context and content”. Okuonzi and Macrae 
(1995:122) concluded from their study that “while (at times) the content of international 
prescriptions to strengthen the health system may not be bad in itself, the process by which 
they are applied potentially threatens national sovereignty and weakens mechanisms for 
ensuring accountability”. At the policy implementation stage, “some actors leverage on 
certain possible factors (i.e. ambiguous objectives, poor communication between responsible 
agencies, inadequate time and resources in implementation units, and problems in work 
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environments etc.) to adjust or influence or reject the policy” (Hudson & Lowe 2004 cited in 
Tantivess & Walt 2008: 330). 
3.3 Application of the Framework 
The framework assists in understanding how economic conditions, religion, politics and other 
situational factors affect the CBHI policy in Kwara State (context); helps to explain the roles 
of the Kwara State Government, Health Insurance Fund [that introduced the CBHI policy 
option], PharmAccess Foundation [the foreign implementing partner responsible for pushing 
the HIF agenda], Hygeia Nigeria Limited [the local implementing partner] etc. (actors); assists 
in examining the design and implementation as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the 
policy (content); and finally, helps in analysing the entire processes involved in the 
programme from agenda-setting to implementation (process). Further, the framework 
provides an understanding of the interplay between the various elements (concepts) 
concerning the collapse of the Kwara CBHI. 
The framework was adopted by Green (2000) to explore health sector reform in Thailand, 
Peters et al. (2003) to assess the healthcare system in India, Khan (2006) to analyse health 
policy in Pakistan and May et al. (2013) used it in their study on palliative care in Ireland. 
Also, Gleeson (2011) used the model to explain the mutual impact between health policy and 
public health nursing in the UK. It was also used by Jardali et al. (2014) in a study on nursing 
practice in Lebanon; they found that the adoption of international policy recommendation may 
be risky especially without consideration for local stakeholders and contextual factors. In a 
comparative study, Muslim (2014) adopted the model to analyse oral healthcare policy 
development in Australia and South Africa; he found that the policy development structures 
in the countries are deeply rooted in their socio-cultural contexts. Further, Osore (2015) used 
it in analysing the implementation process of a healthcare programme in Botswana. He found 
that the government was highly committed but the programme failed due to poor coordination 
and some other sustainability challenges. More recently, the model was also used in healthcare 
studies conducted by Juma et al. (2016), Tesfazghi et al. (2016), Mukanu et al. (2017), Maluka 
et al. (2018), Mokitimi et al. (2018), Al-Ansari et al. (2019), Alostad et al. (2019) among 
others. Specifically, in Nigeria, Onoka et al. (2015) adapted the model in analysing the 
emergence of the NHIS and found that the pace of policy process and UHC-related 
achievements are largely contingent on the interest of political leaders. In essence, the 




The chapter discussed the conceptual framework guiding the study. It consists of four essential 
elements (context, actor, content and process). It draws attention to areas which are often 
neglected in the course of policy analysis but are necessary to be given attention. It also shows 
how the process of policymaking can be infiltrated (due to situational factors) using a series of 
channels and how the policy space can be convoluted by different actors who are pursuing 
different goals. Specifically, it helps to deconstruct the complexities around the introduction 
and stoppage of the CBHI programme in Kwara State Nigeria. It shows how healthcare policy 
can be understood and how to effectively implement by giving attention to important areas of 
the policy process. While this study adopts the framework for analysing a policy that was 
implemented (retrospectively), the framework also has the potentials for informing the 


























The chapter covers the research methodology. It is the scientific study of the conduct of 
research. According to Kothari (2004:8), “research methodology is a science of studying how 
research is done scientifically, which equips the researcher with various steps that are 
generally adopted in studying research problems along with the logic behind them”. 
Essentially, research helps in the discovery or production of knowledge. Often, the worldview 
of a researcher is greatly influenced by the paradigm (positivism, interpretivism or critical 
realism) to which they align themselves (Doyle et al., 2009:176). However, the nature of a 
study plays a significant role in determining the paradigm to be adopted in the study. Thus, 
this chapter details the methodology that guides the research. 
4.2 Research Paradigms 
Research paradigm refers to “a set of beliefs or principles about the world that guide people’s 
actions regarding how to go about their research” (Kivunja & Kuyini, 2017:26). According to 
Kuhn (1962) who originated the term, ‘research paradigm’, it is an analytical lens for viewing 
the world and a framework for understanding human experience. It is a general and established 
framework that guides the research process based on human beliefs and experience. For 
Greene and Hall (2010:121), it includes “the philosophical issues of ontology or what is the 
nature of the social world we study, epistemology or what counts as warranted knowledge, 
methodology or how to generate and justify such knowledge, and axiology or what is the 
nature and role of values in the social inquiry”. 
4.2.1 Positivism 
According to Ferrante (2013:20), “the term positivism was coined by Auguste Comte (1798-
1857) who used the word to advocate the development of sociology as a science, but in the 
context of a shift in societal belief systems from theological to metaphysical and finally, 
scientific”. Comte was optimistic that sociology would become the ‘queen of science’ to gain 
recognition and universal status. Positivism is generally described “as an approach that seeks 
to apply the natural science model of research to investigating social phenomena” (Nudzor, 
2009:116). Positivism offers unambiguous and accurate knowledge. Further, “it assumes that 
social reality is made up of objective facts that value-free researchers can precisely measure 
and use statistics to test causal theories” (Neuman, 2004 cited in Tuli, 2010). Positivists seek 
to formulate laws that serve as the basis for prediction and generalisation (Scotland, 2012:10). 
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Positivist sociologists argue that positivist methodologies should be adopted to “study social 
behaviour in ways similar to those used in the natural sciences to study behaviour in the natural 
world” (Livesey, 2006:2). They see the researcher as external to the research setting and often 
use a large sample from the population to test relationships among variables. They use 
“standardised tests, closed-ended questionnaires and description of phenomena using 
standardised observation tools” (Pring, 2000 cited in Shah & Al-Bargi, 2013:225) among 
others, for data collection while analysis is usually done using statistical tools. 
However, this approach has been criticised of not having deep insight and knowledge of 
phenomena. Also, methods of data analysis are quantitative. In addition, Cohen et al. (2007:8) 
maintained that “the approach is nomothetic because it is characterised by procedures and 
methods which are designed to discover general laws”. More so, no scientific evaluation or 
explanation of human behaviour is ever complete (Berliner, 2002:20). Instead, methods of 
human sciences require detailed understanding and interpretation (Dilthey, 1976 cited in 
Swingewood, 1984:130). 
4.2.2 Interpretivism 
The interpretivists “reject the methodological monism of positivism and refuse to view the 
pattern set by natural sciences as an ideal for a rational understanding of reality” (Nudzor, 
2009:117). According to Tubey et al. (2015:225), “the nature of interpretivist inquiry is to 
understand a particular phenomenon and not to generalise findings to a population”. In support 
of this approach, Appleton and King (2002) noted that numerous realities and diverse 
interpretations that are important might result from research endeavour. Some of these realities 
emerge during the process of research, and their interpretation will enrich the findings of the 
research. Thus, this paradigm enables research participants “to derive meanings from their 
own realities and contribute to knowledge production through practice” (Cohen et al., 
2007:10). 
For interpretive sociologists, the social world is different from the natural world because it 
consists of and constructed through meanings (Livesey, 2006:4). Therefore, when studying 
social behaviour, it is appropriate to “describe and explain it from the point of view of those 
involved” (Livesey, 2006:4). More so, Danby and Farrel (2004:41) asserted that “interpretive 
researchers produce theorised accounts that represent participant’s sociological 
understandings”. In other words, the interpretive method “yields insight and understandings 
of behaviour and explain actions from participants perspective” (Scotland, 2012:12). 
However, the paradigm has been criticised in terms of validity, reliability and generalisability 
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(Chowdhry, 2014:434) and that it does not “provide any agreed doctrine underlying all 
qualitative social research” (Nudzor, 2009:118). Consequently, mixed-methods emerged as a 
result of the rivalry (paradigm war) between positivism and interpretivism.  
4.2.3 Critical Realism 
Critical realism seeks to harmonise the strengths of both positivism and interpretivism. It 
rejects positivism’s tendency to confuse observation for reality, and relativism’s tendency to 
claim that ‘all’ accounts of a phenomenon under study are equally valid. Critical realism 
“accepts that reality can best be understood by investigating the multiple outlooks” (Halcomb 
& Hickman, 2015:6). As such, it sees people's situations and their viewpoints as real 
phenomena that have causal interaction with one another (Maxwell & Mittapalli, 2010). 
Critical realists also hold the belief that “all theories about the world are grounded in a 
particular perspective and worldview, and all knowledge is partial, incomplete, and fallible” 
(Regnault et al., 2018:3). 
This standpoint helps mixed-methods researchers “to better understand the context of what 
they study” (Doyle et al., 2016:625). Also, “it provides a philosophical stance that is 
compatible with MMR (Mixed-methods Research) in that it acknowledges the methodological 
characteristics of both qualitative and quantitative research and can facilitate communication 
and cooperation between the two” (Regnault et al., 2018:3). In other words, it provides 
opportunities for quantitative and qualitative researchers to collaborate (Cresswell & Plano 
Clark, 2018). While noting its importance, Wong (2016:58) opined that researchers could begin 
a mixed-methods study with the “quantitative phase, and then collect more data in the 
qualitative phase” for a better understanding. Given the strengths of this epistemic standpoint 
(which allows researchers to combine qualitative and quantitative methods), this study is 
informed by critical realism. 
4.3 Research Site 
The research was conducted in Kwara State, one of the 36 states comprising Nigeria and has 
Ilorin as its capital. It is geopolitically located in the North Central zone of the country and 
bounded by Benin Republic, Osun, Oyo, Ekiti and Niger states. The state comprises of 16 
Local Government Areas (LGAs) delineated across 3 Senatorial Districts. Kwara State has 
both urban and rural areas, but the CBHI programme existed only in rural areas. As of 2016, 
the population of Kwara State is approximately 3.2 million (see National Bureau of Statistics, 
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2018:7). The elites mainly reside in the urban areas while the non-literates and semi-literates 
constitute the majority of the rural dwellers.  
Agriculture is the primary source of income in rural Kwara. The principal cash crops are 
kolanut, palm produce, coffee and cotton. Agriculture keeps most people indigenous to the 
state in their rural communities. Meanwhile, some other economic activities drive the rural 
dwellers to migrate or regularly travel to urban areas. Inadequate access to healthcare is 
another factor that takes the rural dwellers to the urban areas for medical attention. The major 
languages spoken by the people of the state are Yoruba, Baruba, Nupe and Fulani while the 
majority of the people belong to Islam, Christianity and the traditional religion. There is 
limited access to quality healthcare, especially for the rural dwellers. 
Figure 4.1: Map of Nigeria And Kwara State 
 
4.4 Research Design 
Research design refers to “how research can be conducted to answer the question being asked” 
(Marczyk et al., 2005:22). For Yousaf (2019), it is a systematic approach adopted by a 
researcher for conducting a scientific study. It serves as the methodical plan for a study. Given 
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the philosophical stances discussed above and the need to adequately answer the research 
questions raised, the design adopted in this study is the mixed-methods approach.  
4.4.1 Mixed-methods 
As noted earlier (see 4.2 above), mixed-methods emerged as a result of the ‘methodological 
harm’ that can result from the alliance with only of the two paradigms (i.e. positivism and 
interpretivism); therefore, emerging as a third paradigm (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
Specifically, the epistemic standpoint which informed the choice of mixed-methods approach 
adopted in this study is critical realism because it allows the mixture of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods in a research. It further allows the researcher to identify similarities, 
contradictions and variations as well as elicit a range of views from study participants based 
on the context of the study (Barbour, 2018). 
Mixed-methods is “a process of research in which researchers rigorously integrate quantitative 
and qualitative methods of data collection and analysis to understand better a research 
purpose” (Guetterman et al., 2019:179). Put differently, “it is a process of collecting, 
analysing and interpreting quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or in a series of 
studies that investigate the same underlying phenomenon” (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 
2009:265). Also, Cresswell and Plano Clark (2007) noted that mixed-methods have 
philosophical assumptions and methods of inquiry. For them, these assumptions guide how 
the methods are combined in one study through the stages of data collection and data analysis 
for a better understanding of research problems.  
These philosophical assumptions are understood “in terms of axiology [role of values in 
research], ontology [what is considered real in the world], epistemology [how we gain 
knowledge of what we know], methodology, [process of conducting research] and rhetoric 
[language of research]” (Cresswell & Plano Clark, 2018). For instance, critical realism 
(adopted in this study) “integrates realist ontology [i.e. a real-world exists and independent of 
our constructions and perceptions] and constructivist epistemology [i.e. our understanding of 
the world is based on our perception]” (Cresswell & Plano Clark, 2018). Mixed-methods 
design also helps to tie several steps together in an evaluation process (Johnson et al., 
2019:143; Dopp et al., 2019:3). Thus, in this study, mixed-methods allowed the researcher to 
use quantitative and qualitative methods iteratively.  
Though there are arguments that the research paradigms are not compatible and would not be 
combinable for a single study (e.g. Crotty, 1998), Gorard and Taylor (2004:7) contended that 
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“while requiring a greater level of skill, the routine combination of methods create research 
with an increased ability to make appropriate criticism of all types of research”. More so, 
Nudzor (2009) noted that “an appropriate methodological approach to social research is the 
one which gives pre-eminence to the purpose as well as the philosophical realm into which 
the issue under investigation fits”. Further, Doyle et al. (2009:180) declared that “the product 
of combining qualitative and quantitative methods are more important than the process and 
therefore, the end justifies the means”. However, Uprichard and Dawney, (2019:20) advised 
that “methods should be mixed in a way that has complementary strengths and non-
overlapping weaknesses” for a meaningful outcome. The three overlapping spheres are 
quantitative, qualitative and mixed approaches to research, and the ability of mixed-methods 
to address complex research problems within a single study has led to its acceptability and 
application across disciplines (Plano Clark & Ivankova, 2016) and this particular study.  
Weber (2004:vi) argued that the difference in the two methods does not affect the fundamental 
goals of their research because they tend to enhance the understanding of the world. In the 
recent times, mixed-methods research is emerging as a dominant paradigm in healthcare 
research because healthcare researchers are increasingly using it (Fetters et al., 2013:2134; 
Guetterman et al., 2019:179; Holtrop et al., 2019:85). Recently, Alatinga and Williams 
(2019:82) canvassed for “the adoption of mixed-methods for studying health policy and 
specifically, health insurance, to enhance our understanding of the complex healthcare 
systems in Africa”. This method is suitable for this study as it gave the researcher a synergistic 
understanding of the phenomena under study. It further allowed the researcher to collect data 
by recruiting respondents across identified geographical settings (quantitatively) and obtain 
detailed information (qualitatively) that are relevant to the study, from the participants. 
Therefore, this study adopted quantitative-dominant mixed-methods research design which 
methodologically gives priority to quantitative approach compared to the qualitative. Mixed-
methods enabled us to collect data from a range number of respondents to arrive at a reliable 
conclusion in the study. The study also adopted a concurrent triangulation strategy. This refers 
to the process whereby “qualitative and quantitative data are collected and analysed during a 
similar time frame” (Fetters et al., 2013:2137). However, before the main data collection 
exercise, the study adopted a method called building - the method of “using the results of one 
form of data to inform data collection of the other, such as systematically using qualitative 
findings to develop a survey or instrument” (Fetters et al., 2013:2140). Focus Group 
77 
 
Discussions (FGDs) were conducted, and insights from the discussions were used to 
strengthen the questionnaires and In-Depth Interview guides designed for the study.  
4.4.2 Sampling Techniques 
The study adopted a multi-stage sampling technique and sampling was informed by the 
research questions. The study population consisted of residents of rural communities in Kwara 
State. The residents (former enrollees and non-enrollees) were important in this study because 
they are the ones the programme aimed to benefit. The sampling for the study involved the 
following stages: 
Stage One: Purposive sampling was used to select the community with the highest enrolment 
from each of the 11 Local Government Areas (LGAs) hosting the programme. The 
communities are Aboto-Oja, Gure, Bacita, Osi, Idofian, Oro, Edidi, Kaiama, Bode Saadu, 
Odo-Owa and Erinle. Sampling across the various communities was to allow the researcher  
answer the research questions one (What are the perceptions of the community members about 
the CBHI programme in Kwara State Nigeria?), three (What were the funding mechanisms of 
the CBHI programme in Kwara State Nigeria?) and four (What are the factors that led to the 
collapse or stoppage of the CBHI programme in Kwara State Nigeria?) effectively. 
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Figure 4.2: Map of Kwara State showing Study Location 
 
Stage Two: The total enrolment in the programme was 139,713, and the total enrolment in all 
the selected communities is 95,151. The sample size of 1,055 was proportionally taken from 
the former enrollees in the 11 selected communities (having a total of 95,151 enrollees), using 
the Survey System Sample Size Calculator at a confidence interval of three per cent (see 
www.surveysystem.com) as respondents for the enrollees’ questionnaire. This is to ensure that 
the findings reflect the viewpoint of the entire population. Since the research questions sought 
to understand the perception of the community members about the programme, half of the 
total sample size of 1,055 (i.e. 528 respondents) was evenly selected among the non-enrollees 
for the study from the 11 communities. This is because there is no data available to determine 
the population of the communities for sampling purposes. Besides, all the communities had a 
very high number of non-enrollees; hence, they were allowed equal participation in the study 
(i.e. 48 non-enrolled respondents per community).  
Stage Three:  Systematic random sampling and non-systematic random sampling procedures 
were followed in the study. The primary aim was to systematically sample former enrollees 
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into the study from the enrolment registers and the non-enrollees from community registers. 
The researcher was, however, not given access to the enrolment registers and community 
registers were non-existent. Therefore, the respondents (former enrollees and non-enrollees) 
were recruited into the study based on households using systematic random sampling (i.e. 
using the nth number and selecting a sample at regular interval depending on the size of each 
community and needed sample). Scholars such as Kothari (2004:62), Degu and Yigzaw 
(2006:42), Kumar (2011) and Hibberts et al. (2012:58) suggested the need to determine the 
sampling interval based on the size of the population, select a random starting point and select 
every nth number into the study. 
Operationalising the sampling procedures (in each community) with the assistance of 
community residents, each household in the community was allocated a number to create a 
households’ register which served as the sampling frame. This allowed the researcher to 
determine the sampling interval for each of the communities depending on the number of 
households in each community and the number of respondents required among the former 
enrollees and non-enrollees. Thus, the sampling interval varied from one community to the 
other. After a random selection of the starting point from the register, the research team 
identified and visited the systematically selected households. 
Since the study included the sampling of both formerly-enrolled and non-enrolled respondents 
in selected households, the first question was to determine if the household had a member that 
was enrolled or not enrolled in the programme. The response determined which sub-sample 
(enrollees or non-enrollees) the household falls into and the questionnaire to be used for 
collecting data. Thus, one respondent from a given household was selected into the study. 
Data collection for former enrollees and non-enrollees was carried out concurrently. However, 
in a particular community (Edidi) snowball sampling (a non-systematic technique) was used 
to identify some (4 out of 12) of the former enrollees because the enrolment population in the 
community was relatively low. 
As proposed to reflect gender sensitivity, in each of the communities, 50% of the respondents 
(former enrollees and non-enrollees) were selected among males and females, respectively. 
Also, this is because the health requirements of men are different from women, especially for 
those in the reproductive age range. Further, individuals 21 years and above were selected into 
the study to ensure that respondents were at least 18 years (age of majority) by the time the 
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programme stopped in 2016. The former enrollees recruited into the study showed their 
registration cards as evidence of enrolment in each of the selected communities.  
Also, the non-enrollees were selected among male and female heads of household (i.e. 
husband or wife) in the communities because of their roles in the decision about enrolment of 
members of the household in the CBHI programme. The experience of data collection exercise 
varied from one community to the other, especially with the dynamics (e.g. gender 
consideration) required for the sampling design. As such, in a few cases, preference was given 
to a particular gender (male or female) in selected households to fulfil the sampling 
requirement of equal participation for both male and female in the study.  
Stage Four: Purposive sampling was used in selecting 22 participants (i.e. one male and 
female per community) for the In-Depth Interviews (IDIs) conducted in this study. Also, 32 
Key Informant Interviews were conducted. The participants included: 11 community leaders, 
12 healthcare providers (from healthcare facilities in the communities and referral centres), 
four policymakers (from the Governor’s Office, State Ministry of Health and the NHIS’s 
Office), two officials of the Health Maintenance Organisation (Hygeia Nigeria Limited) and 
two officials of the International Partners (PharmAccess Foundation and Health Insurance 
Fund) and one main researcher on the programme. Further, 12 Focus Group Discussions were 
conducted in six communities with the highest enrolment among the 11 communities selected 
(i.e. Aboto Oja, Gure, Bacita, Osi, Idofian and Oro). Two sessions (i.e. male and female) were 
conducted in each of the six communities while each session had between eight to ten selected 
participants (involving former enrollees and non-enrollees). All the participants in the Key 
Informant Interviews were sampled to provide answer to research questions two, three and 
four raised in the study while the participants in the IDIs were to provide further insights in 
answering research questions one, among others.  
4.5 Data Collection 
The research instruments used for data collection in the study are Focus Group Discussion, 
Questionnaire, In-Depth Interview and Key Informant Interview. The semi-structured format 
was adopted for the research instruments which allowed for relevant topics not previously 
considered to emerge organically from the discussion (Nicks et al., 2017), and the qualitative 
data were tape-recorded. According to Kelly (2010), audio recording helps to eliminate 




The researcher personally collected the qualitative data using a digital tape recorder and 
intermittently, also took the necessary field notes during and after each interview/FGD sessions 
on observations and thoughts that were useful for the data analysis. As recommended by 
Persaud (2010) and Kelly (2010), the researcher established rapport and familiarity with the 
study participants to gain their trust and elicit the information required for the study. Closure 
of the interview and FGD sessions were also done in a polite manner (Persaud, 2010). 
4.5.1 Focus Group Discussion 
Focus Group Discussion (FGD) was adopted to obtain a series of information on the general 
perception of the participants (community members) about the programme. Van Eeuwijk and 
Anghern (2017:2) noted that “focus group discussion is a qualitative research method and data 
collection technique in which a selected group of people discusses a given topic or issue in-
depth, facilitated by a professional, external moderator”. This instrument aims to “give the 
researcher an understanding of the participants’ perspective on the topic being discussed” 
(Wong, 2008:256) as well as their emotional orientations and cognitive viewpoints (Lange, 
2002).  
For Rabiee (2004:656), it provides “information about a range of ideas and feelings that 
individuals have about specific issues, as well as illuminating the differences in perspective 
between groups of individuals”. Also, “the information obtained from FGD can be used to 
identify potential areas of enquiry or to clarify the subject matter that may elude other research 
instruments” (Powell & Single, 1996:500). Essentially, FGD is an easy, fast, and effective 
technique of data collection from many participants in a short time (Krueger & Casey, 2000 
cited in Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009:2; Masadeh, 2012:64; Mishra, 2016:4). 
Also, FGDs are very useful for programme evaluation (Heary & Hennessy, 2002:50), 
especially, health programmes to explore the perspective of patients and other groups in the 
healthcare system (Wilkinson, 1998:334; Tausch & Menold, 2016:1). FGD is often conducted 
among homogenous group primarily depending on the purpose of a study. However, some 
diversity in the composition of the group may enhance the quality of the discussion (Wong, 
2008:257; Nyumba et al., 2018:22). As such, the FGD sessions conducted in this study 
consisted of former enrollees and non-enrollees in the CBHI programme for a better outcome.  
Also, participants were recruited into the groups based on their relevance (Wong, 2008:257). 
For instance, the study sought the opinions of former enrollees and non-enrollees about the 
programme. Therefore, each session of the discussion consisted of 8 to 10 participants 
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(involving former enrollees and non-enrollees). This falls within an acceptable range for 
discussion (Morgan, 1997: 36; Masadeh, 2012:65; Connelly, 2015:369).  
Powell and Single (1996:501) recommended between one and ten sessions for a study arguing 
that “since at some juncture, the group’s discussion will simply replicate existing data, making 
further sessions unnecessary”. However, the coverage and nature of this study (involving 
different communities) necessitated an increase. Consequently, 12 FGD sessions were 
conducted in the six (6) communities with the highest enrolment (i.e. Aboto Oja, Gure, Bacita, 
Osi, Idofian and Oro) among the eleven (11) communities where the study was conducted, 
and as such, covering more than 50% of the sampled communities. In line with the reason for 
conducting the sessions, the researcher was able to obtain series of information on the general 
perception of the participants about the programme and as well, draw insights from the 
discussions to strengthen the other instruments (Questionnaires, In-Depth Interview and Key 
Informant Interview) used in the study; and findings from the discussions were also used in 
reporting of results in the study. 
4.5.2 Questionnaires 
Questionnaires were used to collect the quantitative data. It is an instrument used in obtaining 
information from many respondents in a study. Kumar (2011:145; 2019:222) defined it “as a 
written list of questions, the answers to which are provided by respondents”. Questionnaires 
are designed to obtain responses to “questions or reply to statements based on what people are 
(the characteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity etc.), how people think (their beliefs and 
attitudes), how people act (their behaviours) and what people know (their knowledge)” 
(Robbins, 2009:121 cited in Mangal & Mangal, 2013:337). To ensure that the instrument is 
well designed, scholars such as Stone (1993:1264), Jenn (2006:35) and Safdar et al. 
(2016:1274) advised that a questionnaire must be appropriate, intelligible, clear, unbiased, 
omnicompetent and well-presented.  
A questionnaire can gather useful information from many people using limited time and 
resources to inform policy decisions, especially if the sample is large and widely dispersed. 
On this, Brace (2008:4) noted that “asking questions in the same way from different people is 
highly essential in a survey research”. As such, the instrument helped in gathering data relating 
to the design, implementation, funding and collapse of the CBHI programme in Kwara State 
(from a wider number of respondents in the selected communities) within a manageable time. 
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The collection of quantitative data was carried out using enumerator-administered 
questionnaires by the researcher. This was facilitated with the support of experienced research 
assistants that were trained to assist the respondents in completing the questionnaires, with the 
supervision of the researcher. This form of questionnaire was chosen because most of the 
residents in the study area are non-literates or semi-literates; thus, the questions were asked in 
the local language (Yoruba Language – the most common language in Kwara State). More so, 
Bowling (2005:281) noted that this form of questionnaire administration is the least 
burdensome because it only requires the respondent to have the necessary verbal and listening 
skills; and respond to the questions asked. Further, this method helps to eliminate the 
possibility of misunderstanding the questions asked because there was room for seeking 
clarification where necessary, before responding.  In this study, two (2) types of questionnaires 
were designed. The first type was used to gather relevant information from selected members 
of the communities who enrolled to benefit from the programme (former enrollees). The 
second type of questionnaire was designed to examine the perception of members of the 
















Table 4.1: Selected Communities and Number of Questionnaires Administered 












1 Aboto Oja Asa 11,993 133 48 181 
2 Gure Baruten 8,961 99 48 147 
3 Bacita Edu 6,731 74 48 122 
4 Osi Ekiti 24,550 272 48 320 
5 Idofian Ifelodun 11,009 122 48 170 
6 Oro Irepodun 12,306 137 48 185 
7 Edidi Isin 1,119 12 48 60 
8 Kaiama Kaiama 5,213 58 48 106 
9 Bode Saadu Moro 5,963 66 48 114 
10 Odo Owa Oke-Ero 1,682 19 48 67 
11 Erinle Oyun 5,624 63 48 111 
 Total  95,151 1,055 528 1,583 
  
4.5.3 In-depth Interview 
In-depth interview (IDI) is “a qualitative research instrument used for collecting detailed 
information about people’s knowledge, experiences, opinions or behaviour” (Pascale, 2015:7). 
For Rodríguez-Dorans (2018:747), it is an “encounter in which researcher and participant 
engage in an act of telling, listening, and meaning-making in order to understand aspects of a 
specific topic”. IDI minimally structures how participants report their thoughts and feelings 
(LaRossa, 1989:228) and thus, “explores their viewpoints on a certain idea, program, or 
circumstances” (Boyce & Neale, 2006:3). Further, an in-depth interview helps to obtain 
understanding about the “lived experience of participants and the meaning they make of that 
experience” (Seidman, 2006:9).  
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Interviews in social research are seen as ‘special conversations’ (which has a specific agenda 
or purpose) therefore, the researcher must be equipped with adequate skills and techniques to 
elicit rich, detailed and accurate information from the participants (Kielmann, 2012:25; Serry 
& Liamputtong, 2013) as well as take note of relevant gestures, expressions and movements 
during the interview session (Mihnat, 2015:211). Importantly, IDI is highly crucial to health-
related research because an in-depth understanding of the realities in the healthcare system can 
help to improve healthcare policy and service (Kelly, 2010). For a deep insight into the study, 
the researcher conducted IDIs with 22 community members that were enrolled in the 
programme. That is a male and female in each of the 11 communities selected for the study.  
4.5.4 Key Informant Interview 
Key Informant Interview (KII) helps to gather information from certain individuals with the 
requisite as well as relevant knowledge and experience about the phenomena under study. 
Rieger (2007:1) stated that KII involves a process where a “researcher employs interviewing 
of knowledgeable participants as an important part of the method of investigation”. According 
to Cossham and Johanson (2019:2), “key informants are knowledgeable individuals who 
contribute a perspective on a research phenomenon or situation that the researchers themselves 
lack”. In clearer terms, they explained that “key informants are usually not the core research 
participants (that is, they are not the main subjects of the research; they provide information 
about those subjects) but contribute to expanding a researcher’s understanding and precise 
insights”. 
Marshall (1996:92) noted that “a key informant interview is an expert source of information 
and highly relevant to healthcare research”. Marshall added that the personal skills and position 
make the informant suitable for providing deep insight into what is going on around them. 
O’Leary (2014) cited in Cossham and Johanson (2019:3) listed those who could be key 
informants: “a leader, the observant, experts (at the top of their field), insiders (in an 
organisation, culture or community), the highly experienced and those with secondary 







Table 4.2: Key Informants Interviewees in the Study 
Category of Participants Number 
Community leaders 11 
Healthcare Providers 12 
Policymakers  4 
International Implementation Partners  2 
Health Maintenance Organisation 2 
Researcher on the Programme 1 
Total 32 
   
The selected key informants were very critical in the study because of their experience with 
the programme. For instance, the community leaders shared their views, and shed light on the 
perception of the generality of the people about the programme and how it impacted their 
healthcare status. This provides an avenue to obtain additional information (to the data 
collected via in-depth interview) on the community members’ perspective of the programme. 
The healthcare providers are very relevant in the study because they were responsible for 
providing healthcare services under the programme. Also, the policymakers and the foreign 
implementing partners are relevant to the study because they introduced and implemented the 
programme. 
Further, the Health Maintenance Organisation facilitated the implementation of the 
programme. It served as an interface between the collaborators that funded the programme and 
the healthcare providers, as well as the enrollees. Finally, the researcher (who carried out 
studies on the programme) was relevant to obtain a professional viewpoint based on experience 
with the programme. Goldman and Swayze (2012:232) observed that though it might be 
difficult to access most of the key informants because of their busy schedules owing to their 
positions, there are numerous advantages to interviewing them. The researcher was able to 
access all the participants except one healthcare provider who outrightly declined to participate 
after a series of visits to the hospital, scheduled appointments and follow-up calls.  Whereas 
the researcher had also reached the information saturation point and his non-participation did 
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not affect the result of the study. Most of the key informants were still holding their positions 
while few had taken up appointments in other organisations. 
4.5.5 Validity and Reliability 
Zohrabi (2013:254) argued that “adopting mixed-methods is another way of ensuring the 
validity and reliability of a study”. It provides the opportunity to assess the convergence or 
divergence in the findings of data collected through different techniques. According to Wium 
and Louw (2018:8), the main essence of validity and reliability in a mixed-methods study is to 
legitimise the research. For them, the overall essence of mixed-methods research is determined 
by three processes: methodological rigour, interpretive rigour and inference transferability. In 
other words, the rationale behind validity and reliability is to ensure that a study follows a 
carefully systematised rigorous procedure in reaching conclusions.  
 
Validity “represents the degree to which a research instrument is able to measure what it is 
purported to measure in a study” (Cooper & Schindler, 2014, cited in Moazzam, 2015:89). 
Essentially, “validity is concerned with whether our research is believable and true and whether 
it is evaluating what it is supposed or purports to evaluate” (Zohrabi, 2013:268). Therefore, 
researchers are expected to identify means of assessing instrument validity that are suitable for 
the goals and objectives of the research (Hsu & Sandford, 2010). Accordingly, the instruments 
used in the study were designed based on the objectives. Wium and Louw (2018:9), explained 
that validity becomes increased when findings from FGD are used to strengthen the 
construction of the questionnaire (and other research instruments). As such, in this study (as 
noted in 4.5.1 above), the researcher conducted FGDs in six communities and insights from 
the discussions were used to improve the contents of the questionnaires and interview guides 
used in the study.   
According to Mohamad et al. (2015:164) cited in Creswell (2005), “reliability means that the 
scores of an instrument are stable and consistent”. For Tischler (2011:42), reliability holds that 
the findings of a study must be repeatable. Thus, the consistency in the findings from the 
various communities covered by this study proves its reliability. Relying on the works of 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Merriam (1998), Zohrabi (2013:259-260) asserted that a study 
can attain reliability through the use of three techniques: (i) the investigator needs to explain 
the different processes and phases of the research explicitly; (ii) the investigator needs to 
combine different techniques for data collection (triangulation); and (iii) the investigator needs 
to give a full description of data collection, analysis and how results are obtained. Therefore, 
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in this study, the researcher detailed the various processes and stages as well as the techniques 
for collecting and analysing data (in this chapter). Triangulation method was also adopted at 
the levels of data collection and data analysis to ensure validity and reliability. More so, the 
results from the quantitative data are consistent with the findings of the qualitative data. 
Generally, the research was carried out with a high sense of carefulness and rigour. 
4.6 Data Analysis 
According to Tischler (2011:39), data analysis is the “process through which large and 
complicated collections of scientific data are organised so that comparisons can be made, and 
conclusions drawn”. Marczyk et al. (2005:198) noted that “the process of data analysis involves 
three steps: preparing the data for analysis, analysing the data, and interpreting the data (i.e., 
testing the research hypotheses and drawing valid inferences)”. Data analyses in mixed-
methods research are performed on the quantitative and qualitative data accordingly, based on 
the acceptable methods of analysis. However, the analysis plan must be aligned with the 
objectives of the study (Curry & Nunez-Smith, 2015). Hence, the methods of data analyses 
adopted in this study are as follows: 
4.6.1 Quantitative  
The data collected from the former enrollees and non-enrollees were sorted accordingly. After 
that, the data were given serial numbers and coded by the researcher (i.e. assigning values to 
responses in the questionnaires). It is on this basis that the data input was carefully done 
(according to a format designed by the researcher) using Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS) version 25 (for analysis). Thereafter, a descriptive analysis was done using the SPSS 
software. Tischler (2011:109) explained that “descriptive statistics allow the researcher to 
describe the data and examine relationships between variables”. Through this, the researcher 
generated frequency tables and percentages, and charts to show results from the data. 




According to Flick (2014:5), “qualitative data analysis is the classification and interpretation 
of linguistic (or visual) material to make statements about implicit and explicit dimensions and 
structures of meaning-making in the material and what is represented in it”. The qualitative 
data were analysed with both manual and electronic methods. After translating the data 
obtained in the local language, all recorded discussions and interviews were transcribed and 
coded to yield major themes (Nicks et al., 2017). Thematic analysis was used to identify the 
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relevant themes in the data. For Nowell et al. (2017:2), “this kind of analysis is appropriate 
because it is a useful method for examining the perspectives of different research participants, 
highlighting similarities and differences, and generating unanticipated insights”.  
 
Also, ATLAS.ti was used in the study to systematically organise and support the analysis of 
the qualitative data obtained. “ATLAS.ti is a Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis 
Software [CAQDAS]” (O’Kane et al., 2019:2). The “basic idea behind these programs is that 
using the computer is an efficient means for storing and locating qualitative data” (Cresswell 
& Cresswell, 2018:315). Particularly, ATLAS.ti helped the researcher to manage, extract, 
compare, and explore data within the texts which has meanings for the analysis (Mkwinda, 
2013:3; Paulus & Lester, 2016:405; Brito, 2017). Excerpts from interviews conducted in the 
local language (Yoruba), other than in English, are presented in English with the original 
language included beside the translation (Roulston & Choi, 2018).   
4.7 Ethical Considerations 
According to Tischler (2011:44-45), sociologists must accept responsibility for recruiting 
research subjects in order not to become vulnerable as a result of their cooperation. Guillemin 
and Gillam (2004:263) distinguished between “two significant dimensions of ethics in 
research: procedural ethics and ethics in practice”. According to them, “procedural ethics 
involves seeking approval from a relevant ethics committee or organisations to undertake 
research involving humans”. On the other hand, they explained that “ethics in practice refer to 
the day-to-day ethical issues that arise in the doing of research”. This shows an expectation 
from researchers to give optimum attention to ethical issues in conducting their research. 
Accordingly, this study adhered strictly with the ethical requirements for conducting research. 
After securing the ethical clearance of the Research Ethics Review Committee of the College 
of Human Sciences of the University, as a requirement, the researcher also obtained ethical 
clearance from the Kwara State Ministry of Health in Nigeria before embarking on the 
fieldwork.  
 
As noted by Costley et al. (2010) and Høyland et al. (2015:226), in each of the communities, 
before commencing the study, the researcher met the community leaders (and other gatekeepers 
to access some key informants) and informed them, adequately, about the research. The 
respondents and participants were treated with respect. They were informed of the purpose of 
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the study and the relevance of their response. Participants were also allowed to dictate the 
convenient time and location for the sessions to hold (Pascale, 2015:12).  
 
Also, they were assured of confidentiality and their anonymity preserved in the reporting of 
the findings (Bolderston, 2012:73; Minhat, 2015:211). They were also informed of their rights 
to refuse participation in the study, withdraw at any point in time, and refuse to answer any 
question about which they were not comfortable. Furthermore, the participants and respondents 
were notified that there was no financial benefit for participation; however, the findings of the 
study could aid improved access to healthcare in their communities. More so, they were 
informed and given assurance that there were no negative consequences for them in 
participating in the study. Also, the researcher reiterated that the data (digital and non-digital) 
would be kept safely. Apart from the verbal information, the participants and respondents were 
given printed copies of Informed Consent detailing all the information. After accepting to 
participate, consent forms were given to the respondents and participants to obtain their written 
consents.   
4.8 Reflexivity 
Begoray and Banister (2012:798) defined “reflexivity as the researcher’s ongoing critique and 
critical reflection of his or her own biases and assumptions and how these influence all stages 
of the research process”. In a qualitative study, researchers “reflect about how their role in the 
study and their background, culture, and experiences hold potential for shaping their 
interpretations, such as the themes they advance and the meaning they ascribe to the data” 
(Cresswell & Cresswell, 2018:301). Also, “this aspect of the methods is beyond advancing 
values and biases in the study, but how the background of the researcher may shape the course 
of the study” (Cresswell & Cresswell, 2018:301). In this study, however, the researcher was 
critically conscious to ensure that his values, experience and culture does not affect the 
research process. Maximum focus was directed to the research process, and the researcher 
displayed a high level of transparency throughout the study.  
4.9 Fieldwork Challenges 
The researcher was faced with some challenges during the fieldwork exercise. One, the 
research setting consists of communities drawn from different Local Government Areas in 
Kwara State. Thus, the researcher team had to travel to all the communities to collect data. 
Apart from the long-distance that characterised the trips, most of the terrains were very bad 
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and relatively not motorable; and the researcher had to visit some the communities twice for 
data collection (i.e. using FGDs and then, the other instruments).  
During one of the trips in Kwara North, rainfall started suddenly, and the commercial vehicles 
could not continue with the journey; we resorted to hiring motorcycles to our destinations, 
which was more dangerous, to meet up with the scheduled appointment. The most terrible 
travel experience during the fieldwork was the trip from Kaiama (where the research team slept 
after data collection in the community) to Gure (to commence data collection in the 
community). The road was so bad that on several occasions the driver drove off the road and 
negotiated ahead through the bush because the ‘main road’ was not motorable. The road, we 
learnt had been abandoned for decades by successive state governments and not renovated. The 
driver explained that he could not continue to replace the shock absorber all the time; hence, 
as passengers, we were uncomfortably feeling the direct effects of the bad vehicle and poor 
road as we travelled. After the episode, the researcher had to suspend the fieldwork for a few 
days to take medications and adequate rest from the experience. 
Two, the researcher found it difficult to access most of the key informants because of the nature 
of their positions and professions. There were several cases of failed appointments and 
rescheduling of appointments. However, as suggested by Shenton and Hayter (2004:226) that 
a researcher can rely on a past link, thus, the researcher leveraged on his previous familiarity 
with someone who was involved in the implementation of the programme to access the 
informants, and this yielded positive results. In some cases, apart from the informed consent 
that the researcher had, demands were made for formal letter to be written requesting 
participation in the study. The research did as demand, and the interviews were granted.  Some 
of the interviews were conducted in the evening and during the weekends due to the tight 
schedules of the participants.  
Third, in a particular community, most people (former enrollees and non-enrollees) initially 
showed disinterest in participating in the study based on their experience regarding the 
programme. However, when we convincingly explained the importance of the study and that 
it was for academic purpose, they agreed and participated in the study. In contrast, in another 
community, many individuals were ready to participate as they misconstrued the consent forms 
(which respondents completed) to be registration forms. We needed to take some time to 
address them and explain that we were conducting the study for academic purpose and that we 




The chapter centred on the research methods used in the study. It examines the major research 
paradigms and located this study within critical realism. An overview of the research site was 
discussed. Also, the researcher extensively discussed the research design as well as the 
sampling techniques used in the study. The researcher also gave a clear analysis of the methods 
of data collection, including the various techniques adopted and the reasons for the choices. 
The issues relating to the validity and reliability of the study were addressed in detail. Further, 
the procedures for analysing the quantitative and qualitative data collected, including the 
softwares used to aid the process were discussed. Lastly, the researcher addressed the issues 
relating to ethical considerations and reflexivity; and chronicled the fieldwork challenges 




















DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CBHI PROGRAMME IN KWARA  
5.1 Introduction 
The cut in public spending as a result of the SAPs in the 1980s negatively affected the provision 
of adequate healthcare services by the federal government. Consequently, it became 
burdensome for the governments at the state level to provide healthcare coverage for the entire 
population. Though it is worthy of note that there is also a relative lack of commitment by 
successive governments. The same thing goes for the healthcare system in Kwara State. This 
chapter is significant because it explores the context that led to the introduction of the CBHI 
programme as an alternative model for healthcare provisioning. Also, it examines the design 
in terms of health benefits involved. Further, it discusses the programme’s implementation 
process and finally, reviews the success of the CBHI programme in rural Kwara. 
5.2 Healthcare Situation in Rural Kwara: Pre-CBHI 
The healthcare condition in Kwara State before the introduction of the CBHI programme was 
similar to what could be found in most states in Nigeria. This is because of the weakness of the 
national healthcare system, partly due to inadequate funding and ineffective policies. No 
remarkable achievement has been recorded up till date in the bid to provide adequate healthcare 
services across the country. For instance, the recent Nigeria National Demographic and Health 
Survey (2018) revealed that 59% of births are delivered at home, showing no significant 
departure from the trend since 1990. The Survey further found 512 maternal mortality ratio per 
100,000 live births between 2011 and 2017.   
In Kwara State, there was a general outcry about poor healthcare conditions in every part of 
the State (even when the programme was operational because it covered a few rural 
communities). According to Brals (2019:74), “the Kwara State health system is characterised 
by weak governance and legislation, inadequate government funding, and poor health 
infrastructure and service quality”. Similarly, Musah and Kayode (2014:34) found insufficient 
healthcare personnel and poor quality of care in Ilorin Metropolis – the capital and economic 
centre of the State.  
The Nigeria Malaria Indicator Survey (2015) reveals a 68% prevalence rate for anaemia among 
children (aged 6-59 months) in Nigeria, generally, and a 58% prevalence rate in Kwara State, 
specifically. The survey also showed a 28% prevalence rate for malaria among the same 
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category of children in Nigeria, and 27% in Kwara State. In the study, participants were asked 
about the healthcare situation in the rural communities before the implementation of the CBHI 
programme. Most of them indicated that the situation was awful, leading to loss of lives. Some 
of the participants stated that: 
Opolopo awon eyan ni won kori itoju gba; 
tiwon nilati lo si Ilorin fun itoju. Ki won 
to gbe elomi de Ilorin gaan, won a ti  ku. 
Most people did not have access to 
healthcare; they had to travel to Ilorin for 
care. Some people even died on their ways 
to the hospital in Ilorin (KII, Community 
Leader, 01/07/2019, Aboto-Oja). 
Igbati won gbe Hygeia wa, o bo si asiko ti 
gbobgbo community yi ati awon to wa ni 
agbegbe, ti won need e; ti aisan po, ti kosi 
si owo nilu, ti kosi ise, ti ile ise kosi sise 
rara. 
Hygeia [i.e. the CBHI programme] was 
introduced at a time when the community 
and its environs needed it; there were so 
many cases of illness and the people had no 
money to pay for healthcare, and the 
industry [Nigeria Sugar Company] in the 
community has stopped working (Female 
FGD, 30/05/2019, Bacita). 
A healthcare provider in one of the rural communities narrated how the collapse of an agro-
industrial entity, the Nigeria Sugar Company, in the community deepened the healthcare 
challenges of the people, especially among the company’s former employees. He explained 
that: 
The community is a rural community. In the heydays of the sugar company when it was 
fully operational. Then, most workers were enjoying some degrees of good healthcare 
under the auspices of the sugar company at much less cost, than it would have been 
necessary. It was highly subsidised and most times, even sponsored. So, when sugar was 
sugar, there was a good supply of multitude; and relatively, the degree of social welfare 
was going on because of the presence of the company. Once the company collapsed, 
virtually every other thing collapsed. Family life was in tension, and children suffered 
quite a lot. Malnutrition cases were rife, and there was social neglect. The people were 
financially disadvantaged, and so many goodies of life that were always harvested from 
expenditure were not possible. It was breeding its own frustration in its own way; and 
people had no choice than to resort to alternative medical practices, which at best were 
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not satisfactory but that was the only recourse they had when NISUCO [i.e. Nigeria Sugar 
Company] collapsed. Also, because of the level of education around here, it was very 
easy to adapt to the low-level quality of life in every sphere (KII, HCP, 19/06/2019, 
Bacita). 
 Another healthcare provider added that: 
The people are 100% farmers, and if they fall sick outside the farming season, they don’t 
want to visit the hospital because of the fund. To avoid loss of lives, they have to sell 
their farm produce in advance, and if they happen to sell everything to raise fund for 
healthcare, they would have nothing to harvest when it is time. For instance, if a sack of 
soya beans is sold for N12,000 during the harvesting period, they can collect N6,000 
from the buyer with the promise that “when I harvest the produce, come and collect a 
sack”; meaning the farmer loses N6,000 (KII, HCP, 15/08/2019, Gure). 
The prevalence of healthcare challenges in the communities was mainly due to the lack of clear 
healthcare policy framework exclusively designed for the State. Most of the health policies 
obtainable then were national policies which often stem from the declarations of global health 
organisations. Some of the key informants noted that there was no clear and specific healthcare 
policy in the State when the programme was operational. The government-owned healthcare 
facilities established in various parts of the State were poorly managed. Participants 
commented on the health policy in the State before the CBHI programme as thus:  
The health policy in the State was like that of many others since the government could 
not shoulder the burden of free healthcare; people were paying out-of-pocket (KII, 
Researcher, 30/07/2019, Ilorin).  
I know the policy was skewed to the urban area and those in the rural areas also needed 
access (KII, Foreign Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). 
The HMO officials added that: 
I think the state government had a lot of hospitals at the state level, Local Government 
Area level, dispensaries and health posts. That was how they were operating, but it was 
inadequate. They [i.e. health facilities] were not well staffed; especially the health posts, 
you don’t have doctors there. Even hospitals in rural communities, they didn’t have 
doctors; even if they had, they didn’t come regularly. Probably they did not have a good 
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monitoring system to know if people were doing their jobs (KII, HMO Official 2, 
29/07/2019, Ilorin). 
The health policy in the State before the programme was similar to what was happening 
at the federal level. They were policies that supported other parallel programmes in the 
State such as Kick out Polio, Roll Back Malaria, subsidised care for women, and child 
health. Also, there was a funding challenge in government hospitals as well as policies 
implementation (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin). 
The statements of the government officials substantiate the above submissions. They confirmed 
that there was no clear-cut healthcare policy in the State before the CBHI policy. Some of them 
noted that: 
Kwara did not have a clear-cut policy, but they had a policy on children under-5 welfare, 
which was a national policy as well, that every State had to follow (KII, KWSG Official 
2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Before the programme, our health policy was nothing to write home about… There was 
no clear-cut health policy in the State (KII, KWSG Official 1, 20/08/2019, Ilorin). 
Arising from the above, the healthcare system in the State did not enjoy adequate policy and 
financing attention before the emergence of the CBHI in rural Kwara. It was within the poor 
healthcare “context” that the CBHI programme crept into the policy landscape of the health 
system in Kwara State. Minkman et al. (2018:229) noted that policy transfer tends to flourish 
in the absence of alternative or competing policies. This is due to an impending need to solve 
identified challenges. In other words, where there is no better alternative, one is likely to take 
up an available offer. 
It is, however, important to note a salient point about the submissions above. The memory time 
horizon from which these officials draw is the post-SAP experience of the retrenchment of 
public health funding and provisioning. Perhaps, they are unable to imagine a comprehensive 
publicly-funded healthcare system. Such system of public health provisioning – funded 
significantly from the fiscus – existed in Nigeria (and Kwara State) before 1985, when SAP 
was introduced (as noted in chapters 1 and 2). The refusal to countenance publicly-funded 
health system is part of the culture war of neoliberalism. That alternative exists and should be 
on the table for health systems reform in Nigeria. 
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5.3 Design of the CBHI Programme in Kwara State 
The CBHI scheme in Kwara State “(otherwise called Hygeia Community Health Plan or 
Hygeia Community Health Care)” was established in 2007 (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 
2018:224) under a partnership “between the Kwara State Government and Dutch Health 
Insurance Fund [HIF]” (Gustafsson-Wright & Schellekens, 2013:14). The PharmAccess 
Foundation provided technical support, including monitoring and evaluation; and Hygeia 
Nigeria Limited was contracted as Health Maintenance Organisation to facilitate the provision 
of healthcare services in the programme. The long-term goal of the programme was to increase 
access to basic quality health services. According to Bonfrer et al. (2018:55), the Kwara CBHI 
“had two aims: (i) to provide access to a heavily subsidised voluntary health insurance scheme 
and (ii) to initiate quality upgrades in healthcare facilities”.  
The programme provided “coverage for medical consultations, diagnostic tests and drugs for 
all conditions that can be managed at a primary care level and limited coverage for secondary 
care services” (Brals et al., 2017:991). The enrollees had the right to visit the healthcare 
facilities whenever they were ill. Enrollees also had up to 5 days hospitalisation (Humphreys, 
2010) under the programme. The programme was flagged-off in Kwara North (Edu and Moro 
Local Government Areas [LGAs]) and expanded gradually to other parts of the State. 
Healthcare services were provided “through a network of contracted public and private 
healthcare facilities” (PharmAccess Group, 2017:15).  
Specifically, the Health Insurance Fund financed the renovation and provision of many 
medical equipment and facilities while the PharmAccess Foundation provided clinical 
protocols, training, and quality monitoring (Lagomarsino & Kundra, 2008:34). As of 2015, 
the programme was operational in 43 healthcare facilities across 11 rural LGAs, and two 
tertiary referral centres within the state capital (Ilorin). Non-enrollees in the programme were 
also eligible to use the healthcare facilities by paying OOP for services (Gustafsson-Wright et 
al., 2018:225). The programme existed in the three geopolitical zones in the State (i.e. Kwara 
South, Kwara North and Kwara Central) at varying levels. It was anticipated to cover 600,000 
people by the end of 2017 (AIGHD, 2015:12). More details about the programme are 
discussed in the proceeding sections and chapters. 
Specifically, “the primary and secondary care covered by the CBHI programme are: 
(i) Inpatient care; 
(ii) Outpatient care; 
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(iii) Hospital care and admissions;  
(iv) Specialist consultation; 
(v) Provision of prescribed drugs and pharmaceutical care; 
(vi) Laboratory investigations and diagnostic tests; 
(vii) Radiological investigations; 
(viii) Screening for and treatment of diseases including malaria; 
(ix) Minor and intermediate surgeries; 
(x) Antenatal care and delivery; 
(xi) Neonatal care; 
(xii) Preventive care, including immunisation; 
(xiii) Eye examination and care; 
(xiv) Screening for and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases; 
(xv) Annual check-ups; and 
(xvi) Health education” (Amsterdam Institute of International Development, 2013:12). 
 
The comprehensiveness of a CBHI benefits package is a determinant for enrolment among the 
poor (Schneider, 2004:353) as well as the success of the programme. But as noted earlier in 
chapter 2, that healthcare coverage of CBHI programmes usually does not include some critical 
needs of the enrollees; the Kwara CBHI programme was not an exception. According to 
Gustafsson-Wright et al. (2018:225), “the insurance does not cover high technology 
investigations (for example magnetic resonance imaging), major surgeries and complex eye 
surgeries, family planning commodities, treatment for substance abuse/addiction, cancer care 
requiring chemotherapy and radiation therapy, provision of spectacles, contact lenses and 
hearing aids, dental care, management of acute cardiovascular events other than admission to 
a hospital intensive care treatment such as dialysis”.  
This is, however, a substantial social policy concern which demands a comprehensive approach 
to social services provisioning, including healthcare. Dutta and Hangoro (2013:35), argued that 
“Nigeria cannot consider covering large numbers of citizens, especially the very poor, with a 
basic primary healthcare package using a patchwork of such schemes. It is also not clear how 
the very poor can participate in these schemes and access healthcare. Therefore, these schemes, 
despite the attention placed on them, do not obviate the need for investing in strengthening 




More so, the so-called pro-poor take on health provisioning is still trapped within the neoliberal 
echo chamber. The point of an expansive publicly-funded health system is to raise the tax to 
finance the health system from the citizens. The progressive nature of the tax system means 
that the marginal tax rates increases as the income level rises. This will allow for the coverage 
of everyone not just the ‘poor’. In cases where 75% of the citizens live below US$3.10/day (in 
purchasing power parity terms) what is the point of targeting the poor? Finally, “separate 
discriminatory services for poor people have always tended to be poor quality services” as 
Richard Titmuss observed decades ago (cited in Shafik, 2018:7). When public health sector 
offers discriminatory ‘free’ services for the poor, the middle class tends to flee for the private 
healthcare sector, because in such scenario, the quality of services in the public sector declines 
overtime. 
5.4 Programme Implementation  
According to Mthethwa (2012:37), “policy implementation refers to the mechanisms, 
resources, and relationships that link policies to programme action”. For Khan (2016:4), policy 
implementation refers to “a process, an output and an outcome, and it involves some actor 
organisations and techniques of control”. Essentially, policy implementation is an activity or 
exercise that cannot be carried out in isolation but involves relationships among various actors. 
Thus, this section analyses the role of the various actors in the policy implementation, 
indicating their various levels of involvement, and the activities that constituted the 
implementation process. A participant gave a general idea of the activities entailed in the 
implementation of the programme as thus: 
On the demand side, there were awareness programmes in the communities, and we got 
philanthropists to enrol the indigents, we collected the premiums during rainy seasons 
when crops were harvested. We also created health posts, medical outreaches in the 
hard-to-reach communities. In these upgraded health facilities, the programme 
operated, organising mobile health exercises in collaboration with the UITH to solve 
some of the health problems. On the supply side, we had the structure of carrying out 
the quality assessment; we gave them some Quality Improvement Plans (QIPs) to 
improve the quality of service, we carried out train-the-trainers, training of medical staff 
on current evidence-based best practices, we carried out some advocacies to the 
stakeholders especially the government to make sure they paid their subsidy (KII, HMO 
Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin).  
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Before delving deeper into the implementation process, it is necessary to understand the main 
actors involved in the implementation. This is because the positionality and ideational pre-
disposition of actors have a bearing on policy design and implementation (Koduah et al., 
2015:3; Etiaba et al., 2015:2; Campos & Reich, 2019:225; Araujo & Filho, 2001). Therefore, 
the main actors included: the Kwara State Government, the PharmAccess Foundation 
(representing HIF) and the Hygeia Nigeria Limited (HMO). Their involvement and roles are 
discussed below. 
5.4.1 The Main Actors 
The policy space for implementation of the CBHI programme involved three major actors, that 
is, two local actors (i.e. Kwara State Government and Hygeia Nigeria Limited) and one 
international actor (PharmAccess Foundation). The role of the actors are examined as follows:  
5.4.1.1 Kwara State Government  
The role of the Kwara State Government (KWSG) in the implementation of the programme 
was to provide an enabling environment for the programme to run and thrive smoothly. 
However, it had an agency known as CHIS (Community Health Insurance Scheme) created to 
represent it in the implementation of the programme. The agency played some roles through 
the government-owned healthcare facilities. Notably, the core responsibilities of CHIS was to 
ensure adequate staffing, procurement of drugs and smooth running of the healthcare facilities. 
All these were funded using the capitations that were due to the public facilities (KII, HMO 
Official 2, 29/07/2019, Ilorin).  
One of the government officials explained that: initially, “the Kwara State Government was to 
give the will, support and enabling environment for them to thrive. The Kwara State 
Government at that point was providing facilities and security at the places” (KII, KWSG 
Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin). With time, however, the involvement of the State Government 
became contributory when it requested for continuation and extension of the programme to 
more rural communities. Also, during the period of operation, the state government embarked 
on the renovation of 5 general hospitals and construction 15 primary health care centres 
(Boston Consulting Group, 2015:19).  
5.4.1.2 PharmAccess Foundation 
The PharmAccess Foundation (PAF) represented the Dutch Health Insurance Fund (HIF) in 
the design and implementation of the programme. The HIF, a Dutch Foundation, was 
established in 2006 as an agency under the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide the 
people in Africa with access to better healthcare (PharmAccess Group, 2018; Okoli et al., 
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2016:2). According to the Boston Consulting Group (2015:14), “the HIF was founded to re-
orient the healthcare market development towards effectiveness and sustainability, especially 
for low-income populations’ access to affordable and high-quality care. The mission was to 
overcome the limitations of the prevailing paradigm and help replace it with a new one (that is 
transformative, long-term, locally owned, and private-sector inclusive) for sustainable 
healthcare system development”. In other words, it aimed to strengthen the private sector’s 
capacity towards improved access to quality care in the LMICs (PharmAccess Group, 
2017:11). 
This led to the release of “a grant of EUR 100 million by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to HIF in 2006 (together with PharmAccess - a Dutch not-for-profit organisation, as executing 
partner) to launch community-based health insurance programmes in some African countries - 
Nigeria, Tanzania and Kenya” (Gustafsson-Wright & Schellekens, 2013:11). The HIF was 
exclusively represented in Nigeria by the PharmAccess Foundation. In pursuing its mission, 
the HIF seized the opportunity by leveraging on the existing links and reputation of PAF in 
many countries with private and public sector institutions; and this availed the Dutch 
government a suitable platform for executing its projects (Boston Consulting Group, 2015:15). 
PharmAccess Foundation was established in 2001 with the primary focus on HIV/AIDS  
treatment, especially in Africa but expanded its focus to a general improvement of access to 
quality healthcare (Amsterdam Institute for Global Health and Development, 2017:9; 
PharmAccess Group, 2017:11), especially since its alliance with the HIF. The implementation 
was carried out by PharmAccess Foundation in collaboration with Health Maintenance 
Organisations (HMOs) that were considered reputable in the selected countries. In the case of 
Nigeria, Hygeia Nigeria Limited was the HMO engaged for the direct implementation of the 
programme in Lagos and Kwara states.  
An official of the agency noted that: “PharmAccess Foundation is a not-for-profit entrepreneur 
organisation with its headquarters in Amsterdam, The Netherlands. We are supporting Sub-
Sahara African countries in making health market work through our integrated approach” (KII, 
Foreign Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). Another participant noted that: “The role of 
PharmAccess Foundation was also to generate and regulate finances as well as develop 
financial strategies and plans. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Amsterdam was responsible 
for the financing provided through PharmAccess Foundation, serving as Fund Managers” (KII, 
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KWSG 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin). The HIF through the PharmAccess Foundation provided the 
initial funding of the programme.  
However, as noted in chapter 2, the idea to ‘re-orient the healthcare market’ (claimed by the 
HIF above) is often promoted by taking publicly-funded health system off the policy agenda. 
This approach is firmly within the neoliberal policy frame: (a) get people to pay for their own 
healthcare, (b) take public spending off the table, and (c) reluctantly, only in demonstrable 
instances of inability to fund one’s healthcare is public support to be provided. This is the 
quintessential case of stratified, segmented, and segregated social policy design (see Fischer, 
2018). Thus, it appears that The Netherlands offered to replicate a poorer version of its own 
social insurance-based healthcare system. 
5.4.1.3 Hygeia Nigeria Limited 
The CBHI programme was implemented through the engagement of Hygeia Nigeria Limited. 
It was established in 1986, and it is one of the leading Health Maintenance Organisations 
(HMOs) in Nigeria and known as Hygeia HMO. Specifically, a new HMO was floated by the 
organisation, basically for the CBHI programme in Kwara State and named Hygeia Community 
Health Care (HCHC) to facilitate the implementation of the programme. More specifically, its 
role involved the “administration of the package and marketing activities for scaling up the 
project” (Gomez et al., 2015:6). 
The HMO was appointed by the PAF through a selection process midwifed by the 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (AIID, 2013:11) and was provided assistance to improve its 
administrative capacity (England, 2008:58). One participant noted that: “Hygeia was the Health 
Maintenance Organisation engaged by the PharmAccess Foundation to assist in implementing 
the programme” (KII, KWSG 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin). Another participant explained that “there 
was, however, a local implementing HMO designed strictly to oversee the local 
implementation of the scheme in Kwara State, Hygeia Community Health Care (HCHC) was 
seeing to the scheme’s administration with the support of the committee set-up by the then 
governor to ensure that they worked hand-in-hand as a team to ensure that everything went on 
seamlessly” (KII, Foreign Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin).  
Also, the HCHC served as an emissary of the partners in relating with the healthcare providers 
and as well, the enrollees. The HCHC also had the roles of quality assurance and claim 
management in the programme. Payment of capitation and fee-for-service to healthcare 
providers (private and public) were facilitated through the HCHC by the PharmAccess 
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Foundation. The HCPs were paid capitations in advance, in the first week of the month to allow 
them to purchase drugs and other requirements (KII, HCP, 20/06/19, Bode Saadu). Thus, the 
KWSG was hosting the programme; the PharmAccess Foundation was funding the programme 
while the mandate of HCHC was facilitating the implementation of the programme. 
5.4.2 Implementation Process 
The policy implementation process involved some critical activities. The main activities 
constituting the process are discussed in this section, critically reflecting the roles played by 
each of the main actors, though, most of the responsibilities were carried out by the HMO. 
5.4.2.1 Piloting and Provision of Healthcare Facility 
As noted earlier, the programme became operational in 2007 in Shonga, Edu LGA of the State. 
Two reasons informed the selection of the community for piloting the programme. One, there 
was large-scale commercial farming in the community by some Zimbabwe farmers. As such, 
it was necessary to provide accessible healthcare for them and the entire community to build a 
formidable workforce for the emerging agricultural industry. As one of the participants put it: 
“they [i.e. the partners] decided to take a holistic approach to have health insurance which was 
to start in Shonga, Edu LGA, an agrarian community where the Zimbabwean farmers were 
settled and at the same time, they used it as a pilot to provide health insurance in that 
community and improve agricultural production” (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Moreover, health and economic development are intertwined. Two, it was easier to pilot the 
programme in Shonga because, the then State Governor and the Emir of the community are 
medical doctors, who know the importance of healthcare (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, 
Ilorin). At this stage, the state government provided the healthcare facility and was responsible 
for the payment of staff salaries, but the facility was renovated and equipped by the foreign 
partner. 
5.4.2.2 Sensitisation and Enrolment 
The HCHC handled the responsibility for sensitisation and enrolment into the programme. The 
activities involved awareness creation about the programme and organising rallies as 
sensitisation fora for discussing health matters in the communities. Panda et al. (2015:1103) 
and Mekonen et al. (2018:11) concluded from their studies in rural India and Northeast 
Ethiopia respectively that awareness sensitisation efforts are crucial to enrolment and success 
of CBHI programmes. In Kwara, the HCHC had enrolment officers charged with the 
responsibilities of enrolling members of the communities (and environs) in the programme. 
These officers, in turn, worked with some community members to navigate and penetrate the 
104 
 
entire villages around the host communities, including the hard-to-reach (HTR) communities 
to widen the coverage of the programme.  
For wider coverage, the enrolment officers moved door-to-door to articulate the programme to 
community members (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2018:225). Interested community members 
were registered on the payment of enrolment premium (which was N500 as at the time the 
programme stopped) and provided with enrolment cards. The enrolment card granted its holder 
the opportunity to access healthcare for a year in a designated healthcare facility. In the early 
years of implementation, in order to boost enrolment, community members were provided with 
souvenirs after enrolment (Female FGD, 30/05/2019, Bacita). 
Also, given the influence that community leaders have on the people, they were given the 
mandate to mobilise members of their communities to enrol in the programme. Some 
community leaders explained that:  
Kosi role kankan fun community ju’pe 
won pewa pe, ki a sensitise awon eyan; asi 
sensitise won. 
There was no role for the community 
leadership other than sensitising the 
people [to enrol in the programme]; and 
we sensitised them (KII, Community 
Leader, 13/06/2019, Erinle). 
Won encourage wa wipe ka se 
enlightenment, wipe bi eyan ba se po si ti 
won gba card, oun ni kiniyen yi o se work.  
We were encouraged to enlighten the 
community members to enrol because the 
higher the enrolment, the better the 
programme (KII, Community Leader, 
20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
Nigbayen, oba ilu gbe microphone fun 
awon eyan ki won fi kede kaakiri gbogbo 
igberiko. 
At that time, the King gave out the public 
address system to some people to 
publicise the programme in the 
community and its environs (KII, 
Community Leader, 03/07/2019, Gure). 
The main actors were asked if they were comfortable with the enrolment coverage at the end 
of the programme, the government officials and the HMO were not satisfied while the officials 
of the foreign agency seemed to be satisfied. Some of the participants had this to say: 
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We were not satisfied with the level of enrolment as at the end of the programme because 
we had our own targets (KII, KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin).  
Our HMO was not satisfied with the active enrolment population as at the end of the 
programme in 2016 because we couldn’t meet up with the target most of the time. As at 
then, the state population was about 2.6 million and the closing enrolment figure was 
about 139,000. By this, we did not do very well in terms of the coverage in 11 LGAs. 
We would have done more better (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin). 
PharmAccess Foundation was satisfied with the enrolment base as at the end of the 
programme in 2016…You know change is gradual, we could not cover more than that 
because it was difficult to get people convinced about the programme initially, but 
unfortunately, the programme stopped at a time when most people were convinced to 
enrol (KII, Foreign Agency Official 2, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). 
As stated in Chapter 1, the fraction of enrolment coverage is insignificant in view of the rural 
population which constitute a larger part of the State’s population (of well over 2 million people 
at that time). As indicated in Figure 5.1 below, at the end of the programme, the enrolment 
population was 139,713. Generally, “enrolment is one of the major impediments to the 
effectiveness of CBHI in Sub-Saharan Africa [SSA]” (Kalolo et al., 2015) and the LMICs at 
large. Olowe (2019:3) noted that CBHI enrolment coverage in developing countries is often 
threatened by trust, implementation challenges and high enrolment dropout.  
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Figure 5.1: CBHI Enrolment Per Local Government Area 
 
Source: Hygeia Community Health Care 
5.4.2.3 Expansion into Communities 
The feedback from the piloting phase of the programme gave the partners an impression that it 
was possible to use the programme “to improve access to healthcare in rural Kwara” (Hendriks 
et al., 2016:478). Therefore, the programme extended from Shonga to some other parts of the 
State. Between 2007 and 2015, the programme was operational in 43 healthcare facilities 
(public and private) across the State. A participant noted that: “The aim was, for a radius of 5 
kilometres, there must be a health facility in the area where people can access healthcare 
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Figure 5.2: CBHI Healthcare Facilities Distribution 
 
  Source: Hygeia Community Health Care 
From Figure 5.2 above, the programme commenced operation in three healthcare facilities in 
2007. It added three more facilities in 2009, three in 2011, three in 2012, fourteen in 2014 and 
seventeen in 2015. Thus, the programme operated in nineteen facilities each in Kwara North 
and Kwara South, and five facilities in Kwara Central senatorial zone; perhaps because there 
are more rural communities in the North and South compared to the Central, which has the 
State capital. The expansion was steady from 2007 to 2012 but took a more aggressive turn 
between 2014 and 2015. The partners were asked about the reasons for an expansive 
community entry between 2014 and 2015. Some of them noted that: 
The programme expanded to most of the communities in 2015 because enlightenment 
was high, and there was a lot of demand by the community leaders and willingness to 
participate was also high. That was the reason we had a major expansion in 2015 (KII, 
KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin).  
When you start a programme, you pilot and move gradually. We started in Edu LGA in 
2007, in 2009 we moved to 3 LGAs. The government at that time said they wanted to 
spread around the State (KII, Foreign Agency Official, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). 
The programme was extended to most of the covered communities in 2015 as part of 
the strategies towards UHC (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Kwara North Kwara Central Kwara South
2007 3 0 0
2009 1 2 0
2011 1 2 0
2012 0 0 3
2014 6 0 8
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Even at its most expansive reach, the CBHI programme covered only a small proportion 
(4.41%) of the total population of Kwara State. This exemplifies a typical phenomenon of 
CBHI programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa (Smith & Sulzbach, 2008:2461). The low rate of 
coverage over the nine-year period suggests that attaining UHC through CBHI would take a 
very long time. 
5.4.2.4 Engagement of Providers and Capacity Building 
After identifying communities where the programme would be extended, the healthcare 
providers in such communities were approached to participate in service delivery under the 
programme. This was usually preceded by carrying out a baseline assessment or medical due 
diligence on the facility, and each facility was expected to be well-staffed, especially the private 
facilities. The HCPs were selected by a team of PharmAccess Foundation and Hygeia HMO 
following the due diligence (England, 2008:59). After the assessments, HCPs were provided 
with Quality Improvement Plan (QIP) detailing the requirements across 13 key areas: 
“Management and leadership; human resource management; patients’ rights and access to care; 
management of information; risk management; primary healthcare services; inpatient care; 
operating theatre; laboratory; diagnostic imaging; medication management; facility 
management; and, support services” (AIGHD, 2015:22). A follow-up assessment would be 
conducted (Bonfrer, 2018:56) before a provider was finally engaged under the programme. 
A private provider stated that: “We expanded our staffing from 17 to 75 before the programme 
collapsed” (KII, HCP, 19/06/2019, Bacita). They were also expected to have specific and 
separated departments or units to meet up with the operational standard. For instance, each 
facility was requested to have an ICT (Information Communication Technology) unit for 
capturing and transmitting the records of service delivery to the Programme Managers. 
Besides, the presence of many healthcare facilities in rural areas is uncommon because of the 
level of poverty and a high likelihood of not enjoying patronage. One of the healthcare 
providers recalled how he was approached. He narrated that: 
In 2006, when the CBHI was introduced here [i.e. Kwara State], it was unexpected and 
unplanned because nobody was thinking along that line. One day, a group came to my 
facility without prior information that they were coming, and they said they came to 
inspect the hospital. It was a crowd of people comprising white men, reporters and 
people from the Ministry of Health and Local Government Area officials, and so on. I 
was later informed that the inspection was to see a possible partnership on the CBHI 
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programme…We were used as a regional referral centre to handle cases beyond 
primary healthcare facilities. We also became the primary provider (KII, HCP, 
19/06/2019, Bacita). 
Public healthcare facilities were used if they were suitably available in any community of 
interest. In that case, the management of such a facility would be under the CHIS (KII, HMO 
Official 2, 29/07/2019, Ilorin). Put differently, the HMO was in charge of the private facilities 
and the CHIS (the government agency) was in charge of the management of the public 
healthcare facilities. Figure 5.3 below shows that 74% (32) of the healthcare facilities were 
government-owned, while 26% (11) were private facilities. Payments were based on 
capitation for the healthcare services covered “while other types of care remained on a fee-
for-service basis” (Bonfrer, 2018:56). The HCPs were given operational guidelines on how to 
deliver healthcare services under the CBHI programme. This is to positively influence the 
providers’ behaviour and ensure efficiency and quality service delivery (Munge et al., 
2016:1).  
Figure 5.3: Ownership of the CBHI Healthcare Facilities 
 
Source: Hygeia Community Health Care 
In addition, capacity building helps to lubricate the wheel of programme implementation for 
results. Thus, training and capacity building workshops were regularly organised for all 
categories of healthcare workers in the hospital to deliver standard service. Stakeholders were 
also often called to ruminate on issues regarding the status of the programme and way forward 
(HIF, 2012:4). A participant noted that: “They [i.e. Programme Managers] organised seminars 
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and training programmes for providers at different categories of staff for capacity building” 
(KII, HCP, 20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). A participant from a referral centre also testified that: 
“…They even brought equipment and trained us on best practices” (KII, HCP, Referral Centre 
2 Official, 12/07/2019, Ilorin).  
This indicates that the HCPs were exposed to standard and best practices in healthcare service 
delivery through trainings and seminars. This was confirmed by one of the implementing 
partners that: “We had capacity-building for healthcare workers across all cadres – medical 
doctors, nurses, midwives, laboratory scientists and technicians, pharmacists, pharmacy 
technicians etc.” (KII, Foreign Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). However, more often, 
trainings and capacity building programmes are utilised by policy actors to enforce compliance, 
as well as introduce and instil the needed modus operandi in the healthcare providers (see 
Stone, 2004:556). 
5.4.2.5 Facility Upgrade 
In selecting communities during the expansion of the programme, the availability of a 
healthcare facility was considered. As such, it became necessary to renovate some healthcare 
facilities for implementing the programme. In other cases, facilities adjudged to be suitable for 
the programme were upgraded with the provision of equipment and other necessities to ease 
delivery of quality service. The funding was incurred by the international partner. One of the 
officials explained that: 
HIF financed the upgrade of many facilities, public and private. We had the Ogo-Oluwa 
Hospital in Bacita; it was a private hospital that benefitted immensely from structural 
and equipment upgrade (KII, Foreign Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). 
A provider who benefitted from the upgrade confirmed that: “They brought in some new 
equipment to improve quality of service…” (KII, HCP, 28/07/2019, Aboto-Oja). Some of the 
types of equipment given out were ambulances and ultrasound machines while other facilities 
further benefitted through a structural upgrade. The main funding of the facility upgrade was 
“by the Health Insurance Fund and partly by the Kwara State Government” (Bonfrer, 2018:57-
58).  
5.4.2.6 Monitoring and Evaluation 
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) aimed to ensure “regular monitoring of the quality of care” 
(Schneider, 2004:353) and confirm that the implementation of the programme was carried out 
according to the established rules and guidelines. It was a quarterly exercise carried out in all 
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the facilities operating under the programme. The M&E was championed by the PharmAccess 
Foundation through SafeCare Healthcare Standards, an organisation dedicated to setting the 
standards for internationally acceptable healthcare service delivery. It consists of five 
components: “general training session; baseline assessment and gap analysis; initial feedback; 
improvement plan; and implementation assistance and feedback” (Dunsch, et al. 2017:7-8). 
The monitoring teams of the State’s Ministry of Health and the HCHC were however carried 
along in the process, in attendance. The earliest M&E exercises were carried out in June 2007 
and January 2008 (England, 2008:59). An official of the international agency commented on 
this when describing the roles of the organisation as: 
…improving quality using the SafeCare quality methodology designed by three     
organisations. JCI [i.e. Joint Commission International] of America, COHSASA 
[Council for Health Service Accreditation of Southern Africa] of South Africa and 
PharmAccess Foundation for resource-restricted settings in Africa (KII, Foreign 
Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). 
A government official added that: 
Basically, evaluation and monitoring of the programme were done by SafeCare 
Healthcare Standards to know if they met with standards…The evaluation was carried 
out quarterly. They gave a notification to providers on the things to be complied with. 
This included safety and clinical rules that needed to be complied with. It was a 
participatory thing, and they gave them a checklist on the things. It was not an exam, 
and it was like a way of life. The facilities used then were the best in standards (KII, 
KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Kwara State Ministry of Health Monitoring Team in collaboration with the 
PharmAccess Foundation carried out an integrated inspection in the health facilities 
using SafeCare methodology to monitor their activities quarterly. The exercise was 
effective (KII, KWSG Official 3, 01/08/2019, Ilorin). 
An HMO official also noted that: 
There was usually quarterly M&E conducted by the monitoring team that evaluated the 
programme, and there was also a team of doctors, we called them Care Coordinators 
that went to the clinics on a regular basis to monitor the delivery of care. The enrolment 
teams were also used to get feedback from enrollees. We also used the traditional rulers 
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and agents within the communities that tell us how things were run in the hospitals (KII, 
HMO Official 2, 29/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Another way of monitoring the programme was through committees constituted in the 
communities to ensure proper implementation. A participant noted that: 
There was also a committee in each community for the programme involving traditional 
rulers, health workers and implementing partners to identify challenges and act to solve 
them. It was joint monitoring by all stakeholders (KII, KWSG Official 1, 20/08/2019, 
Ilorin). 
A community leader added that: 
Ti a ba ni complain, a o pe Enrolment 
Officer, aade attend si wa. Igbaami, a 
tunle jo se meeting pelu awon Health 
Committee ati awon health officials. 
Emini Secretary Health Committee. 
Whenever we had a complain, we called the 
Enrolment Officer, and he attended to us. At 
times, we involved him in the meeting of the 
Health Committee [in the community] and 
the health officials [in the facility]. I am the 
Secretary of the Health Committee (KII, 
Community Leader, 15/06/2019, Edidi). 
In addition, 9 out of 10 HCPs confirmed the effectiveness of the M&E. One of them noted that:  
There was effective monitoring and evaluation of the programme because they did 
evaluation every three months, and we usually prepared well for it so that we would not 
be marked down. I’ll advise that the M&E be taken along any other programme that 
would come up. Enrollees were also given questionnaires to assess the quality of our 
service (KII, HCP, 13/06/2019, Erinle).  
Furthermore, the majority of the community leaders (10 out of 11) and community members 
(20 out of 22) testified to the effectiveness of the M&E. In the same vein, the quantitative data 
in Table 5.1 below shows that the majority (87.1%) of the respondents believed that there were 
effective evaluation and monitoring of the programme. More so, the Table shows a statistically 
significant association between quality of service and monitoring and evaluation of the 
programme (
2 = 488.181, p-value = 0.001). The study also found a statistically significant 
association between conduct of the healthcare workers and monitoring and evaluation of the 
programme (
2 = 436.802, p-value = 0.001). These suggest that the M&E exercise played a 
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positive role to ensure that the healthcare workers conduct themselves properly and provide 
quality healthcare services to the enrollees.  
Table 5.1: Effectiveness of the Monitoring and Evaluation 
Response Frequency (N = 1,012) Percentage 
Yes 881 87.1 
No 131 12.9 
 
Chi-Square Test of Association between Selected Variables and Effectiveness of the 
Monitoring and Evaluation System 
Variables Former Enrollees (p-value) 
Quality of Care .001 
Conduct of the healthcare workers .001 
Note: 5% significance level  
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
The respondents were not fully involved in the M&E exercise (i.e. some of them were 
interviewed as part of the process), but their perception as shown in the above Table indicates 
that the monitoring and evaluation of the programme were effective. However, the state 
government was not in the forefront of the exercise. Notwithstanding the level of response 
noting that the M&E was effective, there were a number of problems (discussed in Chapter 8) 
that tend to challenge the effectiveness of the exercise. Government officials were part of the 
M&E process “in-attendance” (KII, HCP, 27/07/2019, Oro) without significant contribution or 
influence. Mainly, the M&E focused more on healthcare service delivery “within the facility” 
without adequate attention to the administrative process of the programme at the level of 
HCHC and CHIS to checkmate their “excesses”.  
5.4.2.7 Decision-making  
Decision-making in the policy space was greeted with a lot of contestation, with one party 
trying to dominate the other in exerting their influence. Promotion of personal interest is often 
the primary target of each party (Jones & Jenkins-Smith, 2009:45). In the case of Kwara CBHI, 
the findings reveal that decisions were jointly made. All (7 officials) that responded to the 
question noted that decisions were jointly made. For instance, an official of the foreign agency 
stated that: “Decisions were jointly made by the partners. The KWSG, HCHC and 
PharmAccess Foundation” (KII, Foreign Agency Official 2, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). 
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The submission was affirmed by the HMO officials and the researcher. One of them noted that: 
“Decisions were jointly made by the partners including on expansion and stoppage” (KII, HMO 
Official 2, 29/07/2019, Ilorin). Meanwhile, in a context of collaboration where a party owns 
the financial power and appears to possess better knowledge and expertise than the counterpart, 
joint decision-making is often passive and lack serious or adequate deliberation. This is 
reflected in the statements of participants. A participant noted that the foreign partner was 
always present in the State, and in fact, had an office in the State. This is to allow for close 
monitoring of the implementation of the programme, to their satisfaction. The participant 
explained that:  
Yes. Decisions were jointly made by the partners when the programme was operational. 
The government of the Netherlands were almost always here to have a discussion with 
the Kwara State Government. And they have their group here, the PharmAccess 
Foundation. They have their office in Kwara State here, and the State also has 
somebody, the Executive Secretary in charge of the health insurance scheme (KII, 
Researcher, 30/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Kwara State Government official also confirmed that decisions were jointly made by the 
parties. However, they explained certain areas where decisions were solely made by the 
international partner. One of the officials stated that: “Most of the decisions were jointly made 
by the partners” (KII, KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin). There are two areas identified 
regarding the programme that decisions were made by the international partner. First, is the 
choice of communities where the programme would be extended; second, is the decision 
regarding the standard of care given to the enrollees. The officials explained that:  
Decisions were jointly made by the partners. We agreed with their choice of 
communities to run the programme (KII, KWSG Official 1, 20/08/2019, Ilorin). 
Regarding the choice of communities, the official added that: 
The foreign partners came by themselves and chose all the areas where they wanted the 
programme to be run. They would come here physically, drove around the whole State 
and found the areas where they felt the programme was highly needed. If it was the 
decision of the State Government, Bukola Saraki would have taken it to Agbaji [i.e. 




Another official pointed to the decision around the standard of healthcare. He explained that: 
Decisions were jointly made by the partners, but in terms of the standard of care, 
PharmAccess Foundation took upright decisions alone to ensure that quality was not 
compromised. Decisions about expansion benefits package, premium etc. were made 
together (KII, KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin).   
Based on the above discussion, like the policy design, the decision-making around the 
implementation of the programme was not totally made jointly. Some decisions were 
exclusively made by the foreign partner. This is inimical to the basic principles of partnership. 
However, programmes being pushed through “policy learning or policy transfer” are 
characteristically dominated by one party (the promoter) than the other, mostly, under the 
“guise” of technical know-how.  
5.5 Achievements of the CBHI Programme  
This section examines achievements and successes recorded by the CBHI programme within 
the period it was operational. As indicated in chapter 2, there have been concerns regarding the 
efficacy and success of CBHI as a policy or programme. In some cases, where CBHI 
programmes are implemented, there are implementation challenges stemming from the policy 
design. In other cases, where they are adjudged to be successful, they are faced with 
sustainability challenges. In the same light, the CBHI programme in Kwara State was viewed 
with concerns. An official of the state government shared his experience regarding the concerns 
people have about the workability and sustainability of the CBHI programme. He noted that: 
“The remarks about the programme had mixed feelings. At a conference at the Washington 
DC, there were debates that the national health insurance was not working well… I was able 
to showcase some data at the programme; even if we were on CBHI, it had fared very well 
within the State, and we had the records and data. At that point, some people were saying this 
is just one HMO programme, and you said it is thriving” (KII, KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, 
Ilorin). 
It, however, recorded some level of success before its eventual stoppage. One of the 
participants explained that: “Some of the major achievements are a great improvement in the 
health indices of the State in the National Demographic Health Survey. The programme was 
pinpointed as the intervention” (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin). All the key 
informants (i.e. the researcher, HCPs as well as the officials of the HMO, International Agency, 
KWSG) argued that the programme met the healthcare needs of the former enrollees and that 
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it achieved some success. Another participant stated in general terms that: “The programme 
had multi-dimensional success. Access to healthcare by the people increased. The premium 
was just N200 for a whole year to access primary healthcare. The health facilities were 
upgraded. In terms of health status, the impact evaluation shows that the health status of the 
enrollees improved significantly. Preparation of health services also improved. It also had a 
touch on their socio-economic conditions since they would not have to spend much on 
healthcare, and they can spend on other things. The nutritional status of enrollees also 
improved” (KII, Researcher, 30/07/2019, Ilorin). Arising from the data, achievements 
highlighted by the participants are discussed as follows: 
5.5.1 Benefits Package 
All the HCPs claimed that the programme met the healthcare needs of the former enrollees and 
that the programme covered most of the diseases common in the communities. For instance, 
one of them argued that the readiness of the community members to enrol if the programme is 
re-introduced serves as an indication of the success of the programme. In justifying that the 
programme met the healthcare needs of the former enrollees, one of them pointed out that: 
…This is evident in the lamentation of the beneficiaries since the stoppage of the 
programme. There are now cases of people dying at home due to the challenge of the 
fund (KII, HCP, 28/07/2019, Aboto-Oja). 
Similarly, another HCP contended that the programme met the healthcare needs of the 
beneficiaries because it covered most of the diseases in the community, and as such, it earned 
some international awards. In his words:  
The programme met the healthcare needs of the enrollees excellently to the extent that 
the Kwara State Government received international awards twice or thrice on the 
programme (KII, HCP, 19/06/2019, Bacita). 
He continued that: 
The programme covered most of the diseases that are common in this community. This 
includes malaria, arthritis, measles, fever, malnutrition, anaemia and common surgeries 
like hernia, hydrolysis, appendicitis; and then, the obstetrics department which was the 
peak of it because many who would not come for ante-natal care would have died but 
they were coming on the platform of the programme, and they did not have to pay even 
if they delivered with surgery. The programme contributed to lowering the maternal 
117 
 
mortality rate in this area when the programme was operational (KII, HCP, 19/06/2019, 
Bacita). 
In addition, an HCP supported the above claim that: “The programme met the healthcare needs 
of the enrollees because some of them with chronic diseases could access regular care” (KII, 
HCP, 27/07/2019, Oro). He added that: 
The programme covered most of the diseases common in the community. Though, it 
didn’t cover some geriatric conditions that require specialised attention. It covered what 
we can consider as the health body of that society (KII, HCP, 27/07/2019, Oro).  
Another provider contributed that: 
The programme covered most of the diseases common in this community, to some extent. 
Malaria, maternal care, hernia, hypertension, and diabetes were covered hospital (KII, 
HCP, 20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
 In the same vein, an official of the international agency noted that: 
The benefits package was very robust involving some minor and intermediate surgeries 
such as caesarean section, appendectomy and many other intermediate surgeries. People 
could go to their farms to farm, people could go to their places of work and the economy 
of the populace was boosted because they were healthier (KII, Foreign Agency 1, 
02/09/2019, Ilorin).  
However, “most CBHI schemes offer limited benefits package that comprises of either one or 
a combination of services including outpatient care, surgery, deliveries, diagnostic test, referral 
to specialist hospitals and primary healthcare” (Chuma et al., 2013:4). Likewise, as noted 
above, the Kwara CBHI covered primary and limited secondary healthcare services. As such, 
enrollees could not access services (e.g. dialysis in a case of renal failure) outside the benefits 
package without paying OOP. This tends to limit the interest of the people in enrolment in 
CBHI programmes (Panda et al., 2016:58).    
5.5.2 Increased Utilisation of Hospital Care 
The key informants noted that the programme increased utilisation rate of hospital care services 
in the communities. This is attributable to the amount paid as premium for accessing care. A 
government official noted that: “People attended hospitals more and we had more volume of 
patients in the hospital, and since they were not paying anything it reduced mortality rate. 
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People were very healthy, including the workforce to help the economy” (KII, KWSG Official 
1, 20/08/2019, Ilorin). Another participant made a comparison and narrated that:    
The CBHI achieved fantastic success in the State. The utilisation rate of the 
Comprehensive Health Centre in Shonga was very poor before the programme. 
Utilisation rate rose from 10 to over 200 cases daily. They could have up to 10 deliveries 
in a day, and that showed that there was a demand for healthcare, but people could not 
access due to many factors; our research showed that it was due to money, ill-equipped 
healthcare facilities (KII, Foreign Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). 
Some HCPs confirmed how healthcare service utilisation rose astronomically in their facilities. 
They stated that: 
The programme met the healthcare needs of the enrollees because the utilisation rate was 
very high (KII, HCP, 17/06/2019, Odo-Owa). 
At inception, drugs were available, and enrolment was very high, and the hospital was 
usually filled with patients, but suddenly, the standard dropped (KII, HCP, 02/07/2019, 
Kaiama). 
At some point in the programme, we had about 16,000 enrollees in our facility. That is 
enough evidence that we provided quality service (KII, HCP, 19/06/2019, Bacita). 
Many of the people did not go for an ultrasound scan or ante-natal care prior to the 
commencement of the programme. During the operational period, there was a high level 
of utilisation of care in the hospital (KII, HCP, 20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
As at the time of the close of the programme, we had about 25,000 enrollees which was 
the largest enrolment base in the State. People from other Local Government Areas, Oke-
Ero and Isin, which had the programme were also coming to our hospital for care (KII, 
HCP, 21/06/2019, Osi).  
From the foregoing, there was increased healthcare utilisation among community members 
when the programme was operational. This is aligns with studies conducted by Brals et al. 
(2017:999), AIID (2013:22 ) and AIGHD (2017:15); who found a high rate of healthcare 
utilisation among the enrollees in the programme. The testimonies of the first sets of enrollees 
served as the basis through which many other members of the communities enrolled and 
benefitted from the programme. 
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5.5.3 Reduction in Mortality Rate 
One of the fundamental goals of healthcare programmes is a reduction in the mortality rate. 
Findings (‘unverified claims’) emanating from the study indicates that the programme reduced 
the mortality rate in the communities and increased life expectancy of the enrollees. An HCP 
noted that: “The programme met the healthcare needs of the enrollees because it reduced 
mortality rate” (KII, HCP, 13/06/2019, Erin-Ile). One HMO official recalled how some people 
named their children (as Hygeia) because of the standard of care received, leading to successful 
deliveries. He explained that:  
The programme was a great success because it was the first time the people would 
benefit from health insurance to the extent that people named their children delivered 
through CS [caesarean section] after the programme… (KII, HMO Official 1, 
26/07/2019, Ilorin). 
In support of the above, another participant among the HCPs narrated a specific case where a 
pregnant woman who was in a very critical stage of labour was referred to his facility. He 
explained that a caesarean section was successfully carried out and the baby was named after 
the programme, popularly called Hygiea. He elaborated that:  
The case of a pregnant woman whose baby is called “Hygeia Baby” today, was referred 
from Shonga to our facility because she had difficulty in delivering. We did CS, and 
the baby survived, and the baby was the first delivery under the programme free of 
charge. This boosted the population of the programme (KII, HCP,19/06/2019, Bacita). 
In addition, a participant declared that: 
The programme had a huge success, and it overachieved the purpose for which it was 
established because the life expectancy of the people increased in addition to improved 
health-seeking behaviour. Maternal and infant, and aged mortality reduced. Chronic 
diseases such as diabetes and hypertension were well-managed by using standard 
quality operating procedure from the Dutch government, and all the hospitals followed 
the procedure (KII, HMO Official 2, 29/07/2019, Ilorin). 
In support, some other participants stated that: 
Maternal morbidity and mortality reduced drastically, and productivity increased 
among the people. You know when there was no health insurance, we had a lot of 
farmers that had hernia (KII, Foreign Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). 
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It had a record of gross reduction of maternal and infant mortality rates, hypertension, 
diabetes, stroke etc. It improved the population rate and health status of the people (KII, 
KWSG 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin).  
5.5.4 Awards and Point of Reference 
The programme won awards while it was operational regarding its performance, as noted in 
Chapter 1. One of the participants reiterated that: “The programme won both local and 
international awards, e.g. the Economic Development Award, Financial Times Award and the 
Ministry of Health also paid accolades to the programme. More so, representatives from 
different States came to understudy the programme based on its success. It also boosted the 
economic fortunes of the State through employment… Essentially, it brought Kwara State to 
the world map in terms of health improvement” (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Another participant added that: 
The international agencies commended the programme, and it received awards. The 
programme recorded huge success and helped the poor and vulnerable people in rural 
areas (KII, KWSG Official 3, 01/08/2019, Ilorin).  
In addition, the programme was described as a viable model of health insurance that could be 
replicated in other climes. It was also reported that a former United Nations’ (UN) Secretary-
General endorsed the programme and recommended it for the adoption of other countries in 
Africa. A government official noted that: 
The most important thing is that the advent of the Kwara CBHI was the reason for the 
CBHI programme in other places in Nigeria. When they realised that it was thriving in 
Kwara, we were invited to come up with a model that can fit every other State in Nigeria. 
Because we gave them an argument that you cannot mandate health insurance policy in 
every state because each state has their own ways of managing it. Mr Ban Ki-moon, the 
then Secretary-General of the UN said, and I quote “the Kwara model is a model that can 
be recreated in all Sub-Saharan Africa” (KII, KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin). 
He added that: 
It became the only state that had a successful CBHI programme that became a tutorial 
centre for all other States to learn from. The States included Kaduna, Ogun, Delta, Ondo 
etc. Some people came in from Tanzania. Also, there are 40 international students who 
wrote their theses on the Kwara CBHI (KII, KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin). 
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Another official remarked that: 
The programme was widely and worldly acclaimed as a very successful programme. It 
was commended by a former Secretary-General of the United Nations. Many other States 
came to understudy the programme based on its success. It was a very wonderful, 
remarkable and tremendous achievement (KII, KWSG Official 1, 20/08/2019, Ilorin). 
Precisely, the programme won the “Saving Lives At Birth (SLAB) Award in 2014; Finalist for 
the OECD-DAC’s (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development 
Assistance Committee DAC) Prize for Taking Development Innovation to Scale by the World 
Economic Forum in 2014; Financial Times/International Finance Corporation’s 
Transformational Business Award in 2016” (PharmAccess Group, 2016:6) etc. The CBHI 
programme also emerged as a point of reference for other States in the federation to “emulate” 
in terms of the provision of healthcare services. The United Nations (UN) former Secretary-
General, Ban Ki-moon remarked about the programme in 2011 that: “The ground-breaking 
Community Health Insurance Scheme of the Kwara State Government is another hopeful 
example…This is exactly the kind of innovative partnership that we should replicate - here in 
Nigeria and beyond” (Ki-moon, 2011).  
Quite worrisome at this point relates to the “lessons” learnt from the Kwara CBHI programme 
and the indication of interest by many states of the Nigerian federation. This is because it is 
claimed that 17 out of the 36 states have come up with health insurance laws based on the 
experience and ideas from the Kwara programme (see PharmAccess Group, 2017:5). Although 
there are huge lessons to be learnt but introducing health insurance in settings where only a 
limited part of the population can afford to pay tends to exclude the majority. In the same vein, 
this outcome challenges the ideational basis of this kind of policy, in spite of the stated 
achievements. Meanwhile, effective social provisioning towards development is “based on 
visionary agenda-setting, capturing a wider vision of society for long-term benefits” (Adésínà, 
2011:464). 
5.6 Conclusion 
The chapter discusses how the context of healthcare in Kwara State led to the emergence of the 
CBHI programme. It shows the vulnerable nature of the State in agreeing to the launching of 
the CBHI programme. The chapter also shows how CBHI got onto the policy landscape in 
Kwara State. There was, however, no effective policy in place to improve and attend to the 
healthcare needs of the people. Consequently, it became easy to propose and implement the 
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CBHI policy in the State by international actors, with no input in the policy content from the 
local actors or policymakers.  
The domination by the international actors was possible because of their possession of the fund 
and technical know-how. The main actors in the policy implementation were examined in 
relation to their roles. The programme was however implemented through the engagement of 
a local HMO by the international actors, and it directs it on how to implement the programme. 
The chapter further examines the achievement of the programme from the perspective of the 
key informants. The next chapter, however, comprehensively examines the perception of the 
community members about the programme. As such, areas of convergence and divergence will 




















PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF COMMUNITY MEMBERS ABOUT THE 
CBHI PROGRAMME 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the perceptions of community members about the CBHI programme 
during the time it was operational in the various communities. This forms an important aspect 
of the study because it provides insights from the community members about the programme. 
Put differently, it reveals the insights of the people about the programme and the understanding 
of its success-level from the standpoint of the beneficiaries. Specifically, it discusses the 
demographic features of the respondents. Also, the awareness and interest of community 
members in the CBHI programme were interrogated. Issues regarding enrolment, healthcare 
service delivery and benefits package of the programme were also discussed. 
6.2 Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
This section deals with the socio-demographic features of the respondents (former enrollees 
and non-enrollees) in the study. This is summarised in Table 6.1 below. 
Table 6.1: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
Variable  Enrollees (N = 1,055) Non-Enrollees (N = 528) 
Gender Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Male 527 49.95 264 50.0 
Female 528 50.05 264 50.0 
Age Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
21 – 25 94 9.7 69 15 
26 – 30 193 20.0 127 27.6 
31 – 35 127  13.1 64 13.9 
36 – 40 135 14.0 50 10.9 
41 - 45  85 8.7 40 8.7 
46 – 50 106 11.1 41 8.9 
51 -55 43 4.5 19 4.1 
56 – 60 73 7.6 10 2.2 
61 and above 110 11.3 40 8.7 
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Variable  Enrollees (N = 1,055) Non-Enrollees (N = 528) 
Education Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
No Formal Education 215 20.9 74 14.4 
Primary School Education 197 19.1 98 19.0 
Secondary School 
Education 
303 29.4 202 39.2 
ND/NCE/Tech. School 201 19.5 92 17.9 
HND/University Graduate 115 11.2 49 9.5 
Religion Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Islam 629 61.7 306 59.4 
Christianity 388 38.0 207 40.2 
African Traditional 
Religion 
1 0.1 1 0.2 
Other 2 0.2 1 0.2 
Marital Status Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Married  886 86.9 528 100.0 
Divorced  4 0.4 0 0 
Single Parent 4 0.4 0 0 
Widow 120 10.6 0 0 
Single 6 0.5 0 0 
Household Size Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
1 – 3 165 20.4 74 21 
4 – 6 435 53.8 180 51 
7 – 10 174 21.5 76 21.5 
11 and above 35 4.3 23 6.5 
Occupation Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Farmer 118 11.7 72 14.1 
Trader 409 40.8 164 32.0 
Technician 109 10.8 78 15.2 
Civil Servant 166 16.4 59 11.5 
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Variable  Enrollees (N = 1,055) Non-Enrollees (N = 528) 
Others 208 20.6 139 27.1 
Income per month (USD) Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
N3,000 or below  
(8.2 and below) 
61 7.7 33 8.7 
N3,001 – N6,000  
(8.2 – 16.5) 
137 17.3 74 19.5 
N6,001 – N9,000  
(16.5 – 24.8) 
47 5.9 17 4.5 
N9,001- N12,000  
(24.8 – 33.1) 
158 19.9 65 17.1 
N12,001 – N15,000  
(33.1 – 41.4) 
53 6.7 33 8.7 
N15,001 and above  
(41.4 and above) 
337 42.5 158 41.5 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
As shown in Table 6.1, 1,583 respondents took part in the study. The study had equal 
participation for both male and female enrolled and non-enrolled respondents in the study to 
reflect gender sensitivity. Specifically, male respondents among the former enrollees were 527 
(49.95%), and female respondents were 528 (50.05%). For the non-enrolled respondents, 264 
(50%) were males, and 264 (50%) were females. Further, the mean age of the enrolled and 
non-enrolled respondents is 41.7 and 37.8 years, respectively. This signifies that the majority 
of the respondents were in their youth. Also, over 60% per cent of the total respondents had a 
minimum of secondary school education signifying that most of them acquired some forms of 
formal education. However, those with no formal education are more among the formerly-
enrolled (20.9%) compared with the non-enrolled (14.4%) respondents.  
Also, most of the respondents were Muslims because of the dominance of Islam in the study 
area. While the non-enrolled respondents were purposively taken from the married men and 
women in the selected communities, more than 80% of the formerly-enrolled respondents were 
also married. This indicates that the majority of the total respondents in the study were married. 
Further, the household size of the majority of the respondents falls within the range of 4-6 for 
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both the formerly-enrolled and non-enrolled respondents. More so, most of the total 
respondents were traders. While farming is common in the rural areas, only a few indicated 
that they were farmers. This might be because most people in the rural communities merely 
engage in subsistence farming while they combine it with other occupations (such as trade) to 
generate income.  
Furthermore, half (50.8%) of the former enrollees and half (49.8%) of the non-enrollees earned 
monthly income of N12,000 (33.1 USD) or below. This suggests that most people in the rural 
communities earn slightly above one-third of the recently approved minimum wage of N30,000 
(82.8 USD) per month. The income level of most of the respondents shows that they are ‘petty 
traders’ or engaged in small scale businesses in the rural communities. The finding reflects the 
income status of most people in Nigeria. The low income is similar to the finding of Ameen et 
al. (2016:5) among artisans on awareness about CBHI in Ilorin metropolis, whereby 41.1% of 
the respondents earned below N20,000 (55.2 USD) monthly. Also, Ogben and Ilesanmi 
(2018:56) found in a CBHI study in Abuja that over 60% of the respondents earned less than 
N18,000 (49.7 USD) monthly. Further, Agbo et al. (2019:52) found in a study of willingness 
to pay in Lagos that 48% and 95.8% of the urban and rural respondents earned monthly 
household income of less than N20,000 (55.2 USD) respectively. 
6.3 Awareness about the CBHI Programme in Kwara State 
As stated earlier in the preceding chapter, the CBHI programme became operational in 2007 
and started in Shonga, Edu Local Government Area of Kwara State. The commencement was 
supported with strong awareness efforts to ensure the acceptance of the programme through 
massive enrolment. As a result, many people who lacked affordability and those who never 
considered receiving healthcare in the hospital as a necessity had the opportunity of enrolling 
in the programme. This section examines the sources of knowledge about the programme and 
interest of community members to enrol in the programme. 
6.3.1 Source of Knowledge About the CBHI Programme 
The respondents became aware of the CBHI programme through various sources. These 
strategies provided an opportunity for publicising the programme across the rural communities 
where it was introduced. Table 6.2 shows the various sources through which the respondents 





Table 6.2: Sources of Knowledge about the CBHI Programme 
Source of Knowledge 
Former Enrollees (N = 1,111) Non- Enrollees (N = 527) 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Mass media 141 12.6 60 11.4 
Family & Friends 421 37.8 214 40.6 
Community meeting 393 35.3 157 29.7 
Sales Agent 28 2.5 8 1.5 
Mosque/Church 10 0.9 1 0.2 
Healthcare facility 23 2.07 5 0.9 
Association meeting 1 0.09 0 0 
Awareness 
programme 0 0 7 1.3 
Others 94 8.5 75 14.2 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
Table 6.2 shows the predominant sources of information among the respondents were family 
& friends and community meetings, suggesting that there was a good level of social interaction 
and communication among the community members. This is a common feature of rural 
communities, known for a relatively high level of collectivism. The qualitative data aligns with 
the above results. A community leader during an interview noted that: 
Akoko, nigbati information ko go round, 
odape oje ajoji si community yi, but with the 
efforts of awon indigenes, ti won go round, 
ti won enlighten awon eyan, wipe: this is 
what the government is trying to do. O 
make e easy. 
Initially, when information about the 
programme did not go round, it was 
seemingly strange to this community, but 
with the efforts of the indigenes that went 
around to enlighten the people, that: this is 
what the government is trying to do. It 
made it easy for the programme to gain a 
high level of acceptance (KII, Community 




Another community leader stated that: 
Ape meeting gbogbo awon ara ilu, ati 
gbobo ilu towa ni surroundings wa,  won 
sin brief wa ‘pe nti wongbe bo niyi, asi 
tewo gba. 
We called a meeting of all community 
members, including people from the 
neighbouring communities. Then, we were 
briefed about the programme and we 
embraced it (KII Community Leader, 
01/07/2019, Aboto Oja).  
A community member also pointed out that religious institutions assisted in increasing 
awareness about the programme. He explained that: 
I became aware of the programme in the hospital, though the community also sensitised 
the people through the mosques and churches. This sensitisation exercise improved the 
level of participation in the programme because more people became aware and enrolled 
(IDI, Male, 19/06/2019, Bacita). 
Another community member noted that: 
I heard about it from a family member, but there was also awareness efforts carried out 
in the community (IDI, Male, 03/07/2019, Gure). 
Some other sources of information that enhanced awareness about the programme were radio 
programmes and signboards. According to some community members: 
Akoko, mogbo nipare l’ori afefe, tianpe ni 
redio; elekeji, mogbo nipare lati enu awon 
ebi mi; eleketa, mo gbo nipare nibi 
community meeting. Awon ona yi jeki 
opolopo eyan kopa nibi eto na. 
First, I heard about it through the radio; 
second, I heard about it through my family 
members; third, I heard about it at the 
community meeting. These media 
encouraged most people to enrol in the 
programme (IDI, Male, 13/06/2019, Erinle). 
 
Sanboodu lari. Bi ase lo konfaamu niyen, 
wonde ni beeni. 
It was the signboard about the programme 
that we saw. We went to confirm, and they 




More so, community leaders were given the mandate of informing and urging their community 
members to enrol in the programme, and this strategy also yielded positive results. Some of the 
community leaders discussed their role in the programme as thus: 
Won ni ki awa asiwaju ilu maa se alaye fun 
awon eyan pe kiwon maawasi odo won. 
The community leadership was requested 
to sensitise and enlighten the community 
members to enrol in the programme (KII, 
Community Leader, 02/07/2019, Kaiama). 
Awa asiwaju ilu’nfun awon ara ilu ni 
idanileko wipe kiwon losibe, ‘pe kosi ifoya.  
The community leadership enlightened the 
community members to enrol in the 
programme that there was no cause for 
alarm (KII, Community Leader, 
21/06/2019, Osi). 
Table 6.3: Chi-Square Test of Association between Selected Variables and Knowledge 
about the CBHI Programme 
Variables Former Enrollees (p-value)* Non-Enrollees (p-value)* 
Gender .080 .525 
Education .215 .242 
Age .669 .054 
Occupation .028 .013 
Note: 5% significance level 
*Two-tailed test 
  
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
Table 6.3 above reveals that the study did not find a statistically significant association between 
gender and knowledge about the CBHI programme among the former enrollees (
2 = 6.746, 
p-value = 0.080) and the non-enrollees (
2 = 2.235, p-value = 0.525). This might be linked to 
the high level of awareness and sensitisation efforts for the programme. The study did not also 
find a statistically significant association between educational status and knowledge about the 
programme among the former enrollees (
2 = 15.512, p-value = 0.215) and the non-enrollees 
(
2 = 14.990, p-value = 0.242). Similarly, Banwat et al. (2012:56) found no statistically 
significant relationship between educational status and knowledge about CBHI in North 
Central Nigeria, the same region where Kwara belongs. 
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Further, it found no statistically significant association between age and knowledge about the 
CBHI programme among the former enrollees (
2 = 20.482, p-value = 0.669) and the non-
enrollees (
2 = 36.096, p-value = 0.054). In the same vein, Noubiap et al. (2014) found no 
relationship between age and knowledge about CBHI in Cameroun. However, the study found 
a statistically significant association between occupation and knowledge about the CBHI 
programme among the former enrollees (
2 = 22.955, p-value = 0.028) and non-enrollees (
2 = 25.321, p-value = 0.013). This might be related to the methods of publicising the 
programme. For instance, rallies and meetings were organised in the community markets. A 
community leader explained that:    
Inu big market wa ni won ti bawa so’ro. 
Everybody sin jade si’ta. 
We were invited to our big market where 
they introduced the programme to us, and 
everybody was present (KII, Community 
Leader, 03/07/2019, Gure). 
The submission of the various participants indicates that the spread of information and 
awareness about the programme was due to the combined efforts of those implementing the 
programme and the community members, most notably, the community leaders and religious 
leaders. However, there was “poor awareness and paucity of information” about the CBHI 
programme in Lagos (AndChristie Research Foundation/Centre for Public Policy Alternatives, 
2014:15). Also, studies by Abdulrasheed and Aladetohun (2018:18) and Bamidele and 
Adebimpe (2013:9) in Alimosho Lagos and Osun South-Western Nigeria respectively, found 
poor CBHI awareness among the respondents. The high level of awareness found in this study 
can be attributed to many media and channels employed in creating awareness about the 
programme.  
Table 6.4: Multinomial Logistic Regression on Knowledge about the CBHI Programme 
Variable 
















1.649 4.349 .037 
 
1.143 1.317 .251 
 
Gender -.237 .666 .414 .789 -.357 .878 .349 .700 
Education -.168 1.909 .167 .846 .375 3.939 .047 1.455 
Age -.110 3.620 .057 .895 -.129 2.113 .146 .879 






2.823 16.897 .000 
 
2.193 7.412 .006 
 
Gender -.123 .239 .625 .884 -.476 2.577 .108 .621 
Education -.165 2.469 .116 .848 -.039 .076 .783 .961 
Age -.108 4.765 .029 .897 -.045 .491 .483 .956 




3.922 32.522 .000 
 
2.339 8.001 .005 
 
Gender -.602 5.674 .017 .548 -.594 3.717 .054 .552 
Education -.283 7.208 .007 .753 .001 .001 .997 1.001 
Age -.103 4.266 .039 .902 .011 .028 .866 1.011 
Occupation -.100 .983 .322 .905 -.254 4.613 .032 .776 
Note: 5% significance level 
Reference Category: Others  
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
The result in Table 6.4 above shows a comparison of each of the means of knowing about the 
CBHI programme against the Reference Category (Others – those who knew about the CBHI 
programme through other means) for the enrollees and non-enrollees. The first set of 
coefficients indicates that only education (b = 0.375; 0.047) and occupation (b = -.505; 0.001) 
among the non-enrollees were significant predictors though occupation had inverse 
relationship. Also, the second set of coefficients indicates that only age (b = -.108; 0.029) 
among the former enrollees was a significant predictor. However, the third set of coefficients 
reveals that only occupation was not a significant predictor among the former enrollees but 
found as a significant predictor among the non-enrollees. 
6.3.2 Interest and Trust in the CBHI Programme at Inception 
The introduction of the CBHI programme attracted most of the community members because 
it came with an opportunity of access to healthcare. Some people saw it as an opportunity while 
some other people felt the package was too good to be real. As noted earlier in Chapter 2, trust 
is one of the challenges of enrolment in CBHI programmes. This study also found that some 
people were sceptical about the efficacy of the programme. Therefore, some community 
members decided to wait while others enrolled to ascertain the genuineness of the claims 






Figure 6.1: Interest in the CBHI Programme among Respondents 
 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
Figure 6.1 shows that most of the respondents were interested in the CBHI programme. This 
indicates that the community members were delighted with the claims (during awareness 
programmes) that the programme would provide financial protection and improve their 
healthcare status. The qualitative findings of the study affirmed the results. All the interviewees 
(community leaders and community members) in the communities were delighted with the 
introduction of the programme. A community member gave a similitude of how happy she was, 
as thus: 
Odabi eni tolosinu orun ni, ti orun tipaa 
toti feeku; towade tangbe Maltina tutu 
fun komu. 
It was like someone who had been under the 
sun and about to die due to the hotness of the 
sun; and was given a very cold drink to take 
(IDI, Female, Odo Owa, 17/06/2019). 
Some other participants noted that: 
Inumi dun nigbati wongbe eto na wa nitori 
wipe opolopo nikoni alafia ti won’o delowo 
lati fi toju arawon. 
I was very delighted with the introduction 
of the CBHI programme because many 
people were not healthy and had no money 































Another community member stated that: 
Nigbati won gbe eto naa wa, inuwa dun 
wipe won ma toju wa. 
We were happy when the programme was 
introduced, hoping to receive quality 
healthcare (IDI, Female, 12/06/2019, 
Idofian). 
A community leader noted that: 
Nigbati agbo nipa eto naa, inuwa dunsi. 
Awon osise won niwon wasi aafin obawa 
nibi, won salaye. Kabiyesi si salaye fun 
gbogbo awa oloye, awan salaye fun awon 
eyan.  
We were delighted when we heard about 
the programme. The organisers came to 
this palace to inform the King, he informed  
us [the chiefs], and we also informed the 
community members about the 
programme (KII, Community Leader, 
17/06/2019, Odo-Owa). 
However, regardless of the level of interest, some people were still very reluctant to accept the 
programme. A participant explained that: 
Hygeia wa very interesting toripe opolopo 
eyan mi tiokin losi hospital, igbayen ni won 
ni access; mean ‘pe ofe ni. Orisi nkan 
tikoda ni awon eyan nso nigbayen until ti 
awon kan sope eje ka try rewo. 
The programme was very interesting 
because most people that were not 
receiving hospital care had access to care 
because it was free. People were 
insinuating all sorts of negativities about it 
at inception until when some people 
decided to give it a try (IDI, Female, 
21/06/2019, Osi).  
Another participant noted that: 
The programme was superb and interesting. Initially, we did not trust the programme, 
but gradually we started to find it interesting when we were hearing about what was 
happening in the hospital (IDI, Male, 19/06/2019, Bacita). 
A participant also commented that: 
Igbati won koko introduce programme yen 
siwa, tikotii bere, arope fake ni because iye 
When the programme was introduced 
then, before it commenced, we felt it was 
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tiwon ni kamaa san nigba yen okere si itoju 
tiwon ni amaari. 
fake because the premium was low 
compared to the benefits package that was 
promised (IDI, Male, 20/06/2019, Bode 
Saadu). 
The finding of this study that some community members were sceptical about the efficiency of 
the programme is confirmed by the outcome of a systematic review conducted by Adebayo et 
al. (2015:1) which found “lack of trust as one of the main reasons for low coverage of CBHI 
in the LMICs”. As shown in Table 6.5 below, the study found no statistically significant 
association between gender and interest in the CBHI programme among the former enrollees (
2 = .762, p-value = 0.858) but found a statistically significant association between gender 
and interest in the CBHI programme among the non-enrolled respondents (
2 = 8.244, p-value 
= 0.041). This shows that the interest in the programme among the former enrollees was beyond 
gender considerations. This is confirmed by Figure 6.1, showing that interest was higher among 
the former enrollees compared to the non-enrollees.  
The high level of interest in the programme is in tune with the study conducted by Haile et al. 
(2014:6) in Southwest Ethiopia where 77.8% of the respondents were interested in enrolling in 
CBHI programme. In the same vein, Kibret et al.  (2019:1) found that 81.5% of respondents 
were interested in enrolling in the CBHI programme in Northwest Ethiopia. The association 
between gender and interest in the programme among the non-enrolled respondents suggests 
that certain factors influenced their interest in the programme. For instance, this might include 
considerations of affordability and thoughts of who (in terms of gender) was mostly in need of 
healthcare coverage in the household.  
The study also found no statistically significant association between age and interest in the 
programme for both the former enrollees (
2 = 26.184, p-value = 0.344) and the non-enrollees 
(
2 = 33.160, p-value = 0.101). This indicates that most of the respondents did not give 
consideration to age regarding their interest in the programme. Often, the aged and children 
appear more vulnerable, however, no one is immune to illness. More so, the healthcare 
programme was accessible to all upon enrolment and regardless of age group. The finding is 
against the outcome of a recent study by Garedew et al. (2020:45) in Ethiopia which found an 
association between age and interest in CBHI programme. 
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Further, the study found no statistically significant relationship between education and interest 
in the CBHI programme among the formerly-enrolled (
2 = 14.793, p-value = 0.253) and non-
enrolled (
2 = 15.917, p-value = 0.195) respondents. This shows that the respondents 
understood the importance of access to healthcare regardless of their educational status and 
that creation of awareness about the programme was done among the people using their local 
languages for better understanding. However, this is not in tune with the findings of studies 
conducted in Nepal (Ko et al., 2018:58), North Central Nigeria (Banwat et al., 2012:57) and 
Southeast Nigeria (Azuogu & Eze, 2018:3) that found association between education and 
interest in CBHI. 
In addition, the study found a statistically significant relationship between occupation and 
interest in the programme among the former enrollees (
2 = 23.813, p-value = 0.022) and the 
non-enrollees (
2 = 22.335, p-value = 0.034). This might be related to the risks involved in 
some occupations. For instance, hernia was common among the farmers in the rural 
communities (Female FGD, 30/05/2019, Bacita; KII, HCP, 20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
Similarly, Ahmed et al. (2016:1) found an association between occupation and willingness to 
enrol in a CBHI programme in Bangladesh. 
Furthermore, it found a statistically significant association between income and interest in the 
CBHI programme among the formerly-enrolled (
2 = 48.175, p-value = 0.001) and the non-
enrolled (
2 = 28.289, p-value = 0.020) respondents. This may be related to the financial 
capacity of the respondents. Table 6.1 (above) shows that most of the respondents earned 
N12,000 (33.1 USD) or below and the majority were traders who may not have consistent or 
guaranteed income but desired healthcare coverage against catastrophic OOP. Likewise, 
previous studies by Gobir et al. (2016:8) and Bamidele and Adebimpe (2013:1) found an 
association between income and interest in CBHI programme in North-Western Nigeria and 
South-Western Nigeria, respectively. 
The study also found a statistically significant association between source of knowledge about 
the programme and interest in the CBHI programme among the former enrollees (
2 = 18.232, 
p-value = 0.033) and the non-enrollees (
2 = 57.301, p-value = 0.001). This might be linked 
to the various strategies and methods adopted in creating awareness for the programme. Table 
6.2 reveals that the majority of the people knew about the programme through family and 
friends and community meetings. Thus, the endorsement of the programme by the community 
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leaders as well as the bond shared with family and friends may have influenced the interest of 
the community members in the programme. As explained earlier in Chapter 5, community 
leaders and religious leaders were involved in the sensitisation efforts for the programme (KII, 
Community Leader, 11/07/2019, Idofian; KII, Community Leader, 20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
A male community member in Bacita noted that: “The programme was publicised through 
health talks in the markets, churches, mosques and other parts of the community…” (IDI, Male, 
19/06/2019, Bacita). All of these were contributory to the high level of interest in the 
programme in the communities.  
Table 6.5: Chi-Square Test of Association between Selected Variables and Interest in the 
CBHI Programme 
Variables Former Enrollees (p-value)* Non-Enrollees (p-value)* 
Gender .858 .041 
Age .344 .101 
Education .253 .195 
Occupation .022 .034 
Income .001 .020 
Knowledge about CBHI  .033 .001 
Note: 5% significance level 
*Two-tailed test 
  
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
Further, Table 6.6 below on multinomial regression logistic shows a comparison of each level 
of interest in the CBHI programme against the Reference Category (Indifferent) for the 
enrollees and non-enrollees. The first set of coefficients indicates that only income (b = .912; 
.044) among the former enrollees was a significant predictor of association. Similarly, the 
second set of coefficients indicates that income among the former enrollees (b = .988;.031) and 
non-enrollees (b = -.411; .003) were significant predictors. However, the relationship was 
inverse for the non-enrollees. The third set of coefficients reveals no significant predictors for 
the non-enrollees but indicates for age (b = .216; .044) and knowledge about the CBHI 





Table 6.6: Multinomial Logistic Regression on Interest in the CBHI Programme 
Variable 
















4.865 1.949 .163 
 
4.774 12.650 .000 
 
Gender  .182 .029 .864 1.200 -.130 .102 .750 .878 
Education .424 .632 .427 1.528 -.069 .128 .721 .934 
Age .005 .000 .984 1.005 .057 .394 .530 1.059 
Occupation -.434 1.129 .288 .648 .024 .025 .874 1.024 








3.215 .814 .367  1.691 1.316 .251  
Gender  .113 .011 .917 1.120 .502 1.192 .275 1.652 
Education .189 .120 .729 1.208 .408 3.477 .062 1.504 
Age .077 .117 .733 1.080 .139 1.901 .168 1.149 
Occupation -.486 1.335 .248 .615 -.121 .475 .491 .886 








4.545 1.532 .216  1.542 .905 .342  
Gender  .109 .009 .923 1.115 .391 .610 .435 1.478 
Education .256 .205 .651 1.291 .015 .004 .950 1.015 
Age -.202 .714 .398 .817 .216 4.068 .044 1.241 
Occupation -.527 1.478 .224 .590 .116 .375 .540 1.123 




-1.132 2.565 .109 .322 -.746 6.592 .010 .474 
Note: 5% significance level 
Reference Category: Indifferent 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
6.4 Enrolment in the CBHI Programme 
Generally, decisions to enrol or otherwise are often premised on specific reasons. Participants 
in the study identified various reasons that informed their enrolment and non-enrolment in the 
CBHI programme. The reasons among the former enrollees are detailed in Table 6.7 below. 
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Table 6.7: Reasons for Enrolment among the Formerly-enrolled Respondents 
Reason Frequency (N = 1,043) Percentage 
Illness 195 18.6 
Affordability 169 16 
Benefits package 501 48 
Testimony of others 161 15 
Maternal Care 1 0.9 
Others 16 1.5 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
Table 6.7 shows that most (48%) of the respondents enrolled because of the benefits package 
offered by the programme. This implies that the respondents understood the importance of 
utilising modern healthcare services and the need for financial protection. The results were 
substantiated by the qualitative findings showing that almost half (10 of 22) of the participants 
in the IDIs were prompted to enrol by the benefits package. Other participants identified 
affordability of enrolment premium, maternal care, access to quality healthcare etc. A 
community leader noted that: 
Most of the community members were prompted to enrol based on the benefits (KII, 
Community Leader, 11/07/2019, Idofian). 
Some community members disclosed that: 
Nkan to prompt mi lati register ni’pe won 
sofunwa ‘pe leyin N500 tiaba ti san 
nigbayen fun enrolment, ‘pe odun kan 
gbako laafi je anfani eto ilera ofe laisan 
kobo.  
What prompted me to enrol was that we 
were told at that time that after paying an 
enrolment premium of N500, we would 
benefit free access to healthcare for a 
whole year without paying a dime (IDI, 
Female, 26/06/2019, Oro). 
Mo wa ninu oyun nigbayen. I was pregnant at that time (IDI, Female, 
13/06/2019, Erinle).  
Mogba kaadi nipa ’pe itoju to peye ni won 
ose fun awon eyan. 
I was prompted to enrol with the believe 
that good quality of care would be 
provided for the enrollees under the 
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programme (IDI, Male,15/06/2019, 
Edidi). 
Another community member explained in detail that: 
I was prompted to enrol in the programme because I saw people who benefitted and 
confirmed that it was real. There were many healthcare challenges in this community that 
required treatments. I then decided to enrol my entire household, and my wife was within 
reproductive age. However, I would not have enrolled if I was not prone to sickness (IDI, 
Male, 19/06/2019, Bacita). 
From the findings, the main prompts for enrolment among the respondents/participants were 
the benefits package and illness. Similarly, Kotoh et al. (2018:443) reported that “health 
benefits are enablers of enrolment in the Ghanaian health insurance programme”. Also, 
Mahmood et al. (2018:8) found that “individuals with chronic disease were likely to enrol in a 
CBHI programme in rural Bangladesh”. However, those who did not enrol in the CBHI 
programme have their reasons as follows: 
Table 6.8: Reasons for Non-Enrolment among the Non-Enrolled Respondents  
Reasons for Non-Enrolment Frequency (N = 511) Percentage 
Financial Constraint 98 19.2 
Enrolled in another health insurance scheme 25 4.9 
Lack of trust 52 10.2 
Lack of interest 135 26.4 
Not fully around in the community 145 28.3 
Late Awareness 23 4.5 
No belief in hospital care 5 1 
Spiritual healing 1 0.2 
Always healthy 8 1.6 
Misinformation that it is meant for the aged 4 0.8 
Negative feedback from former enrollees 2 0.4 
Distance to a healthcare facility 1 0.2 
Others 12 2.3 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
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Table 6.8 reveals that even with the awareness programmes carried out in the communities, 
some people did not have confidence in the programme. Thus, apart from a common challenge 
of affordability of enrolment premium, other reasons were accountable for non-enrolment in 
the CBHI programme among the respondents. Findings from the qualitative data corroborate 
this result. Out of the twenty-nine participants that reacted to the question during the FGDs 
conducted, twelve noted that they were not around in the community when the programme was 
active; six claimed that they were not aware of the programme and three participants each 
identified lack of interest and non-satisfactory conduct by the HCPs as their reasons for non-
enrolment. One of the non-enrolled participants in an FGDs explained that: 
Though, I did not register but had the intention to register. However, after a while, they 
started removing some services from the coverage of the programme. With this, some 
people became discouraged and did not enrol (Male FGD, 30/05/2019, Bacita). 
Other participants stated their reasons that:   
Mi o gba kaadi nitori ‘pe miosi ni’lu n’igba 
na. 
I did not enrol because I was not living in 
this community when it was operational 
(Female FGD, 31/05/2019, Aboto-Oja). 
 
Mi o darapo mo eto na nitori wipe mio gbo 
nipa re. 
I did not join because I was not aware of 
the programme (Male FGD, 27/05/2019, 
Osi) 
Mi o darapo mo eto na nitori wipe eto itoju 
won ko t’emi lorun. 
I did not enrol because I was not satisfied 
with the services rendered (Male FGD, 
29/05/2019, Idofian). 
While stated by some respondents through the questionnaire, none of the participants in the 
FGDs and IDIs gave financial constraint as the reason for non-enrolment as indicated by the 
quantitative data. If it was part of the reasons for non-enrolment of any of them, perhaps, they 
were not comfortable to state it. For instance, one community member in Bacita noted that: 
Mio darapomo eto na lati ara ailakasi abi 
airaye nitori moni awon eyan legbemi ti 
won darapo mo.  
I did not enrol due to my nonchalant 
attitude or busy schedule because I have 
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close associates who were enrolled 
(Female FGD, 30/05/2019, Bacita). 
The decision to enrol and not to enrol in CBHI programmes are many and vary from one 
situation to another. However, in this study, the main reasons were: not fully resident in the 
community during the period, lack of interest and financial constraint. This partly aligns with 
the finding of AIGHD (2015:55) on the same programme indicating that non-enrolment, late 
renewal of enrolment and decision to enrol selected members of households are linked to 
financial constraints. Also, the finding on lack of trust and interest in the programme aligns 
with the finding of the study by Adewole et al. (2015:650) in South-West Nigeria where “most 
of the respondents were sceptical with the involvement of government in the provision and 
management of health insurance programme”.  
Table 6.9: Chi-Square Test of Association between Selected Variables and Enrolment 
Decision  
Variables Former Enrollees (p-value)* Non-Enrollees (p-value)* 
Gender .990 .222 
Age .001 .424 
Religion .636 .016 
Note: 5% significance level 
*Two-tailed test 
  
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
Table 6.5 focuses on the interest of the respondents in the programme. Table 6.9 therefore 
sheds light on the actual decision to enrol or otherwise among the respondents. As shown in 
the Table, the study found no statistically significant association between gender and enrolment 
decision among the former enrollees (
2 = .260, p-value = 0.992) and the non-enrollees ( 2
= 8.227, p-value = 0.222). This suggests that the decisions to enrol or otherwise were taken 
without gender considerations. Previous study by Parmar et al. (2014:76) in Burkina Faso also 
found no association between gender and enrolment in CBHI programme. However, Dror et 
al. (2016) found that gender and age were related to CBHI enrolment in the LMICs. 
Further, the study found a statistically significant association between age and enrolment 
decision among the formerly-enrolled respondents (
2 = 75.407, p-value = 0.001). This 
supports the finding of Adhikari et al. (2018:378) that households with persons above 60 years 
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were likely to enrol in a CBHI  programme in Nepal. The study however found no statistically 
significant association between age and enrolment decision among the non-enrolled 
respondents (
2 = 49.213, p-value = 0.424). This indicates that the decision not to enrol in the 
programme among the non-enrollees was not determined by age. Similarly, Schoeps et al. 
(2015) found no association between age and enrolment in CBHI in rural Burkina Faso.  
Further, the study found no statistically significant relationship between religion and enrolment 
decision among the former enrollees (
2 = 9.774, p-value = 0.636). This may be related to an 
understanding of the distinction between the roles of modern healthcare and religious belief 
system. It however found a statistically significant association between religion and enrolment 
decision among the former enrollees (
2 = 33.089, p-value = 0.016). This is confirmed by the 
submission of a participant in Bacita. She stated that: 
Mi o darapomo eto na nitori’pe iyawo pastor 
ni mi, asi ni gbagbo ninu adura. A n gba’dura 
Olorun si n gbo.  
I did not enrol because I am a pastor’s wife, 
and we believe in prayer. We pray, and God 
has always answered us (Female FGD, 
30/05/2019, Bacita). 
Further, Table 6.8 shows preference for spiritual healing and lack of belief in hospital care as 
part of the reasons for non-enrolment in the programme. Similarly, Reshmi et al. (2018:312) 
found an association between religion and CBHI enrolment decision in South India. I will take 
up further discussion about factors that influenced enrolment in the CBHI programme in the 
next Chapter (section 7.3). 
6.5 Non-Enrollees and Access to Healthcare 
The submissions by the respondents and participants above indicate that some community 
members enrolled in the programme and that there are also others who were not enrolled. 
Meanwhile, illness is relatively inevitable. Therefore, it is necessary to know how the 
healthcare needs of the non-enrolled respondents were met, and also how the formerly-enrolled 
respondents catered for the healthcare needs of their non-enrolled household members during 
the operational years of the programme. The respondents indicated their means of attaining 




Table 6.10: Management of Illnesses of Non-Enrolled Household Members 
Management Option Former Enrollees (N = 812) Non-Enrollees (N = 495) 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Out-of-pocket payment 526 64.7 298 60.2 
Traditional Medicine 80 9.9 55 11.1 
Self-medication 121 15 98 19.7 
Adequate rest 0 0 1 0.2 
Enrolled in the NHIS 0 0 7 1.4 
Prayer for healing 0 0 1 0.2 
Everyone was enrolled 49 6 0 0 
I was the only one around 4 0.5 1 0.2 
Always healthy 6 0.7 15 3.0 
Others 26 3.2 19 3.8 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
From Table 6.10 above, the majority of the formerly-enrolled (64.7%) and non-enrolled 
(60.2%) respondents managed the healthcare needs of their non-enrolled household members 
through OOP. As revealed in Table 6.7 earlier, this confirms that most of the respondents knew 
the importance of mordern healthcare services. The qualitative data corroborate the above 
finding as the majority (11 out of 19) of the participants in the IDIs confirmed that they catered 
for non-enrolled household members through OOP. Some community members stated that:  
Awon tio darapo mo eto na ninu ebi mi 
nlo si hospital, asi san’wo. 
Non-enrolled members of my family 
received healthcare at the hospital, and we  
paid OOP (IDI, Female, 15/06/2019, Edidi). 
Asan’wo ni fun itoju awon tio darapo mo 
eto na ninu ebi. 
We paid OOP for treating the non-enrolled 
household members (IDI, Female, Odo Owa, 
17/06/2019). 
Another participant explained that:  
Like half of the non-enrollees in the community still used hospital care, but they paid 
higher while the other half resorted to the use of herbal care and self-medication (IDI, 
Male, 19/06/2019, Bacita). 
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Table 6.11: Chi-Square Test of Association between Selected Variables and Management 
of Illnesses of Non-Enrolled Household Members 
Variables Former Enrollees (p-value)* Non-Enrollees (p-value)* 
Occupation .012 .012 
Income .151 .684 
Household size .431 .180 
Education .261 .068 
Note: 5% significance level 
*Two-tailed test 
  
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
According to Table 6.11, the study found a statistically significant relationship between 
occupation and management of illnesses of non-enrolled household members for both the 
former enrollees (
2 = 31.427, p-value = 0.012) and the non-enrollees ( 2 = 25.535, p-value = 
0.012). This indicates that the occupational experience of the people might have influenced the 
healthcare option adopted for treating the ailments of non-enrolled household members. For 
instance, farmers who are familiar with the use of herbs and roots may opt for herbal care 
instead of visiting the hospital for care. Equally, a systematic review by Arbesman and Mosley 
(2012) partly found a link between occupation and management of illnesses.   
However, the study did not find a statistically significant relationship between income and 
management of illnesses of non-enrolled household members among the former enrollees (
2
= 26.447, p-value = 0.151) and the non-enrollees (
2 = 11.930, p-value = 0.684). It also did 
not find a statistically significant relationship between household size and management of 
illnesses of non-enrolled household members among the formerly-enrolled (
2 = 12.190, p-
value = 0.431) and the non-enrolled (
2 = 12.624, p-value = 0.180) respondents. These may be 
related to the importance attributed to the need to provide access to care for the affected 
household members regardless of income and size of the household. This is affirmed by the 
submission of a non-enrolled participant that: 
Gegebi eniti kodarapo mo eto na, mo man’lo 
family doctor wa, asin’san wo. 
As a non-enrolee, I patronised our family 




Further, the study found no statistically significant relationship between educational status and 
management of illnesses of non-enrolled household members among the former enrollees (
2
= 19.147, p-value = 0.261) and the non-enrollees (
2 = 19.934, p-value = 0.068). This suggests 
that irrespective of the level of education, the respondents had tendencies to attend to the 
healthcare needs of their non-enrolled household members when necessary. 
Apart from improving access to care, protection of community members from payment of OOP 
was one of the reasons for the introduction of the programme. Meanwhile, the attainment of 
this goal optimally was affected by the non-enrolment of some members of the communities. 
Table 6.10 which shows that more than 60% each of the formerly-enrolled and non-enrolled 
respondents managed the illnesses of non-enrolled household members through OOP payments 
indicates that illnesses of non-enrolled household members were mainly treated at the hospitals. 
However, this questions the level of protection which the programme was able to provide for 
the communities against catastrophic health expenditure. The finding is substantiated by the 
finding of Cleary et al. (2013:42) in South Africa that there was a high rate of borrowing and 
asset sales to cater to healthcare service costs, especially among the rural dwellers.  
This also supports the finding of a study conducted in rural Uganda by Dekker and Wilms 
(2010:375) where “people had difficulties in paying their health insurance premium and 
borrowed money or sold assets to pay”. Also, they reported that only 37% of enrolled 
household heads (who should shoulder the responsibility of enrolling other household 
members) “were able to pay their premiums, and more than half of those enrolled (55%) 
borrowed money to pay”. These support the findings of Dror et al. (2016:1) on CBHI in LMICs. 
Consequently, the high level of OOP reported in this study could be linked to sales of assets or 
borrowing. However, most of these people resorted to the use of hospital and paid OOP for 
care when their health conditions have deteriorated badly (KII, HCP,15/06/2019, Bacita; KII, 
HCP, 27/07/2019, Oro). 
6.6 Delivery of Healthcare Services 
Healthcare service delivery includes a range of issues. Essentially, improving healthcare 
delivery “requires a deliberate focus on the quality of health services, which involves providing 
effective, safe, people-centred care that is timely, equitable, integrated and efficient” (WHO, 
2018b:11). In this section, the perception of community members, particularly, the former 




6.6.1 Conduct of Healthcare Providers 
The conduct of healthcare workers forms part of the judgement about the quality of service 
rendered by a healthcare facility. This is because poor conduct by healthcare personnel is 
capable of deterring healthcare utilisation (Kotoh et al., 2018:443). As such, the respondents' 
assessment of the conduct of the healthcare workers is presented in Figure 6.2 below. 
Figure 6.2: Satisfaction with the Conduct of Healthcare Workers  
 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
Figure 6.2 indicates that the majority (87.9%) of the formerly-enrolled respondents found the 
conduct of the healthcare workers to be very satisfactory and satisfactory. The qualitative data 
confirms the results because the majority (20 out of 22) of the interviewees stated that the 
healthcare workers attended to them very well. A participant noted that: 
Awon osise ile iwosan na ni oyaya, won kii 
foju paware. Bi aba sedesi nasen toju wa.  
The healthcare workers related with us  
[enrollees] cheerfully and with respect. 
They attended to us on a first-come-first-



























Another participant explained that:  
Awon osise yen ‘ofi ise sere rara. Won yoo 
tun bawa soro lori nti ale maaje taofi ni 
alafia.  
The healthcare workers did not joke with 
their jobs at all. They even advised us on 
what to eat to be more healthy (IDI, Male, 
21/06/2019, Osi). 
However, apart from the participants from Idofian who complained about the preference for 
non-enrollees as part of their non-satisfaction with the conduct of the healthcare providers, 
some participants during an FGD in Gure alleged that: 
Ti won ba ti ri’pe eni kaadi awon, won o ni 
tete dayin loun. Koda, ara ogun tiwon kowa 
ni wonfi ntoju awon eyan. 
If they realised that you had the enrolment 
card, the healthcare workers would not 
attend to you on time. They even used 
drugs meant for the programme in treating 
non-enrollees [who would pay OOP] 
(Male FGD, 03/06/2019, Gure). 
From the preceding, majority of the respondents and participants were satisfied with the 
conduct of the healthcare workers. This is confirmed by Sarker et al. (2018:10) who found in 
a CBHI study in Bangladesh that enrollees were satisfied with the conduct of the healthcare 
workers. A study in Ghana by Kodom et al. (2019:579) reported that while some of the workers 
were rude, others were respectful and receptive. However, Olowe (2019:8) found the need to 
improve the conduct of healthcare workers towards CBHI enrollees in developing countries.  
Table 6.12: Chi-Square Test of Association between Selected Variables and Satisfaction 
with the Conduct of the Healthcare Workers 





Note: 5% significance level 
*Two-tailed test 
 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
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As presented in Table 6.12, the study found a statistically significant association between 
gender and satisfaction with the conduct of the healthcare workers (
2 = 7.928, p-value = 
0.048). This might be as a result of the difference in the healthcare requirements of the male 
and female enrollees. For example, women within reproductive age (who required ante-natal 
care) were likely to utilise healthcare services more frequently than their male counterparts 
within the same age bracket. As such, the level of satisfaction might differ. The study also 
found a statistically significant association between education and satisfaction with the conduct 
of the healthcare workers (
2 = 55.205, p-value = 0.001) as well as between occupation and 
satisfaction with the conduct of the healthcare workers (
2 = 24.915, p-value = 0.015).  
These confirm the findings of Jadoo et al. (2012:976) in Turkey that gender, education, 
occupation and age were significantly associated with level of satisfaction with health 
insurance. However, this study found no statistically significant association between age and 
satisfaction with the conduct of the healthcare workers (
2 = 23.394, p-value = 0.497). The 
finding suggests that the attitudinal disposition of the healthcare workers tends to be similar 
towards all the respondents regardless of age bracket. This result is against the outcome of a 
study by Badacho et al. (2016) which found an association between age and satisfaction with 
a CBHI scheme in Ethiopia.  
Table 6.13: Multinomial Logistic Regression on Satisfaction with the Conduct of  the 
Healthcare Providers 
Variable Coefficient Wald ratio P-value Odds ratio 
Satisfactory 
Intercept 
-.996 6.525 .011 
 
Gender .430 8.509 .004 1.537 
Education -.012 .036 .849 .988 
Age -.039 1.671 .196 .962 
Occupation .108 3.475 .062 1.114 
Very satisfactory 
Intercept 
-1.028 2.266 .132  
Gender .367 1.947 .163 1.443 
Education -.415 11.330 .001 .660 
Age -.030 .324 .569 .970 
Occupation -.059 .307 .580 .942 
Not satisfactory 
Intercept 
-1.723 3.411 .065  
Gender -.237 .415 .519 .789 
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Education -.371 5.329 .021 .690 
Age .016 .049 .825 1.016 
Occupation .135 .977 .323 1.145 
Note: 5% significance level 
Reference Category: Satisfactory 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
The result in Table 6.13 shows a comparison of each level of satisfaction with the conduct of 
the healthcare providers under the CBHI programme against the Reference Category 
(Satisfactory) for the former enrollees. The first set of coefficients shows gender (b = .430; 
.004) as the only significant predictor of association. Also, the second and third sets of 
coefficients indicate education (b = -.415; .001 and b = -.371; .021) as significant predictors 
though with negative relationships. 
6.6.2 Quality of Care 
The CBHI programme was a voluntary healthcare service provided in selected rural 
communities. Mostly, a critical factor in the decision to enrol or renew enrolment was hinged 
on the perceived quality of service. Consequently, respondents and participants were 
questioned about the quality of care rendered under the programme. 
Figure 6.3: Rating of Quality of Care by the CBHI Programme among Former Enrollees 
 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
Based on Figure 6.3 above, the majority (61.3%) of the respondents believed that the quality 
of care was excellent and acceptable. The qualitative findings confirm the results that most of 
the former enrollees received good quality of care. Majority of the community members in the 




Level of Quality in Percentage
Excellent Good Fair Poor
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quality of service. Also, almost all the community leaders (10 out of 11) believed that the 
programme provided quality healthcare service. One of the former enrollees who enjoyed the 
programme stated that: 
 The quality of service was good under the programme (IDI, Male, 03/07/2019, Gure). 
Some other participants testified that: 
Itoju towa labe eto na gbopan. Emi 
funrami ni aisan ulcer. Gbogbo igba 
to’ba ti de simi, tinba tide’be, won a treat 
mi. Mo sin man siiki, bi iba; igbaa mi, 
won a admit mi. Won a fami simi lara, 
won a fun mi loogun. Tiaba sisetan, an 
lo’le lofe. Elekeji, omomi kan wa l’Eko. 
Eru nbawon lati se operation fun. Mowa 
ni ki won maa gbebo, asinti  register re 
nibi. Biwon sede, won se operation. 
Lalafia l’omo lole laisan kobo. 
The quality of care under the programme was 
good. Personally, I am an ulcer patient and 
each time I got there with the crisis, I was 
treated. I often fall sick with malaria. I was 
subjected to hospital admission in some 
cases and given drips and drugs; and after the 
full treatment, I would go home without 
making any payment. Secondly, I have a 
child who was sick in Lagos State. They were 
afraid of subjecting her to a surgical 
operation. I then told them to bring her here, 
meanwhile, I had enrolled her earlier. When 
they arrived, she was successfully treated 
under the programme through the surgical 
operation  without paying a dime (IDI, 
Female, 19/06/2019, Bacita).  
Inu gbogbo ara ilu dun si itoju towa labe 
eto na. 
Community members were happy with the 
quality of care given under the programme 
(IDI, Female, 13/06/2019, Erinle). 
Itoju to pe’ye ni owa ni abe eto na 
nitori’pe awon eyan nwa lati Aala ati 
Opanda lati wagba itoju. Inu awon eyan 
si dun si itoju na. 
The quality of care was good because people 
came to receive care from as far as Aala and 
Opanda. People were happy with the 




Also, some laboratory tests were covered by the programme. Therefore, whenever it was 
necessary, tests were carried out on enrolled patients to have a better understanding of the 
ailment before treatment. Some community members noted during IDIs and FGD that: 
Quality of service ti won render 
nigbayen odaa ‘tori kosi eniti olo si 
hospital yen ti won o daa loun. Won o se 
test fun won, won o si fun won loogun. 
The quality of service rendered at that time 
was good because no one went to that 
hospital who did not receive medical 
attention. They conducted the test on them 
[i.e. the enrollees] and gave them drugs (IDI, 
Female, 20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
Gbogbo test ti oye kiwon carry out ni 
won se koto di ‘pe won ma fun yan ni 
treatment. 
They conducted all relevant tests before 
giving treatment (IDI, Female, 21/06/2019, 
Osi). 
Nigbayen, elomi wa ti aisan mi wa lara e 
tiomo. T’oba ti de Hygeia tanba ti test e 
ni aisan yen mayoju, won a de treat e. 
At that time, there were some people with 
other ailments but were not aware. It was 
after they went through tests at the hospital 
that the ailments were discovered and they 
were treated (Female FGD, 31/05/2019, 
Aboto-Oja).  
Further, community leaders affirmed that the programme provided a good quality of service. 
According to some of them: 
Itoju to pe’ye ni won fun awon eyan. 
Gbogbo aare tiwon gbe losi General 
Hospital n’Ilorin naani won treat nibe, ti 
awon eyan o fe ranti ‘pe General 
Hospital nbe n’Ilorin gaan ma. Kosi itoju 
ti won kii toju eyan nibe. 
The healthcare services rendered to the 
enrollees were of quality. All the healthcare 
cases that were usually taken to the General 
Hospital at Ilorin were treated at the hospital 
[under the programme in the community] to 
the extent that people do not really remember 
that the General Hospital was still existing. 
There was no healthcare need that they didn’t 
attend to at that hospital (KII, Community 




Itoju t’owa labe eto na pe’ye to the extent 
wipe opolopo eyan ‘o lo hospital mi’ ma 
ju Health Centre ti won gbesi lo. 
The quality of care provided under the 
programme was efficient to the extent that 
most people neglected other hospitals in the 
community, to enrol in the programme at the 
Health Centre where it was operational (KII, 
Community Leader, 15/06/2019, Edidi). 
Emi gegebi enikan, mogbadun Hygeia 
yen, ‘tori iyawomi kan bimo laarin time 
yen. Mio san N1 leyin kaadi ti amuwa 
t’ofi gba itoju. Bi ara awon omo kobade 
ya, tan ba losibe won o dawon loun. 
Personally, I benefitted from the programme 
because I have a wife who gave birth under 
the programme. Apart from presenting the 
enrolment card, I didn’t pay a dime for the 
treatment. My children were also given 
medical attention whenever they were ill 
(KII, Community Leader, 03/07/2019, 
Gure). 
Itoju to gbopan daada lowa labe eto na 
‘tori opolopo eyan pelu orisirisi aisan 
niwon toju. 
The quality of care under the programme was 
very good because most people with 
different cases were treated (KII, 
Community Leader, 17/06/2019, Odo-Owa). 
The findings from the respondents indicate that the programme rendered good quality of 
service. This supports the findings of Brals et al. (2017:999), Odusola et al. (2015:182) and 
PharmAccess Group (2016:15) on the quality of service under the programme. However, the 
experience differs across the communities. For instance, the experience in Idofian signifies a 
marked difference from most of the other communities. The community members relatively 
did not enjoy the programme and rated the quality of service under the programme as poor. A 
community member in Idofian remarked that: 
Eto Hygeia nilu yi, kose daada to. Agba 
kaadi ni N500, igbati abama de hospital, 
won ko funwa loogun. Won ni kasanwo 
ni. Awa sije koyen won wipe kiniyi kiise 
alejo wa, won se ni Edu Local 
The CBHI programme in this community 
was not good enough. We enrolled with 
N500. Whenever we got to the hospital, we 
were not given drugs but requested to pay 
OOP. We however told them that the 
programme was not new to us because it was 
also operating in Bacita, Edu Local 
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Government, t’oje ilu Bacita, ti won treat 
eyan lofe.  
Government Area where enrollees were 
given free treatments (IDI, Male, 
12/06/2019, Idofian). 
He added that: 
Awon eyan nlo’be lairi itoju gba. Eminaa 
lo, won o fun mi ni itoju. Molowo B.P. 
mi nijoyen ni. Won wo tan, won ni 
owoda. Mo ni Hygeia ni. Won ni Hygeia 
kini; won ni se awon loun r’ogun fawon 
ni. Igbati mowa kin funwon, at the end of 
the day, won sa fun mi ni paracetamol 
N5. Emeta ni molo’be. 
Enrollees were visiting the accredited 
hospital without getting treated. I also went 
there and I was not treated. I went to check 
my BP (Blood Pressure) on that day. After 
the check-up, they requested me to pay, and 
I said I was a CBHI enrollee. I was told 
which CBHI; are they [the Programme 
Managers] the ones buying them drugs. I 
expressed my anger towards them, and at the 
end of the day, I was given paracetamol 
worth N5. I went there thrice (IDI, Male, 
12/06/2019, Idofian).  
Other enrolled community members disclosed that: 
Nigbati itoju tiwon fun mi ose, emi o 
dohun mo. 
Since the quality of care given to me was 
inefficient, I stopped going to the hospital for 
for treatment (IDI, Female, 12/06/2019, 
Idofian). 
Molo lakoko, gbogbo ibitin dun mi ni mo 
salaye fun won, paracetamol ni won ko 
fun mi; otun d’elekeji na, paracetamol 
naani; igbati od’eleekeeta, paracetamol 
naani, moni otogee bahun.  
On my first visit, I explained all my health 
challenges, and I was given paracetamol; on 
my second visit, I was still given 
paracetamol; on my third visit, I was further 
given paracetamol, and I said enough is 
enough [ i.e. decided not to go again] 
(Female FGD, 29/05/2019, Idofian). 
The above submissions revealed the odd side about the quality of care given to enrollees under 
the programme. While there might be a pocket of cases in other communities, the gross 
dissatisfaction expressed by enrollees in Idofian is unwholesome. Adebayo et al. (2015:11) 
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found that “poor quality of service could manifest in terms of non-availability of drugs and 
other medical supplies, the attitude of healthcare workers, waiting period and efficiency of 
treatment”. The perceived poor quality of care reported was the reason for non-enrolment of 
some (4 out of 5 non-enrolled participants in the male FGD session) community members in 
Idofian. A participant lamented during a session that: 
Igbati molo, o tie re mi die ni, mo 
complain gbogbo oun t’on semi lara. 
Won fun mi ni paracetamol ati flagyl. 
Won ni ki n pada wa nijo keji sugbon mi 
o lo. Although, maa mi ni luck, won 
gba’bere, nitori ‘pe iyawo omo won kan 
wa nibe.  
When I went there during a brief illness; after 
my complaint, I was given paracetamol and 
flagyl. I was told to come back the following 
day, but I did not go. Although, my mother 
was lucky to be treated with an injection 
because one of the staff was like her 
daughter-in-law to her (Female FGD, 
29/05/2019, Idofian). 
Table 6.14: Chi-Square Test of Association between Selected Variables and Perceived 
Quality of Care 





Note: 5% significance level 
*Two-tailed test 
 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
As indicated in Table 6.14, the study did not find a statistically significant association between 
gender and perceived quality of care ( 2 = .921, p-value = 0.820) among the respondents. 
Meanwhile, in a cross-sectional study, Teunissen et al. (2016) found a relationship between 
gender and percieved quality of care during hospital stay. The study also found a statistically 
significant association between educational status and perceived quality of care ( 2 = 88.089, 
p-value = 0.001). This suggests that the level of education of the respondents influenced how 
they rated the quality of care received under the programme. In other words, those with high 
level of education (and having knowledge of healthcare standards) tend to rate the quality of 
care to be low if it appears to be inadequate. 
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It further found an association between occupation and perceived quality of care ( 2 = 41.094, 
p-value = 0.001) among the respondents. This upholds the finding presented in Table 6.12 
showing that satisfaction with the conduct of the healthcare workers is associated with 
education and occupation. Further, the study found no statistically significant relationship 
between age and perceived quality of care ( 2 = 24.629, p-value = 0.426). This also affirms the 
finding in Table 6.12 which shows a lack of association between age and satisfaction with the 
conduct of the healthcare workers. It indicates that the quality of care received by the former 
enrollees were similar across all age categories.  
The experience of the former enrollees in Idofian, however, challenged the effectiveness of the 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) exercise carried out while the programme was operational. 
Though the experience is unique and peculiar, an effective M&E in the community might have 
allowed the community members to benefit from the programme. From the above narratives, 
it is clear that the majority of the former enrollees across most of the communities received 
good quality of care under the programme while a majority of the people that enrolled in one 
particular community (Idofian) did not receive a good quality of care under the CBHI 
programme.  
Table 6.15: Multinomial Logistic Regression on Perceived Quality of Care  
Variable Coefficient Wald ratio P-value Odds ratio 
Good 
Intercept 
-.333 .667 .414 
 
Gender .041 .071 .790 1.042 
Education -.078 1.367 .242 .925 
Age -.023 .507 .476 .978 
Occupation -.057 .906 .341 .944 
Fair 
Intercept 
-2.300 8.158 .004  
Gender -.050 .027 .870 .952 
Education -.154 1.429 .232 .857 
Age .061 1.006 .316 1.063 
Occupation .037 .098 .754 1.038 
Poor 
Intercept 
.253 .079 .779  
Gender .119 .112 .738 1.127 
Education -.872 16.602 .001 .418 
Age -.003 .002 .965 .997 
Occupation -.491 6.860 .009 .612 
Note: 5% significance level 
Reference Category: Excellent 
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Source: Fieldwork 2019 
The result in Table 6.15 above shows a comparison of each level of perception about the quality 
of care delivered under the CBHI programme against the Reference Category (Excellent) 
among the former enrollees. The first and second sets of coefficients show no significant 
predictor. However, the last set of coefficients indicates education (b = -.872; .001) and 
occupation (b = -.491; .009) as significant predictors though with inverse relationships.  
6.6.3 Combination of Alternative Care with CBHI Care 
The act of combining orthodox and alternative treatments for healthcare is a common 
phenomenon across Africa and particularly in Nigeria. Perhaps, due to the belief that some 
ailments are better treated using alternative medicine (Robyn et al., 2012:162). The formerly-
enrolled respondents were asked if they combined alternative healthcare with the care accessed 
under the CBHI programme, and their responses are presented as thus: 
Figure 6.4: Combining Alternative Care with CBHI Care 
 
 Source: Fieldwork 2019 
According to Figure 6.4 above, only 125 (12.2%) combined alternative/traditional care with 
the CBHI care while 901 (87.8%) did not combine the CBHI care with other forms of treatment. 
Thus, the CBHI programme was able to cater to the healthcare needs of the enrollees. The 
qualitative data from the study supported the results. Participants noted that the combination 


















easier for them to access care on time before the illness became worse. Excerpts from the 
interviews and FGDs are as follows: 
I don’t think enrollees combined hospital care with traditional care. Personally, I did 
not do that (IDI, Male, 19/06/2019, Bacita). 
Mio pa agbo ‘pomo itoju hospital nitori 
‘pe mo ni anfani ati losi hospital laini 
sanwo, ki aare to wo ara. 
 
I did not combine herbal care with hospital 
care [received under the programme] 
because I had the opportunity to go to the 
hospital for healthcare at the early stage of 
illness before it becomes serious, without 
paying OOP (Female FGD, 28/05/2019, 
Oro).  
Awon eyan kii pa itoju hospital papo mo 
ti alagbo nitori itoju ofe. Ti eyan ba 
gbatoju loni, ti ara ‘otii se daada, won 
otun toju eyan naani. Kojeki eyan maa lo 
ile alagbo laarin igbana.  
Most community members did not combine 
hospital and herbal care because the hospital 
was always ready to treat enrollees until they 
fully recover. Thus, the use of traditional 
healthcare was very minimal in the 
community at that time (IDI, Female, 
01/07/2019, Aboto-Oja).  
Ki elomi t’oti enrol to losi hospital, oleti 
maa lo herbal healthcare, ti kobawa cure 
re, yoo wa losi hospital. Sugbon ni family 
temi o, hospital nikan lalo. 
Some enrollees adopted herbal healthcare 
before going to the hospital and resorted to 
the hospital if it [herbal care] proved 
ineffective. However, my family used 
hospital care only (IDI, Male, 20/06/2019, 
Bode Saadu). 
Table 6.16: Chi-Square Test of Association between Selected Variables and Combination 
of Alternative Care with CBHI Care 




Quality of care .001 
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Note: 5% significance level 
*Two-tailed test 
 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
Table 6.16 shows no statistically significant association between gender and combination of 
alternative care with CBHI care ( 2 = 1.657, p-value = 0.198) as well as between age and 
combination of alternative care with CBHI care ( 2 = 14.569, p-value = 0.068) among the 
respondents. These imply that gender and age were not determinants of combining alternative 
care with CBHI care. In other words, those who combined both cares might have done so 
because they believed in the efficacy of that approach regardless of their gender and age. 
However, the study found a statistically significant relationship between educational status and 
combination of alternative care with CBHI care ( 2 = 16.237, p-value = 0.003). This implies 
that those with low level of education might do so due to an inadequate knowledge of the risks 
involved in combining both kinds of healthcare.  
The study also found a statistically significant relationship  between perceived quality of care 
and combination of alternative care with CBHI care ( 2 = 91.074, p-value = 0.001) among the 
respondents. That is, enrollees who perceived the CBHI care to be inadequate might have 
combined it with alternative care. The qualitative data confirms that some of the participants 
in this study combined alternative care with the formal CBHI care. One of the few that 
combined alternative care with the CBHI care stated his reason that: 
Itoju t’owa labe eto na ‘okun to fun awon 
to gba kaadi. T’obaye kan funyin ni ogun 
merin, meta abi meji ni won o fun yin. 
Oun lofaa ti awon eyan fin pa agbo po 
mo itoju hospital.   
The quality of care given under the 
programme was not good enough. If you 
were supposed to be given medication of four 
drugs, they would give you three or two. That 
was what led some people to seek herbal care 
in addition to hospital care (IDI, Male, 
03/07/2019, Gure). 
One of the goals of CBHI is to reduce alternative or traditional care adjudged to be mostly 
unregulated and risky. Thus, the above findings fall in line with the expected gains from a 
CBHI programme. Relevant examples are found in Burkin Faso. The finding of this study on 
non-combination of care is confirmed by the study of De Allegri et al. (2006:854) in rural 
Burkina Faso which reported that enrollees had a negative perception about traditional 
healthcare and viewed it as inadequate. Robyn et al. (2012:162) later found that 
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notwithstanding CBHI enrolment, enrollees in Northwest Burkina Faso continued to seek 
alternative healthcare through traditional healers. Perhaps, this might be due to the increasing 
challenges of CBHI sustainability in terms of quality of care and overall efficiency.  
6.6.4 Knowledge of Benefits Package  
As part of the implementation of a CBHI, adequate insurance education and sensitisation 
efforts are crucial for the smooth running of the programme. Figure 6.5 below shows that the 
majority of the respondents received prior information about the benefits package of the 
programme before enrolment. 
Figure 6.5: Knowledge about the CBHI Health Benefits Coverage 
 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
 
In the same vein, reactions from the majority of the participants in the IDIs (20 out of 22) 
aligned with the results, but there were divergent responses from the FGDs. Though, primarily, 
enrollees were to be informed about the coverage before enrolment; however, some of the 
enrollees got to know about the coverage at the hospital after enrolment. For those who 
confirmed that they were informed about the health benefits package of the programme before 
enrolment, the following are some of the excerpts from their interviews: 
Ko to di’pe mo dara po mo eto na, won 
salaye awon itoju t’opo ti Hygeia cover. 
Prior to my enrolment, I was informed about 






Amo, won so’pe awon kan nbe ti Hygeia 
‘o cover o, kama rope gbogbo e yayan 
nlo cover.  
the programme. However, they stated that 
some ailments were not covered so that we 
do not think it covered everything (IDI, 
Male, 01/07/2019, Aboto-Oja). 
Won salaye awon itoju t’eto na ko sinu 
fun wa, ni hospital. Awon tiwon fun w 
ani kaadi so’pe o cover oloyun, omo ojo 
si odun marun, oni ifunpa ati diabetes. 
We were informed at the hospital about the 
coverage of the programme. We were told by 
the enrolment officers that it covered 
maternal care, under-5 children, 
hypertensive and diabetic patients (IDI, 
Female, 13/06/2019, Erinle). 
Contrastingly, some claimed that they were not informed about the benefits package. For 
instance, all the formerly-enrolled participants in the Male FGD in Bacita declared that they 
were not informed and the majority of those that participated during the Male FGD conducted 
in Idofian noted that they were not informed about the benefits package of the CBHI 
programme before enrolment. Some of the excerpts are as follows:  
The enrolment officers were not informing potential enrollees about the coverage of the 
programme before enrolling them (Male FGD, 30/05/2019, Bacita) 
Won ‘osalaye awon itoju ti eto na kosinu 
funwa. 
We were not informed about the specific 
healthcare services covered by the 
programme (Male FGD, 29/05/2019, 
Idofian) 
Incidentally, one of the participants who noted that they were not pre-informed was never 
disappointed because all his healthcare needs were within the benefit coverage of the 
programme. He stated that: 
Won ‘osalaye awon itoju ti eto na kosinu 
sugbon gbogbo aisan ti mo gbelo ni won 
toju.  
I was not informed about the coverage of the 
programme, but I was treated for everything 
I complained about (Male FGD, 27/05/2019, 
Osi) 
Procedurally, each enrollee was supposed to be informed before their enrolment. However, this 
was not the same. Some of those who confirmed that they were informed however noted the 
161 
 
possibility that other enrollees might not be informed as a result of the medium and method of 
passing the information. They noted that: 
Won salaye ibiti agbara Hygeia mon lati 
toju awon eyan. Nibi apejo tiwon ‘pe ni 
wonti se alaye na. Eekan na ni won pe ipe 
na. Awa taa wanibe lalanfaani ati gbo. 
We were informed about the limits of 
healthcare coverage under the 
programme. This was explained during an 
awareness programme which was done 
once. Those of us that were present had 
the opportunity of knowing about the 
specific coverage (KII, Community 
Leader, 21/06/2019, Osi). 
Won salaye awon nkan ti programme na 
cover ni meeting ti won se ni aafin, sugbon 
awon kan lema gbo latari aisinibe.   
We were informed about the coverage of 
the programme at the meeting held in the 
palace, but some might not be informed 
about the coverage because of their 
absence (IDI, Male, 15/06/2019, Edidi). 
Further, among those who claimed that they were informed, some of them argued that they 
were misinformed by the enrolment officers/sales agents that enrolment provides access to all 
kinds of care. One of them stated: 
Awon towa fun wa ni kaadi ni gbogbo 
oun toba tinseyan, kalo soun. 
The enrolment officers said that we 
[enrollees] were eligible to receive any kind 
of treatment under the programme (IDI, 
Female, 12/06/2019, Idofian). 
The ‘misinformation’ or inadequate information could serve the purpose of attracting 
community members into the enrolment of the programme. Notably, in a case where 
prospective enrollee was deemed to be ‘illiterate’; it became difficult to explain the coverage 
of the programme clearly. Thus, a quick but unethical way of getting them to enrol might be to 
declare that the programme covered all kinds of healthcare service. This served the interest of 
the HMO which was in-charge of enrolment and had targets to meet for each period in the 
communities. 
As argued by some formerly-enrolled participants, some HCPs confirmed that the people were 
not well-informed about the benefits package. One of them noted that: “The health coverage 
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was not clearly spelt out for the enrollees to know and they continued to demand for what was 
not covered” (KII, HCP, 27/07/2019, Oro). Also, a participant clarified during an FGD that at 
the inception of the programme in her community, prospective enrollees were informed about 
the coverage. They were given pamphlets at the initial stage detailing the coverage of the 
programme, but this stopped after a while when it was extending to other communities in the 
State. She stated that: 
Nigbati won koko bere, ni Shonga, ibi ati 
Lafiagi, won se alaye sugbon nigba t’odi 
‘pe oun pinka pinka, boya owo ‘ati fund 
re nio simo. 
When the programme commenced in 
Shonga, here [Bacita] and Lafiagi, they pre-
informed prospective enrollees about the 
coverage of the programme. Still, when it 
was expanding across the State, perhaps, due 
to inadequate funding they stopped 
informing the people (Female FGD, 
30/05/2019, Bacita). 
Another participant emphasised that: 
Iwe kan wa nigbanaa ti won funwa, 
tiwon ko gbogbo ounti Hygeia cover si. 
In the beginning, they gave us a pamphlet 
containing all the healthcare services covered 
by the programme (Female FGD, 
30/05/2019, Bacita) 
Unfortunately, the downplaying of the importance of information about benefits package in 
enrolment and utilisation decisions led to a disappointment and disinterest on the part of most 
enrollees. A community leader confirmed this and remarked that: 
Opolopo eyan ‘omo cases t’awon le je 
anfaani e. Tiwon ba debe ti won ni eleyi 
‘osi ninu Hygeia, oun discourage elomi. 
Won ‘osalaye awon cases ti awon eyan 
le gbewa. 
Most people did not know the healthcare 
benefits covered by the programme. When 
they got their and were informed that the 
needed care was not covered, some became 
discouraged. They didn’t explain the 
healthcare services accessible under the 
programme (KII, Community Leader, 
20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
163 
 
Table 6.17: Chi-Square Test of Association between Selected Variables and Knowledge 
about the Programme’s Benefits Package 





Note: 5% significance level 
*Two-tailed test 
 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
Table 6.17 reveals that the study found no statistically significant association between gender 
and knowledge about the benefits package (
2 = .241, p-value = 0.624). This implies that both 
the male and female enrollees had similar levels of knowledge about the benefits package. It 
also found no statistically significant relationship between age and knowledge about the 
benefits package (
2 = 13.948, p-value = 0.083). However, it found a statistically significant 
relationship between education and knowledge about the benefits package (
2 = 10.760, p-
value = 0.029) as well as between occupation and knowledge about the benefits package (
2 = 
24.834, p-value = 0.001). These suggest that those with high level of education and formal 
employment had the tendency to ask questions regarding the benefits package if they were 
given inadequate information. 
Notwithstanding the high level of awareness about the programme, knowledge about the 
benefits package was low. Similarly, Olowe (2019:8) found poor knowledge of CBHI benefits 
package in developing countries. Ebrahim et al. (2019:139) also found poor knowledge about 
principles and high level of awareness about a CBHI programme in Ethiopia. Likewise, 
Kuwawenaruwa et al. (2019:20) found in Tanzania that “most of the enrollees lacked an 
understanding of the health insurance benefits package”. The benefits package is one of the 
important determinants of enrolment decision. Most of the former enrollees believed that they 
were eligible to access all kinds of care under the CBHI, as a result of non or poor education 
of community members about the coverage of the programme. This might be the reason for the 
non-renewal of enrolment by some community members. Boston Consulting Group (2015:4) 
found relatively low renewal of enrolment in the programme. Specifically, the enrolment in 
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Asa LGA between 2011 and 2013 was relatively stagnant, and half of the enrollees in 2013 
were new enrollees (AIGHD, 2015:27). This means that half of the enrollees in 2011 dropped-
out of the programme, perhaps due to distrust or disappointment in the programme. Kebede 
and Geberetsadik (2020) concluded from their study in Ethiopia that proper education and 
information about benefits package should be given to the people to improve satisfaction in 
CBHI services.  
6.7 Conclusion 
The chapter provided an assessment of the programme from the perspective of the 
beneficiaries. It generally explored the perception of the community members about the 
programme. From the analysis, members of the communities were interested and delighted 
with the introduction of the CBHI programme. While the sources of information varied, there 
was a high level of awareness about the programme in the communities and their environs. 
Also, most community members were prompted to enrol to have access to healthcare without 
OOP payments. Those who did not enrol attributed it, mainly, to financial constraint, lack of 
interest, and not being fully resident in the communities during the period. They, however, paid 
OOP if they must utilise hospital care. 
Furthermore, in terms of service delivery, the majority of the respondents and participants 
expressed satisfaction with the conduct of the healthcare providers and the quality of care 
provided. Though there were some cases of dissatisfaction. While most of the enrollees utilised 
hospital care to attend to their healthcare needs, others combined it with alternative care. 
Generally, the strength and aggressiveness deployed towards the enrolment process at 
inception dwindled with time, leading to improper education of prospective enrollees about the 












FUNDING MECHANISMS OF THE CBHI PROGRAMME IN KWARA STATE  
7.1 Introduction 
Funding is an integral part of any programme, most notably, intervention programmes. No 
matter how well-planned, the success of such a programme is contingent on the availability of 
fund or effective funding mechanism. This chapter is vital to the study because funding was an 
important part of the design and implementation of the Kwara CBHI programme. Thus, the 
first section of the chapter discusses the primary sources of fund committed to the 
implementation of the programme - counterpart fund by the partners and enrolment premium. 
Also, the second section examines the affordability of enrolment premium (which was one of 
the scheme’s sources of funding) from the perspectives of the community members and other 
stakeholders in the implementation of the programme. Further, the third section discusses the 
capacity of government to provide free healthcare for the citizens. The final section concludes 
the chapter. 
7.2 Financial Sources  
The fund used in the implementation of the CBHI programme was generated through three 
primary sources. They are the financial contributions by the partners (i.e. the Kwara State 
Government and the international partner, Health Insurance Fund - through PharmAccess 
Foundation) and enrolment premiums. The funding requirements of the programme related to 
administrative and marketing expenses to manage the programme as well as facilities’ upgrade 
and technical assistance (Brals, 2019). The funding mechanisms are discussed in this section 
as thus: 
7.2.1 Counterpart Fund by the Partners 
The CBHI programme was co-funded by the KWSG and the HIF. At inception, the 
programme was fully-funded by the international partner as a pilot in a Local Government 
Area (LGA) and extended to a second LGA after two years. However, like many other transfer 
programmes, the international partner offered to mainly finance the programme for the first 
five years of implementation with a view to reducing its financial commitment by 20% per 
annum in the subsequent years. The ultimate goal was that after at least ten years of 
implementation, the state government would take full ownership of the programme and 
continue to run it ‘sustainably’.  
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Based on this arrangement, “the Kwara State Government was to increasingly take up the 
subsidy that made the initial insurance premium affordable, while the contribution of the 
Dutch HIF was to diminish gradually over the life span of the programme” (Amsterdam 
Institute of International Development, 2013:11). A participant noted that: “The initial 
agreement was that PharmAccess Foundation offered to make a complete payment of 
premiums for beneficiaries and then the PharmAccess had to withdraw gradually, and Kwara 
State Government took up the 100% responsibility of the premium payment” (KII, Foreign 
Agency Official 2, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). Another official gave a more precise insight and 
captioned it as thus:  
The MoU that was signed between Kwara State Government and the HIF is that since 
they [i.e. HIF] were paying full subsidy at inception - the first five years, it was fully 
paid; and there was an MoU that when we see how the scheme is running, the Kwara 
State Government would gradually take responsibility for subsidy payment for enrollees 
premiums such that at a point in time, the Kwara State Government would take full 
responsibility for sustainability because it was just a pilot (KII, Foreign Agency Official 
1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). 
A government official corroborated the above and described how the funding responsibility 
was transferred to the state government on a sliding scale. He explained that: 
When the programme started, they [i.e. PAF] decided to fund it a hundred per cent. As 
the programme progressed, it was scheduled that they would be scaling down their 
funding by paying 80% and the Kwara State Government to pay 20%; the following year, 
they would pay 60%, and the Kwara State Government would pay 40% - in that order; 
until we would be able to own the programme. Such that their own funding would be 0% 
and Kwara State Government would be at 100% (KII, KWSG Official 1, 20/08/2019, 
Ilorin).  
The agreement signed by the parties were not sacrosanct but reviewed based on necessity. A 
participant stated that: “There was a signed agreement which was subsequently reviewed based 
on need and demand. I think the first agreement was 5-year and funding was done 100% by the 
Dutch government” (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin). The state government was 
enticed with the financial relief enjoyed at the commencement of the programme, and the 
Governor requested that the programme be extended to another LGA in the State. This, 
therefore, pave the way for the foreign partner to introduce its conditionalities regarding 
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ownership of the programme, after a period. This is a common trend in transfer programmes 
(Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, 2000; Stone, 2004; Fawcett & Marsh, 2012; Minkman et al., 2018). 
Another government official narrated that: 
In 2009, the then Governor, Bukola Saraki requested an expansion to other LGAs and 
the PharmAccess Foundation said that if you need that, you must increase your 
commitment. So, the agreement had to change. You’ve not been having direct financial 
contribution; if you want us to do that, you must have a direct financial contribution. That 
was when the sliding scale agreement came in, such that the programme would be handed 
over to the Kwara State Government in 5 years (KII, KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, 
Ilorin). 
The first “financial commitment by the Kwara State Government was for the period between 
July 1, 2010, to June 30, 2011” (AIGHD, 2015:11). Though the amount spent by the 
international partner was not disclosed, the amount spent, as part funding by the state 
government on the programme within the nine years of operation, was N1.1 billion [3.055 
million USD] (Ahmed, 2018). A participant noted that the international partner was the main 
financier of the programme and confirmed that the state government indeed made financial 
commitments as well. She noted that:  
The funding of the programme was by the donor. Though, the Kwara State Government 
also tried by paying some of the counterpart funds. I don’t know the commitment of the 
donor, but I know the Kwara State Government paid N60 million, N50 million, N100 
million and N200 million at different times to the programme (KII, KWSG Official 3, 
01/08/2019, Ilorin). 
The Kwara State Government gave its counterpart funds to the international partner who would 
then disburse the fund to the HMO and the CHIS for implementation of the programme 
accordingly. In most sponsored or collaborative programmes, the partner with financial 
strength tends to direct the trend of policy design and implementation (Szlezak et al., 2010:1; 
Koduah et al., 2015:1; Storeng et al., 2019:561). This, therefore, questions the level of control 
or ownership of the programme by the state government. 
7.2.2 Enrolment Premium 
The enrolment premium paid by the enrollees was another source of fund for the programme. 
At inception, the premium was fixed for N200 (1.26 USD) per annum per person. After a while, 
it was increased to N300 (1.90 USD), and it covered only 7% of the cost while the 93% balance 
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was covered by the state government and the HIF (Gustafsson-Wright & Schellekens, 2013). 
However, the premium was increased to N500 (3.13 USD) in 2013, and it was the amount paid 
to the end of the programme. Though the premium was only enough to print the enrolment card 
used for accessing care by the enrollees. As a participant puts it: “The N500 was a commitment 
from the beneficiaries. That amount usually served as the fund for printing out the ID cards. 
The actual premium as at that time was over N4,000” (KII, Foreign Agency Official 2, 
02/09/2019, Ilorin). Thus, the premium paid by the enrollees was meagre; it was not significant 
in funding the programme.  
7.3 Affordability of Enrolment Premium: Community Members and Other 
Stakeholders  
Affordability or ability to pay enrolment premium has always been a major challenge of a 
health insurance policy. CBHI, which is a smaller form of SHI, designed for rural community 
dwellers with a relatively lower premium. It was found in section 7.2.2 above, that enrolment 
premium contributed very little to the funding of the programme, yet, some people still battled 
the problem of affordability. This a source of concern on whether the enrolment premium can 
form a significant part of a sustainable funding mechanism for CBHI programme.  
There is variation in the views of community members and other stakeholders (government 
officials, foreign implementing partners, HMO officials, and healthcare providers) involved in 
the planning and/or implementation of the Kwara CBHI programme regarding the affordability 
of the premium. Some participants noted the difficulty in paying the enrolment premium; some 
believed that the premium was significantly subsidised and made very affordable. For clarity, 
the views of the opposing sides are examined separately in this section.  
7.3.1 Affordability of Premium: Community Members Views 
Figure 7.1 shows that most (87.6%) of the respondents claimed that the premium at N500 per 
annum was very affordable and somewhat affordable. In the same vein, seven out of the eleven 
community leaders stated that the enrolment premium of N500 was affordable while the 








Figure 7.1: Percentage Distribution of Affordability of Enrolment Premium  
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
However, the qualitative data reveals that their claims of affordability are in consideration of 
the benefits involved. For instance, a community leader stated that: 
Ti eyan ba feran ara re, N500 o po ju fun 
anybody lati san. Agbara opolopo eyan 
loka N500. Bi o ba ka, yio l’omo t’agbara 
re kaa because o mo ere tohun o je nibe. 
K’osan N500 for 12 months! 
If one loves him/herself, N500 is not too 
much for anybody to pay. It was affordable 
to most people in this community. If he/she 
cannot afford it, he/she would have a child 
who could afford to enrol him/her because of 
the healthcare benefits. To pay N500 for 12 
months! (KII, Community Leader, 
13/06/2019, Erinle). 
Another community leader noted that: 
Agabra won ka. eni toba mo anfaani 
t’owanbe. 
The premium of N500 was affordable to 
most community members. Whoever 
appreciates the benefits of the CBHI 
programme would pay (KII, Community 
Leader, 03/07/2019, Gure).  
Similarly, some community members shared their views about the affordability of enrolment 

























Ti aba quantify owo ti won fi register pelu 
iwosan ti won gba, N500 ko je nkankan. O 
wa affordable. 
If we compare the enrolment premium 
with the healthcare benefits, N500 was 
nothing. The premium was affordable 
(IDI, Female, 20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
In contrast, some other participants argued that the premium was not affordable for most 
people. Participants in all the 12 FGDs conducted in the study concluded that the premium of 
N500 was not affordable for most community members. That is, some could afford but not the 
majority of the people. During a Focus Group Discussion in Gure, some participants linked 
inability to pay with poverty and large family size. They revealed that:  
We are very poor here. Elomi fe gbaa 
sugbon agbara re ‘okaa. Ati ri N500 
gaan, onira. 
We are very poor here. Some wanted to enrol 
but could not afford the premium. It was even 
difficult to earn N500 (Male FGD, 
03/06/2019, Gure). 
Agbara opolopo eyan ‘oka latisan 
because a family of 30 masan N500 times 
30, oje N15,000. Opolopo ninu wa are 
poor farmers. 
Most community members could not afford 
the enrolment premium because a family of 
30 would have to pay N500 in 30 places 
making N15,000. Most of us are poor 
farmers (Male FGD, 03/06/2019, Gure). 
A female participant during a Focus Group Discussion in Bacita narrated the consequence of 
increasing enrolment premium to N500 in her community. She disclosed that: 
Nigbati won so owo kaadi di N500, 
awon eyan bere sini diku die die. Oka 
awa naa lara ‘pe won sodi apo meji abo. 
Sugbon awaro wipe, ti aba losi hospital 
omi, owo kaadi lasan ’wo N500, 
kotodipe won o treat eyan. Oun lafin lo. 
When the premium was increased to N500, 
some people could neither renew nor enrol in 
the programme and enrolment in the 
programme started to reduce steadily. 
Though we were also not comfortable with 
the increment to N500 but we felt if we leave 
for another hospital, cost of obtaining a card 
only at another hospital was up to N500 
before the cost of treatment. That was why I 
continued to renew my enrolment  (Female 
FGD, 30/05/2019, Bacita). 
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Also, female participants in FGD in Aboto-Oja confirmed the difficulty in paying premium.  
Owo kaadi N500 ko ro’run fun opolopo 
awon eyan. Elomi ni omo merin si 
marun, osin ye ko gba kaadi fun gbogbo 
won.  
The premium of N500 was not affordable for 
most people in the community. Some people 
have four to five children, and they needed to 
enrol all of them (Female FGD, 31/05/2019, 
Aboto-Oja). 
However, in the absence of a better alternative, some participants helplessly expressed 
readiness to strive and pay N500 premium should the programme is restored in their 
communities. According to them: 
Won ti fi towa lenu wo, an gbe oungbe 
re. Biwon ba gbewa ni N500 nisin, awon 
eyan ojade. 
We have experienced the benefits of the 
programme, and we are craving to have it 
back. If it is restored with a premium of 
N500, most people will enrol (Female FGD, 
30/05/2019, Bacita). 
T’obaje ‘pe N500 naani yoo je, kan 
gbewa, oni kaluku yoo wa. 
Even if the programme would require us to 
pay N500 premium, it should be restored. 
Everyone would source money and enrol 
(Female FGD, 31/05/2019, Aboto-Oja). 
Further, more than half (10 out of 17) of the community members who responded to the 
question on premium affordability during IDIs asserted that the premium of N500 was not 
affordable to most members of their communities. A community member also explained a 
reason as thus: 
Agbara elomi ‘oka lati san N500. Kosise 
kan taara nileyi ju kalo sa koro cashew 
lo. 
Some people could not afford the premium of 
N500. There is no major source of income in 
this community than to pick cashew nuts and 
sell (IDI, Male, 12/06/2019, Idofian). 
Given the difficulty in paying enrolment premium, communities devised a means of enrolling 




Anpe attention awon t’Oloun bun lati ran 
awon ti ko rolorun lowo. 
We called the attention of the rich ones in the 
community to assist with the enrolment of 
those who could not afford to pay (KII, 
Community Leader, 01/07/2019, Aboto-
Oja). 
Also, some community members confirmed the non-affordability of the premium and 
explained how they assisted some few others with enrolment. According to them: 
Mo register gbogbo idile mi ati awon ti 
won ‘ole san’wo tanwa ni akata mi. 
I enrolled everyone in my family, and I also 
enrolled people who could not afford the 
premium around me (Female FGD, 
30/05/2019, Bacita). 
Agbara awon ‘mi koka N500 tori 
t’ebawo ilu yi, awon tio sise poju awon ti 
wonsise. Elomi, boya oko l’onda; kosi to 
ri nkan oko re, odigba ti nkan oko bata. 
Ni alafo igbayen, t’oba re, agbara re 
onika. Awon mi nranyan lowo. Emi gaan  
register eyan to mejo tiwon kii se malebi 
mi.  
The premium of N500 was not affordable to 
some people. If you look at this community, 
those who are unemployed are more than 
those with employment. A person might be a 
farmer; he/she could only earn from it when 
it is ready for harvest. If he/she falls sick 
before the period of harvest, he/she would 
not be able to afford the cost of care. 
However, some people assisted with the 
enrolment premium of others. I also assisted 
in enrolling up to eight people who are not 
my relatives (IDI, Male, 13/06/2019, Erinle). 
I was responsible for my first premium but the second one was paid by Senator Shaaba 
Lafiagi, a politician (IDI, Male, 02/07/2019, Kaiama). 
These indicate that most people found it difficult to pay the enrolment premium based on their 
earnings. As a result, community members who could not afford the enrolment of their entire 
households had to enrol selected members. Also, some of the non-enrolled respondents were 
responsible for the enrolment of some household members who they deemed vulnerable. This 




Table 7.1: Responsibility for other Persons’ Premium among Respondents  
Payment of Another Person’s 
Premium 
Former Enrollees  
(N = 1,006) 
Non-Enrollees  
(N = 500) 
Yes 462 45.9 136 27.2 
No 544 54.1 364 72.8 
 
Number of Persons Enrolled by 
Respondents 
Former Enrollees  
(N = 359) 
Non-Enrollees  
(N = 78) 
1 – 5 288 80.2 57 73 
6 – 10 65 18.1 19 24.4 
11 and above 6 1.7 2 2.6 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
Table 7.1 shows that less than half (45.9%) of the former enrollees could afford to pay the 
premium of other persons, mostly household members. Also, only a few (27.2%) of the non-
enrollees were able to enrol members of their households while the majority could not afford 
to enrol themselves and members of their households. These indicate a high level of inability 
to pay enrolment premium (for others) among the respondents. Furthermore, the Table shows 
that out of those who ‘strived’ to enrol other persons, very few (less than 100) were able to 
enrol more than 5 persons in the programme. This also indicates that even while the programme 
was active, most people did not have financial protection and were still exposed to catastrophic 
healthcare spending because non-enrollees were meant to pay OOP for accessing healthcare 
(see Table 6.10). These support the finding of the WHO (2017) that as of 2010, “808 million 
people (11.7% of the world’s population) incurred catastrophic spending at the 10% threshold” 
of income or consumption. 
Table 7.2: Chi-Square Test of Association of Selected Socio-economic Variables with 
Affordability of Enrolment Premium and Reasons for Non-Enrolment 
Socio-economic Variables Former Enrollees (p-value)* Non-Enrollees (p-value)* 
Income .001 .674 
Education .001 .696 
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Household Size .008 .026 
Occupation .001 .048 
Note: 5% significance level 
*Two-tailed test 
  
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
For the former enrollees, the study found a statistically significant association between income 
and affordability of enrolment premium (
2 = 66.312, p-value = 0.001); education and 
affordability of enrolment premium ( 2 = 41.997, p-value =0.001); household size and 
affordability of enrolment premium ( 2 = 27.045,  p-value = 0.008) and occupation and 
affordability of enrolment premium ( 2 = 47.315, p-value = 0.001). Further, for the non-
enrollees, it found a statistically significant relationship between household size and non-
enrolment ( 2 = 31.384, p-value = 0.026) as well as between occupation and non-enrolment (
2 = 36.619, p-value = 0.048). Meanwhile, there was no statistically significant relationship 
between income and non-enrolment (
2 = 26.025, p-value = 0.674) and also between education 
and non-enrolment ( 2 = 20.010, p-value = 0.696) for the non-enrollees.  
The study found a statistically significant association between income and affordability of 
enrolment premium among the enrollees but found no association between income and non-
enrolment among the non-enrollees. A review of studies on the LMICs conducted by Umeh & 
Feeley (2017:304) indicated a direct association between socio-economic status and decision 
to enrol in CBHI. Also, Atnafu et al. (2018:3) and Jude et al. (2018:65) found an association 
between income and affordability of enrolment premium in CBHI studies conducted in 
Ethiopia and Cameroon respectively. The lack of significant association between income and 
non-enrolment in this study is confirmed by the results shown in Table 6.8 (see Chapter 6) 
where only 19.2% of the non-enrolled respondents indicated financial constraints as reasons 
for non-enrolment. Thus, for this category of respondents, income was not a significant factor 
for non-enrolment in the programme. Similarly, a recent study conducted by Atafu and Kwon 
(2018:902) on determinants of enrolment in Northwest Ethiopia did not find a direct association 
between income and non-enrolment in CBHI.  
Moreover, findings from this study (as shown above) indicate that most community members 
cannot afford up to an annual premium of N500 (1.38 USD). Similarly, in Ethiopia, 49% of 
respondents could not effectively pay the premium, and this excludes the very poor that were 
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enrolled based on government subsidy (Ethiopian Health Insurance Agency, 2015:x). Also, 
Umeh & Feeley (2017:304) found that co-payment may discourage the poor from enrolling in 
CBHI, even if they can afford the premium. Palermo et al. (2019) found that premium waiver 
improved enrolment in health insurance programme in Ghana. Consequently, there is a 
tendency that some of the non-enrolled respondents would have been enrolled if the financial 
barrier was removed for them.  
More so, the study found a statistically significant association between education and 
affordability of enrolment premium for the former enrollees but found no statistically 
significant association between education and non-enrollment among the non-enrolled 
respondents. In the same vein, Akazili et al. (2014:8) found in Ghana that “individuals with 
high educational attainment and white-collar jobs are likely to enrol in CBHI programme”. 
This is because of the possible financial opportunities attached to them and making 
affordability easy. In this study, only 225 (14.7%) of the total respondents were civil servants 
(who were expected to earn steady salaries). In contrast, the income of others could be irregular, 
and this can affect enrolment decision. 
Also, the study found a statistically significant relationship between household size and 
affordability of enrolment premium among the former enrollees as well as between household 
size and non-enrollment among the non-enrollees. This shows that there is a tendency that 
small households would find it affordable to enrol. Further, the association between household 
size and non-enrolment might be linked to the ‘we-feeling’ that is common in rural 
communities. This can necessitate the non-enrolment of an entire household if the household 
head is not capable of paying for all. According to an HMO official:  
It is difficult for a farmer with a household of 10 people to enrol all, and he may want to 
enrol some and leave others (KII, HMO official 2, 29/07/2019, Ilorin).  
This confirms the finding of Kusi et al. (2015:4) in Ghana, where affordability of premium was 
“a burden on households with low socio-economic status and large household size”. More so, 
Mba et al. (2018:271) recently found in a study on Nigeria that large household size increases 
the vulnerability of households. More recently, Taddesse et al. (2020:7) found that “household 
size was a determinant of enrolment in CBHI in Northwest Ethiopia”.  
Furthermore, this study found a relationship between occupation and affordability of enrolment 
premium among the former enrollees and between occupation and non-enrolment among the 
non-enrollees. The findings regarding occupation and enrolment confirms those by Atinga et 
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al. (2015:316) among urban slum dwellers in Ghana. Essentially, occupation is closely related 
to enrolment because there are very limited economic opportunities in the rural areas where the 
programme existed. Only those with better occupation were able to enrol. Similarly, Baloul 
and Dahlui (2014) found an association between occupation and enrolment in CBHI in Sudan. 
They also found an 80% chance of enrolment for civil service workers compared to those 
without employment.  
Table 7.3: Multinomial Logistic Regression on Affordability of Enrolment Premium 




-.368 .537 .464 
 
Education -.247 5.677 .017 .781 
Occupation .269 9.621 .002 1.309 
Household size -.031 .040 .842 .970 




-.928 1.722 .189  
Education -.092 .404 .525 .912 
Occupation .015 .014 .905 1.015 
Household size -.221 .996 .318 .802 
Income -.166 3.071 .080 .847 
Not affordable 
Intercept 
-.497 .156 .693  
Education -.180 .414 .520 .835 
Occupation -.392 1.756 .185 .676 
Household size -.290 .513 .474 .748 
Income -.252 2.204 .138 .777 
Indifferent 
Intercept 
-3.610 11.968 .001  
Education -.144 .482 .487 .866 
Occupation .159 .806 .369 1.172 
Household size .497 2.950 .086 1.644 
Income -.158 1.314 .252 .853 
Note: 5% significance level 
Reference Category: Very affordable 
  Source: Fieldwork 2019 
The result shown in Table 7.3 above compares each level of affordability of the CBHI 
enrolment premium against the Reference Category (Very affordable) for the former enrollees. 
The first set of coefficients shows education (b = -.247; .017), occupation (b = .269 ; .002) and 
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income (b = -.286 ; .001) as significant predictors, with only occupation having a positive 
relationship. The second, third and fourth sets of coefficients have no significant predictor.  
7.3.2 Affordability of Premium: Position of Other Stakeholders  
The stakeholders in this regard, include the officials of government, HMO officials, foreign 
implementing partners and the healthcare providers. Many of these stakeholders held different 
beliefs from the community members about the affordability of enrolment premium. 
Specifically, the Kwara State Government and its international partner introduced a premium, 
which they believed was affordable to the community members. For instance, the premium of 
N500 was introduced with the belief that it was affordable. However, some participants, among 
other stakeholders, believed that the claim of non-affordability of the premium was due to 
misplacement of priority or that most community members gave priority to other things over 
their healthcare. Most of them argued given the health benefits package offered by the 
programme, as argued earlier by some community members in support of the N500 premium. 
One of the healthcare providers noted that the programme had at least one negative 
consequence for the people, that is, it made them dependent with no willingness to take up their 
‘personal responsibilities on healthcare’. The HCP added that: 
The premium was affordable to most members of the community except for those who 
did not know the importance of the programme (KII, HCP, 17/06/2019, Odo-Owa) 
Another HCP argued that poverty did not deter the affordability of N500 premium if healthcare 
is given priority. She maintained that:   
The premium of N500 was not much, based on preference [of the community members 
on what to spend on]… Sincerely, N500 was affordable for health in this community 
even with the presence of poverty (KII, HCP, 20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
One of them further explained that: 
The premium was extremely cheap, but most claimed they did not have enough money 
to enrol, but that was not correct because priority issues were involved. Most of those 
complaining about the increment of the premium to N300 and N500 is now ready to pay 
N1,000, and some will gladly pay N2,000 if the programme is re-introduced. The N500 
is the amount to obtain card alone in private hospitals, and it was used to access care for 
a whole year under the programme (KII, HCP, 19/06/2019, Bacita). 
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He further argued the programme instilled poverty mentality in the community members. In 
his words: 
One of the negative parts of the programme was a poverty mentality that fostered a 
beggarly culture where people don’t want to spend at all. They may spend money on 
ceremonies, but it’s like a curse for them to spend on health. So, any amount spent on 
health-related issues pained them as if they were exploited or punished. For them, 
spending on health is not a priority (KII, HCP, 19/06/2019, Bacita). 
Another participant corroborated this view that: 
The truth is that people don’t take healthcare as their priority. They would instead use 
such money to buy Aso Ebi [cloths for attending ceremonies]. It’s not about affordability 
but not having the will (KII, Researcher, 30/07/2019, Ilorin). 
In essence, seven out of the ten HCPs noted that the premium of N500 was affordable to 
community members, while three noted that it was not affordable. One of the HCPs who 
believed the premium was not affordable stated that: 
Most people could not afford the premium, and some of them were assisted in paying 
their enrolment premiums (KII, HCP, 15/06/2019, Edidi). 
Another participant buttressed that: 
Most people could not afford the premium, and that was the reason we involved donors 
in enrolling the indigent people, especially the minors (KII, HCP, 21/06/2019, Osi). 
Meanwhile, two out of the seven HCPs who noted that the premium was affordable were not 
outright in their submissions. One of them stated: 
The premium was affordable to some extent, and some still found it difficult to pay (KII, 
HCP, 28/07/2019, Aboto-Oja). 
The other participant pointed out a situation which necessitated non-affordability of the 
premium. He explained that: 
The premium was affordable to most members of the community. However, there were 
some challenges. It became a problem for people who intended to register members of 
their large households; and they only enrolled those that were vulnerable because the 
total amount was not affordable (KII, HCP, 15/08/2019, Gure).  
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Meanwhile, large households is a common feature of rural settings in Nigeria (Adebowale et 
al., 2012:93) and it can limit affordability to enrol (Kebede et al., 2014:263; Panda et al., 
2016:40). As noted by a participant:  
Olorun funwa ni ore ofe omo bibi ni’lu 
yi. Aman bimo gaan. 
God blessed us with fruits of the womb in the 
community. We give birth a lot (Female 
FGD, 30/05/2019, Bacita).  
It can be concluded that only five out of the ten healthcare providers fully argued that the 
premium of N500 was affordable to the community members. More so, the inability to afford 
enrolment premium by the community members was confirmed by the HMO officials. They 
explained that the increment in enrolment premium affected the coverage of the programme 
because some community members could not renew their enrolment at the cost of N500. They 
explained that: 
The premium started with N200, increased to N300 and end with N500. The increments 
affected the coverage, given price sensitivity and economic situation of the country. 
Majority of the people live below one dollar per day. The issue of the increase in premium 
affected enrolment into the programme. People’s health-seeking behaviour changed, and 
they had to return to what they were used to (KII, HMO official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Politicians and philanthropists had to pay the premium of some people. Affordability to 
enrol was higher when it was N300 (KII, HMO official 2, 29/07/2019, Ilorin).  
Arising from the above, most of the stakeholders believed from experience, that the premium 
of N500 was not affordable to all the community members. Though, it may appear unbelievable 
- especially from afar, that the ‘low’ premium could be unaffordable to some people. Thus, the 
poor economic situation in the country and the communities, in particular, is a major 
impediment to the affordability of the enrolment premium. Hence, the need to revisit the CBHI 
or insurance approach to healthcare provisioning to be on track towards UHC. 
7.3.3 Community-Level Affordable Amount as Premium 
Though the premium of N500 paid by the respondents when the programme was operational 
appeared relatively small for accessing healthcare for a year, the data suggests that affordability 
was a challenge for most people in the communities. It was, therefore, necessary to know the 
actual amount in premium that could be affordable in the communities. A participant noted 
that: “Premium can only be determined through actuarial analysis” (KII, Foreign Agency 
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Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). However, some of the key informants suggested a premium 
ranging between N500 and N8,000. One HCP opined that: 
It is through a survey that the idea of affordability can be gotten but going by the current 
reality, the idea of N500 is no longer sustainable, and they [i.e. community members] 
should be thinking of between N4,000 and N6,000 and those who know the importance 
will pay (KII, HCP, 28/07/2019, Aboto-Oja). 
Another HCP noted that: 
I believe if the premium is now fixed at N1,000 or N1,500, people will pay (KII, HCP, 
15/08/2019, Gure). 
Further, government officials stated that: 
I believe community members would be able to pay a premium of N1,500 (KII, KWSG 
Official 1, 20/08/2019, Ilorin). 
Many factors are considered in determining the premium, but we can be looking at a 
premium of N8,000 per person (KII, KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Also, an HMO official commented that: 
Though it requires empirical test currently, the premium can still be affordable between 
N500 and N1,000 if there is a good quality of service based on trust (KII, HMO Official 
1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Perhaps, those recommending between N500 and N1,500 were doing so from the viewpoints 
of affordability by the community members. In contrast, those recommending above N1,500 
were concerned with the economic reality of providing a reasonable benefits package. 
However, the amount indicated as affordable premium by the respondents is quite below the 








Figure 7.2: Affordable Amount as Premium by the Respondents 
 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
Figure 7.2 shows that 92.7% of the respondents believed that the enrolment premium should 
not be more than N500. This includes those who wanted a premium of N200 and below (43.9%) 
and those who wanted a premium between N201 and N500 (48.8%). The responses were from 
the standpoint of an average community member and not based on the personal affordability 
of the respondents and participants. The quantitative data revealed that the average affordable 
amount as premium by the respondents is N383 ($1.6). Meanwhile, in all the twelve FGDs 
conducted in six out of the eleven communities covered by the study, the amount concluded 
by participants as an affordable premium for all is N200. For instance, one of the participants 
during the FGD conducted in Oro noted that: 
Tiwon bale bawa faa wale si N200, gbogbo 
eyan ‘olesan. 
The premium will be affordable to all if it is 
reduced to N200 (Female FGD, 28/5/2019, 
Oro). 
Another participant stated that:  
Tiwon bale bawa sesi N200, agbara opolopo 
yio kaa. 
Most people in the community would be able 
to afford a premium if it is fixed at N200 
(Male FGD, 03/06/2019, Gure). 
N200 and Below
(0.55 USD)
N201 – N500 (0.55 
USD  – 1.38 USD)
N501 – N800 (1.38 
USD – 2.21 USD)
N801 – N1,000 

























Invariably, the N200 is like half (52.2%) of the average amount indicated by the quantitative 
data as affordable premium (i.e. N383) for most community members. Similarly, a recent study 
by Azuogu and Eze (2018:1) in Abakaliki, South-East Nigeria showed that respondents 
(artisans) were willing to pay premiums between N400 and N1,500 for healthcare that covers 
hospitalisation and surgery. The results from both settings mirror the socio-economic realities 
of the people in most parts of Nigeria. 
While Udeh et al. (2016:10) found that high premium reduces the likelihood of enrolment 
among individuals in the lowest socio-economic quintile, they, however, noted that low level 
of literacy in the rural areas might be responsible for non-enrolment due to inability to weight 
the magnitude of health challenge and give priority to premium payment over other needs. This 
contrasts with the finding of this study which has high literacy level because only 20.9% and 
14.4% of the former and non-enrolled respondents respectively had no formal education at all. 
Though, this study also reveals that access is likely to be challenging for individuals who fall 
within low economic quintile because of inability to pay for care. As such, “it is necessary to 
understand the socio-economic context of each setting through a careful analysis of spending 
on healthcare, including out-of-pocket payments to help determine the actual cost of healthcare 
versus the buying-power of the people” (United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees, 
2012:7) especially, in the rural areas.  
The premium may appear not too much, but the economic situation of a people can deny the 
ability to pay. For instance, approximately 50% of the total respondents earned N12,000 (33.1 
USD) or below monthly (see Table 6.1), suggesting that relatively few people could earn above 
the recently approved minimum wage of N30,000 (82.6 USD). Consequently, subsidising this 
amount (N383, i.e. average community-level affordability) is arguably as good as providing 
the care for free. This is because the “consequence of non-accessibility of healthcare can be 
enormous with poor health outcome, poverty, and sometimes death” (Adewole et al., 
2015:650). Moreover, recent findings revealed Nigeria as the world capital of poverty with 
close to half of its population trapped in poverty. According to the World Poverty Clock (2019), 
about 95 million people in Nigeria live in extreme poverty, with an estimated population of 
about 196 million people (World Bank, 2019). For instance, poverty grossly limits the access 
of women to maternal and pre-natal care in Nigeria (Ekpeyong et al., 2019:1; Adedokun & 
Uthman, 2019:1).  
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Further, the discussion of affordability requires consideration of other costs related to 
healthcare. In clear terms, Russell (1996:222) explained that “healthcare could be considered 
affordable when utilisation is not due to financial reasons, and when the opportunity costs 
incurred do not cause levels of consumption and investment (e.g. on education) to go below 
minimum needs in the short run”. This is because the cost of accessing care is more for some 
people beyond the enrolment premium. Moreover, the programme was designed to cover the 
host communities and their environs; consequently, the facilities were closer to some enrollees 
than the others, necessitating extra costs, including transportation. A participant explained that: 
The people in the Hard to Reach [HTR] areas wanted the programme in their environment 
because some had to spend N1,000 to travel to access care in this community, amount 
higher than the annual premium. The only time they got a vehicle to this community was 
on market day. So, if they needed to come on another day, they come by bike, spending 
between N300 and N500 and returned with the same amount (KII, HCP, 20/06/2019, 
Bode Saadu). 
Another participant in Gure narrated a similar challenge of extra costs in accessing care. He 
noted that: 
For some [i.e. residents of distant communities], it was a problem to raise transport fare 
to Gure for care; that is if they can get the transport (KII, HCP, 15/08/2019, Gure). 
This is consistent with the finding of Mahmood et al. (2018:8) that “distance between 
households and health facilities to access care plays a significant role in the decision to enrol 
as well as affordability, among the rural poor”. The World Health Organization declared that 
“health spending is viewed as catastrophic when a household must reduce its basic expenses 
over a certain period to cope with the medical bills of one or more of its members” (see 
Kawabata et al., 2002:612). More precisely, “catastrophic health spending is defined as out-of-
pocket expenditures exceeding 10% of total household consumption or income” (WHO, 2017). 
Oriakhi and Onemolease (2012:98) found in a study on CBHI in Edo State Nigeria that 65% 
of respondents took credit facilities of averagely N8,000 within three months, to pay for 
healthcare. This shows the extent of the catastrophic expenses of people in accessing care. 
 
It is crystal clear that fixing the health insurance premium is a polemic issue that requires 
consideration of many factors. However, the ability to pay determines the possibility or 
workability of any health insurance programme. Put differently, health insurance cannot work 
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without the payment of premium; and this must be in tandem with the economic realities of the 
beneficiaries to achieve results. It is therefore imperative to examine the ability to pay of the 
beneficiaries. A participant concluded that: “Health insurance premium is a controversial issue 
because socio-economic status and cultural dynamics of the communities need to be considered 
given the cost of care and other sources of fund. It is the synergy of these that will assist in 
determining the appropriate premium” (KII, Referral Centre 1 Official, 30/07/2019, Ilorin).  
 
Given these, Aggarwal (2011:1657) concluded from his study that “while CBHI may be used 
to reach the disadvantaged population, they cannot be considered as a substitute for 
government-created health infrastructure”. More so, if the premium was so low that it only paid 
for the cost of producing enrolment card (as noted above), and the HIF expected the KWSG to 
assume hundred percent responsibility for financing the programme, then, it is no longer a 
social insurance. Thus, it may be necessary for promoters of CBHI to have a rethink and accept 
a publicly-funded (i.e. tax-based), universal healthcare system as a better alternative. 
7.4 Capacity of Government and Free Healthcare  
As highlighted in Chapter 2, the commodification of social services provisioning is one of the 
reasons for promoting health insurance as a means of accessing healthcare. However, the 
prevalent challenge of affordability of enrolment premium (see Workneh et al., 2017:356; 
Fonta et al., 2010:111) for many, prompted the need to revisit the capacity of government to 
provide free healthcare services to the citizenry as done in the past. Figure 7.3 below details 











Figure 7.3 Government’s Financial Capacity to Provide Free Healthcare  
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
 
Figure 7.3 above shows that most of the respondents, especially, among the former enrollees 
believed that the government could afford to provide free healthcare services for the people. 
This gives an insight regarding the people’s impression of the government. Table 7.4 below 
give more insights into the results. 
Table 7.4: Chi-Square Test of Association between Selected Variables and Belief about 
the Government’s Financial Capacity to Provide Free Healthcare Services for the People 
Variables Former Enrollees (p-value)* Non-Enrollees (p-value)* 
Gender .430 .527 
Age .270 .076 
Education .013 .281 
Occupation .848 .483 
Note: 5% significance level 
*Two-tailed test 
 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
As shown in the above Table 7.4 above, the study did not find a statistically significant 
relationship between gender and belief in the government’s capacity to provide free healthcare 
services among the formerly-enrolled (
2 = .623, p-value = 0.430) and non-enrolled (



























p-value = 0.527) respondents. The chi-square test also found no statistically significant 
relationship between age and belief in the government’s capacity to provide free healthcare 
services for both the former enrollees (
2 = 9.931, p-value = 0.270) and the non-enrollees (
2
= 14.209, p-value = 0.076). These imply that both the male and female respondents across all 
age categories have same opinion about the government’s ability to provide free healthcare 
services. 
Further, the study found a statistically significant association between educational status and 
belief in government’s capacity to provide free healthcare services among the formerly-
enrolled respondents (
2 = 12.707, p-value = 0.013). This might be linked to their exposure to 
the ‘huge’ resources and or responsibilities of the government. However, it found no 
statistically significant association between education and belief in government’s capacity to 
provide free healthcare services among the non-enrolled respondents (
2 = 5.064, p-value = 
0.281). Furthermore, the study found no statistically significant association between 
occupation and belief in the government’s capacity to provide free healthcare services among 
the formerly-enrolled (
2 = 1.376, p-value = 0.848) and non-enrolled (
2 = 3.467, p-value = 
0.483) respondents. This suggests that occupation was not a significant factor in their belief 
regarding the government’s ability to provide free healthcare services for the populace. 
Table 7.5: Multinomial Logistic Regression on Government’s Financial Capacity to 
Provide Free Healthcare 
Variable 















-1.180 1.812 .178 
 
.351 .364 .546 
 
Education -.537 11.391 .001 .584 -.219 .977 .323 .803 
Occupation -.014 .013 .911 .986 .188 2.872 .090 1.207 
Gender .267 .613 .434 1.306 .107 4.448 .035 1.113 
Age -.217 8.451 .004 .805 .004 .002 .963 1.004 
Note: 5% significance level 
Reference Category: Yes 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
The result in Table 7.5 above shows an assessment of government’s ability to provide free 
healthcare services for the people against the Reference Category (Yes) among the respondents. 
The set of coefficients shows education (b = -.537; .001) and age (b = -.217 ; .004) as significant 
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predictors among the former enrollees but with negative relationships. However, gender (b = 
.107; .035) appears as a significant predictor among the non-enrollees with positive 
relationship.  
In consonance with the quantitative results, the qualitative findings substantiate the trend of 
response. Majority of the participants noted that the government has the financial capacity to 
provide free healthcare services to the people. This includes ten out of eleven community 
leaders, all the participants in the IDIs (i.e. 24 out of 24 members of communities), nine out of 
ten healthcare providers and four out of eight officials of the implementing partners. Also, 
participants in ten out of the twelve FGDs conducted unanimously noted that the government 
has the financial capacity to provide free healthcare. A community leader argued, 
fundamentally, that provision of healthcare is a primary responsibility of the government to the 
citizens. According to him: 
The government has the financial capacity to provide free healthcare as part of the 
people’s right to cover basic needs because this might be their only vivid benefit from 
the government as most people are restricted to their rural communities (KII, Community 
Leader, 11/07/2019, Idofian). 
Some interviewees opined that free healthcare could be financed through government 
allocation to the health sector and internally-generated revenue (IGR). They noted that:   
Government ni agbara lati pese iwosan 
ofe fun ara ilu nitori ‘pe won vote owo 
fun health, sugbon selfishness kole jeki 
won se. 
The government has the financial ability to 
provide free healthcare for the people 
because there is an allocation for healthcare. 
Still, selfishness would not allow them to 
offer it (IDI, Female, 20/07/2019, Bode 
Saadu). 
Another participant in Bacita emphasised that: 
The government can provide free healthcare services to the people, and it should provide 
it. This is because the government can finance it from its revenue, and there are many 
resources in the State (Male FGD, 30/05/2019, Bacita). 
Further, some of the participants contended that it is possible if the government has the political 
will and makes it a priority. They stated that: 
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Ijoba lagbara lati pese iwosan ofe fun ara 
ilu, ti wonba fe se.  
The government has the financial capacity to 
provide free healthcare services to the people 
if they have the will (KII, Community 
Leader, 15/06/2019, Edidi). 
B’ijoba ba fe se, ijoba lagbara e. Okan 
laafiile gbokan. 
The government has the financial capacity to 
provide free healthcare service if it has the 
will. It is by making it a priority (KII, 
Community Leader, 13/06/2019, Erin-Ile). 
Ijoba lese ju bee lo bi won ba fe se. The government largely has the financial 
capacity to provide free healthcare service if 
it has the will (IDI, Female, 19/06/2019, 
Bacita). 
Further, officials of government and the HMO added that: 
The government has the financial capacity to provide free healthcare to the people if they 
want (KII, KWSG Official 3, 01/08/2019, Ilorin). 
The government has the financial capacity to provide free healthcare, just that the 
political will is not there (KII, HMO Official 2, 29/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Perhaps, due to the perceived lack of political will and bad governance, some participants (a 
community member and an official in a government-owned health facility) almost concluded 
that the government would never think in that direction. They declared that: 
Ijoba ni agbara latise sugbon won ‘ofe 
se, won ‘ofe ran ara ilu lowo. 
 
The government can provide free healthcare, 
but they don’t want to do so or assist the 
masses (Female FGD, 30/05/2019, Bacita). 
I believe the government has the financial capacity to provide free healthcare to the 
citizens. Still, they would not do because they would claim that they have to spend on 
other sectors of society (KII, HCP, 15/06/2019, Edidi). 
In most cases, healthcare providers, especially, the private providers, are found to resist the 
introduction of free healthcare services (Béland & Ridde, 2016:15) given how it might affect 
their businesses. Contrastingly in this study, as stated earlier, virtually all the HCPs (9 out of 
10) noted that the government has the financial capacity to provide free healthcare services to 
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the people. Some of them felt that free healthcare could be provided if the government can re-
organise the system of governance, block areas of wastage and then reprioritise its spendings. 
According to them: 
For the government to provide free healthcare, there is a need for restructuring in 
governance because the cost of the present presidential system of government is high. A 
lot of funds would be saved and channelled to the healthcare system in addition to the 
healthcare tax (KII, HCP, 28/07/2019, Aboto-Oja).  
Free healthcare is possible, depending on the commitment of leadership. There is enough 
wastage to address areas of the shortfall, and it can be diverted. (KII, HCP, 19/06/2019, 
Bacita). 
The government has the financial capacity to provide free healthcare services but lacked 
the political will. What is needed is to re-order their priorities (KII, HCP, 21/06/2019, 
Osi). 
The above submissions are in line with the findings of Walker and Gilson (2004) and Zeidan 
et al., (2004) in South Africa and Sudan respectively, where healthcare workers were in support 
of free healthcare (cited in Béland & Ridde, 2016:14). Also, Gilson and McIntyre (2005:762) 
stressed “the need for systematic removal of user fees in Africa because it’s a significant 
impediment to access to healthcare, especially for the teeming poor”. However, some 
participants were less optimistic and noted that if a policy on the provision of free healthcare 
services is introduced, a practical implementation may be challenging. Excerpts from their 
interviews are as follows: 
Ijoba lagbara lati pese iwosan ofe fun ara ilu 
sugbon won ‘oni se. Bi ijoba batie pase re 
loke, won ‘onije kode ‘sale. 
The government has the financial capacity to 
provide free healthcare to the citizens but 
lacks the political will. Even if the top-level 
government approves it, it won’t be 
implemented accordingly (IDI, Male, 
17/06/2019, Odo-Owa). 
The government can provide free healthcare to the people because we are not as poor as 
a nation, but we do not have good managers (KII, HCP, 13/06/2019, Erin-Ile). 
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The country and state have the financial capacity to provide free healthcare, but our 
problem is a mismanagement. Though health is not free anywhere, if it is properly 
managed; we can achieve it (KII, KWSG Official 1, 20/08/2019, Ilorin). 
The worries of the participants were rife about the seemingly poor level of transparency and 
accountability in the government’s dealings. Furthermore, those who argued that the 
government could not afford to provide free healthcare services attributed their concerns to the 
need for sustainability. They are, however, keenly, in support of health insurance such that 
enrollees pay for care as a form of appreciation. A community leader, an HMO official and an 
HCP shared similar view that:  
Ko possible fun ijoba lati pese iwosan 
ofe fun awon ara ilu. Nkan to wa ni 
health, opo koja kani government nikan 
loma mojuto alafia. Won ‘oni agbara 
owo ati staff ti yoowa sufficient.  
It is not possible for the government to 
provide free healthcare service to the people. 
The responsibilities in the healthcare sector 
are beyond the ability of the government 
only. The government doesn’t have the fund 
and staff strength to provide the service (KII, 
Community Leader, 20/06/2019, Bode 
Saadu). 
I do not support free healthcare in any form. People should appreciate by paying an 
amount for health (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin). 
The beneficiaries should be taught to appreciate what is done for them by making them 
pay a little bit more gradually in the reality of my rural community such that the 
programme can become sustainable…Even in Freetown, things are not free; somebody 
must have paid for it (KII, HCP, 27/07/2019, Oro).  
He continued that: 
The government does not have the financial capacity to provide free healthcare for the 
citizens. Even the USA does not have enough resources to do so. Regarding health 






A government official who has the same opinion added that: 
Even if the government has the financial capacity to provide free healthcare for the 
people, it is not the best. It is always good to tailor it along with health insurance. In my 
hometown, there is a famous saying that “the medicine that is not paid for, is not usually 
potent”. The people need to be financially committed but reduce their OOP payment 
drastically. There is no country where the government can sustainably take up the 
healthcare needs of the people 100% considering its other engagements (KII, KWSG 
Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Other participants added that: 
For some of us in healthcare financing, we don’t believe in free healthcare because 
there’s nothing free, it costs somebody something. And with the kind money available to 
governments, very few will be able to run free healthcare. Very rich governments, 
governments of the US, Britain and so on cannot run free healthcare, so how will we 
pretend in Nigeria to be running free healthcare. Our economy cannot carry the cost. 
Thus, the health insurance scheme is a way out (KII, Researcher, 30/07/2019, Ilorin). 
There is no free healthcare anywhere; one must contribute an amount, and if the need 
arises, he or she will be able to access care. The government cannot pay for everything. 
Even if the government has the capacity, individuals must also pay to make the 
programme effective (KII, NHIS Official, 01/08/2019, Ilorin).  
Free services are usually turbulent, but the government can provide affordable and 
efficiently subsidised healthcare. Providing free healthcare will need more. No free 
programme in Nigeria has outlived its originator or campaigner or administration (KII, 
Referral Centre 1 Official, 30/07/2019, Ilorin).   
Meanwhile, from a social policy viewpoint, scholars such as Adésínà (2007; 2011; 2015) and 
Mkandawire (2010) have argued that provisioning of social services (including healthcare) is 
a fundamental responsibility of the government to ensure the well-being of the citizenry. 
Specifically, Adésínà (2007:20) argued that rather than adopting private sector-driven 
provisioning, the government needs to spend more on social services. As such, there is more 
to social policy than what the government is doing currently (Adésínà, 2011:455). For equality, 
“everybody deserves equal access to good quality essential services, so access should be free 
for all and not rationed by ability to pay” (Devereux, 2016:179). Also, the sustainability of 
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investment requires adequate ideational commitment with a focus on the goals and long-term 
developmental outcomes. Moreover, payment of subsidised CBHI premium does not guarantee 
the sustainability of health insurance programmes. 
 
The officials of the foreign agency also admitted, partly, that the government can provide free 
healthcare services for the people if it has the political will. They, however, noted that this is 
not the ‘right time’ for the government to do so and that healthcare must be a shared 
responsibility between the government and the citizen. One of the participants stated that: “The 
FG was expected to commit at least 15% of the budget to health, but we’ve not been able to 
achieve 5%, not to talk of 15% which means that the government has other priorities and other 
sectors might suffer if the burden is pushed to government. Thus, I don’t think this is the right 
time to make such decisions” (KII, Foreign Agency Official 2, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). Another 
participant argued that: 
When the government has the political will to do something, it would be done. However, 
the responsibility is not about the government alone; it is everybody’s responsibility. The 
government would play their part; the citizens would play their part. Everybody has to 
take part. That’s why the quickest and fastest way to attain UHC is through insurance. 
Donors can only assist if the government shows political will and trust (KII, Foreign 
Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). 
The spirit of interventionism and privatisation introduced to the healthcare system in the 1970s 
and 1980s, as discussed in chapter 1, has continued to linger with its consequent challenges on 
social services. The study found a disconnection between the economic realities of the people 
and the need for them to pay a premium to access healthcare. In other words, there was a clear 
threat to sustainability if one of the sources of the fund (i.e. enrolment premium) for the 
programme is weak. This wide gap needs to be filled if the rights of the citizenry must be 
protected. Thus, “the need to return to a wider vision of social services provisioning beyond 
narrowed social protection instruments” (Adésínà, 2015:100) such as CBHI. This is because if 
the plans towards providing accessible healthcare services for all is not revisited now, it 
becomes difficult to identify the appropriate time to rise with the idea.  
7.5 Conclusion 
Relying on empirical data, the chapter discussed the sources of fund for the CBHI programme. 
Most of the funds were generated through counterpart funding by the Kwara State Government 
(KWSG) and the Dutch HIF; these were complemented by the enrolment premium paid by the 
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enrollees. Also, from the perspectives of community members and other stakeholders in the 
implementation, the chapter explored the affordability of enrolment premium by the 
community members, since it was one of the sources of fund for financing the programme. The 
study showed that the premium was not affordable to most members of the communities. Going 
forward, the chapter also assessed the capacity of government to provide free healthcare for the 
citizens and majority of the respondents and participants held the belief that the government 
























STOPPAGE OF THE CBHI PROGRAMME IN KWARA STATE NIGERIA 
8.1 Introduction 
The establishment of the Kwara CBHI programme sought to extend access to healthcare service 
to the rural dwellers. However, the programme stopped ‘abruptly’ after less than a decade of 
implementation. One of the goals of this study is to examine the reasons behind the stoppage 
of the CBHI programme in rural Kwara. This chapter begins by examining the challenges that 
faced the CBHI programme, as they relate to each of the major actors in the implementation of 
the programme. Further, it discusses the reasons behind the stoppage of the programme, which 
were mainly non-payment of counterpart fund and poor management. Also, the healthcare 
situation in the communities in the post-CBHI era is examined. The community members and 
healthcare providers highly felt the resultant effects. 
8.2 Challenges and Moral Issues in the Programme   
It is necessary to note that “policies do not fail on their own merits” but dependent on the 
processes of implementation (Hudson et al., 2019:1) as well as design. The stoppage of the 
CBHI programme was preceded by specific challenges which partly led to the eventual 
stoppage of the programme. However, challenges are never strange phenomena if there are 
adequate mechanisms put in place to tackle them as they arise. Table 8.1 details the challenges 
identified by the former enrollees, based on their experience with the programme.  
Table 8.1: Challenges of the CBHI Programme by the Formerly-Enrolled Respondents 
Challenge Frequency (N = 811) Percentage 
Non-availability of drugs 33 4.1 
Poor treatment 54 6.7 
Poor attitude of healthcare workers 30 3.7 
Distance 1 0.1 
Request for Out of Pocket Payment 3 0.4 
Long waiting period 122 15 
Inadequate staffing 52 6.4 
Increase in premium 4 0.5 
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Inadequate equipment/ facility 7 0.9 
Inadequate benefits package 7 0.9 
Funding challenge 35 4.3 
Poor education on the benefits package 4 0.5 
Poor management 22 2.7 
Abuse of care 2 0.2 
Lack of trust 8 1 
No challenge 400 49.3 
I don’t know 27 3.3 
 
Chi-Square Test of Association between Selected Variables and the Challenges of the 
CBHI Programme 
Socio-economic Variables Former Enrollees (p-value)* 
Conduct of healthcare workers .001 
Quality of care .001 
Note: 5% significance level 
*Two-tailed test 
 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
Table 8.1 above shows that slightly above half (52.6%) of the respondents did not identify any 
challenge with the programme. This might be as a result of their none or infrequent utilisation 
of healthcare under the programme because not all those that enrolled accessed care often while 
the programme was active. The Table also reveals a statistically significant relationship 
between conduct of the healthcare workers and the challenges of the programme (
2 = 527.036, 
p-value = 0.001). It also shows a statistically significant relationship between quality of care 
and the challenges of the programmes (
2 = 537.549, p-value = 0.001). These might be related 
to the various challenges mentioned by the respondents (see Table 8.1 above) which are mainly 
linked to the delivery of healthcare services under the programme.    
The qualitative data indicates that most of the participants identified challenges with the 
programme (6 out of 11 community leaders, 16 out of 22 community members and 10 out of 
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12 FGDs). More so, the experience differed from one community to the other. The qualitative 
data gives a better understanding of the challenges presented in Table 8.1. As observed among 
the respondents in the above Table, some of the participants also noted that there was no 
challenge with the programme. One of them indicated that: 
Mio ri complain kankan nipa eto na. Igbati 
aari awon eleto na mo, ni won complain. 
I didn’t observe any challenge in the 
programme. People only complained about 
the programme when it stopped (KII, 
Community Leader, 15/06/2019, Edidi).  
However, other participants highlighted various challenges with the programme. These 
challenges range from the lethargy of the donors, low capitation, pressure on healthcare 
workers and facilities, long waiting period, poor knowledge of benefits package (KII, HCP, 
21/06/2019, Osi), tribal issues (KII, KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin), over-utilisation of 
services, non-renewal of enrolment due to the absence of sickness (KII, NHIS Official, 
01/08/2019, Ilorin), inadequate human resources (KII, Community Leader, 11/07/2019, 
Idofian), insufficient research, inadequate funding (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin), 
among others.  
A participant added that the problems included:  
Communication gap, inadequate advocacy, distribution of referral centres; UITH 
[University of Ilorin Teaching Hospital] is the only secondary-tertiary referral centre in 
the geopolitical zone. The distance between the UITH and the communities is far. The 
capitation given to HCPs is inadequate. I believe the enrollees and Programme Managers 
had their problems too (KII, Referral Hospital 1, 30/07/2019, Ilorin).  
An HCP also recalled his experience with adverse selection when the programme commenced 
in his community, which stemmed from the poor healthcare situation in the State. He noted 
that: “There was the problem of adverse selection where the first set of enrollees were the 
chronically-ill with hypertension, diabetes, rheumatoid, arthritis, cancer and some other 
degenerative illnesses. Meanwhile, cancer was not covered. The HMO was not happy because 
they were paying more money than they were receiving” (KII, HCP, 21/06/2019, Osi). 
Generally, adverse selection is a common challenge in CBHI programmes, as found by Jembere 
(2018:1) in Ethiopia, Parmar et al. (2012:1) in Burkina Faso and Bodhisane and Pongpanich 
(2018:615) in Lao P.D.R. It tends to be more pronounced in places with a high rate of poverty 
and a weak healthcare system.  
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Taking a closer examination of the challenges beyond the responses in the questionnaire, the 
qualitative data relatively allows for classifying the challenges according to various actors or 
stakeholders, concerning how their actions or inactions constituted a challenge in the 
implementation of the programme. Thus, this section further examines the challenges of the 
programme as follows: 
8.2.1 The State Government  
The challenges of distance and stock-out of drugs, particularly in government-owned 
facilities, are attributed to the state government. Hence, that is the focus of this sub-section. 
8.2.1.1 Distance 
There was a problem of distance during the implementation of the programme, limiting the 
ability to reach people in many of the villages located around rural Kwara. Though efforts were 
made to contact them through the creation of health posts (KII, Foreign Agency Official 1, 
02/09/2019, Ilorin), they were just too many and dispersed. This inability to extend healthcare 
services to them is partly due to the poor healthcare architecture and infrastructure in Kwara 
State which does not ensure that healthcare facilities are located within an accessible distance 
for various human settlements in the State. Consequently, those who intended to access care 
under the programme had to spend more to reach the facilities and access care. A community 
member noted that: 
Onira fun awon tanwa ni abule lati je 
anfaani eto na nitori ‘pe ojina siwon.  
It was difficult for dwellers of small villages 
in the hinterlands to benefit from the 
programme because of the distance (IDI, 
Female, 20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
One of the HMO officials lamented because it was difficult for the enrolment officers to reach 
these settlements. He stated that:  
…Accessing hard-to-reach areas was another problem and distance to the health facility, 
on the supply side, was also a problem. Some needed to pay more than their premium for 
transportation (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019,  Ilorin).  
Another participant who identified poor road network as an impediment to access supported 
the above notion with an example from Asa LGA, as thus: 
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For instance, there are a lot of interior communities in Asa LGA. I can mention more 
than 50 that are located far in the bushes. You can be going for like an hour in the bush 
without reaching the end (KII, HMO Official 2, 29/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Further, a healthcare provider pointed out this challenge in Gure. He noted that: 
Complaints of enrollees under the programme were distance. The programme facility 
was in Gure. Places like Siya, Kosubosu, Yanrin, Yashikira, Chikanda etc., complained 
of distance including other villages in the bush where roads were not motorable. They 
wanted the facility closer to them (KII, HCP, 15/08/2019, Gure). 
In this regard, the CBHI programme was not able to penetrate by establishing its presence 
beyond the use of few health posts in some places where they were available. Another 
healthcare provider observed this problem and noted that it is one of the reasons people 
eventually settled for patronising quacks when the programme was operational. She explained:  
…Some of them [i.e. rural dwellers] decided to patronise quacks around them and took 
wrong medications. It was only emergency cases they brought to the town because of 
distance (KII, HCP, 20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
Another participant corroborated the implication and consequence of inability to access care 
under the CBHI programme due to distance. He concluded that: 
Where enrollees needed to spend more on transportation than premium, they felt its not 
worth it and settle for patent medicine shop for treatment (KII, Researcher, 30/07/2019, 
Ilorin). 
At the policy level, the introduction of the CBHI programme could have considered the number 
of healthcare facilities that were available in the target areas, that is, the rural areas, to see how 
this could facilitate or inhibit enrolment and utilisation of healthcare services. Thus, even for 
CBHI to work effectively, there is a need to locate healthcare facilities within a considerable 
distance to the people. Unfortunately, however, some of those who should have enrolled and 
some enrollees in the programme submitted to the patronage of patent medicine vendors to buy 
drugs due to non-proximity of formal healthcare facilities. More painfully, for those who were 
enrolled, most of these medications were covered by the CBHI programme (Gustafsson-Wright 
et al., 2018:249).  
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Dror et al. (2016) found distance as a common barrier to enrolment or utilisation of CBHI in 
LMICs. Also, Haven et al. (2018:5) found in Uganda that “individuals living in hard-to-reach 
areas were less than half likely to utilise CBHI services due to distance”. Parmar et al. 
(2014:76) also found a similar level of utilisation among CBHI enrollees and non-enrollees 
who lived far from healthcare facilities. Cost of transportation is another burden for the rural 
dwellers. Masiye et al. (2016) found in Zambia that even with the removal of user fees at 
primary healthcare level, catastrophic healthcare expenditure was high among the poor due to 
the spending on transportation. The roll-out of the CBHI programme in rural Kwara was partly 
hampered by the ‘unpreparedness’ of the government concerning the non-availability of 
healthcare facilities within accessible distance to the intended beneficiaries. The number of 
facilities was never enough to reach the entire rural population in the State.   
8.2.1.2 Stock-out of Drugs 
One of the characteristics of the challenge of the programme was the non-availability of drugs. 
There were several instances where enrollees went to the hospitals for care, and they were told 
that the required drugs were not available. This was, however common with the public facilities 
under the management of the CHIS (the government’s agency) because participants with this 
complain were receiving care in public facilities. As stated in Chapter 5, the agency was 
responsible for stocking the public hospitals with drugs from the capitation obtained on the 
enrollees. A participant cited an instance and noted that: 
Nigbati kosi ogun nile, won ni ki awon 
eyan pada wa.   
There was a time enrollees were told to go 
and come back for drugs because drugs were 
not available (IDI, Male, 15/06/2019, Edidi). 
This was bolstered by a community leader who saw non-availability of drugs as one indicator 
that the programme would likely stop. In his words: 
Awon eyan complain nipa pe awon ‘ori 
ogun gba. Lati ara aisi ogun latinri apere 
firifiri’ pe eto na yio denukole. 
Some enrollees complained about non-
availability of drugs. We observed traces that 
the programme would stop due to the non-
availability of drugs (KII, Community 
Leader, 13/06/2019, Erinle). 




The challenges were stock-out of drugs, lack of delivery materials, no drugs for specific 
diseases and enrollees were told everything was free (KII, HCP, 02/07/2019, Kaiama).  
Though the programme was jointly sponsored by the state government and the international 
partner, the use of government facilities provided the government officials with some influence 
on how the policy was implemented in the public facilities. A participant recalled that: 
Policy kan wa lati Ministry of Health  lori 
iye itoju tiwon lese lojumo laifi aye kale 
fun emergency. 
There was a policy from the State Ministry of 
Health stating the number of cases to be 
attended to in a particular day without 
consideration for emergency cases (IDI, 
Male, 13/06/2019, Erinle). 
Arising from the above, the implementation of the programme in public facilities was partly 
stalled with the stock-out of drugs and the general quality of care in private facilities was better 
than what was obtainable in government facilities under the programme. This partly informed 
the reason why enrolments were higher in private compared to the public facilities. This was 
confirmed by a study conducted by AIGHD (2015:37) on the programme which reported that 
in 2011, there was 39% enrolment in Aboto-Oja (private facility) and 26% in Afon (public 
facility) in the same LGA. Regarding non-availability of drugs, Kodom et al. (2019:576) 
reported a similar scenario in Ghana where enrollees were given only cheap drugs and directed 
to purchase the rest. Situations like these, obviously, limit the quality of care and expose 
enrollees to catastrophic healthcare spending, thereby altering the goals of CBHI. Generally, 
however, Mladovsky and Mossialos (2008) observed that corruption in government tends to 
affect the success of CBHI programmes. 
8.2.2 The HMO 
The challenges attributed to the HMO (HCHC) cannot be divorced from the international 
partner (PAF) because some of their decisions were based at the direction of the international 
actor. The following are some of the challenges of the programme attributed to the HMO.  
8.2.2.1 Reduction in Health Benefits 
The health benefits package was reviewed downward over time. In other words, some medical 
conditions that were covered, initially, were removed from the healthcare package. This was 
done as the programme expanded to more communities. The knowledge about the health 
benefits coverage became complicated with relatively frequent review in policy or operational 
guidelines, regarding the implementation of the programme. This included a reduction in the 
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benefits package of the programme. As a result, enrollees could no longer access some 
healthcare services under the programme, and they were not adequately informed. One reason 
most of the enrollees were not aware was that generally, the majority of the people utilised 
basic healthcare services. Some enrollees who required these services became enraged and 
confused about the programme’s benefits package. For instance, a participant who was not 
affected by the reduction in benefits package noted that she was not informed about the removal 
of any care from the inclusion list. According to her: 
Won ‘o salaye sugbon gbogbo igba ti mo 
ba ti lo naani won toju mi. 
 I was not informed about the specific 
coverage of the programme, but I was treated 
for all the ailments I presented under the 
programme (IDI, Female, 03/07/2019, 
Gure). 
The resultant effect of the reduction was felt most by the communities where the programme 
started early when they realised that they could no longer enjoy certain services under the 
programme. For instance, hernia was covered at inception, and it was one of the benefits 
enjoyed by former enrollees in Bacita (where the programme commenced in 2007). However, 
it’s one of the ailments that residents of Bode Saadu (where the programme started in 2014) 
wished to be covered by the programme. During an FGD with female community members in 
Bacita, a participant commented on the coverage of the programme and stated that: 
Hygeia cover hypertension, T.B., omo 
bibi, operation, paapa julo hernia. Oni 
ojo tiwon lakale fun operation. Won le 
bere lati seven laaro titi di nine ale.  
The programme covered hypertension, 
tuberculosis, maternal care, surgical 
operations, especially hernia. There was a 
particular day designated for different 
kinds of surgical procedures. They could 
start at 7 am and stop at 9 pm (Female FGD, 
30/05/2019, Bacita). 
Meanwhile, a participant in Bode Saadu suggested while discussing the challenges of the 
programme that: 
Koba daa, tiwon ba leje ko cover gbogbo 
awon ibi ti ko cover ninu aare, bi hernia. 
It would be good if the programme could 
be re-designed to cover some other 
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ailments such as hernia (IDI, Male, 
20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
This shows that the health benefits coverage of the programme changed at some point in time 
and it became disappointing to most of the enrollees. A community member recalled that, 
ironically, the reduction in benefits package was at a time when the premium was increased. 
According to her: 
Won withdraw awon itoju kan ‘pe ko 
cover re mo. Anfaani taati wa je lalakoko 
taamo ‘pe gbogbo e lo cover, won wa yoo 
kuro. Igbati awa nsan apo meji abo ni 
kowa cover nkan mii towa nibe tele. 
Some healthcare services were removed 
from the coverage of the programme. 
Some services that we had earlier 
benefitted from were removed. It was 
when the premium was increased to N500 
that the health services were excluded 
(Female FGD, 30/05/2019, Bacita).   
An HCP confirmed the reduction in the benefits package. She noted that: 
Before the programme was introduced in Bode Saadu, some people went to Bacita to 
enrol in the programme where all services were covered. By the time they were 
expanding the programme, they had put a limitation on cases, where excluded cases were 
treated through OOP. There were surgical cases excluded; as a result, people started to 
complain about the exclusion of some care. For example, the Programme Managers 
would not pay for surgical delivery of any woman who had previously delivered through 
C.S. (KII, HCP, 20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
The exclusion of some benefits became challenging for the HCPs to relate effectively with the 
enrollees in situations where the needed care had been removed. An HCP confirmed the 
exclusion of some health benefits and recalled the challenge faced because enrollees became 
furious when asked to pay for any care that was not covered. She stated that: 
…Another challenge was that enrollees became furious whenever they were advised to 
pay for cares that were not covered by the CBHI programme (KII, HCP,15/06/2019, 
Edidi).  
Another HCP supported the above submission while highlighting the challenges faced, and 
exposed the lapses of the HMO in the areas of enrollee education about the programme and 
how it affected their integrity as a provider. He narrated that:   
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…There were also some areas which the programme did not cover in terms of treatment, 
and this also brought up some challenges. This was as a result of an information gap 
between the Programme Managers and the enrollees. The Managers, unfortunately, 
transferred some responsibilities to us, to educate enrollees about coverage and inclusion 
package, which was their duty. The gap was to the extent that some patients would come 
with ailments that were not in the inclusion package, but they assumed it was. By the 
time you treat and ask them to pay, they accuse you of double-dealing (KII, HCP, 
19/06/2019, Bacita). 
There seems to be more to what he regarded as information gap because the provision of 
inadequate or wrong information about the coverage might be deliberate (on the part of the 
HMO) considering the effect the information could have on enrolment decision. As a marketer 
of the insurance package, the HMO also had an ‘ultimate’ mandate of selling and expanding 
enrolment coverage; thus, they might have engaged in deceptive marketing. Meanwhile, 
misleading advertising in insurance “erodes social safety nets, corrodes trust and erases the 
potential of insurance as a mechanism of social solidarity” (Ericson & Doyle, 2006:993). 
Primarily, the reduction of benefits package was due to the challenge of funding as it was 
difficult to sustain the initial package. An HMO official confirmed that the benefits package 
was reduced; “at some points, some healthcare services were removed from the coverage of 
the programme. Usually, the package was robust, but with time, funding and policy review led 
to the reduction of benefits package” (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin). He added that:  
Some of the benefit packages, too were not realistic. The benefits package did not match 
the fund available (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin).   
According to the HIF (2012:11), the downward review of benefits package was necessitated 
by the need to ensure sustainability in terms of funding, by aligning the inclusion package to 
the health priorities of the target group. As much as this could sound rational, it appeared to 
have breached the trust of the community members or enrollees because sustainability has 
always been a bane of CBHI and this could have been adequately considered at the inception 
of the programme. This had negative consequences for the enrollees because they were only 
informed about the exclusion at the point of use and not at the point of enrolment or renewal 
of enrolment. Also, reduction in benefits tends to limit CBHI enrolment coverage (Akinyemi 
& Idowu, 2015) and expose enrollees to catastrophic health expenditure (Purohit, 2014:1242).   
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Aside from the reduction in the benefits package, further worrisome aspects of the CBHI 
schemes is the difficulty with accessing care for ailments that were usually not covered by the 
scheme such as chemotherapy, dialysis etc. There was no provision in place regarding financial 
protection for the healthcare needs of any enrollee whose ailment was not part of the benefits 
package, apart from a referral. An official of the foreign agency claimed that:  
In a few cases that tilted towards complications, we had an arrangement that they were 
properly referred to. UITH was our major referral centre, and they were referred to have 
a continuum of treatment (KII, Foreign Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). 
However, the submissions of other participants differ from the above claim. An HMO official 
noted that: 
Enrollees with ailments that were not covered were informed and taken to referral 
centres. At the same time, we rendered any support within our means to ensure they got 
treated. At times, we made special requests on why the enrollees should be assisted with 
financial protection for treatment.  (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin). 
More precisely, a government official submitted that: 
Enrollees were not treated for ailments that were not covered by the programme (KII, 
KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Also, a participant from a privately-owned referral centre confirmed that referred patients often 
complained of high cost of treatment. According to her: 
…They (enrollees) complained about our bills because they felt the treatment was free. 
Meanwhile, the CBHI was not paying their bills to us (KII, HCP, Referral Centre 2 
Official, 12/07/2019, Ilorin). 
These show that the referral system only served to guide enrollees to where ‘quality’ care could 
be accessed without adequate provision of financial protection. Fundamentally, promotion of 
CBHI policy is partly premised on the need to pool resources and improve access to care 
because most people die as a result of mild, preventable and manageable illness (Acharya & 
Ranson, 2005: Odeyemi, 2014); thus, where diseases are manageable, fund should not be a 
barrier to access. At the policy level, however, there is a huge concern about the benefits 
package as a component of the CBHI programme because it usually, states clearly, the specific 
healthcare services covered by the programme. This limitation usually placed on coverage 
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technically and subliminally ignores the other healthcare needs of the enrollees that are not 
covered by the CBHI programme. For example, Ayebazibwe (2019:12) found that a CBHI in 
Uganda did not cover high blood pressure and diabetes. Myint et al. (2019:2), argued that “a 
unified health insurance system providing the same benefits package for all, is the most 
efficient way to attain equitable access to health care”. Meanwhile, the existence of CBHI 
programme tends to shift possible social policy attention of the government from adequate 
spending on healthcare to other sectors, denying the health sector the needed attention. 
8.2.2.2 Inadequate Enrolment Coverage 
Enrolment was a challenge in the programme. The enrolment coverage during the nine years 
(i.e. 2007 and 2016) was 4.41% of the State’s population, though, the focus was on the rural 
areas which accounted for more than 70% of the entire population. One of the reasons attributed 
to the low level of coverage was the increase in enrolment premium (KII, HMO Official 1, 
26/07/2019, Ilorin). Another participant linked inadequate enrolment coverage to non-
engagement of adequate staff by the HMO to strengthen the enrolment drive. He stated that: 
“…For Hygeia, I believe the staff strength provided was not enough in terms of coverage of 
communities. We devised means of employing agents in the community, and we paid them a 
commission based on the number of enrolments” (KII, HMO Official 2, 29/07/2019, Ilorin). 
This was confirmed by a community member who noted that some surrounding communities 
were not reached in terms of awareness and enrolment efforts. According to him: 
Enrolment yen ko cover gbogbo igberiko.  The enrolment efforts did not reach most of 
the small villages around here. (IDI, Male, 
20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
Instead of boosting enrolment through the improved workforce, the use of agents by the HMO 
was perhaps, a way of reducing expenses; and this took its toll on the programme in terms of 
enrolment coverage. Generally, achieving large enrolment base is a common challenge in 
CBHI programmes as reported by Adebayo et al. (2015) in LMICs, Aggarwal (2011:1657) in 
India, Mladovsky et al. (2014:18) in Senegal, Ajuaye et al. (2019:1304) in Tanzania and 
Odeyemi (2014) in Nigeria. 
8.2.2.3 Low Capitation 
One of the challenges identified in the programme is the payment of low capitation to the HCPs. 
Meanwhile, the HCPs are at the forefront of the CBHI programme implementation. 
Importantly, where health policy implementation process is poorly organised, without adequate 
consideration for the interest of the healthcare workers, the policy goal would be negatively 
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impacted (Béland & Ridde, 2016:16). Some of the HCPs lamented that the responsibilities and 
duties carried out under the programme were more than the remuneration they got. The 
capitation was not stable; it was reviewed continuously. Before the end of the programme, the 
capitation of private facilities was N180 while the public facilities were receiving N140 per 
enrollee (KII, HCP, 27/07/2019, Oro). One of the HCPs noted the inadequate amount while 
highlighting the process of getting capitation. She stated that:  
We complained that the capitation given to us was small compared to the huge amount 
of work. As providers, we were given capitation ahead of treatment, that was N250 or 
N350 per enrollee, in the first week of the month to purchase drugs. For government 
hospitals, they paid into the government coffers to purchase drugs for all government 
facilities. At the end of the month, the list of cases treated that were beyond capitation 
such as C.S. would be sent to the Programme Managers for claims (KII, HCP, 
20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
Another healthcare provider noted that the capitation was very low and concluded that it was 
the enrollees that bore the consequence. He stated that: 
The capitation was abysmally too low... In the end, the enrollees were the ones affected. 
Because of this, the HCPs could not improve their service because they were managing 
what they were given (KII, HCP, 27/07/2019, Oro). 
Other HCPs added that: 
As time went on, they [i.e. the HMO] started reducing the number of cases they paid for. 
For instance, they stopped paying for surgery and evacuation and other fee-for-service 
illnesses outside capitation. The reason was that there was no money (KII, HCP, 
15/08/2019, Gure). 
When the capitation was reduced, the dosage was also reduced, and the enrollees 
complained through the questionnaire, and we explained that it was due to low capitation 
(KII, HCP,13/06/2019, Erinle). 
Being a public-private partnership programme, there was “an inherent contradiction between 
the quest for profits and the need to deliver quality healthcare services to the people” (see 
Romero & Gideon, 2019:11). The HCPs would not want to jeopardise their interests, and as 
such, the burden was transferred to the enrollees in the programme. The reduction in capitation 
that led to a reduction in benefits package was a serious flaw in the implementation of the 
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programme. It was also an indication of the non-sustainability of the funding requirements of 
the programme. Myint et al. (2019:1) noted that inappropriate payment mechanisms have 
devastating consequences for the quality of care. More broadly, Robyn et al. (2013:111) 
observed that inadequate payment of providers could hamper effective participation, quality 
and quantity of services, satisfaction, enrolment population and financial sustainability of 
CBHI programme. Thus, the role of HCPs is vital to the success of CBHI programmes.  
8.2.2.4 HMO and HCP: Clash of Interest 
HCPs often do not have confidence in HMOs regarding guaranteed payment of their 
entitlements (Mladovsky et al., 2014:9). The HCPs in the Kwara CBHI complained about the 
constant change in policy. Notably, they complained about the introduction of fingerprint 
enrolment system, that they were wrongfully refused payment for errors made by the enrolment 
officers, who were staff of the HMO. One of the HCPs explained that:  
Change of policies, especially with the introduction of ICT software for fingerprint 
enrolment. This posed some challenges in terms of accepting or rejecting some enrollees 
or record multiple enrolments. In the process, healthcare providers were deprived of their 
entitlements because of the non-functionality of the software introduced by the 
Programme Managers [i.e. HMO]. Another problem was the inability to continue the 
programme, and there was poor financial will to sustain it at all cost. Also, there were no 
other financial commitments apart from the partners (KII, HCP, 28/07/2019, Aboto-Oja). 
Another HCP who felt short-changed added with an example that: 
When the Enrolment Agents typing the names made mistakes, they transferred the 
blames to us, and we were not the ones doing the computation. For instance, if the gender 
of MUHAMMED FATIMA was mistakenly documented as male and if the person 
delivered a baby; they would say “How can a man deliver a baby?” That was atrocious 
and fraudulent because they were passing the blame on us, and we had nothing to do with 
the enrolment. There was usually gender error, age error, spelling error, and error while 
transferring data from one segment to another (KII, HCP, 19/06/2019, Bacita). 
He continued that: 
All these were thorns in our flesh. We were short-changed of payments arising from the 
errors. Many times, they did not pay for such errors, and services had been delivered. 
There was a time we lost over a million naira to that errors. Of course, our IT Department 
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had their own issues because of the pressure of work on them but minimal (KII, HCP, 
19/06/2019, Bacita). 
Apart from the fund-related clash, an HCP complained about pre-authorisation before carrying 
out some treatments. She explained that: 
The problem we had with the Programme Managers was regarding pre-authorisation 
before carrying out the surgery, except emergencies. Some enrollees wanted it to be 
conducted as early as possible but won’t be paid if it was not authorised. Then, enrollees 
became annoyed (KII, HCP, 13/06/2019, Erinle). 
This suggests that the HMO did not have full trust in the HCPs, and the imbalance relationship 
tends to have adverse effects on the smooth implementation of the programme. For instance, 
seeking pre-authorisation before embarking on surgical procedure gives way for possible loss 
of life where there is a delay. Each party wanted to protect its interest. At the same time, the 
HMO acted to guard against ‘unjustified’ claims. The HCPs expected not to be ‘wrongly’ held 
accountable for lapses outside their purviews or incur a financial loss.  
8.2.3 The Health Care Providers  
HCPs are expected to understand the objectives of CBHI and appreciate their roles in the 
success of the programmes (Ndiaye et al., 2007:160). However, in this study, the conduct of 
some HCPs posed specific challenges to the CBHI programme. While some of them greeted 
their grievances with the programme managers on the enrollees, others explored and exploited 
the loopholes in the CBHI policy to their own advantage.  
8.2.3.1 Long waiting Period 
The former enrollees complained about the long waiting period before accessing care in the 
healthcare facilities. This is a common glitch in the implementation of CBHI programmes ( 
Adebayo et al., 2015:1; Onwujekwe et al., 2009:99; Mukagendo et al., 2018:4). Though the 
HCPs might have their faults, this problem was partly because the programme was operational 
in selected and few facilities, leading to a hike in utilisation rate in the facilities. This was rife 
in government hospitals with inadequate staffing (IDI, Female, 13/06/2019, Erinle) and the 
government had the highest number of facilities in the programme (i.e. 32 out of 43). Typically, 
seeking healthcare should not be accompanied by stress or uncertainties. Still, in circumstances 
of this nature, some enrollees might not be able to endure the long wait to access care and 
would eventually return home without medical attention. With this in mind, some community 
members might have refused to enrol or renew enrolment. A participant explained that: 
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I enrolled in the programme with my family, but I stopped using it for healthcare when I 
took my child to the hospital one day, and we were delayed for several hours without 
being attended to. We left them to receive treatment in another hospital (IDI, Male, 
03/07/2019, Gure). 
A community leader confirmed the problem and stated that:  
Opolopo ma n complain ‘pe a lot of time 
lawon lo nibe nitoripe eyan tipoju. Eleyi 
discourage opolopo eyan lati lo hospital 
na. Sugbon eniti obale ni suru, yio ri toju 
todaa gba. 
Most people complained that they spent a lot 
of time waiting to receive care. This 
discouraged most people from accessing care 
under the programme. However, those who 
could endure got quality care (KII, 
Community Leader, 20/06/2019, Bode 
Saadu). 
A  community member also noted that: 
The only challenge I saw in the programme is that you may get there and meet many 
people  (IDI, Male, 26/06/2019, Oro).  
Another community member confirmed that: 
Ero man po gaan ni hospital. Eyan de ma 
pe die. 
There was usually a high number of patients 
in the hospital waiting to receive care. One 
would wait for some time before getting 
medical attention (Female FGD, 27/05/2019, 
Osi). 
Another participant shared his experience regarding the hardship that enrollees went through 
to access care. He explained that: 
I know of people who left their homes around 3:30 am to the hospital to access care 
because of a multitude of enrollees also seeking care. Many people wanted to be around 
before 7:00 am when the hospital would start consultation/treatment. Those who could 
not stay long might not be able to access care except those with cases of emergency (IDI, 
Male, 19/06/2019, Bacita).  
This problem was confirmed by a researcher that: “some people complained about the long 
waiting period” (KII, Researcher, 30/07/2019, Ilorin). This finding is affirmed by the study 
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conducted by AIGHD (2015:54) on the same programme which found during the FGD that 
some enrollees refused to utilise the service because of overcrowding, which stemmed from 
understaffing in the facilities. The HCPs acknowledged the challenge and one of them 
remarked that: 
The complaints lodged by patients when the programme was active related to the long 
waiting period due to the high rate of utilisation. But generally, everyone was taken care 
of because we had enough doctors (KII, HCP, 21/06/2019, Osi).  
Though, the problem of long waiting period could be partly blamed on the poor healthcare 
situation in the State, which had an inadequate number of healthcare facilities and personnel. 
Nevertheless, it was expected of the healthcare providers to ensure adequate staffing of the 
facilities and provide prompt services to the enrollees. The HCPs, however, saw it as a ‘normal’ 
phenomenon where there is a high utilisation rate. One of the HCPs who viewed it as normal 
noted that the utilisation could be very tiring and then, highlighted their efforts in militating the 
challenge. She explained that: 
Enrollees usually complained of waiting normal time, but then we had three doctors on 
the ground to attend to about 400 patients daily. In the morning, three of them would be 
on shift, one would be off in the afternoon, and two would be on call overnight. At times, 
when there were emergencies overnight, doctors may be tired in the morning, and 
patients would be complaining (KII, HCP, 13/06/2019, Erinle). 
Another provider noted that: “Then, I had three to four doctors working with me. Despite that, 
patients complained that it took too long” (KII, HCP, 19/06/2019, Bacita). He argued that the 
problem could not be resolved in situations where there are high rates of utilisation by enrollees. 
According to him: 
By training, each patient must be given enough attention, but some of the enrollees 
complained about the long waiting period. Meanwhile, when it comes to their time, they 
want to spend as much as possible time with the doctor to be detailed enough in their 
consultation. There is no way such a problem can be divorced from massive turnout (KII, 
HCP, 19/06/2019, Bacita). 
The HCPs could only improve the situation within the financial resources acquired through the 
programme. The challenge was a systemic problem, and it persisted with no clear solution. An 
official of the international agency also noted the challenge and stated that: 
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The long waiting period was due to high utilisation rate, and as such, the manpower 
suffered (KII, Foreign Agency Official 2, 02/09/2019, Ilorin).  
Thus, this questions the suitability of the CBHI policy option of healthcare services 
provisioning. It may not record appreciable success in settings without equal attention for 
healthcare infrastructural and human resources development for building a formidable 
healthcare system. Fundamentally, the government has the responsibility to make “direct or 
indirect investments in health and healthcare infrastructure” (Tuohy & Glied, 2011). 
8.2.3.2 Preference for Non-Enrollees 
There were complaints by participants that certain healthcare providers exhibited some 
unethical conducts while providing healthcare services under the programme. For instance, 
some enrollees complained that non-enrollees were given better attention over enrollees 
because non-enrollees would pay OOP. This was peculiar to some private healthcare providers. 
A community member recalled that: 
Igbati won koko bere, won toju eyan; 
igbati to ya, tieba ti so’pe Hygeia nioo, 
won o so’pe kelo joko na. Won o koko 
toju awon tofe sanwo na.  
The programme was very effective at 
inception, but later, the enrollees were not 
given prompt attention. Priority was given to 
those who paid OOP for care (IDI, Female, 
17/06/2019, Odo-Owa). 
Another community member noted while lamenting about the poor quality of care and 
preference given to non-enrollees that:  
Won sofun awon elomi kanlo m’owo wa. Some enrollees were asked to pay OOP for 
care (Female FGD, 29/05/2019, Idofian). 
In another community, a participant recounted that: 
Kinikan wa tofe mu confusion wa nigba 
yen. Oun ni time tan fiile fun’toju awon 
toni kaadi, won o sope ise government ti 
pari. Seeri, ti eyan balo lataaro, toba tidi 
bi two, won oti stop ise. Ise owo loku 
tiwoon maase. 
There was something that was somehow 
confusing when the programme was 
operational. They had specified time to 
attend to enrollees; they would say that they 
were done with the government’s work [i.e. 
the CBHI programme] for the day. See, they 
attended to enrollees from morning till 
around 2 pm, and they’ll leave them for 
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attending to those who would pay OOP 
(Male FGD, 03/06/2019, Gure). 
Another participant added that: 
Nigba taalo’be, enitoni hospital 
sofunyan’ pe: toun o ba gba owo, awon 
omo tantele oun, kini won o je. 
When we went there, the owner of the 
hospital told people that: if he didn’t collect 
OOP payment, how would he pay his staff 
(Male FGD, 03/06/2019, Gure).  
The finding above is similar to the finding of in Ghana by Derbile and van der Geest (2013:590) 
that “healthcare workers abused poor enrollees with exemptions at the point of accessing care”. 
Ayebazibwe (2019:15)  also found that a CBHI in Uganda offered better services to patients 
who paid cash. In this study, the conduct is, however, inimical to the terms of their engagement 
in the programme. The idea was that the HCPs would be able to achieve their earnings through 
the provision of services, mainly to the CBHI enrollees since they were in the rural areas where 
healthcare utilisation is usually low. Still, it did not stop them from attending to non-enrollees 
but not at the detriment of those who were enrolled.  
8.2.3.3 Foray of HCPs into Enrolment 
Given the complaints by the private healthcare providers that the capitation given to them was 
low, some of them found a way of increasing their earnings within the available context of the 
policy. The HCPs colluded with the enrolment officers by providing fund for enrolling 
community members freely, to boost their enrolment base. This, in turn, would make them 
eligible to get capitation on the total number of enrollees registered with their facilities. For 
instance, if a facility has 10,000 enrollees, it would be entitled to N180 X 10,000 enrollees per 
month (i.e. N1,800,000 X 12 months, gives N21,600,000). One of the HCPs touched on this 
while complaining that poor capitation could stimulate sharp practices. He noted that: 
…As a result, it encouraged sharp practices where the HCP decided to use their funds to 
enrol some people, essentially healthy population who may not want to access the care 
to drive in more capitation to cushion their expenses (KII, HCP, 27/07/2019, Oro). 
Also, an official of the international agency confirmed that the HCPs explored various 
opportunities to maximise their earnings from the programme, including giving ‘unnecessary’ 
treatments that could attract fee-for-service. She explained that: 
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For facilities to make more money, they would always cut corners, and that was very 
eminent. There were different ways they were trying to manipulate the system. For 
instance, a facility would earn more based on the collection of fee-for-service as opposed 
to capitation (KII, Foreign Agency Official 2, 02/09/2019, Ilorin).  
She continued that: 
When you increased the number of visits a patient has made, or a patient comes in for 
just malaria, and you treat him for something else because the drug implication for that 
particular treatment is higher. To manipulate the system, deliberately data are distorted 
so that this can happen; and for growth we need data, and that is why the need for 
technology is very eminent (KII, Foreign Agency Official 2, 02/09/2019, Ilorin).  
Given the above, it is instructive to rethink and note two fundamental points regarding 
enrolment. One, the total enrolment coverage of about 140,000 enrollees at the end of the 
programme was partly motivated by this ‘ploy’. Two, the submission of the respondents and 
participants, as presented in Chapter 7, regarding non-affordability of N500 premium is factual. 
This is because if the strategy was not deployed, the total enrolment might not be up to that. It 
is because of situations like this that Benatar et al. (2009:361) challenged the moral basis of 
the promotion of privatisation of healthcare services, in the recent decades, that it is detrimental 
to the goal of health for all or UHC. They noted that “it is becoming clear that our modern 
system of morals, with its emphasis on market values, the desirability and necessity of 
corporate power and their institutionalisation in bureaucratic processes promotes corruption 
and extreme forms of exploitation that are tantamount to slavery”. 
8.2.4 Former Enrollees and Abuse of Care 
The art of managing enrollees also came up as a challenge under the programme, especially in 
their relationship with the HCPs. The conducts of some enrollees culminated in what could be 
called abuse of care. They capitalised on their enrolment cover to access healthcare at the 
slightest opportunity for the simplest complaints. Also, some of them did not have an 
understanding of how orthodox healthcare works and expected to recover from ailments almost 
immediately. A community leader observed that: 
Elomi, ti aare bade arare yoosi fe kolo ni’ 
sejukan. Aasese wa funwon ni suuru pe 
Some enrollees expected to gain full 
recovery immediately after receiving 
treatment. We, however, educated them that 
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koda b’eyan bam’ agbo na, koni sare 
cure re lesekan. 
recovery would be gradual even if they were 
treating the ailment using herbs (KII, 
Community Leader, 01/07/2019, Aboto-
Oja). 
Using an example, a participant during an FGD in Bacita noted how some enrollees ignorantly 
accused the HCP because the medication given to them fell below their expectations. She 
recounted that: 
Elomi je alainitelorun. Iyakan wa toun 
rojo nijokan ‘pe ogun die ni won fun oun 
tiwon si di ogun to po fun awon kan. 
Mowani kile sope oseyin, oloun ni iba 
lomu oun, ori nfoun. Mowa sofun ‘pe 
dede ounti yio wulo fun onikaluku ni 
won fun won. Iya yen pada rimi leyin bi 
ojoketa, owa dupe fun mi ‘pe omo mi 
omaseun, wipe oun lo ogun na, ode se 
dede ara oun. 
Some people were not contented. One day, 
there was a woman who was complaining 
that she was given a few drugs, while some 
other enrolled patients were given many 
drugs. I asked her of the ailment she took to 
the hospital, and she said malaria and 
headache. I had to educate her that each 
person was given what they needed. She later 
thanked me when we met about three days 
after that she had recovered using only the 
drugs (IDI, Female, 19/06/2019, Bacita). 
Another strand of abuse among enrollees was to deceptively lodge a medical complaint at their 
healthcare facilities to obtain drugs, as a way of benefiting from the programme before the end 
of an enrolment year. A community member narrated that:  
Elomi leso’pe: mii lori lodun ni oo, emi 
naelo, nre gboogun. Ati nkan se, ati nkan 
‘o se, won lawon osaa koo’ le. 
Some enrollees would say: I have not 
benefitted this year, I’ll also go and collect 
drugs. Whether they were sick or not, they 
said they would keep it at home (IDI, Female, 
13/06/2019, Erinle). 
Some key informants confirmed that some enrollees lacked an understanding of the principle 
of insurance and were keen on benefitting from the programme within the enrolment year. They 
stated that: 
Some saw their premium as a contribution and wished they could collect a refund (KII, 
NHIS Official, 01/08/2019, Ilorin). 
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Those who did not fall sick to use the care did not want to renew enrolment and wished 
to collect their premium (KII, KWSG Official 1, 20/08/2019, Ilorin). 
Also, there were cases where some community members would not enrol until they needed to 
access healthcare. Meanwhile, the access rule is a month after enrolment to minimise adverse 
selection. A community leader who observed it stated that:  
Some people did not enrol until when they needed to access care (KII, Community 
Leader, 19/06/2019, Bacita). 
Further, some healthcare providers shared their experience on the conduct of the enrollees in 
terms of abuse of access. One of them recalled that: 
The problem we had with enrollees was moral abuse. For instance, there was a day an 
enrollee came and was complaining about ‘belching after eating’, around 11 pm. Though, 
we appreciated if enrollees came for a check-up but not to abuse the access to care (KII, 
HCP, 13/06/2019, Erinle). 
Though hospitals are expected to be open 24 hours a day and accept emergencies, regardless 
of the time of the day. Also, typically, healthcare workers on duty are expected to be available 
to attend to patients. However, another HCP recalled a case of abuse by enrollees. He explained 
that: 
You can imagine someone coming at 9 pm to check blood pressure without being a 
known hypertensive patient; when healthcare workers were to be relaxing. To such 
people, we told them, this is not the time you suppose to come… It was an abuse of 
process, and we wanted them to learn the right thing (KII, HCP, 27/07/2019, Oro).  
A community member substantiated the assertion of the HCPs on abuse of care and cited an 
instance that: 
Elomi lede bayi koni oungbawe lataaro, 
oun sese sinu tan nisin, boun se j’amala 
gbona l’oru wa mu oun.  
An enrollee might come now and say he was 
fasting since morning; he just broke the fast 
by eating hot amala, and he’s feeling the heat 
(IDI, Female, 13/06/2019, Erinle). 
In the same vein, Garshong et al. (2001:23) reported abuse of care by exempted enrollees in 
Ghana. The latter returned to the hospital within a few days of treatment to obtain more 
medications while they were yet to consume the earlier ones dispensed to them altogether. As 
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a result of the interaction between the enrollees and the programme managers through various 
means, HCPs found it difficult to decisively deal with abuse of care because they might be 
reported to the programme managers. An HCP recounted how enrollees obtained drugs through 
the programme for non-enrolled relatives. She narrated that: 
Enrollees came to the hospital even with unnecessary cases, and we must give them drugs 
when they arrive. This is because there was a forum of enrollees and PharmAccess 
Foundation/Programme Managers where they interacted with enrollees and took up their 
complaints with the providers. Though, we didn’t give drugs at times because not all 
cases required drugs (KII, HCP, 20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
She added that: 
At times, enrollees came to the hospital to obtain drugs for their non-enrolled relatives 
and came back the following week for another treatment that the ailment was still 
persistent. We eventually discovered this prank because some came at a time when they 
should not have finished using the drugs given to them earlier (KII, HCP, 20/06/2019, 
Bode Saadu). 
Though, not many, but there were cases of impersonation among the enrollees. An HCP noted 
that: “Impersonation wanted to come, but we prevented it” (KII, HCP, 13/06/2019, Erinle). 
However, it took place in another community, perhaps undetected. A former enrollee noted 
during an FGD while discussing the prompt for enrolment that: 
Igbat’okoko bere miogba kaadi. Owa re 
omomi okunrin kan nigbayen. Mowaya 
kaadi eyan kan, mofi gbatoju. Igbayen 
ni mowa ri ‘pe kaadi yen ni nfaani 
pupo.  
I didn’t enrol in the programme at inception. 
One of my male children then fell sick. I 
borrowed someone’s enrolment card to 
access care. It was then that I realised that 
enrolment in the programme was beneficial 
(Female FGD, 31/05/2019, Aboto-Oja). 
Abuse of care by non-enrollees is a peculiar problem in settings where healthcare is seen as an 
opportunity and privilege. This problem is less likely to be pronounced in places where the 
health policy allows easy access to healthcare. For example, it would not be necessary to obtain 
drugs and keep for future use or give to another person for consumption, if the health system 
is good. Also, there were cases where people came from distant locations, outside the spatial 
coverage of the programme, to access care under the programme. People that were resident in 
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neighbouring Ekiti and Kogi States (Male FGD, 27/05/2019, Osi)  and Lagos State (Female 
FGD, 30/05/2019, Bacita) travelled to rural Kwara to access care. This shows the level of 
weakness in the Nigerian healthcare system, which is ‘incapable’ of easing access to healthcare 
for the people. Notwithstanding, the actions of these enrollees are condemnable.  
8.3 Stoppage of the CBHI Programme: The Reasons  
The respondents (i.e. formerly-enrolled and non-enrolled community members) were not in the 
forefront of the implementation of the programme and as such, might not be fully aware of the 
actual reasons that led to the stoppage of the programme. However, they shared their opinions 
based on their experience with the programme. Also, the stoppage of the programme was not 
accidental because the challenges discussed above are capable of crippling the success of a 
programme, especially when they are left unresolved. Consequently, some of these challenges 
form part of the perceived reasons advanced by the respondents, causing the stoppage or 
collapse of the programme. These are indicated in Table 8.2 below.   
Table 8.2: Perceived Reasons for the Stoppage of the Programme 
Reason Former Enrollees Non- Enrollees 
Frequency 
(N = 860) 
Percentage Frequency  
(N = 380) 
Percentage 
Failure of the state government 
to pay counterpart fund 
132 15.3 23 6.1 
Non-availability of drugs 3 0.3 0 0 
Poor treatment 30 3.5 3 0.8 
Poor attitude of healthcare 
workers 
9 1 1 0.1 
Poor management 26 3 13 3.4 
Lack of political will 1 0.1 5 1.3 
Request for OOP payment 9 1 0 0 
I don’t know 425 49.4 218 57.4 
New policy by the government 8 0.9 18 4.7 
Inadequate staffing 2 0.2 0 0 
Corruption 0 0 1 0.3 
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Inadequate benefits package 1 0.1 0 0 
Poor enrolment 0 0 1 0.3 
Funding challenge 135 15.7 60 15.8 
Inadequate equipment/ 
facilities 
10 1.2 0 0 
Information gap 2 0.2 0 0 
Bad governance 67 7.8 37 9.7 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
As shown in Table 8.2 above,  more than 50% of the total respondents did not know the reasons 
for the stoppage of the programme. This might be understandable because they were not at the 
forefront of the implementation of the programme. However, about 16% each among the non-
enrolled and formerly-enrolled respondents pointed to funding as a challenge. In contrast, 
among the former enrollees, exclusively, 15% attributed the stoppage to failure of the 
government to fulfil its funding agreement to the programme. Also, the former enrollees who 
indicated funding challenge were indirectly blaming it on the government because it had a 
responsibility of providing fund for the programme. In essence, the main reasons given by the 
respondents are fund-related and bad governance. Similarly, Deo et al. (2018) concluded from 
a situational analysis that CBHI adopted in 1990 in Nepal eventually failed due to a myriad of 
challenges. This is because any observed shortcoming in the programme tends to decrease 
enrolment, which is a crucial factor in CBHI success.   
Further, the qualitative findings provide better insights into the reasons, indicating that the main 
reason for the stoppage was funding. While most others did not know, three out of six 
community leaders, eleven out of twenty-five community members and six out of twelve FGDs 
concluded that the programme stopped due to non-payment of counterpart fund by the state 
government. Also, eight out of ten HCPs stated that the stoppage was as a result of the funding, 
specifically, the non-payment of counterpart fund by the state government. All the government 
officials confirmed this. Contrastingly, while the officials of the foreign agency acknowledged 
the challenge of non-payment of counterpart fund by the state government, they argued that 
the programme did not collapse but transitioned into a state-wide programme to cover everyone 
in the State.   
Often, success or failure of public CBHI programmes is mainly attributed to the government 
and external donors (see Ranson, 2003:86) because of their crucial roles and level of 
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involvement. Findings from the qualitative data indicate two major causes of the collapse:  non-
payment of counterpart fund and bad management. While the non-payment of counterpart fund 
was attributed to the state government, bad management was assigned to the main actors in the 
programme at varying degrees – the HMO, the foreign partner and the State government 
agency. The main reasons are further considered as thus: 
8.3.1 Non-Payment of Counterpart Fund 
The success and sustainability of any policy programme are heavily reliant on the availability 
of fund. Given the heavy subsidy of the enrolment premium, Humphrey (2010) raised concerns 
about the sustainability of the programme because of the huge subsidy involved. As envisaged, 
the CBHI had a serious funding challenge. The state government was not able to fulfil the 
funding agreement signed with the international partner towards ownership of the programme. 
The counterpart fund was essential for the smooth running of the programme. However, after 
its financial commitment in December 2013 (PharmAccess Foundation, 2015b:3),  the state 
government ceased to fulfil its financial obligation to the programme, and this posed 
sustainability challenges. One of the community leaders noted that: “The reason given was 
non-payment of counterpart fund by the state government” (KII, Community Leader, 
11/07/2019, Idofian). Similarly, some community members noted that: 
Nkan taagbo nipe oni counterpart fund t’ 
oye ki state government san. Igbati won 
‘o san, boya oun lofa ti won fi stop 
programme na. 
We learnt that the state government did not 
pay its counterpart fund. This might be the 
reason for the stoppage of the programme 
(IDI, Male, 20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
The reason was that the state government did not pay its counterpart fund. People were 
so disappointed in the state government and annoyed (IDI, Male, 02/07/2019, Kaiama). 
Also, a healthcare provider noted: “Inability of government to pay their counterpart funds” 
(KII, HCP, 21/06/2019, Osi) as a reason for the stoppage. Other HCPs added that: 
We were informed that the programme would be winding up that the government was 
not paying its counterpart fund (KII, HCP, 15/06/2019, Edidi) 
The reason given was that funds were no longer available, essentially, from the state 
government side and not the donor (KII, HCP, 19/06/2019, Bacita). 
He added with dismay that: 
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It was the political will that made it possible in the beginning. It was the most meritorious 
work done by the government for not rejecting it. However, for not injecting their 
counterpart funding in the programme, they helped in its collapse (KII, HCP, 19/06/2019, 
Bacita). 
Further, the HMO officials acknowledged non-payment of counterpart fund as a reason for the 
stoppage. They noted that: 
Fund was the major reason for the stoppage of the programme because it was not coming 
as expected, especially from the state government (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, 
Ilorin). 
The reason for the stoppage of the programme was non-payment of counterpart fund by 
the Kwara State Government (KII, HMO Official 2, 29/07/2019, Ilorin). 
In fact, all the government officials in the study affirmed that the collapse of the programme 
was due to non-payment of counterpart fund. They, however, blamed it on recession or 
decreased federal budgetary allocation to the State. One of them recalled that: 
When there was a drop in allocation from the federal government in 2015, and we were 
not able to pay counterpart fund, that was when we started having a problem. You know 
those people would not take any excuse. From their own side, they were very serious and 
very upright, but because of the problem of allocation, we were not able to meet their 
demands, and it was at that time that the programme wound-up (KII, KWSG Official 1, 
20/08/2019, Ilorin). 
Nonetheless, the drop in federal allocation to the State, the government could give the 
programme some priorities but failed to do so. The participant further linked the stoppage to 
the: “Attitude of the government by not wanting to spend money on anything. They underrate 
the benefits that the people would derive” (KII, KWSG Official 1, 20/08/2019, Ilorin). This is 
due to non-interest by the then government and lack of strategic policy roadmap for successive 
government to follow.  
For clarity, the programme commenced during the tenure of Governor Bukola Saraki and the 
non-payment of counterpart fund was experienced during the tenure of his successor, Governor 
AbdulFatah Ahmed (who was also a senior official in the Saraki administration). Despite that, 
both of them belonged to the same political party (with campaign claims that Governor Ahmed 
was to continue the works of Governor Saraki) they had a different level of interest and 
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commitment to the programme making the signed agreement seemingly unreliable. Similarly, 
a CBHI programme in Anambra, South-east Nigeria partly failed because it did not get political 
and financial backing from the new government (Onwujekwe et al., 2009:31).  
There were concerns on whether the programme would outlive the tenure of the governor who 
signed an agreement with the foreign partner. According to Ayangbayi, “In five years’ time, 
the person who promised [to pay the subsidy] today will not be in the government. So, who are 
you going to hold accountable?” (quoted in Humphreys, 2010). Generally, each leadership in 
power comes up with its template and policy plans. This approach is detrimental to meaningful 
development because it makes it difficult to implement policies towards success. Meanwhile, 
transformative social policy requires long-term plans, guarded by legislation, for 
implementation by successive governments. In other words, “social policy requires a 
democratic set up that embeds protection of human rights and civil liberties” (Lucas & Badubi, 
2017:88), devoid of subversion (Adésínà, 2020:576). 
Other government officials explained that:  
Fund was part of the reasons for the collapse of the programme (KII, KWSG Official 3, 
01/08/2019, Ilorin). 
The major reason was finance because everything was in motion. The non-payment of 
the counterpart fund led the partner to pull out of the programme (KII, KWSG Official 
2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Further, the officials of the international agency confirmed that the state government could not 
pay its counterpart fund to the tune of N300 million. She explained that: “…Financing was also 
a challenge, especially when the Kwara State Government took over the programme and could 
not meet up due to economic recession” (KII, Foreign Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). 
She added that: 
Because of the economic recession in the country, for more than two years, the state 
could not pay counterpart funding of the programme which PharmAccess Foundation as 
an organisation was paying for the State. So, the State incurred a counterpart bill over 
N300 million (KII, Foreign Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin).  
However, officials of the international partner only noted funding as a challenge but not the 
reason for the stoppage. They claimed that the programme did not collapse but was 
transitioning into a  state-wide programme that would cover all residents in the State. One of 
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them noted that the stoppage of the programme was due to a need to expand the programme to 
cover the entire population in the State (KII, Foreign Agency Official 2, 02/09/2019 Ilorin). 
Further, while they agreed that the financial challenge was not totally resolved, one of the 
officials emphasised that the transition was a response to a global trend. In her words: 
By the year 2016, everything in the world was changing, and the narrative changed that 
we needed to have universal health coverage, everybody everywhere; no matter the 
status or location, you must have access to quality healthcare. So, the paradigm has to 
change that, community-based was strictly community-based; we needed to now have 
a state-wide…So, the CBHI began the journey of transitioning into a state-wide health 
insurance scheme (KII, Foreign Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). 
The claim that the programme was transitioned may not be tenable because: one, community 
members have been left without coverage since 2016 until the ‘launch of the State-wide’ 
programme in 2018. Two, transition ought to be seamless without a stoppage. Three, the state-
wide programme (meant to restore the coverage of the former enrollees and further cover the 
entire population) was launched in 2018 without implementation. In other words, it took almost 
two years to launch the state-wide programme in 2018, after the stoppage of the CBHI in 2016. 
As of August 2020, it is yet to commence operation. An HCP also expressed that: “The 
transition period between the cancellation and start of a new one has been too long” (KII, HCP, 
19/06/2019, Bacita). Notwithstanding the change in government, ordinarily, if a programme is 
transitioning, it would do so seamlessly without major glitch or stoppage for a protracted 
period. It is also not out of place to argue that the launch in 2018 was a mere ‘political stunt’, 
to show on record, that the state-wide programme was initiated by the immediate-past governor 
because there were no adequate structures and facilities in place for a smooth take-off of the 
programme. 
Essentially, the transition to state-wide programme appeared to be an idea of the international 
partner (who felt a need for a paradigm shift – as quoted above). This is because the state 
government could not live up to its financial obligations to the CBHI with the claim that it had 
financial deficiency through dwindling federal allocation. Therefore it could not have thought 
of a state-wide programme which requires financial commitment far more than the community-
based programme that was rural-centric. More so, availability of fund is a cornerstone in of 
public or social policy decision (Signe, 2017a:20). Perhaps, the international partner found 
Kwara State as a ‘veritable site’ for experimentation of health insurance models. 
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8.3.2 Poor Management 
Efficiency in management is an essential factor for the success of CBHI programmes (Ranson, 
2003:86). Bennett et al. (2008) however observed that “the main reasons in the past for failure 
of CBHI schemes have been managerial problems like poor design, mismanagement, lack of 
oversight mechanisms and corruption” (cited in Purohit, 2014:1241). Most of the participants 
commented that the programme was plagued with bad management. The problem ranged from 
misappropriation of the fund to several other forms of inadequacies. The collapse was linked 
to the mismanagement of fund by the HMO. One of its officials explained that: “The stoppage 
came to us as a shock, but the issue of funding and ‘corruption’ led to the stoppage with a re-
bouncing effect on the people in the communities because they were dissatisfied. Corruption 
on the part of the government because there was an agreement to pay counterpart fund; there 
was integrity issue” (KII, HMO Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin).  
Contrarily, Some  (3 out of 6) of the HCPs noted that the programme was characterised by bad 
management and misappropriation of the fund on the part of the HMO. One of them recalled 
that: 
One of the things that killed the programme was the administration of the fund. Some of 
us were unofficially privileged to have access to the evaluation report of the finance after 
the programme. About 50% of the fund was spent on administration without clear 
justification in terms of office keeping, salaries of Hygeia staff etc. How can the 
programme be sustainable? No reasonable planner of health insurance would allocate 
such amount to administration. The problem boils down to the fact that the Kwara State 
Government did not take ownership of the programme. It’s like giving someone a blank 
cheque to write any amount they like (KII, HCP, 27/07/2019, Oro).       
Another HCP stated that “It seemed they were using the bulk of the money to run the secretariat 
in Lagos and we only did as they wished” (KII, HCP, 15/08/2019, Gure). He added that: 
They were using most of the money on their own recurrent budget. Whenever the M.D. 
[Managing Director] came to Ilorin, they lodged in Kwara Hotel and other expensive 
hotels. The flights and hotel bills were paid from the fund meant for the programme. 
Some of their staff go on December holidays in the UK or the US, from the programme’s 
fund. Therefore, the programme was characterised by bad management (KII, 
HCP,15/08/2019, Gure). 
In addition to identifying poor funding and leadership with the collapse, an HCP noted:  
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…Selfishness on the part of the Programme Managers. The money needed for people in 
rural areas is not much, but they fought for their own comfort at the expense of the 
enrollees. Some of the vehicles we asked for, to take healthcare to the people in the hard-
to-reach areas were some of the ones they drove around (KII, HCP, 20/06/2019, Bode 
Saadu). 
The HMO officials noted mismanagement of fund and submitted that: 
If we want to be sincere, in this part of the world, we have a lot of issues with leadership 
and management; and being proactive as well. If not for this, why would the programme 
have to stop if we were on top of our game? Saving for the rainy days was not put in 
place… There was a lot of mismanagement in the money that was gotten initially. It’s 
supposed to be well-planned. When the programme started, there was a lot of funds to 
run it, and if it were appropriately managed and invested, the situation would not have 
gone this bad (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin).   
…I also feel that maybe some people were a bit extravagant. When you see the Dutch 
people funding the programme coming to Kwara, they would not use aeroplane but let 
the Hygeia people come from Lagos to Kwara; they came in an aeroplane (KII, HMO 
Official 2, 29/07/2019, Ilorin).    
Also, as briefly noted earlier, the private facilities performed better compared to the public 
facilities. A participant noted that: “The private facilities performed better under the 
programme than the public facilities” (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin). Another 
participant expressed his discomfort with the management of the public facilities under CHIS 
(the government agency) and narrated how it affected the enrolment coverage of the 
programme. He recounted that:  
We had people that managed the scheme for the state government. The CHIS was in-
charge of the state facilities in the programme. Part of the issues we had with enrolment 
is that all the state facilities except in Edu LGA were struggling. Majority of the state 
facilities could not perform to the level of the privately-owned facilities because 
sometimes enrollees would get there and there would be no drugs (KII, HMO Official 2, 
29/07/2019, Ilorin). 
He added that: 
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Remuneration of staff was poor, especially those under CHIS. And when your staff are 
not motivated, they would also not perform (KII, HMO Official 2, 29/07/2019, Ilorin).  
From the preceding, there is an indication that there was no smooth synergy between the two 
bodies in-charge of healthcare facilities – HCHC and CHIS. Each party seemed to have 
capitalised on pursuing their interests and overlooked the excesses of each other. A participant 
opined that the government could have curtailed mismanagement on the part of the HMO. He 
noted that: “If the Kwara State Government had been monitoring the HMO and obtained the 
quarterly report from them, it would have checkmated that much longer. However, the Kwara 
State Government did not have the moral right to do that because it did not pay its counterpart 
fund” (KII, HCP, 27/07/2019, Oro). On the other hand, a participant noted with worry that the 
HMO chose not to act on complaints about the public facilities. He stated that:  
Part of the issues with Hygeia [i.e. the HMO] was that complaints were coming to them 
about poor services in government facilities and no action was taken to tackle it. The 
complaints included mismanagement of resources, and there was nothing concrete to 
tackle it. Maybe it was because the state government was part of the funding of the 
programme (KII, HMO Official 2, 29/07/2019, Ilorin).  
As noted in Chapter 4, policy arenas are often dominated by actors with various interests with 
each party ultimately pursuing their interests. In some cases, coalitions are formed among 
players with similar goals to take charge of the policy space formidably. As such, local 
policymakers must be fair and possess adequate understanding of the policy space and 
including the various actors; and manage the whole ‘system’ effectively for achieving the 
desired goals (Uzochukwu et al., 2009:6).  
8.4 Healthcare Situation in rural Kwara: Post-CBHI Experience  
The collapse of the programme has implications for rural communities, specifically, the former 
enrollees and the healthcare providers. This section discusses the experiences of the community 
members and the healthcare providers since the collapse of the programme, in terms of its 
negative consequences.  
8.4.1 Experience of the Community Members 
The healthcare situation in rural communities after the collapse of the programme is highly 
devastating. However, most of the formerly-enrolled respondents still make use of hospital 
care. Figure 8.1 indicates that the majority (87.7%) have used hospital care since the stoppage 
of the programme, while only few (12.3%) have not utilised hospital care since the collapse of 
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the programme. The CBHI programme might have increased the acceptance of modern 
healthcare in rural communities because most of the people continued to receive healthcare in 
hospitals after the programme.  
Figure 8.1: Utilisation of Hospital Care Since the Stoppage of the CBHI Programme 
 
Source: Fieldwork 2019 
Meanwhile, the qualitative data show that most people now go through hardships to access care 
because of costs. The use of self-medication and traditional healthcare has also increased 
astronomically, and the former enrollees were not happy with their situations. A healthcare 
provider painfully remarked on the situation of the people after the programme that: “The visit 
to the hospital has dropped because farming is not yielding enough profit for them [i.e. 
community members]. That’s why they are looking for any cheap way of accessing care. They 
can buy N50 gbobonise [i.e. a multipurpose drug that cures all diseases] or go to medicine store 
to buy drugs according to their pockets, not according to their medical needs” (KII, HCP, 
19/06/2019, Bacita). On how the community members felt about the stoppage, one of the 
implementation officials recalled how a former enrollee described it, as thus: 
Someone described it as ‘It’s just like giving a child a sweet, and the child is already 
enjoying the sweet, you now take it out of his mouth with a slap’. That’s how he 
described how they feel about the stoppage of the programme. That to them, it was very 
painful, it was a rude shock to them, and they are not happy about the stoppage of the 
























Self-medication and traditional healthcare are inimical and risky for the people, but they have 
become alternatives for the people in accessing healthcare. Asked about the healthcare 
measures adopted since the stoppage of the programme, the participants explained that most 
people have returned to their old ways of attending to their healthcare needs. A community 
leader noted that: 
Kaluku tun padasi ese aaro naani. Kaluku 
tun pada sibi agunmu abi agbo abi 
general abi private hospital. Emi o lo 
agbo oo; ijo t’oba ti rera, mounlo si 
General Hospital ni. Bayi nisin, b’owo o 
basi lowo, b’aare bade wahala de. Ole je 
k’elomi karibonu lati malo si hospital.  
People have returned to their old ways. 
People have returned to the use of herbal 
substances or concoctions, public or private 
hospital. Personally, I don’t use herbs; 
whenever I fall sick, I proceed to the General 
Hospital.  Now, if there is no money to pay 
OOP during illness, there would be a 
problem. It might deter someone from going 
to the hospital for treatment (KII, 
Community Leader, 13/06/2019, Erinle). 
The healthcare situation was so bad to the extent that people cross the border to another country 
to access cheaper healthcare, for those who can afford. A participant explained that: 
Ki Hygeia to de, opolopo nlo hospital ni 
Faranse nitori ‘pe o cheap; itoju tun dan 
manrain. Igbati Hygeia de, opolopo lo 
darapomo. Awon eyan tipada sibi 
Faranse. Emi naa manlo nida kookan. 
Before the introduction of the programme, 
people were receiving hospital care in the 
Benin Republic because it was cheaper and 
of good quality. They enrolled in the CBHI 
programme when it was introduced, but they 
have returned to hospitals in the Benin 
Republic with the stoppage of the 
programme. I also patronised them once in a 
while (KII, Community Leader, 03/07/2019, 
Gure). 
With the cost involved, people were unable to visit the hospital regularly except when it is 
highly important. Some community members noted how they explore various options in 
treating illness before visiting the hospital. The most prominent among the options are 
traditional medicine and patent medicine. Meanwhile, patent medical vendors account for a 
228 
 
large fraction of OOP expenses in these communities through the sales of pharmaceuticals 
(Gustafsson-wright et al., 2018:249). According to them: 
Lati igbati eto na ti denukole, anlo si 
hospital amo keese gbogbo igba, nigba 
totidi t’olowo. Atipada sibi ogun ibile 
naani. T’aaba logun ibile tioba mun naa, 
ibe naa latun pada si. 
Since the collapse of the programme, we 
still access hospital care but not at all times 
because it involves OOP payment. We have 
returned to the use of traditional healthcare. 
However, we eventually proceed to the 
hospital if the traditional care is ineffective 
(IDI, Female, 01/07/2019, Aboto-Oja). 
Lati igbati Hygeia tiduro, ko easy oo tori 
kos’owo n’ilu yi. Opolopo ni aati koko ma 
ra ogun ni chemist. Ti kobawa mu mo, 
yoodipe gbogbo eyan ngbo. 
Since the collapse of the programme, it's not 
been easy. Many people first engage in self-
medication. By patronising the patent 
medicine stores to purchase drugs, but if the 
medicine fails to arrest the illness, then 
everyone would know that the person is sick 
(IDI, Female, 19/06/2019, Bacita). 
Opolopo o gba itoju oo. Bii kanlo chemist, 
kanlo ra asapo, bii kanwa agbo; awon 
itoju ti kopeye ni onikaluku ndogbonsi 
tori owo. Elomi gaan, aare owa lara re, 
yoo ma paa mara latari ‘pe won o lowo. 
Opolopo eyan o really lo hospital mo.  
Most community members were not going 
for treatment. They have resorted to self-
medication and herbal treatment as a 
remedy because they have no money. Even, 
some decide to inhibit their sicknesses and 
take no treatment because they cannot pay 
for healthcare. Most people don’t receive 
care in the hospital nowadays (IDI, Female, 
20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
Lati igbati Hygeia ti denukole, elomi 
so’pe kosowo lowoun, agbo loun omu. 
Elomi losi chemist lati ra akape. 
Since the stoppage of the programme, some 
claim they don’t have money and resort to 
the use of herbs while others engage in self-




Lati igbati eto na ti duro, oti increase 
death rate. Eniti ko ba lowo lowo’n kawo 
gbera ni. Hospital naani moun lo, mosin 
sanwo. 
Since the stoppage of the programme, the 
death rate has increased. Those who cannot 
pay OOP now stay back at home with their 
illnesses. I still use the hospital, and I pay 
(IDI, Male, 21/06/2019, Osi). 
The HCPs confirmed this, but they noted that the measures taken by the people are risky. They 
explained that: 
People have been catering to their healthcare needs indiscriminately and haphazardly. 
Indiscriminately because they explore the extremely low cost of care and complicate their 
health problems; haphazardly because they go to healthcare providers that are neither 
registered nor qualified, adding more to their problems and end up where they ought to 
have started. They use herbal care, self-medication, patent medicine, and engage in the 
indiscriminate use of drugs (KII, HCP, 28/07/2019, Aboto-Oja). 
Most of them have gone back to that stage where they use concoctions, spiritual powers, 
self-medication (i.e. over the counter drugs), birth delivery at home; and patronise semi-
quacks and traditional birth attendants. It was a rewind of the clock back to the time 
before the CBHI programme came. The reason is that the economy has not improved in 
this locality, when the farmers labour so much, they don’t get so much. They don’t have 
the money to pay for care. The take-home pay of the civil servants is not enough to take 
them home, and the naira is a weak currency. Therefore, people gravitate on what is 
convenient for them economically, even if it is injurious health-wise (KII, HCP, 
19/06/2019, Bacita).     
Since the stoppage of the programme, people have been attending to their health needs 
in bad ways. They cannot afford the cost of care, and some now go to the Traditional 
Birth Attendants (TBAs) [for delivery]. All she collects from them is the head and legs 
of the goats they slaughter for the naming ceremony. Even the wives of the so-called 
educated people use their services because there is no money to pay in the hospital. It has 
affected their healthcare sensibilities drastically (KII, HCP, 15/08/2019, Gure). 
Further, an HMO Official explained that: “Since the stoppage of the programme, the health-
seeking behaviour has changed because some people have turned to take local herbs while 
others seek financial assistance to access care and spiritual healing or self-medication” (KII, 
HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin). A government official added that: “People have been 
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paying OOP and those who do not have, have turned to the use of herbs and Traditional Birth 
Attendants and faced with much complication” (KII, KWSG Official 3, 01/08/2019, Ilorin). 
However, in contrast to other submissions, the officials of the international agency did not 
believe that community members have returned to their old ways. One of the officials noted 
that: 
There have been different means through which people can access care but majorly of 
course, out-of-pocket. We need to be scientific about whether it has pushed people into 
self-medication or alternative medicine. Probably, when a study is conducted, it would 
bring out the objective result (KII, Foreign Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin).  
Given this notion, the international agency may likely misplace priorities if they have a further 
opportunity of influencing the decision in the Kwara State health policy arena. This is as a 
result of the marked difference in its position from the people, as well as the other key 
informants. This is not uncommon in cases of policy transfer, where the transferred policy is 
different from the policy requirement of the setting. As such, such policies tend to fail and fall 
short of achieving the desired results. 
The main consequence of not seeking medical attention in hospitals is the loss of life, and the 
death rate is rising in the rural communities since the collapse of the programme. A community 
leader lamented on the stoppage of the programme and concluded that: “Currently, those who 
cannot afford any kind of treatment will either remain with the sickness or die. However, those 
using herbal care and self-medication have increased” (KII, Community Leader, 19/06/2019, 
Bacita). During FGDs, participants claimed that death rate has increased in their various 
communities, as follows: 
Ati igbati eto yen tilo, iku ti common 
lagbegbe yi. 
Since the programme stopped, the mortality 
rate has increased in this environment (Male 
FGD, 31/05/2019, Aboto-Oja). 
Lati igbati programme yen ti stop, awon 
mi tiku, paapa julo, awon pensioners 
tiwon ‘ori owo gba lati fi ra ogun. 
Some people have died due to the stoppage 
of the programme, especially pensioners 
who were not paid and could not afford the 
cost of their medications (Female FGD, 
28/05/2019, Oro).  
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Nigbati eto na stop, o affect boda mi debi 
‘pe osalaisi, tori kos’agbara owo. Nigbati 
won da Hygeia le, owa okay, yoowa lati 
gba ogun lati Ilorin.  
When the programme stopped, it affected 
my elder brother to the extent that he 
eventually died because he could not 
continue to enjoy the healthcare given to 
him under the programme, due to lack of 
money. When the programme was 
introduced, he was coming from Ilorin to 
receive care here (Male FGD, 27/05/2019, 
Osi) 
Also, an HCP noted that: “The termination was so tragic for quite a number of them. Some of 
them relapsed, some of them stopped coming again, and some have died” (KII, HCP, 
27/07/2019, Oro). He added with despair that: 
I remember a man we treat on the compassionate ground [i.e. since the stoppage of the 
programme] and I have not been seeing him again, meaning he might have died (KII, 
HCP, 27/07/2019, Oro). 
Some other HCPs corroborated the ‘unverified claims’ on increase in mortality rate, especially 
among the older people, as thus: 
Many of the old ones who are hypertensive have died in the past four years. Some have 
been overpowered by stroke (KII, HCP, 19/06/2019, Bacita). 
Since the stoppage of the programme, many have died because they could not afford 
OOP (KII, HCP, 13/06/2019, Erinle) 
Similarly, some officials of the HMO and KWSG submitted that: 
Feedbacks show that a lot of mortalities and morbidities have been taking place in the 
communities especially those that have chronic cases of hypertension and diabetes 
through complication  (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Self-medication has sent many of them to early graves; there have been so many 
casualties (KII, KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Currently, the healthcare situation in the rural communities has degenerated to the bad state 
which is used to be; it might even be worse. Though the case of the former enrollees is 
regretted; however, if the programme did not stop, it would still not have covered up 10% of 
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the entire population. Meanwhile, the actual health policy requirement is one that is capable of 
covering the whole population. This might not be possible in a day, but it must be clear and 
well accommodated in the policy design.  
8.4.2 Experience of Healthcare Providers 
The healthcare providers, like the enrollees, have their significant share in the stoppage. The 
public facilities continue to operate, but utilisation has dropped because, as obtainable pre-
CBHI, patients now need to pay for drugs and every other item needed for treatment such as a 
syringe, cotton wool, fluids, plasters etc. Also, there is a drop in human resources because the 
additional staffing provided by the CBHI programme is no longer in place. Thus, two main 
reasons are responsible for the reduced use of public facilities in the rural communities: one, 
the need to pay OOP for drugs and two, the inadequate human resources and facilities for 
quality treatment. It is quite challenging to get qualified and competent medical personnel to 
work in rural areas.  
However, most of the private providers, who are incidentally, the majority in this study (9 out 
of 11) have been affected in terms of patronage and turnover. Expectedly, they all experienced 
a drastic reduction in patronage. For instance, 95% of patients that accessed care in one of the 
private CBHI-accredited facilities in Kwara North between 2010 and 2011 were enrollees 
(Brals, 2019). This indicates that the stoppage of the programme would leave the facility with 
very low patronage. For most of them, it became difficult to manage the expansions carried out 
during the operational period of the programme.  
One of the HCPs explained that: “The challenges I faced included high personnel, overhead 
and maintenance costs because the programme demanded a high standard of service. So, when 
the programme stopped, it was difficult to finance these services, and it became a liability” 
(KII, HCP, 28/07/2019, Aboto-Oja). While some of them stated that they enjoyed a relative 
level of patronage compared to the Pre-CBHI era because the programme had exposed their 
competence to the people, others complained of very poor patronage. Those who noted better 
patronage explained that the programme allowed the people to see their efficiency. According 
to them: 
The stoppage affected our turnover but no too much because the programme exposed 
the people to our competence (KII, HCP, 21/06/2019, Osi). 
The programme affected our turnover, but it left us better than we were before the 
programme. Our capital base improved. It gave popularity to our facility, and the 
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programme availed us the opportunity of enhancing the standard of service we provide. 
However, we aren’t getting what we got when the programme was on (KII, HCP, 
27/07/2019, Oro). 
On the other hand, those who have been grappling with patronage explained that: 
The stoppage affected our turnover drastically because our enrollee-base was between 
16,000 and 18,000, and the utilisation was around 1,200 per month. It has now reduced 
to far less than 10%, and patients only visit our hospitals when they have emergency 
conditions. They include emergency caesarean section, obstructed labour, typhoid, 
hypertensive crisis, diabetic crisis, sickle cell crisis and severe anaemia in children (KII, 
HCP, 28/07/2019, Aboto-Oja). 
A provider noted that they had to lay-off some staff after a year of when the programme 
stopped. She added that: 
It has really affected our turnover. We just sit here watching television. Most times, we 
subsidise our salaries to ensure we don’t close the hospital (KII, HCP, 13/06/2019, Erin-
Ile). 
Another provider explained that: 
During the programme, we saw as many as 500 patients in a month, but now, we hardly 
see 50 patients in a month coming to the hospital. The patronage has gone down 
drastically (KII, HCP, 15/08/2019, Gure). 
From the preceding, the stoppage of the programme affected both the community members and 
the healthcare providers. Though unconfirmed, the participants claimed that death rate has 
increased in the communities, and the prevalent healthcare options are traditional care and self-
medication. This is due to the inability to pay for healthcare. Also, most of the HCPs are faced 
with the challenge of poor patronage as a result of the stoppage of the programme. Therefore, 
the situation tends to reveal a policy gap or failure in ensuring adequate access to healthcare 
without the fear of cost. 
Given some positive achievements that a policy might have recorded before getting to a halt, 
it may be unacceptable to outrightly declare that a policy has failed (McConnell, 2014:4). 
However, the success or failure of an intervention policy can be understood in terms of 
“whether the project’s deliverables solve whatever problem originally motivated the project, 
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or if the project’s deliverables were used, or fostered real development” (Andrews, 2018:13-
14). The nature of success in the Kwara CBHI is small. It fits into what McConnell (2010:355) 
called precarious success whereby “initially government does fulfil some of its policy-making 
goals, but the costs of doing so become such that short-term success cannot be sustained”. 
Meanwhile, attaining policy success is embedded in good policy design (McConnell, 
2010:247) which considers the various dimensions of policy with an absolute focus on goals 
and required incremental outcomes. According to Adésínà (2008:12), “while policy learning 
from other parts of the world is important, more important is policy learning from within Africa 
itself not only in getting the attention of policymakers but in understanding that development 
is fundamentally about engaging with the local and learning to use what one has to achieve 
what one wants”. 
8.5 Conclusion 
The stoppage of the CBHI programme was relatively abrupt, considering the agreement signed 
for an extension; though, it was characterised by a variety of challenges. Thus, this chapter 
examined the challenges and moral issues that permeated the programme when it was 
operational. These challenges were related to the action(s) and/or inaction(s) of the 
implementing partners. Due to the central role of fund in any programme, the shortage of fund 
and poor management were fundamental to the stoppage of the Kwara CBHI. Though the non-
payment of counterpart fund was attributed to a cut in federal allocation to the state 
government. This was in addition to a lack of commitment on the part of the state government. 
It is claimed that since the stoppage of the programme, death rate in the communities have been 
increasing, and the healthcare providers are finding it difficult to continue to operate profitably 











POLITICS OF HEALTHCARE REFORM: A CASE OF THE CBHI IN KWARA 
STATE NIGERIA 
9.1 Introduction 
The chapter deals with the politics and powerplay that surrounded the introduction and 
implementation of the CBHI programme. The policy arena, more often, is characterised by 
politics of domination and influence by various actors on the policy scene (as noted in Chapter 
3). Given the collapse of the programme, this chapter is important in examining the underlying 
politics in the design and implementation of the CBHI programme in rural Kwara. Thus, the 
first section discusses the emergence of the CBHI programme in rural Kwara. Specifically, it 
examines the process through which the policy was proposed and accepted, including the 
design and implementation of the policy. Further, it explores the link between the stoppage of 
the CBHI programme and the outcome of the 2019 general elections in the State. The last 
section draws on the Kwara experience and argues for a need to repurpose the role of the state 
(i.e. government) to improve social services provisioning, especially, healthcare services 
gainfully. 
9.2 Emergence of the CBHI Programme in Kwara State: The Process  
Arguably, “as the political economy changes, some policy contexts also change, in turn 
affecting which actors are involved, which policy decisions are made, and what processes take 
place at various levels, including the operational and service delivery levels” (Mthethwa, 
2012:41). Also, “a policy is an output of a political process, and politics come into play at all 
stages of the policy reform process” (Fox & Reich, 2015:1021). As noted in Chapter 5, the 
poor healthcare situation in Kwara State, particularly in the rural areas continued until the 
emergence of the CBHI programme in some of the communities during the tenure of Dr Bukola 
Saraki as Executive Governor. As also noted earlier in some preceding chapters, the 
programme emerged from a partnership involving the Kwara State Government, PharmAccess 
Foundation and Hygeia Nigeria Limited to provide healthcare services to selected rural 
communities in the State. This section discusses how the programme emerged and the power 
relations that shaped it.  
9.2.1 Policy Introduction and Offer 
Social policy is often introduced to solve a particular social problem or improve a situation. 
Usually, the needs for a policy are justified, and the implication for adoption and/or rejection 
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is clearly stated. It is through the same process that transnational agencies transfer social 
policies to the global south. They are, however, cascaded in framings that make adoption 
convincing and urgent (Fox & Reich, 2015:1026; Storeng et al., 2019:555: Stone et al., 2020:5) 
as they are placed on the national agenda (Grindle & Thomas, 1989:221); at times, involving 
discreetly coercive process (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000:11; James & Lodge, 2003:190). 
Similarly, the poor healthcare situation in rural Kwara and the need for a solution provided a 
basis for framing the need to adopt the CBHI model. Also, the general discussion around the 
time was on the need to strive towards achieving UHC, and to adopt alternative healthcare 
financing mechanisms (Gustafsson-Wright & Schellekens, 2013:2; WHO, 2010). 
Consequently, this window of opportunity was taken to develop and promote CBHI policy 
instrument. 
The Dutch government proposed the Kwara CBHI programme through the HIF and PAF. The 
partners in the collaboration offered some explanations regarding the reason and how the 
programme emerged. Most of the participants noted that it was in a bid to improve the health 
status of the rural dwellers. An official of the foreign agency simply stated that: “The CBHI 
programme was a partnership between the PharmAccess Foundation and Kwara State 
Government to improve the health indices in the State.” (KII, Foreign Agency Official 2, 
02/09/2019, Ilorin). An HMO Official remarked that: “The motive of the programme was to 
make health accessible to the hard-to-reach communities especially due to the inability of the 
NHIS to cover the informal sector” (KII, HMO Official 2, 29/07/2019, Ilorin). In other words, 
another HMO official stated that: “The purpose of the programme was to improve the health 
indices in the State because before the commencement of the programme, the health indicators 
of the State were poor” (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/7/2019, Ilorin).  
Also, a government official explained that: 
The initial motive of the programme was to see if health insurance could work in rural 
communities. It was also introduced to provide quality health services to the people in 
rural communities and see the possibility of using it to achieve UHC. The motive of the 
Kwara State Government was to ease the healthcare problems in the communities by 
getting them to participate by themselves at affordable cost and reduce OOP payments 
(KII, KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Put differently, he explained that: 
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At the point, the State was trying to improve the health sector, and PharmAccess 
Foundation was also doing community entry in West Africa to assist people in attending 
to their health challenges. At that point, Kwara State was spotted as one of the 
communities where they could test-run the health insurance programme. The agreement 
was between the Kwara State Government, PharmAccess Foundation and the people 
(KII, KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Another government official corroborated this position that the programme was introduced to 
the state government and thus, not the state government’s initiative. He recalled that: 
The programme was foreign-aided. Therefore, we were introduced and initiated into the 
programme by foreigners, particularly the Dutch. They introduced it, and we keyed into 
it; it wasn’t our initiative. They were responsible for the initial take-off of the programme 
(KII, KWSG Official 1, 20/08/2019, Ilorin).  
Also, an official of the foreign agency stated that:  
Our stay in Kwara State has been since 2007 when the then Governor of Kwara State, Dr 
Abubakar Bukola Saraki wanted to ensure that he improved the health status of the people 
in rural areas. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Health Insurance Fund, 
an organisation under the Ministry, supported Kwara State in starting a community-based 
health insurance scheme focused on the rural areas in the State. That programme kicked-
off in Shonga, Edu Local Government Area in 2007… It was a pilot to see how it would 
work in Africa, to see how people can have access to equitable, affordable and quality 
health services, and that was how it began. With the coming of HIF to Africa, the 
programme was first to Kwara State, in the whole of Africa. PharmAccess Foundation 
was implementing for the HIF on behalf of the Dutch government (KII, Foreign Agency 
Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). 
The Health Insurance Fund claimed that the idea of the CBHI was motivated by the poor 
healthcare situation in most parts of Africa. The HIF (2012:5) summarised the motive as thus: 
The healthcare delivery system in sub-Saharan Africa is confronted with low supply 
and low demand for healthcare services. Among other constraints due to the high 
disease burden, limited financial resources, high out-of-pocket expenditures, lack of 
medical and financial data, inadequately trained personnel, insufficient operational 
capacity and quality, low trust in the healthcare system, and barely any investment in 
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the healthcare sector. As a result of these constraints, many people still lack access to 
affordable quality health care and seek other means to solve their health problems due 
to high medical costs. The HIF supports the establishment of ‘sustainable’ systems of 
healthcare delivery and financing in sub-Saharan Africa by introducing voluntary 
health insurances for individuals and communities with low and middle incomes. The 
approach addresses challenges on both the supply and demand side of the healthcare 
system. The principle of insurance tackles the critical need for risk pooling and 
solidarity. By subsidising the insurance premium, health care becomes more accessible 
to low-income groups. For healthcare providers, insurance premiums offer a guaranteed 
income over a longer period, allowing them to invest in capacity and quality. This, in 
turn, will increase the trust in healthcare systems and clients’ willingness to pay for 
insurance (Health Insurance Fund, 2012:5).  
However, the above submission is a remarkably ahistorical account of health systems and 
health financing in post-colonial Africa. As noted in Chapter 1, many African countries ramped 
up investment in their health systems after formal colonial rule. According to Tidjani (2009:6), 
“these states, which are now discredited for their poor achievements, were perceived, in 
the1960s, as strategic actors in terms of economic and social policy”. In a country like Nigeria, 
“the number of doctors per 1,000 of the population rose from 0.017 in 1960 to 0.050 in 1970, 
and 0.192 in 1985” – the year SAP was adopted (WHO's Global Health Workforce Statistics 
cited in World Bank, 2020b). If the growth rate for the period 1975 to 1985 had been 
maintained, the number of doctors per thousand population would have been nearly 0.45 in 
1990. Rather, it was 0.192. In the 1970s, healthcare was universal and publicly-funded. 
Thus, the story that the HIF tells above is the healthcare system after it was defunded and 
damaged by structural adjustment programmes – the same programme that European countries 
(such as the Netherlands) supported when it was imposed on African countries. The crisis with 
the narratives of Africa’s failure is precisely this. Ignore the achievements of the pre-1980s, 
start history from 1985, when the ‘pet policies’ were imposed. Cast an eye on the ruined 
landscape created by the ‘pet policies’, then blame the failure on Africa and Africans, and then 
offer new rounds of proto-neoliberal1 policy doses to address the problems they created in the 
first instance. Another example of such policies is cash transfer policy that is promoted for 
adoption across Africa, Asia and Latin America (see Foli et al., 2018:114). Garcia and Moore 
 
1 Proto-neoliberal policies refer to the post-Keynesian regulatory policies. 
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(2012) [cited in Bender et al. (2014:6)] found that “as of 2012, cash transfer programs were 
discussed, planned or implemented in 35 out of a total of 47 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa”. 
Thus, “the recent history of Sub-Saharan African states is strongly shaped by the transfer of 
policies produced elsewhere” (Tidjani, 2009:15).  
Often, promoters of transferred policies and their agents come up with ‘scary’ problem 
definitions.  They also introduce the policies as forms of ‘best practices’ and back them with 
research to drive acceptability (Stone, 1999:57; Signe, 2017b; Foli et al., 2018:121; Stone et 
al., 2020:2). At times, “these researches are produced in relatively insecure contexts and are 
marred with reliability issues” (Tidjani, 2009:11). The policies are, however, susceptible to 
failure if they are not in tune with the realities of the recipient country (Dolowitz & Marsh, 
2000:17; Hare, 2017:2). Nevertheless, the claim on the sustainability of the CBHI model has 
been defeated with the stoppage of the programme. What is not on the policy table is universal, 
publicly-funded healthcare system. It is not ‘free healthcare’, someone is paying for it—
through tax or sovereign wealth. 
9.2.2 Alliance with Local Actors and Choice of Kwara  
Policy transfers are often crafted in alliance with local actors “because non-state actors rarely 
operate without the consent facilitation of state actors” (Hanafi, 2020:8). In Kwara, the 
programme was characterised by three (3) primary levels of alliance. The first was between the 
Dutch government and the PharmAccess Foundation; the second was between the 
PharmAccess Foundation and Hygeia Nigeria Limited, and the third was the alliance of these 
actors with the Kwara State Government. Apart from the partnership with the Kwara State 
Government, other threads of the alliance in the communities included the engagement of 
healthcare providers, as well as community leaders and religious leaders (used as policy 
ambassadors) towards the implementation of the programme. In other words, the Dutch 
government (through the HIF) and PAF were the policy purveyors (i.e. actors behind the 
introduction of the policy); Hygeia HMO was a policy conduit (through which the policy was 
implemented); and the target of the policy was the Kwara State Government (in policy 
adoption). Further, the healthcare providers, community leaders and religious leaders were 
conduit belts for securing the implementation of the policy.   
The first organisation to be identified in Nigeria by the PharmAccess Foundation was Hygeia 
Nigeria Limited (i.e. the implementing HMO). A participant noted that: “The Dutch NGO 
needed a local partner to work with and the partner they got in Nigeria was Hygeia HMO. 
Therefore, the programme had a tripartite arrangement including the Dutch HIF, Hygeia HMO 
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and the Kwara State Government” (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin). The HMO 
official further explained that the primary objective of the international agency was to attend 
to the HIV menace, but it changed to CBHI programme. The Dutch government relied on the 
wide engagement of PAF in Africa to sell its policy ideas. He added that: 
The then governor, Dr Bukola Saraki had a relationship with the Hygeia HMO in order 
to partner with a Dutch NGO to cater for HIV incidences in the State, but they decided 
to take a holistic approach to have health insurance (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/7/2019, 
Ilorin). 
It was with the assistance of the HMO that Kwara State was identified and its government 
contacted. According to a participant: 
The CBHI Programme in Kwara State started with the late Prof. Lange [the founder of 
PharmAccess Foundation] in Amsterdam who had a lofty idea about HIV/AIDS and 
wanted to sell it to every part of the world. He sought to get the involvement of Nigeria 
in that, and he discussed with some other key stakeholders like Prof. Elebute, Chairman 
of Hygiea HMO then. They came up with the idea of having a broad programme and not 
just HIV/AIDS to allow people to have access to healthcare, and the idea of CBHI came 
up among the rural poor. They got in touch with Kwara State Government and the 
Governor then, Dr Bukola Saraki; and the three parties were very much interested and 
that kick-off the scheme (KII, Researcher, 30/07/2019, Ilorin). 
As noted earlier, policy transfer involves an alliance with local actors, and therefore, the 
appointment of Hygeia Nigeria Limited by PAF was to ease the transfer process further. The 
HMO came on board because it was profitable for them. Also, the training and capacity 
building organised for the HCPs, discussed in Chapter 5, might be part of the efforts to align 
them with the goals set out by the policy promoters.  Further, the network of alliances might 
partly be responsible for the non-curtailment of the excesses of the HMO in the implementation 
of the CBHI, as revealed in Chapter 8.  
Further, the vulnerability of Nigeria and Africa at large with its weak healthcare system built 
the optimism of the international actors that the policy offer was going to be accepted on the 
continent. Perhaps, in Nigeria, the KWSG might have lost to any other State having a large 
rural population. However, it was able to ‘clinch’ the offer based on the influence and 
relationship of the then governor’s father, Dr Olusola Saraki. According to a participant: 
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The programme was initiated by the former governor, Dr Bukola Saraki due to the 
relationship between the Hygeia Group Chairman and the then governor’s father, Dr 
Olusola Saraki; attracting the Dutch government to establish the programme in Kwara 
State. The Dutch government was looking for where to establish the programme in 
Nigeria, a state with a rural setting (KII, HMO Official 2, 29/07/2019, Ilorin). 
9.2.3 Policy Acceptance 
As stated earlier, the CBHI programme was a proposal by the Dutch government through the 
PharmAccess Foundation to the Kwara State Government. Four (4) main reasons informed the 
acceptance of the offer: the glaring poor condition of healthcare in the State; the lack of clear 
healthcare policy in the State; the political relevance of the CBHI programme; and the funding 
relief at inception, whereby funding was not a responsibility of the State government but that 
of the international partner. Consequently, the state government ‘eagerly’ accepted the 
partnership offer since the programme did not place many responsibilities on it.  
As highlighted earlier, the general context of Kwara State (i.e. economic, social, cultural, 
environmental etc. – including the healthcare situation) was part of the reasons the programme 
was proposed and piloted in the State. One of the HMO officials explained that: 
It was an opportunity readily available, and the state government tapped into it. The 
Dutch government had a budget to develop some countries in Africa, and one of the 
targets was Nigeria, and Kwara State was identified as an enabling environment. The 
state governor was a medical doctor and the Emir of the community [i.e. Shonga] too; 
and that made it easy to implement the programme (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, 
Ilorin).  
However, an official of the international agency claimed that: “The Kwara State Government 
had a dream but did not have the fund, but the Dutch government supported the dream to come 
through” (KII, Foreign Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). This is the common narrative 
trend for policy merchants to ‘conceal’ their roles. According to Adésínà (2020:573), the 
current trend in policy merchandising or policy transfer is that policy promoters infiltrate the 
political setting and exert their influence on the political actors to adopt the offered policies. 
Put differently, they initiate the idea, sell it to the client, then turn around and claim they were 
only supporting the vision of the client. This is often complemented with other ‘devices’ such 
as fund, knowledge and data to foster the goals (Stone, 2001; Delvaux & Schoenaers, 
2012:105). In the case of Kwara CBHI, the international partner had its goal and policy option 
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to be implemented, and the most powerful tool to actualise this was fund. With the fund, it was 
arguably certain that it would be able to push through its agenda. In most cases, policy offers 
are backed with funding to ensure acceptance (see Storeng et al.,2019).   
Also, the initial acceptance of the state government to allow for the implementation of the 
CBHI programme in the State has political undertones. This is because politicians tend to use 
such programmes to legitimise and foster their stay in office (see Hunter & Power, 2007:1; 
Bohn, 2011:54; Sarwar, 2018). Also, with the poor state of healthcare in the State and absence 
of concrete policy plans for implementation (as discussed in Chapter 5), it was ‘necessary’ to 
accept such an offer. The establishment of the programme, expectedly, boosted the ‘popularity’ 
of the state government among the people; particularly, in the rural areas where the programme 
was operational. One of the government officials confirmed the political relevance of the 
programme and noted that: “It was in appreciation [i.e. of the programme] that the communities 
voted the administration in 2015 to return the favour” (KII, KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, 
Ilorin). He added that: 
It [i.e. the programme] was enough for anybody to vote somebody because it has so 
many political implications. As a politician, if anyone comes to you that their child or 
wife is sick, all you need to do is to enrol them in the programme. You can keep yourself 
happy; whenever they come up with such again, you can refer them appropriately. That 
was one of the beautiful parts of it; and politically, it was thriving. At that time, we even 
had some of our political leaders enrolling people in the project. What they used in 
enrolment was also cheaper than what they would need to spend for treating [medical] 
emergencies (KII, KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin).  
With these, it was easier for the international partner to lure the Kwara State Government to 
take ownership of the programme for onward implementation. In the early period of 
implementation, the programme started to get applauds and recognitions. Therefore, the 
KWSG requested an expansion to another LGA, perhaps, because of its political relevance. It 
was, however given a conditionality of financial commitment by the international partner (KII, 
KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin). Therefore, the state government agreed to spend on the 
programme and had to accommodate it in the budget. Unfortunately, the KWSG did not take 
full ownership of the programme. In most cases, the common tactic used by donors and transfer 
agents is to give an impression that a proposed programme would not cost much in part-
funding; conditionalities often follow acceptance by the government while refusal is followed 
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by ‘threats’ that may lead to the withdrawal of a whole network of supports (see Foli et al., 
2018:113; Dolowitz et al., 2019:5).  
9.3 Policy Design: “Who Pays the Piper Dictates the Tune” 
The content of a policy instrument is a critical part of any programme. Generally, however, the 
design of social policies in Africa are influenced by interests, ideas, path dependence and 
international norms (Mkandawire, 2015:591). Primarily, the powerful player amongst policy 
actors tends to have the most influence within a policy environment. One of the officials of the 
foreign agency declared that: “The CBHI model was designed by PharmAccess Foundation” 
(KII, Foreign Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). The Kwara State Government was neither 
in-charge of the design of the policy nor given a space to have an input somewhat. Therefore, 
the policy instrument was like a ‘ready-made’ policy design implemented in the State without 
the input of the local policymakers and imposed in the form of ‘assistance’ or ‘support’. One 
of the government officials explained that: “They brought in the policy and said, can we test 
this here?” (KII, KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin). He clarified that: 
The PharmAccess Foundation was responsible for the design of the programme’s policy 
content. They supported the State government in drawing up the policy on health 
management. It was part of their responsibilities in the MoU we had, that they were going 
to develop policies that were going to be of standard. (KII, KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, 
Ilorin).  
Another official added that: 
…They [PAF] were also responsible for the policy design, operations and part funding. 
(KII, KWSG Official 1, 20/08/2019, Ilorin).  
As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, one of the strategies being adopted by foreign policy actors 
to dominate the policy sphere is the technical know-know or expertise, which is ‘believed’ to 
be very limited in the developing countries. However, this provides an avenue for transnational 
organisations to take charge of policy decisions (Maluka, 2018:6; Le et al., 2019:4; Jacquin, 
2019). One HMO official explained that:  
The PharmAccess Foundation designed the policy because they had the technical know-
how. The planning and implementation were done by the foreign partner, the Dutch NGO 
because they know what they wanted (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin).  
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All the healthcare providers, including the referral centres (i.e. 12 HCPs) noted that they were 
not involved in the policy design. They were just engaged and provided with operational 
guidelines on how the programme should be implemented. Some of the observations and 
suggestions of the HCPs on the programme were taken, while the others were not. An HCP 
explained that: 
We were not involved in the policy design. Whenever we had suggestions, we gave them; 
they might take it or not. (KII, HCP, 20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
The healthcare benefits inherent in the proposed programme (at a lower cost) for the rural 
populace who were in dire of access to care beclouded the need to challenge the non-
involvement of local policymakers or actors. Another healthcare provider noted that: 
nobody cared about who drafted the policy because it was seen as a help to the rural 
dwellers, and health is one of the key issues people deal with everywhere. It was like 
something given ‘gratis’ to operate (KII, HCP, 19/06/2019, Bacita).  
Supposing the various relevant actors in the healthcare system took part in the design of the 
policy content, perhaps, it might have reflected more realities in the State in terms of the 
workability and sustainability of the programme. The healthcare providers were questioned 
about their thoughts regarding their non-involvement in the policy design. A participant 
explained that: 
It was not good enough not to involve the providers in the policy design. We told them 
that even if the programme belonged to them, they were using other people’s facilities as 
providers; and we know what suites our communities and their people. It was improper 
to impose the policy on them, but because they funded it, it became ‘whosoever pays the 
piper dictates the tunes’ (KII, HCP, 20/06/2019, Bode Saadu). 
Some other HCPs opined that: 
We were not involved in the policy design, and this also affected the performance and 
outcome of the programme. However, there was a tremendous achievement by the 




We were not involved in the policy design, and there was a huge gap in that respect 
because HCPs were the ones on the ground whose advise and ideas would have been 
relevant in shaping the policy (KII, HCP, 27/07/2019, Oro). 
We were not involved in the policy design and this negatively impacted the programme 
because we only did the little we could do since we were not involved; it could have 
performed better (KII, HCP, 02/07/2019, Kaiama). 
We were not involved in the policy design, but it would have been better if we were 
involved, to enrich the entire package. Probably, it won’t have suffered the way it did 
(KII, HCP, Referral Centre 1 Official, 30/07/2019, Ilorin). 
These confirm that the healthcare providers were also not involved in the policy design and 
they were merely given directives on how the programme should be implemented regardless 
of their abilities to add value to the policy content and their experience about their respective 
communities. Also, as noted in Chapter 1, the CBHI programme in Kwara State was established 
before the NHIS came up with its model known as CBSHIP but then, the input of the NHIS in 
the policy design might have been useful before the implementation of the programme. 
However, the NHIS was relatively sidelined in the design and implementation of the 
programme, and its involvement was limited to facilities inspection. Very few (2 out of 9) 
among the participants (i.e. officials of the state government, international partner, HMO, 
NHIS, and the researcher) asked, claimed that the NHIS was carried along. An NHIS official 
noted that: 
The NHIS was carried along in the design and implementation of the Kwara CBHI in 
terms of inspecting the facilities used and quality of service rendered (KII, NHIS, 
01/08/2019, Ilorin). 
Another participant opined that the NHIS was involved in the design and implementation of 
the programme but did not state explicitly, the roles played, apart from giving its goodwill 
regarding the programme. According to him:  
Yes, the NHIS played a role in the programme. When the programme started, the NHIS 
was just coming up; the NHIS was launched in 2005. The first Executive Secretary 
explained the role that the NHIS played, giving the goodwill for the scheme (KII, 
Researcher, 30/07/2019, Ilorin). 
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In contrast, some other participants expressed that the non-involvement of the NHIS was 
exemplified by a clash of interest at some point when the two authorities were separately 
attempting to establish CBHI and CBSHIP in a particular community. The government officials 
explained that: 
There was a time we wanted to have a clash regarding the establishment of NHIS in 
Patigi. They were planning to start theirs, and it was also our own target. I was invited 
by the Governor, and he directed us to stay away since they wanted to help us care for 
the people... NHIS was not involved in the planning and implementation of the 
programme (KII, KWSG Official 1, 20/08/2019, Ilorin).  
They [i.e. the NHIS] were not involved in the policy design, planning and 
implementation; and no approval was taken from them. There was a time we wanted to 
expand to Patigi, and they were also planning to launch their CBSHIP in the area. The 
governor told us to leave Patigi for them so far it had a health insurance (KII, KWSG 
Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin).  
An HMO official corroborated the above that: 
There was a time both of us [i.e. the CBHI and NHIS’ CBSHIP] were trying to occupy a 
Local Government Area. It wouldn’t have been like that if we were working in synergy. 
It was obvious that they were not involved in the planning and implementation of the 
CBHI programme (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin).  
Thus, the finding reveals that the NHIS, which is the regulatory agency for health insurance 
programmes in Nigeria, was not involved in the design and implementation of the programme. 
The imposition of the CBHI model on all other stakeholders became easy with the poor 
healthcare system in the State. A participant explained: “There was no home-grown health 
policy in Kwara State as at that time. Consequently, the Kwara State Government was spoon-
fed by the foreign partner by bringing up a readily-designed CBHI policy” (KII, HMO Official 
1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin).  
9.4 Policy Implementation and Domination 
Like policy design, policy implementation is a political process with complexities involving 
many actors (Campos & Reich, 2019:226) and partly influenced by ideas, knowledge, interests 
and motivations (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2012:341; Beland & Ridde, 2016:17). Also, in a policy 
cycle, actors with different ideas and interests are always involved in the politics of domination 
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and influence, especially during agenda-setting or policy formulation (Fox & Reich, 2015). 
Another window of influence often targeted by the dominated groups is the implementation 
stage to ‘right the wrongs’ by tilting implementation towards their interests. However, the 
CBHI policy space in Kwara relatively left no opportunity for such, especially for the local 
policymakers.  
Though the KWSG (through CHIS) was responsible for overseeing the implementation of the 
programme in public facilities, as shown in Chapters 5 and 8. Nevertheless, the implementation 
of the CBHI programme was seemingly dominated by the international partner because of the 
resources brought to the policy space – idea, knowledge and fund. As explained in Chapter 7, 
when the involvement of the state government became contributory, the financial contributions 
of the state government were remitted to the PharmAccess Foundation (KII, Foreign Agency 
Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). The Foundation was responsible for releasing fund to the HMO 
that was commissioned for implementing the programme (i.e. HCHC).  
This suggests that the state government, in addition to its non-involvement in policy design, 
had a secondary role in the implementation of the programme. Also, as revealed in Chapter 5, 
some decisions were exclusively made by the foreign partner, especially regarding choice of 
the community for the programme and standard of care. These are often done with influence, 
expertise, skills and other resources (see Hussain & Cornelius, 2009:201) to shape the direction 
of implementation. 
Further, the international partner was solely in charge of monitoring and evaluation of the 
programme, though, the Kwara State Government officials were always present but without a 
technical role in the exercise. For instance, a participant lamented that the State government 
did not have its teams that could allow it to match up with the level of involvement of the 
international agency as equal partners. He noted that “The government did not have its 
independent Quality Assurance Team apart from the HMO’s that is privately-based; that could 
serve as checks and balances and as well, tame the excesses of the HMO (KII, HCP, 
27/07/2019, Oro).  
Same applies to the research conducted to carry out an impact assessment of the programme. 
Though a team of researchers was engaged from the University of Ilorin Teaching Hospital 
(UITH), they were seemingly less involved compared to the teams from Amsterdam (see AIID, 
2013; AIGHD, 2015, 2017). Aside from the constraints that the engagement of ‘foreign 
experts’ place on the in-country consultants (Stone, 2001), more often, these pave the way for 
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the transnational organisations to generate an evaluation and research reports in ways that suit 
their interests. Two reasons pointed out that implementation of the programme was tuned to 
the interests of the international partner. One, the HMO was unilaterally engaged by the 
international partner. Two, the release of fund for implementation of the programme was 
through the international partner, notwithstanding the counterpart funding by the state 
government. According to Tidjani (2009:13), “this positioning of the experts includes the risk 
of leading governments to shed their responsibilities, owing to their intense workloads and the 
weakness of their capacities, thereby becoming secondary actors who merely endorse decisions 
that were taken at the technical stage, and which they cannot hope to change or shape”. 
Contexts like this create opportunities for policy domination. 
9.5 The CBHI Stoppage and 2019 General Elections: Any Link?  
The political system in Kwara State is one that could be identified with godfatherism. Late Dr 
Olusola Saraki was a significant player on the political scene in the State. He was very 
influential to the extent of determining who emerged as governor or held political positions in 
the State, primarily, since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999. For instance, Dr Saraki was 
instrumental in the emergence of Late Mohammed Lawal as the Kwara State governor in 1999, 
and he served till 2003 on the platform of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP). Lawal could 
not return to the office for another term of 4 years in 2003 as a result of a fall-out between him 
and his godfather, Olusola Saraki. This led to the emergence of Saraki’s first son, Dr Bukola 
Saraki, as the governor in 2003, using the platform of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). 
Dr Saraki ruled as governor between 2003 and 2011 before he was succeeded by one of his 
loyalists, AbdulFatah Ahmed, also on the platform of the PDP. This allowed the former 
governor to consolidate his power and influence in the State as he was arguably ruling by proxy, 
after his tenure. Still, under the aegis of the Saraki dynasty, Governor Ahmed got re-elected for 
a second term in 2015 through a newly-floated party in the country, All Progressive Congress 
(APC). In 2019, Dr Bukola Saraki and his followers returned to the PDP for the 2019 general 
elections. Both Saraki and Ahmed, and all other candidates from their political bloc lost 
massively in the general elections in the wave of ‘Oto Ge’ (i.e. Enough is Enough), the mantra 
demanding a change in the leadership and public affairs of the State by the people.   
The trajectory highlighted above indicates that the Saraki family dominated the politics of 
Kwara State between 1999 and 2019. The CBHI programme was introduced during the tenure 
of Governor Saraki in 2007 and stopped during the tenure of Governor Ahmed in 2016. Asked 
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if there was any link between the collapse of the CBHI programme and loss of the election by 
the political bloc that was in government, 7 out of 13 participants did not rule out the possibility 
but opined that there were many other factors that influenced the outcome of the elections. This 
is because people all over the state were generally complaining about poor governance. Some 
HCPs noted that:  
I don’t know if there is a causal relationship between the collapse of the programme and 
change in government because many factors went into that change (KII, HCP, 
19/06/2019, Bacita). 
The pattern of voting in the last election was a conglomeration of many factors relating 
to poor governance. It may be one of the reasons but not the main reason (KII, HCP, 
27/07/2019, Oro). 
An HMO official added that: 
The collapse of the programme might play a role but not the sole reason for voting against 
the last government. Part of it was that the people were tired of the Saraki dynasty (KII, 
HMO Official 2, 29/07/2019, Ilorin). 
A government official submitted that: 
I don’t think the stoppage of the programme affected the decision to vote the last 
administration out of government (KII, KWSG Official 1, 20/08/2019, Ilorin). 
Also, an international agency official and a researcher noted that: 
Some people believe that the CBHI programme was a political tool in 2015 which was 
not so, but we don’t know if the stoppage eventually affected the voting decision in 2019 
(KII, Foreign Agency Official 2, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). 
I don’t think the suspension of the programme has anything to do with general elections. 
In civilised countries, that should have been major a reason why people would vote 
against their leaders. Most people in the State are not even aware of the programme 
anyway. There are several other reasons for voting out the formal government. It could 
be part of the reasons for the former enrollees (Researcher, 30/07/2019, Ilorin).   
On the other hand, the remaining (6 out of 13) participants noted that the collapse of the 
programme influenced the members of the communities in voting against the ruling party in 
the State. A community leader stated that it was the community member’s way of expressing 
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their dissatisfaction with the programme. He stated that: “I can’t say that the stoppage of the 
programme did not affect the outcome of the 2019 general elections in the community, but the 
extent is what I don’t know. This is because directly or indirectly, the voters have been denied 
continuous access to healthcare, and they are expected to react” (KII, Community Leader, 
11/07/2019, Idofian). 
Another community leader opined that the government failed to prepare an alternative for the 
people in accessing care. He noted that: 
Idaduro Hygeia ni effect lori election 2019 
tori’pe ani Maternity ni ilu wa nibi. Ko 
function daada, won ‘ode tunse. Awon eyan 
ro’pe boya tanwon badibo f’elomi, Hygeia 
letun pada. 
The stoppage of the programme had an effect 
on the outcome of the 2019 general elections 
in the community because the government 
was not proactive enough to refurbish 
government hospital in the community to 
become functional. People voted for the 
opposition with the hope that the CBHI 
programme might be revived (KII, 
Community Leader, 01/07/2019, Aboto-
Oja). 
Also, some of the participants in the implementation of the programme argued that the stoppage 
was partly responsible for the loss of the election by the PDP. According to an HCP: 
If the programme did not stop, the PDP would have won the 2019 general elections in 
the State (KII, HCP, 13/06/2019, Erinle). 
An HMO official added that: 
Part of the reasons for the loss of the 2019 general elections by the PDP in the State 
was the stoppage of the programme because the communities were dissatisfied and the 
opposition used it to campaign against them on radio, while some people outrightly 
declared that they wouldn’t vote for them (KII, HMO Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin). 
Also, a government official gave a more precise insight that the programme had always given 
the political leadership some advantages during elections because it was one of the ‘beautiful 
things’ happenings in the State. He submitted that: 
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The programme had a link with the 2011 and 2015 general elections because it was an 
election-winning programme. The people never wanted the programme to be phased-
out. Our advocacy then was that, if you have something beautiful happening in a place, 
you have to keep it up. The people were very anxious and happy with the programme. 
In all the areas where the programme was operational, we had bloc votes from them. It 
was the same thing that happened during the 2019 general elections because we were 
unable to operate and the people were not happy, all the areas we had bloc votes, we 
had zero votes. Because already, for 2 to 3 years after the programme, people were not 
happy. The people’s reaction was that why did you give us the programme when you 
knew you couldn’t sustain it, and we voted you for this (KII, KWSG Official 2, 
24/07/2019, Ilorin) 
The submissions above indicate that the stoppage of the programme, to an extent, had a link 
and was part of the reasons for the loss of the election by the political bloc that had led the State 
for almost two decades. This is because typically, the people have the power to decide their 
representatives in government (Raphael, 2014:385) through elections. McConnell (2014:2) 
noted that “policy failures can cause electoral and reputational damage to governments, and 
even lead to the downfall of public officials, politicians, governments and regimes”.  
9.6 Attaining UHC: Repurposing the Role of the State 
The ultimate goal of every healthcare reform is the attainment of UHC. The level of 
development in Africa makes it vulnerable, and it is seen as a testing ground for all sorts of 
social experiments. Social experimentation and policy transfer have negative implications for 
the LMICs, especially Africa. It is one method of ‘distraction’ turning African countries away 
from adopting transformative social policies. Mostly, when hypotheses are tested, or 
experiments are conducted, there are chances that they may go wrong even if various kinds of 
precisions are considered.  
All sorts of measures are therefore necessarily needed to be put in place to cushion eventual 
negative consequences. Fundamentally, policy options that are not home-grown or closely 
aligned with the realities obtainable in the recipient nations have high chances to fail (Dolowitz 
& Marsh, 2000:17; Kalu, 2012:66). It is as a result of this that ethics is increasingly gaining 
prominence in research around the world. To liken this analogy to the use of Africa as a testing 
ground for social policies or programmes, more often than not, the people of Africa are left to 
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their fates whenever these experiments (mainly promoted by the global North) go awful (see 
Andrianaivosoa, 2016). 
The CBHI programme in Kwara State is a typical example because it was introduced and 
implemented without any input from the policymakers and other local actors. Though the 
programme was meant to enhance the people’s state of health in rural communities; some 
participants noted that it was also a way of testing hypothesis. A government official stated 
that: “It was a way of testing hypothesis and at the same time, it became an institution of 
learning itself” (KII, KWSG Official 2, 24/07/2019, Ilorin). Another participant explained that 
the deficiency in technical expertise and financial resources, pave the way for the foreign 
partner to use the State as a place to test hypothesis and impose its policies of interest, without 
any resistance from within. According to him: 
It was clear that PharmAccess Foundation had an agenda, from a scientific point of view. 
Still, because we did not have the technical know-how and funding to match what they 
were bringing, everything they proposed was taken ‘hook, line and sinker’ (KII, HMO 
Official 1, 26/07/2019, Ilorin). 
In fact, aside from the Kwara CBHI programme, other CBHI programmes sponsored by 
“HIF/PAF in Lagos (for market women and Computer and Allied Products Dealers 
Association), Kenya (for tea producers) and Tanzania (for coffee producers) collapsed as a 
result of financial sustainability and partly low enrolment” (Boston Consulting Group, 
2015:20). This shows that the CBHI intervention programmes of the Dutch government in 
Africa have all stopped suggesting that the policy option is not appropriate. It is clear that CBHI 
is not new in the developing countries. However, the sustainability challenges of the health 
policy option appear to be a thing of concern to policymakers. Before the implementation of 
the Kwara programme in 2007, scholars such as Ekman (2004), Acharya and Ranson (2005) 
and Tabor (2005) have expressed serious concerns about its sustainability, especially in terms 
of funding and enrolment which were the leading causes of the HIF-sponsored CBHI 
programmes in Africa. Perhaps, the implementation of the policy had ideational underpinnings 
because these concerns could have been ‘convincingly’ addressed before implementation. 
Moreover, policy failures in Africa are closely related to “rent-seeking and neopatrimonialism, 
which leaves no room for learning or the interplay of ideas” (Mkandawire, 2015:598). 
 
Notwithstanding the stoppage of the CBHI programme, the international partner was relatively 
still in-charge of the health policy direction in the State. With the stoppage of the CBHI 
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programme, mainly due to financial challenge;  the state government yielded to the policy 
directive of the international partner and launched a state-wide health insurance programme to 
cover all residents in the State. While explaining that the state government eventually paid part 
of its counterpart fund for the CBHI, an official of the international agency pointed out that: 
When they paid the N200 million to PharmAccess Foundation, talking to Dutch Foreign 
Affairs now said, look, we are here to help you and not to take from you. We are keeping 
this fund, please go and set-up your state health insurance, set-up the funding, and make 
sure these criteria are met. That N200 million, we’ll give it back to the State so that it can 
be used to pay the premium subsidy for those that are indigents (KII, Foreign Agency 
Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin).  
Apart from recommending the policy direction and ensuring that it was legislated, the 
international partner was in the forefront of the new programme with further conditionalities 
for the state government. The official added, regarding the role of the PharmAccess Foundation 
in the recently launched state-wide health insurance that: “PharmAccess Foundation was there 
and was able to support the State in the roll-out plan towards the state-wide health insurance 
programme” (KII, Foreign Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). She further stated that: 
PharmAccess Foundation helped to map out the poverty index tool to identify the 
indigents such that even at the point of registration, there is a poverty index tool that is 
used. That N200 million is sitting with PharmAccess, and over the years, it has even 
acquired interest. Once the state sets-up its health insurance programme, the money 
would be transferred to them for the payment of enrolment subsidy for the poor. For 
the scheme design, the roll-out and the rest, PharmAccess did not take a cent, not even 
a dollar (KII, Foreign Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin).  
Further, for any partnership to be fruitful, each of the partners must share a common objective. 
One of the central goals of the international partner in the CBHI programme is inimical to 
statism or social provisioning of healthcare services. It is committed to making healthcare 
market work by giving more roles to the private sector (see PharmAccess Group, 2016; 
AIGHD, 2017; Boston Consulting Group 2015). One of the foreign agency officials noted that: 
“We are supporting Sub-Sahara African countries in making health market work through our 
integrated approach” (KII, Foreign Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). In the wake of 
neoliberalism and market-centric ideas, the international partner is committed to promoting 
private provisioning of healthcare services. She added that: 
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“We are also involved in what we call ‘Access to Finance Framework’ because we 
understand that in Africa, there is a lot of financing challenges in the health sector. So, 
we play the role as guarantors to ensure that private facilities have access to a loan at a 
very affordable interest rate to support building their programmes, as the case may be” 
(KII, Foreign Agency Official 1, 02/09/2019, Ilorin). 
Romero and Gideon (2019:1) noted that “an increasing role of the private sector in the 
provision of healthcare risks undermining social goals in favour of private profits”. Given the 
experience in Latin America, they argued that “public-private partnership in the healthcare 
sector cannot deliver UHC and concluded that: it can be an expensive and risky business; there 
is no empirical evidence to claim that it delivers positive development outcomes; it can have 
negative impacts on the wider health system and on democratic governance”. Meanwhile, in 
the LMICs, most international donors promote social policies that pave ways for free-market 
to thrive at the expense of the social provisioning of services. This tends to shift the state’s 
attention from the likelihood of providing healthcare for the populace. 
Generally, the social protection and social policy instruments ‘enforced’ in developing nations 
are distractive and largely non-progressive because they fail to offer a comprehensive model 
of solving the social policy problems. According to Adésínà (2020:565) “rather than the active 
social policy instruments concerned with enhancing productive capacity, employment, 
redistribution and degrees of collective social provisioning, what is offered is the primacy of 
the market in the allocation of resources and segregated public provisioning in addressing 
market diswelfares”. Essentially, the CBHI programme like some other social policy options 
has a basis in neoliberalism and it is a ploy to ensure a policy shift from a comprehensive 
approach, backed by a normative commitment to ‘make-shift’ policies that would neither solve 
immediate nor long-term social problems.  
Without delving deep into discussions on the dislocation between the socio-demographic and 
economic realities in the State (as shown in Chapter 7) and the newly adopted health policy 
programme - after the demise of the CBHI programme, it is necessary to note that situations 
like this (policy transfer and or policy domination), are likely to continue if most political 
leaders in Africa are not living up to their responsibilities. In other words, “the relationship 
between the citizens and the state” (Magashula, 2010:3) is a web of obligations and 
commitments. Those obligations need to be fulfilled to enjoy peaceful followership. 
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Precisely, the problem of healthcare, like other social services, were ravelling most African 
nations because the governments have not been working effectively. Thus, there is a need for 
a repurposed government especially in Nigeria whereby the objectives of the State would be 
directed towards catering for the social needs of the citizens as well as setting out a 
developmental agenda for the nation. Put differently, for meaningful development and to 
surmount healthcare challenges, it may be necessary for the government to be ideationally 
committed to a long-term effort. Moreover, “traditionally, social policy has been understood 
as a feature of increased social provisioning by the state for its citizen at a late stage in the 
development process” (Adésínà, 2008:3). 
With this, in the end, it would be possible to provide social services, including free healthcare 
for the citizens as done in the past – before structural adjustment programmes were 
implemented. This is reflected in the views of participants. A community member rhetorically 
stated that: “If the government could provide free education in the past, why can’t it provide 
free healthcare services. They can do it though. They don’t want to do it” (IDI, Male, 
19/06/2019, Bacita). An HCP added that: “In the 70s, health was free as well as education and 
financed by the government” (KII, HCP, 17/06/2019, Odo-Owa). Regaining these 
achievements may require commitment at every level of government, and the civil service need 
to have a sense of national mission.  
One recent and ongoing incidence, which makes it imperative to repurpose the role of the state 
is the “coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic which started in Wuhan, China in December 2019” 
(Wang et al., 2020:1). The pandemic has claimed the lives of many around the world. As at 10 
September 2020, “there were 27,668,740 cases and 899,315 deaths globally (WHO, 2020), 
with Africa having 1,095,829 cases and 23,466 deaths in 47 countries” (WHO Regional Office 
for Africa, 2020). Though “the pandemic has overwhelmed the capacity of many nations’ 
healthcare systems” (Gilson & Muramatsu, 2020:1), some countries with good healthcare 
systems were able to respond more positively including those that were initially hard hit in the 
early months of the pandemic (Mehtar et al., 2020). Notwithstanding the lower number of 
cases, many developing countries, especially in Africa, are faced with challenges of human and 
infrastructural resources to curtail spread and attend to the confirmed cases (Alegbeleye & 
Muhammed, 2020:7). This appears to be a wake-up call to the LMICs, including Nigeria, to 




For meaningful improvement in global healthcare, as suggested by Benatar et al. (2009:361), 
there is a need to reconsider “our understanding of what it means to value human life, the role 
of the market and what is meant by development” towards a new vision, focusing on public 
goods. In other words, there is a need to unthink neoliberalism to rethink a new thing. Since 
the ability to pay for care is a significant impediment to access, it becomes necessary to adopt 
a more equitable and effective healthcare policy that will make healthcare accessible to all. For 
instance, the adoption of a non-fragmented health insurance system with a unified benefits 
package for all makes healthcare access and utilisation more equitable (Myint et al., 2019:9). 
Regarding this study, the fund (N1.1 billion [3.055 million USD]) committed by the KWSG as 
counterpart fund on the CBHI could have been directly invested on the sector based on state’s 
envisioned agenda covering the entire population. Braveman et al. (2017:12) explained that 
“health equity means that everyone has a fair and just opportunity to be as healthy as possible. 
This requires removing obstacles to health such as poverty, discrimination, and their 
consequences, including powerlessness and lack of access to good jobs with fair pay, quality 
education and housing, safe environments, and health care”.  
The role of good leadership, at all levels, is critical to the success of social policies, including 
health policies (Isouard, 2010:23; McKee & Mackenbach, 2013:335). Ouma and Adésínà 
(2019) advised that ensuring appropriate problem definition is an essential factor in policy 
change. This is because once the problem is wrongly diagnosed, the policy design and 
implementation will be inefficient to achieve the needed results. The commodification of 
healthcare service provisioning serves as the major impediment to access healthcare by the 
majority of the people. Hence, a need for comprehensive and transformative social policies 
capable of performing multiple functions (Bond, 2007:241; Cook et al., 2013:43) because 
active social policy is instrumental to overall socio-economic development (Mkandawire, 
2007: xii; Adésínà, 2008:3; Adésínà, 2020:578) and overcoming neoliberal policies (Adésínà, 
2015:114). 
According to Duggal et al. (1995:834), “healthcare, like education, housing, old age security 
and other social provisions, has nowhere in the world been able to make an effective 
contribution without the active participation of the state. Even in the most advanced countries, 
the role of the state has been extremely critical in assuring that health care becomes universally 
and equitably available”. Early examples of healthcare provision in this regard are the United 
Kingdom, and Germany and the governments are very much involved. This is because the state 




Based on the empirical data, this chapter exposed the underlying goals behind the introduction, 
design and implementation of the CBHI programme in rural Kwara. It elucidated the process 
through which the policy was transferred and how the design and implementation were 
dominated by the foreign sponsor. It also revealed how the failure of the programme was partly 
instrumental in the ousting of a political bloc that had been in government for close to two 
decades in the State. Given the various findings, the chapter further argued that for a 
meaningful result in social services provisioning, repurposing the role of the state would be 
necessary with a view to ideationally taking full and decisive responsibility for community and 

























The chapter summarises the thesis. The focus of the study is to understand the reasons behind 
the stoppage of the CBHI programme that was operational in rural Kwara, Nigeria. The first 
section highlights a summary of the key findings and contributions of the study to knowledge. 
The second section provides a policy recommendation, and the last part covers a brief 
conclusion and suggestions for future studies. 
10.2 Summary of Key Findings and Contributions 
This section presents the key findings of the study based on the objectives of the study. The 
study sought to examine the perceptions of members of the communities about the CBHI 
programme, the factors that influenced its design and implementation, the funding mechanisms 
and the factors that led to the collapse or stoppage of the programme.   
10.2.1 Short-term Policy and Temporary Outcomes 
As evident in Chapter 6, one significant finding of the study is that except in a few cases, most 
of the former enrollees claimed that they were satisfied with the quality of service rendered by 
the programme as well as the conduct of the healthcare providers or workers. The CBHI 
programme improved the healthcare status of the former enrollees because most of them did 
not have access to modern healthcare. Those who enrolled could access healthcare, and this 
assisted in boosting their healthcare statuses. Also, given the right to visit the hospital to receive 
treatment for selected ailments after enrolment, the level of healthcare service utilisation rose 
during the operational period of the programme in the communities because it was easier to 
access hospitals for healthcare needs (see Chapter 5). Further, as shown in Chapter 6, enrolled 
pregnant women had the opportunity of receiving adequate ante-natal and post-natal care and 
enrolled infants could as well be taken to the facilities to receive care when necessary. These 
findings are consistent with previous studies (see Brals et al., 2017; Odusola et al., 2011, 2014, 
2015, 2016; Hendriks et al., 2013; Odusola, 2015) which were more focused on the gains of 
the programme. However, these benefits were limited to community members that were 
enrolled in the scheme. 
Beyond the scope of the above studies, discussions in Chapters 8 and 9 evidently show that the 
CBHI programme was faced with sustainability challenges. This was also illustrated in the 
cases of Ghana and Rwanda in Chapter 2. As discussed in Chapter 8, the study participants 
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revealed that the benefits package did not cover some of the ailments presented by the enrollees 
which necessitated the payment of OOP. Also, findings in the Chapter show that healthcare 
benefits became reduced with time because some of the ailments initially covered were 
removed from the benefits package. For instance, hernia, which was part of the benefits 
package at inception of the programme in Bacita became excluded from the package by the 
time the programme extended to Bode Saadu. These findings run counter to the commonly 
expressed view that CBHI provides healthcare protection against most of the healthcare needs 
of the people and reduces OOP expenses (see Weinberger & Jutting, 2000; Spaan et al., 2012; 
Carrin et al., 2005; Odeyemi & Nixon 2013; Purohit, 2014).   
Also, contrary to the claims of authors (e.g. Sekhri & Savedoff, 2005) who argued that CBHI 
could lead to UHC, the relative gains of the programme were short-lived with the sudden 
stoppage, leaving the beneficiaries unhappy (see Chapter 8). Thus, it can be concluded, in line 
with the position of scholars (Adésínà, 2007, 2008, 2020; Mkandawire, 2007; Bond, 2007; 
Aggarwal, 2011; Kutzin, 2012; Cook et al., 2013; Romero & Gideon, 2019) that attaining UHC 
requires a far more commitment on the part of the government towards social provisioning of 
healthcare services for all. Regardless of the inherent challenges and weaknesses, evidences in 
Chapter 8 further indicate that the stoppage of the programme has exposed the former enrollees 
to healthcare challenges as they were before the introduction of the programme. Thus, the goal 
of the policy was temporary and short-lived. Yet, social policies ought to be to the benefit of 
all with long-term social advantage. This is to ensure that the entire society felt the outcomes.  
10.2.2 Payment of Enrolment Premium and Affordability  
Health insurance requires the payment of an amount as premium by enrollees to access care. 
As evident in Chapters 5 and 7, the programme did not cover all community members; it 
covered only those who could pay. Contrary to studies (e.g. Gustafsson-Wright & Schellekens, 
2013; Lawanson & Ibrahim, 2015; Odusola et al., 2016; Udeh et al., 2016; Kakama et al., 
2020) suggesting that CBHI enrolment premium was affordable and that people in their 
spending did not give it a priority, majority of the study participants claimed that the enrolment 
premium was not affordable. As discussed in Chapter 7, some of the respondents claimed they 
were able to pay, while others said they were at the mercy of politicians or affluent members 
of their communities to join the programme. As such, premium was a hindrance to enrolment 
for those, who could not afford to pay. Even at the subsidised amount, many claimed that it 
was difficult for them to pay because of poor economic opportunities and high level of poverty 
(see Chapters 7 & 8). 
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It, therefore, becomes worrisome to note that the policy implemented to bridge the barrier of 
access to care in the rural communities left some people uncovered due to inability to pay. The 
existence of CBHI and other forms of health insurance, given the prevalent rate of poverty in 
the developing countries, are inimical to the current drive of the WHO towards attaining UHC. 
The WHO expects that everyone can access quality care without facing financial hardship (see 
WHO, 2017). This study argues that this goal would take a long time to be achieved if the 
provision of healthcare is not given the needed priority and ideational commitment. Thus, 
ability to pay should not be a determinant for accessing healthcare.     
Further, beyond the conclusion of other studies (e.g. Ranson, 2003; Fonta et al., 2010; Workneh 
et al., 2017; Adhikari et al., 2018) that also found affordability as a challenge in CBHI, 
discussions in Chapter 8 revealed an unethical practice which ‘misleadingly’ boosted the 
enrolment population in the programme. That is, some of the HCPs ‘invested’ their monies on 
the enrolment of community members to claim higher amounts in terms of capitation from the 
HMO. This is because the higher the enrolment in a facility the higher the capitation due to the 
provider. This finding calls attention to possible ‘myth’ that can surround CBHI enrolment data 
and it shows that apart from other factors (such as policy content, process and context), the 
roles of actors are vital to the success or failure of any policy (see Chapters 3 & 8).  
10.2.3 Policy Transfer and Domination of the Policy Space 
The international actors often explore the weakness of policy context and capitalise on 
technical know-how and financial resources to achieve policy transfer (see Delvaux & 
Schoenaers, 2012:105; Etiaba et al., 2015:2; Walt & Gilson, 1994:362; Sanni et al., 2017:376; 
Gilson & Agyepong, 2018:38). Other devices that are adopted include scary problem definition 
(to justify the need for a change), research and the need for ‘best practices’ (Tidjani, 2009; 
Stone et al., 2020). However, as highlighted in Chapter 9, there are four (4) main reasons that 
influenced the acceptance of the policy offer in the case of Kwara CBHI. First, the healthcare 
situation in the communities was bad and there was no clear healthcare policy in the state; 
second, the state government saw the policy proposal as an opportunity to improve the people’s 
access to healthcare; third, the proposed policy did not require spending from the fiscus 
initially; and lastly, the political gains of the programme.  
The discussion in Chapter 5 reveals that there were problems in accessing healthcare services 
in rural Kwara. Often, the rural dwellers had to travel to Ilorin (the State capital) to access 
hospital care. This context provided an opportunity for the introduction of the CBHI 
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programme in the State. More so, there was no clear or substantive healthcare policy designed 
for the State apart from the global health policies adopted by the federal government such as 
Roll Back Malaria and Kick Out Polio which was merely designed at the global or regional 
levels to be incorporated into existing policies by various governments (see Chapter 5). In other 
words, the absence of healthcare policy provided an easy way of selling the idea of CBHI to 
the Kwara State Government. Further, findings in Chapter 9 show that the initial offer granted 
by the international partner to finance the programme prompted the leadership of the State to 
accept it. Also, the acceptance was motivated by the political gains (i.e. capacity of the 
programme to boost their political career) that could emanate from it.   
Furthermore, actors in a given policy space tend to collaborate and support a policy which 
appears to serve their common interests (Liefeld & Schneider, 2012). Thus, discussion in 
Chapter 9 revealed that there were three (3) main levels of collaboration in the Kwara CBHI, 
namely: alliance between the Dutch government and the PharmAccess Foundation; alliance 
between the PAF and Hygeia Nigeria Limited; and alliance of these actors with the Kwara 
State Government. These alliances facilitated and eased the introduction of the programme 
because it served the interest of each of the parties in a way.  
As noted by scholars (e.g. Fox & Reich, 2015; Maluka, 2018; Jacquin, 2019), the policy space 
of transferred programmes are often dominated by international actors. The discussions in 
Chapters 5 and 9 indicate that the Kwara CBHI in Nigeria was a ready-made model designed 
by the international actors and imposed on the Kwara State Government without space for 
modification. With the exertion of some relative force or influence, the introduction and 
implementation of the policy were also dominated by international actors (see Chapter 3, 5 & 
9). The programme was rolled out as a partnership between the State Government and the 
international actors; however, the implementation, as done with the design, was dominated by 
the international actor. To conceal the level of domination of the policy space, some local actors 
were repurposed and allowed to act on the policy scene, especially with the role of the HMO 
and CHIS in the implementation of the programme (see Chapters 5 & 9). Also, as against the 
principle of partnership, the HMO that was engaged for the implementation was exclusively 
recruited by the foreign partner. This allowed it to dominate but directly stay-off the policy 
scene, to an extent; and remotely direct the process of policy implementation.  
Evidences in Chapter 5, 7, 8 and 9 indicate that the transferred policy was not in line with the 
reality of the recipient’s setting. Precisely, Chapter 9 shows that one of the main aims of the 
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international partner is to further commodify healthcare services – by making healthcare 
market work. This is however capable of disrupting any plan towards social provisioning of 
healthcare services. More so, the introduction of the programme was not in tune with the 
suggestion of scholars (e.g. Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Adésínà, 2008; Kalu, 2012; 
Andrianaivosoa, 2016) that before a policy is transferred, it must be carefully aligned with the 
circumstances of the recipient nations. In other words, the goal of the international partner was 
to enhance the performance of the private sector in providing healthcare services and was not 
in line with the economic realities of the people as well as the financial capacity of the state 
government.  
Adésínà (2020:572) noted that “when those with voices in society are co-beneficiaries with the 
less well-off, there is a greater political commitment to the welfare instruments, and they tend 
to deliver better quality services to all concerned”. Thus, beyond that ideational underpinnings 
that shaped the implementation of the programme (see Chapters 2 & 9), this study shows that 
weakness of socio-economic and political institutions can lead to policy failure because the 
transfer and domination of the policy space was partly due to the weakness of this institutional 
system of the state – which could not thoroughly sieve through the proposal and make decision 
based on common interest. 
10.2.4 Financing Challenges and the Stoppage 
Most CBHI programmes are faced with challenges (see Acharya et al., 2012; Panda et al., 
2016; Mathauer et al., 2017; Ranabhat et al., 2019). Similarly, the study found that the Kwara 
CBHI also faced some challenges. However, differently, from most studies (e.g. Onwujekwe 
et al., 2009; Aggarwal, 2011; Odeyemi, 2014; Akinyemi & Idowu, 2015; Adebayo et al., 2015; 
Dror et al., 2016; Kodom et al., 2019; Ajuaye et al., 2019) that discussed the problems of CBHI 
programmes without giving clear account of ‘who did or caused what’, this study analysed the 
challenges (in line with the conceptual framework adopted – see Chapter 3) of the programme 
based on the action(s) or inaction(s) of the main actors in the implementation of the programme. 
These include: the state government (distance and stock-out of drugs); the HMO (reduction in 
health benefits, inadequate enrolment coverage, low capitation and clash with HCPs); the HCPs 
(long waiting period, preference for non-enrollees and foray of HCPs into enrolment) as well 
as the abuse of care by former enrollees (see Chapter 8). This approach appears to be useful for 
better understanding of a policy (especially with the positionality of actors) and also serves as 
a ‘route’ towards problem-solving (based on the roles played by each actor).  
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As further discussed in Chapter 8, regardless of all other implementation challenges, the Kwara 
CBHI programme collapsed mainly because of funding. Specifically, the government could 
not meet up with the financial requirements, in terms of counterpart fund. The transfer of the 
policy was technically proposed in a way which did not give the government any reason for 
concern because it came with funding (see Chapter 9). Put differently, the introduction and 
implementation of the programme at inception required no direct financial commitment by the 
government but goodwill and logistic supports. However, after some years of implementation, 
the government was requested by the international partner to become contributory to the 
funding of the programme to achieve a successful transfer and ownership. Financing agreement 
during this phase was on a sliding scale for the government to increasingly take-up the 
financing responsibility of the programme (see Chapter 7). The government agreed to this and 
contributed to an extent, and then stopped. As a result, the international partner eventually 
withdrew its funding, and the programme came to a halt.  
This is the trend through which international organisations try to impose policies on 
governments without considerations for the socio-economic realities on the ground in those 
settings (Uzochukwu et al., 2015; Adésínà, 2020). Several ploys and powers are adopted to 
ensure the policies are accepted and promoted (see Chapter 9). This study demonstrates that 
financing conditionalities cannot compel governments to sustain a policy or programme, 
especially if they lack financial abilities. Short-term programmes are, however, capable of 
inciting violence and disunity among the people. More so, social assistance programmes 
(including healthcare) can only be beneficial if they are aligned with the long-term ideational 
plans and social realities of a people or nation. 
10.2.5 Collapse of Policy: Return to the ‘Old Ways’ 
Scholars have conducted studies (e.g. Uzochukwu et al. 2009) to trace the reasons behind 
stoppage of policy programmes. This study, however, goes further to examine the situation of 
the beneficiaries of the programme after the stoppage. As shown in Chapter 8, the study found 
that the primary goal of policy transfer was defeated in the case of the Kwara CBHI 
programme. Primarily, the purpose of policy intervention is to enhance the well-being of the 
people in a way. However, the collapse of the programme signified a reversal in the 
achievements recorded during the operational period. As claimed by the study participants, the 
healthcare service utilisation dropped drastically, and most people have returned to the use of 
traditional herbs because only a few can afford to pay for hospital care. Thus, the majority now 
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opt for self-medication, and hospitals are the last resorts when the situations are extremely bad 
(see Chapter 8).  
Mkandawire (2015) attributed most policy failures in Africa to rent-seeking and 
neopatrimonialism. Precisely, Ranson (2003) linked the failure of public CBHI to government 
and external donors. However, McConnell (2014) argued that it may be unacceptable to declare 
that a policy failed especially, one with record of some positive achievements before stoppage. 
Andrews (2018) therefore clarified that success or failure of a policy intervention can best be 
assessed in terms of whether the programme solves the actual problem which motivated its 
design and implementation.  
 
In the case of Kwara CBHI, the programme was introduced to tackle the problems of high 
OOP, disease burden, access to affordable and quality healthcare etc (HIF, 2012). It further 
aimed to cover at least 600,000 people by the end of 2017 (AIGHD, 2015). Meanwhile, as 
revealed in Chapters 5, 8 & 9, the programme did not to meet up with the set target of covering 
the rural population. Enrolment population was barely 140,000. Also, the programme has 
ceased to benefit those who were able to enrol during the operational period. In other words, 
the stoppage of the programme has returned the former beneficiaries to face the challenges of 
disease burden, poor access to healthcare and high OOP expenditure which it promised to 
tackle (see Chapter 8).  
Apart from the launch of the new programme (KSHIS) by the former governor in 2018, more 
recently (i.e. September 2020), the incumbent governor of Kwara State, AbdulRahman 
AbdulRazaq launched the state-wide health insurance programme (see Shittu, 2020). However, 
this is a new scheme distinct from the CBHI programme operated between 2007 and 2016. As 
noted earlier, the stoppage leaves the enrollees of the old scheme adrift. Thus, if they want to 
join the new scheme, they have to start all over – with registration and enrolment. Also, the 
government seems to partly retain the dependence on donor funding for the new programme. 
Finally, there is no guarantee that a new governor will not renege on the current promises being 
made and as an earlier governor did? 
10.3 Policy Recommendations 
The following recommendations for both local and international actors are given the findings 
and discussions in this study. 
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At a broader level, the study recommends re-purposing the government’s objectives regarding 
the attainment of meaningful development. This includes identifying the appropriate ways of 
fulfilling its obligations to the citizens through the design of long-term transformative social 
policies with ideational grounding. This is to be supported with unwavering commitment even 
in the face of possible challenges. The challenges of the healthcare system are akin to other 
social services provisioning, and all can be fundamentally addressed through spirited 
commitment. 
For international actors, it is noted that policy transfer is not done in isolation without problem 
identification. Thus, the study suggests that international actors should adequately carry out 
their findings and identify that indeed, there is a need for policy transfer before proposing to 
transfer policies. More importantly, the transnational actors should ensure that the policies are 
relevant to the socio-economic realities of the recipient nations to achieve developmental 
outcomes and results. The art of experimenting for social policy learning should be agreed 
upon and recognized for that particular purpose and implemented within a stipulated period. 
The government should, therefore, be allowed to decide whether to continue with it or not, 
while foreign actors leave the policy scene.  
Furthermore, international actors should be professional and ethical in the art of policy transfer. 
They should articulate from the onset, the extent of their financial abilities or commitments to 
avoid policy collapse. Policy failure or collapse of an intervention programme is capable of 
inciting violence against the government. Thus, if the transnational agencies are not interested 
in this, it is highly necessary to be cautious and prevent unintended consequences.  
More so, international actors should revisit their approaches and long-term effects of the 
proposed policies. Instead of promoting discursive discourses, they should endeavour to equip 
the local actors, where necessary, with the needed skills and knowledge that can aid policy 
formulation and decisions from within, instead of being re-purposed or brainwashed to foster 
foreign interests. In other words, transnational actors should respect the interests of local actors 
and assist them in achieving their policy goals.  
More precisely, transformative social policies can only yield meaningful results when leaders 
are committed and altruistic in their conduct; this includes the local policymakers and other 
stakeholders in the policy arena. In essence, leadership is crucial to the success of social 
policies. Thus, the study recommends that the government should design effective healthcare 
policies that are both ideationally-driven and comprehensive enough to provide access to all 
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without consideration for ability to pay or not, as advised by the WHO. With the alarming rates 
of poverty and unemployment in the developing countries and specifically in Nigeria, 
economic opportunities appear to be limited for most people to attend to their healthcare 
challenges. This can be resolved through the adoption of a single-payer system where 
healthcare is free at the point of use and publicly-financed. As briefly noted in chapter 9, with 
the current efforts against the COVID-19 pandemic, the state is responsible for all regardless 
of ability to pay, most importantly to curtail the spread; so also, should it be accountable for 
the citizenry during the time of no pandemic diseases. 
Also, local actors should be conscious that policy formulation attracts various interests and as 
such, protect the policy space from diversionary tendencies and domination by other benefits. 
In doing this, local actors must articulate their goals and ensure that policy decisions are in tune 
with the central goals proposed to be achieved. This also requires the acquisition of skills and 
knowledge to enable them to relate measurably with the transnational actors in the policy space 
and during policy negotiations.  
Further, it is relatively impossible to prevent transnational actors and other groups with non-
state interests from featuring on the policy scene due to the level of diffusion and cross-border 
exchange of ideas across the world. Thus, policy transfer and recommendation might continue 
to exist. However, this study recommends that since local actors have the prerogative to decide, 
notwithstanding possible sanctions, a critical review of proposed policies by international 
actors should be actively carried out to identify the suitability or otherwise based on the socio-
economic and political realities of the state. And ultimately, how the proposed policy fits into 
the wider vision of the nation. Such policy offers should be politely rejected if they are 
discursive and cannot be aligned to the long-term interest of the country, regardless of the 
incentives and financial backing that are linked to them. 
Also, other local but non-state actors (e.g. professionals and researchers) in the policy space 
should endeavour to imbibe the spirit of patriotism by acting in the interest of their nations. 
These actors are often re-purposed and recruited by the transnational actors into their coalitions 
in pursuing their goals through incentives and recognition.   
Finally, governments of developing countries such as Nigeria, including Kwara State, should 
strive to be productive economically to attain financial independence to avert possibilities of 
accepting diversionary transfer policy offers. These policies are often accompanied with 
conditionalities that turn the local policy actors to ‘spectators’ on the policy landscape without 
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significant influence. Policies of this nature tend to fail with time because of the inability to 
meet up with the conditions and possible clash of interest among the recipients and the policy 
promoters. 
10.4 Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research 
This study centrally focuses on the reasons behind the collapse of the Kwara CBHI. Generally, 
the study shows that the programme improved the health status of the people in the various 
communities but ability to pay enrolment premium was a challenge. It also indicates that the 
international partner dominated the policy space and gave no opportunity to the local actors to 
have input in the policy content. The policy context largely provided avenues for policy 
domination because there was no home-grown health policy in place. The study also 
demonstrates that the international partner initially funded the programme. At some point, the 
government was requested to make a financial commitment to the programme. The programme 
faced several challenges during implementation. However, the main reason for the collapse of 
the programme was funding.  
It is given this that the study makes suggestions for further research that:  
Though the Kwara programme was the most noticed and recognized, a similar programme was 
implemented in Lagos State but has also stopped. It is, therefore, necessary to also carry-out a 
holistic examination of the programme as implemented in Lagos. This will enrich our 
understanding regarding the promotion of CBHI policy in Nigeria as well as the dimensions of 
implementation and specific reasons for the stoppage of the programme in Lagos. Perhaps, the 
narratives and experience might vary in terms of the context, implementation process and roles 
of the actors. In the context of Kwara, there was no substantive health policy in place, easing 
the process of policy transfer. However, the experience in Lagos may differ, and the local actors 
might also have acted differently. 
The CBHI programme in Kwara State was under-studied by some other states in Nigeria such 
as Ogun, Kaduna, Delta and Ondo etc. It is necessary also to examine other CBHI programmes 
in Nigeria to understand the level of success and otherwise, in that, they are not donor-funded 
like the Kwara programme. It would be interesting to learn about the funding mechanisms 
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Appendix 3: Research Instruments 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMMUNITY MEMBERS (FORMER ENROLLEES) 
 
INSTRUCTION: Tick the appropriate item from the available options and answer 
questions in the spaces provided 
SECTION A: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC DETAILS 
Gender Male  Female  
Age 
(as at last birthday) 
 
 










Religion Islam  Christianity  African Traditional Religion  Others  
Marital Status Married     Divorced       Single Parent        Single         
Household Size  
 
Occupation Farmer  Trader  Technician  Civil Servant  Others  
Income per month       
Community  
SECTION B: PERCEPTION 
1. How did you know about the 
CBHI programme? 
 
Mass media  Family & Friends  Community 
meeting  
Others  
Please explain better …………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
2. How did you feel when the 






Not very interest  Indifferent  
 
3. What prompted you to enrol in 
the programme?  
 
If others, please specify 











4. How many members of your 





5. When the programme was 
operational, how often did you 
use the hospital whenever you 
were ill?  
 
Once or more 
a week  







Once in six 
months  
Not used at 
all  
6. Looking back, how would you 
describe the conduct of the health 
care workers in the hospital 
towards enrolees?  
 
Satisfactory  Very satisfactory  Not satisfactory  Indifferent  
7. How did you manage the 
illnesses of household members 





Self-medication   Others  
 






SECTION C: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CBHI PROGRAMME 
1. How will you describe the 
quality of service rendered under 
the programme?  
 
Excellent  Good  Fair  Poor  
2. Before the collapse of the 
CBHI programme, how will you 
describe enrolment into the 
programme? 
 
Increasing  Decreasing  Stagnant  I don’t know  
3. Were you informed about the 
specific healthcare to be provided 
under the programme by the 
enrolment officials before you 
joined? 





4. Looking back, do you think the 
programme provided all the 
services it claimed to cover?  
 
If no, please explain with 
example 







5. Did you undergo medical test 
before treatment at each episode 
of illness? 
Yes  No   
 
 
6. Did you always use alternative 
or traditional health care in 







If your answer is yes, please 
explain the reason. 
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
7. Were there times you visited 
the hospital and you were not 
treated?  
 
Yes   No  
If your answer is yes, how did 




If your answer is yes, how did 




8. Do you know of anyone who 
presented a medical condition 
that was not covered by the CBHI 
programme? 
 
If yes, how did the person handle 
the cost of treatment? 








9. After enrolling, did you drop 
out of the programme before it 
collapsed? 
 
If your answer is yes, what was 
your reason? 






10. Since the collapse of the 
CBHI programme, have you 
visited a hospital for medical 
consultation?  
 
Yes  No  
If your answer is no, explain how 
you have been attending to your 







11. In your view, was there 
effective evaluation and 
monitoring of the programme? 
Yes  No  
 
SECTION D: FUNDING  
1. Who was responsible 
for your premium? 
 
Self  Spouse  Relatives  Politician  Others  
2. Were you responsible 
for anyone’s premium? 
 
If yes, how many 
people? 
Yes  No  
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
3. How will you describe 














4. How much do you 
think will be affordable 
as premium by majority 
of the members of your 
community if health 







5. Did you pay the same 
amount as premium 
throughout your 
enrolment in the 
programme?   
Yes  No  
If no, what do you think 




6. Do you think the 
government has the 
financial capacity to 
provide free healthcare 
services to the citizens?  
Yes  No  
 
SECTION E: STOPPAGE 
1. What were the challenges 
you observed in the programme 
when it was operational? 
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
2. Were you formally informed 
that the programme would be 
winding down?  
 
If yes, what were the reasons 
given? 





3. What other things do you 










QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMMUNITY MEMBERS (NON-ENROLLEES) 
 
INSTRUCTION: Tick the appropriate item from the available options and answer 
questions in the spaces provided 
SECTION A: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC DETAILS 
Gender Male  Female  
Age  










Religion Islam  Christianity  African Traditional Religion  Others  
Marital Status Married     Divorced       Single Parent        Single         
Household Size  
Occupation Farmer  Trader  Technician  Civil Servant  Others  
Income per month  
Community  
 
SECTION B: PERCEPTION 
1. How did you know 
about the CBHI 
programme? 
 
Mass media  Family & Friends  Community meeting  Others  
Please explain better …………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
2. How did you feel 




Very interested  Somewhat interested 
 
Not very interest  Indifferent  
 
3. How many members 




4. Were you responsible 









If yes, how many 
people? 
……………………………………………………………………………………. 
5. How did you manage 
the illnesses of 
household members 





Self-medication   Others  
 






6. Why did you not 





















If others, please specify ………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
7. If your reason was 
financial constraint, 
would you have 
enrolled if someone 













SECTION C: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CBHI PROGRAMME 
1. Did you ever visit the 
hospital for medical attention 








If your answer is yes, who was 
responsible for the bill? 
Self   Family & friends   Others  
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If others, please specify ………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
2. Do you think non-enrolees 
who visited the hospital for 
medical attention were given 
similar quality of care enjoyed 
















SECTION D: FUNDING 
1. Do you think the 
government does not 
have the financial 
capacity to provide free 
healthcare services to 
the citizens?  
Yes  No  
SECTION E: STOPPAGE 
1. What do you think led to the 















INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR COMMUNITY MEMBERS (Former Enrollees) 
 
SECTION A: Socio-Demographic Details 
1. Age:………………………………………….. 
2. Gender:……………………………………… 
3. Educational Qualification:………………….. 
4. Religion:……………………………………. 
5. Marital Status:………………………………. 
6. Occupation:…………………………………. 
7. Location/Community:………………………… 
SECTION B: Perception about the CBHI Programme 
1. How will you describe the CBHI programme that was operational in your community? 
2. How did you feel when it was introduced? Please explain. 
Probe: How did you hear about the programme? Please explain. 
Probe: Did anyone visit your community to provide the information? How were the sessions 
organized? 
Probe: If any, how useful was the information in guiding you in the enrolment and benefit 
utilisation process? 
3. What prompted you to enrol in the programme?  
4. What do you think about the quality of service rendered under the programme? Please 
explain. 
6. When the programme was operational, how often do you think people used the hospital 
whenever they were ill?  
Probe: Do you think they used it regularly? 
7. Before the collapse, do you think the enrolment rate into the programme was increasing or 
decreasing? Please expatiate. 
8. Looking back, how would you describe the conduct of the healthcare workers in the hospital 
towards enrolees? 
Probe: Do you think they attended to patients very well or not? Please explain 
SECTION C: Design and Implementation of the CBHI Programme  
1. How did most people feel about the quality of service rendered under the programme? Is 
that the way you feel too? 
Probe: What will you say about the benefit package? 
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Probe: Do you think the programme covered most of the diseases common in this community? 
Probe: Were you informed about the specific medical conditions covered by the programme? 
2. How did you manage the illnesses of family members who were not enrolled in the 
programme? 
Probe: Did community members often use alternative or traditional health care in addition to 
the hospital treatment? Please explain.  
3. In your experience, were there times enrolees went to the hospital and were not treated? If 
yes, what were the reasons given?  
4. Since the programme stopped as a former enrolee, have you visited a hospital for medical 
consultation? If no, how have you been attending to your healthcare needs, or you have been 
using alternative medicine or self-medication? 
5. In your view, was there effective evaluation and monitoring of the programme? 
6. Do you think the programme achieved the purpose for which it was established? 
SECTION D: Funding 
1. As a former enrolee, who was responsible for your premium?  
2. Were you responsible for anyone’s premium? 
3. How much was the premium per year? 
4. Do you think the premium was affordable to most members of this community? Please 
explain. 
5. Was the premium increased at some point?   
Probe: What do you think about the increase or non-increase? Please explain. 
6. Do you think the government has the financial capacity to provide free healthcare services 
to the citizens? Please explain. 
SECTION E: Factors leading to stoppage of the Programme 
1. What were the challenges you observed in the programme when it was operational?  
Probe: Those things you believed could affect the growth of the programme? Please explain. 
2. Are there other things that you heard people complain about the programme when it was 
operational? 
3. Which ones among these problems were resolved before the programme stopped? 
4. Were you formally informed that the programme would be winding up? If yes, what were 
the reasons given?  
5. What reasons did you hear led to the stoppage of the programme? And you, what do you 
think led to the stoppage of the programme? Probe: what do you think went wrong? 




Thank you very much for participating in this research.   
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR COMMUNITY LEADERS 
 
SECTION A: Socio-Demographic Details 
1. Gender:…………………………………… 
2. Educational Qualification:……………… 
3. Religious Affiliation:……………………… 
4. Community:……………………… 
SECTION B: Perception about the CBHI Programme 
1. When was the CBHI programme introduced in your community? 
2. How did you feel when you heard about the programme? 
Probe: How did you hear about the programme? Please explain. 
Probe: Did anyone visit your community to provide the information? How were the sessions 
organized? 
Probe: If any, how useful was the information in guiding community members in the enrolment 
and benefit utilisation process? 
3. Were you also in the enrolment of the programme? 
Probe: How many members of your household are covered? 
4. What prompted most community members to enrol in the programme?  
5. What do you think about the quality of service rendered under the programme? Please 
explain. 
6. In your assessment, how often did the community members use the hospital when the 
programme was operational?  
Probe: Did they use it regularly or not? Please explain. 
7. Looking back, how did the health care providers relate with the enrolees whenever they 
visited the hospital? 
Probe: Did they attended to the enrolees well or not? Please explain 
SECTION C: Design and Implementation of the CBHI Programme  
1. How did most people feel about the quality of service rendered under the programme? Is 
that the way you feel too? 
Probe: What will you say about the benefit package? 
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Probe: Do you think the programme covered most of the diseases common in this community? 
Probe: Were you informed about the specific medical conditions covered by the programme? 
2. Were there times when enrolees went to the hospital and were not treated? 
Probe: Did you receive any such report? Please explain. 
3. Is there any community effort towards the running of the programme? 
Probe: Was there any collaboration with you as community leader in the implementation 
process of the programme?  Please explain. 
4. Is there any channel of communication for you to reach the people in charge of the 
programme? 
Probe: How did you always discuss your ideas and lodge complaints with the authorities in the 
programme? 
5. Do you think most people in the community were covered by the programme? 
Probe: what will you say about the medical conditions covered by the programme? 
6. How have the community members been catering for their healthcare needs since the 
stoppage of the programme? 
Probe: And you too, have you been paying out-of-pocket, using alternative medicine or self-
medication? Please explain. 
7. In your view, was there effective evaluation and monitoring of the programme? 
8. Do you think the programme achieved the purpose for which it was established? 
SECTION D: Funding 
1. How much was the premium for enrolment per year?  
2. Was there any increment at some point? If Yes, tell me what you think about that. 
3. Was the premium affordable to most members of this community?   
4. Do you think the government has the financial capacity to provide free healthcare services 
to the citizens? Please explain. 
SECTION E: Factors leading to stoppage of the Programme 
1. What were the challenges you observed in the programme when it was operational?  
Probe: Those things you believed could affect the growth of the programme? Please explain. 
2. Are there other things you heard people complain about the programme when it was 
operational? Please tell me. 
3. Which ones among these problems were resolved before the programme stopped? 
4. Were you formally informed that the programme would be winding up? If yes, what were 
the reasons given?  
333 
 
5. What are other reasons did you hear led to the stoppage of the programme? And you, what 
do you think led to the stoppage of the programme? Probe: what do you think went wrong? 
Is there any other thing you will like to discuss with me on this issue? 
Thank you very much for participating in this research.  
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR KEY INFORMANTS (Health Care Providers – 
Rural Facilities) 




SECTION B: Design and Implementation of the CBHI Programme  
1. What are your distinct responsibilities in the implementation of the programme? 
Probe: Were you involved in the policy design? What do you think about that? 
2. In your own assessment, do you think the enrolees were satisfied with the quality of service 
rendered by your hospital? 
3. What complaints did they lodge with you? 
Probe: What problems do you have relating with the enrolees?   
4. How well did the programme meet the health care needs of the enrolees?  
Probe: Maybe some treatments required were not covered by the health plan? Explain please.  
Probe: Do you think the programme covered most of the diseases common in this community? 
Probe: Looking back, were there times when enrolees came for medical care and you did not 
attend to them? Please explain. 
5. Was it a requirement of the CBHI programme to conduct medical test on patients before 
treatment at each episode of illness? Please explain. 
6. Do you think CBHI is the best policy option in rural areas considering the economic realities 
of the people? 
7. What would you say about how people have been taking care of their health care needs since 
the stoppage of the programme? 
Probe: Have they been making out-of-pocket payments or turned to alternative medicine or 
self-medication? Please explain. 
8. How will you describe your relationship with community members and programme 
managers when the scheme was still functional? Probe: Were there personality clashes? 
9. In your view, was there effective evaluation and monitoring of the programme? 
10. Do you think the programme achieved the purpose for which it was established? 
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SECTION C: Funding 
1. Was the premium affordable to most members of this community?  
Probe: Did they find the amount affordable? 
2. What do you know about the funding of the programme?  
Probe: Do you know if the premium was subsidized by the government, an organization or 
individual? Please elaborate. 
3. How viable is CBHI as a health care financing strategy? Please expatiate. 
4. How do you think universal health coverage can be achieved? 
5. Do you think the government does not have the financial capacity to provide free healthcare 
services to the citizens? Please explain. 
SECTION D: Factors leading to stoppage of the Programme 
1. What were the challenges that faced the programme when it was operational? Probe: Those 
things you believed could affect the growth of the programme? Please explain. 
2. Are there other things that you heard people complain about the programme when it was 
operational? 
3. What challenges did you face in delivering healthcare services under the programme?  
Probe: Do you have a conflicting interest or clash with the implementing partners? Please 
explain. 
4. Do you think the programme was characterized by bad management? 
5. Were you formally informed that the programme would be winding up? If yes, what were 
the reasons given?  
6. What reasons did you hear led to the stoppage of the programme? And you, what do you 
think led to the stoppage of the programme?  
Probe: what do you think went wrong? 
7. How has the stoppage affected your turnover?  (FOR PRIVATE HOSPITALS ONLY) 
Is there any other thing you will like to discuss with me on this issue? 
 







INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR KEY INFORMANTS (Health Care Providers - 
Referral Hospitals) 




SECTION B: Design and Implementation of the CBHI Programme  
1. What are your distinct responsibilities in the implementation of the programme? 
Probe: Were you involved in the policy design? What do you think about that? 
2. In your own assessment, do you think the enrolees were satisfied with the quality of service 
rendered by your hospital? 
3. How well did this the programme meet the health care needs of the enrolees?  
Probe: Maybe some treatments required were not covered by the health plan? Explain please  
Probe: Do you think the programme covered most of the diseases common in this community? 
Probe: Looking back, were there times when enrolees came for medical care and you did not 
attend to them? Please explain. 
4. What would you say about how people have been taking care of their health care needs since 
the stoppage of the programme? 
Probe: Have they been making out-of-pocket payments or turned to alternative medicine or 
self-medication? 
5. Was it a requirement of the CBHI programme to conduct medical test on patients before 
treatment at each episode of illness? Please explain. 
6. How will you describe your relationship with community members and programme 
managers when the scheme was still functional? Probe: Were there personality clashes? 
7. In your view, was there effective evaluation and monitoring of the programme? 
8. Do you think the programme achieved the purpose for which it was established? 
SECTION C: Funding 
1. Do you think the premium was affordable to most members of the enrolees?  
Probe: Did they find the amount affordable? 
2. What do you know about the funding of the programme?  
Probe: Do you know if the premium was subsidized by the government, an organization or 
individual? Please elaborate. 
3. How viable is CBHI as a health care financing strategy? Please expatiate. 
4. How do you think universal health coverage can be achieved? 
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5. Do you think the government does not have the financial capacity to provide free healthcare 
services to the citizens? Please explain. 
SECTION D: Factors leading to stoppage of the Programme 
1. What challenges did you observe faced the programme when it was operational? Probe: 
Those things you believed could affect the growth of the programme? Please explain. 
2. Are there other things that you heard people complain about the programme when it was 
operational? 
3. What challenges did you face in delivering healthcare services under the programme? Probe: 
Do you have a conflicting interest or clash with the implementing partners? Please explain. 
4. Do you think the programme was characterized by bad management? 
5. Which year did the programme stop in your hospital? 
6. Were you formally informed that the programme will be winding up? If yes, what were the 
reasons given? 
7. What reasons did you hear led to the stoppage of the programme? And you, what do you 
think led to the stoppage of the programme? Probe: what do you think went wrong? 
8. How has the stoppage affected your turnover?  (FOR PRIVATE HOSPITALS ONLY) 
Is there any other thing you will like to discuss with me on this issue? 
 

















INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR KEY INFORMANTS (POLICY MAKERS - State 
Government Officials) 
SECTION A: Socio-Demographic Details 
1. Gender:………………………………………. 
2. Profession:…………………………………… 
SECTION B: Design and Implementation of the CBHI Programme  
1. What was the motive behind the introduction of the CBHI programme? 
Probe: How did it come about, the policy option, planning, design and implementation? Please 
explain in detail. 
Probe: Who was responsible for the design policy content of the CBHI model implemented in 
the State? 
2. How will you describe the health policy in the State before the introduction of the CBHI 
programme?  
Probe: Was there any variation in the goal of the existing policy when the programme was 
introduced? Please elaborate. 
3. What was the remark of the federal government and international agencies (such as WHO, 
UNICEF etc) about the programme? 
Probe: Were they pessimistic or optimistic? Please explain.   
4. What was the nature of the agreement signed between the State Government and the various 
partners? 
5. How will you describe the success of the CBHI programme in the State? 
Probe: Do you think it achieved the purpose for which it was established. Please list the major 
achievements. 
Probe: What were the specific achievements of the programme in the state? 
6. Was the State Government satisfied with the enrolment population as at the end of the 
programme in 2016? 
7. What were the specific evaluation and monitoring strategies put in place when the 
programme was operational? Please tell me. 
8. What was the provision put in place to get feedback on the programme? 
Probe: Which medium was available to them lodge complaints about the health service? 
9. Was there anytime that some healthcare services were removed from the coverage of the 
programme? Please explain. 
10. What assistance or plans were put in place by the Government to attend to health care needs 
of enrolees with ailments that were not covered by the health plan? Please explain. 
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11. How do you think the people have been catering for their health care needs since the 
stoppage of the programme? 
Probe: through out-of-pocket payments, alternative medicine or self-medication? Please tell 
me. 
12. How many years do you think it could take the State to achieve universal health coverage 
through CBHI? 
13. Majority of the CBHI schemes in the rural communities were established in 2015.  Is there 
any reason for that? Please explain. 
14. What was the role of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in the programme? 
Probe: Did it play any role from planning to the implementation as well as regulation of the 
programme? 
SECTION D: Funding 
1. How would you describe the funding system of the CBHI programme by the State 
Government and the Dutch Health Insurance Fund (HIF)?  
Probe: Did the HIF abide by the funding agreement? Please expatiate. 
2. What was the percentage of contribution provided by each party for the programme? Please 
explain. 
3. Was funding ever a challenge during the lifespan of the programme? 
4. What would you say regarding decision-making on the programme? 
Probe: Were decisions jointly made by the partners or not. Please explain. 
5. Do you think CBHI could be effective in a community with people who do not have stable 
income? Please explain. 
6. Was the premium increased at some point?   
Probe: What do you think about the increase or non-increase? Please explain. 
7. How much do you think will be affordable as premium by majority of the community 
members if health insurance programme is re-introduced? 
8. How viable is CBHI as a health care financing strategy? Please expatiate. 
9. What informed the policy option adopted by the State Government? Please explain. 
10. Is the State Government servicing a debt on the health sector? If yes, when and what was 
the loan taken for?  
Probe: Apart from the partnership, was there any contribution from government or international 
agencies? 
11. Do you think the government does not have the financial capacity to provide free healthcare 




SECTION E: Factors leading to stoppage of the Programme 
1. What were the challenges of the programme when it was operational?  
Probe: Those things you believed could affect the growth of the programme? Please explain. 
2. How were the challenges tackled? 
Probe: Which other challenges do you think were not well not fully resolved?  
3. Which year did the programme stop? 
4. What factors led to the stoppage of the programme? Probe: what do you think went wrong? 
5. Were there disagreements or conflicting interests between the partners implementing the 
programme? 
6. How has the stoppage affected the health care situation of the rural communities? 
7. Were the enrolees formally informed that the programme would be winding up? If yes, what 
were the reasons given?  
Is there any other thing you will like to discuss with me on this issue? 




















INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR KEY INFORMANTS (POLICY MAKERS – 
National Health Insurance [NHIS] Official) 




SECTION B: Design and Implementation of the CBHI Programme  
1. In your view, was the Kwara CBHI designed based according to the Community-Based 
Social Health Insurance Programme (CBSHIP) model of the NHIS? If no, what were the basic 
differences? 
2. Is the CBHSHIP better than the Kwara CBHI model. Please explain. 
3. What was the role of the NHIS in the design and implementation of the CBHI programme? 
Probe: Was the NHIS formally informed or carried along in the process? If no, what was 
supposed to be the role of the NHIS if you were involved? 
4. How will you describe the success of the CBHI programme in the State? 
Probe: Do you think it achieved the purpose for which it was established. Please list the major 
achievements you observed in the programme. 
5. How many years do you think it could take the State to achieve universal health coverage 
through CBHI or CBSHIP? Please explain your views. 
6. How will you describe the reaction of the federal government and international agencies 
(such as WHO, UNICEF etc) to the programme? 
Probe: Were they pessimistic or optimistic? Please explain.   
7. In your view, was there effective evaluation and monitoring of the programme? 
SECTION D: Funding 
1. Do you think the premium paid by the enrolees was affordable?  
Probe: Do you think they found the amount affordable? 
2. What do you know about the funding of the programme?  
Probe: Do you know if the premium was subsidized by the government, an organization or 
individual? Please elaborate. 
3. How viable is CBHI as a health care financing strategy? Please expatiate. 
4. How do you think universal health coverage can best be achieved? Please explain. 
5. What do you know about the funding system for the CBHI programme in the State? Please 
tell me. 
6. Did the NHIS commit any fund to the programme? 
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7. Do you think CBHI or CBSHIP can be effective in a community with people who do not 
have stable income? Please explain. 
8. How viable is CBHI as a health care financing strategy? Please expatiate. 
9. What do you think informed the policy option adopted by the State Government? Please 
explain. 
10. Do you think the government does not have the financial capacity to provide free healthcare 
services to the citizens? Please explain. 
SECTION E: Factors leading to stoppage of the Programme 
1. What were the challenges you observed in the programme when it was operational? Probe: 
Those things you believed could affect the growth of the programme? Please explain. 
2. Do you think the programme was characterized by bad management? 
3. Do you think there were disagreements or conflicting interests between the partners 
implementing the programme? 
4. What factors do you think led to the stoppage of the programme? Probe: what do you think 
went wrong? 
5. Are there other things that you heard people complain about the programme when it was 
operational? 
Is there any other thing you will like to discuss with me on this issue? 
 















INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR KEY INFORMANTS (LOCAL and 
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS – Dutch Health Insurance Fund, PharmAccess 
and Hygeia HMO) 




SECTION B: Design and Implementation of the CBHI Programme  
1. What was the motive behind the introduction of the CBHI programme? 
Probe: How did it come about, the policy option, planning and implementation? Please 
expatiate. 
2. Was it an idea of the State Government or your organization? Please explain. 
3. What was the nature of the agreement between the State Government and your organization? 
4. How will you describe the success of the CBHI programme in the State? 
Probe: Do you think it achieved the purpose for which it was established. Please list the major 
achievements. 
5. Was your Organization satisfied with the enrolment population as at the end of 2016 when 
the programme ended? 
6. What were the specific evaluation and monitoring strategies put in place when the 
programme was operational? Please tell me. 
7. What was the provision put in place to get feedback on the programme? 
Probe: Which medium was available to them lodge complaints about the health service? 
8. Was there any time that some healthcare services were removed from the coverage of the 
programme? Please explain. 
9. What is your understanding of the health policy in the State before the introduction of the 
CBHI programme?  
Probe: Was there any variation in the goal of the policy when the programme was introduced? 
Please elaborate. 
10. How well did the programme meet the health care needs of the enrolees?  
Probe: What assistance or plans were put in place to attend to health care needs of enrolees 
with ailments that were not covered by the health plan? Please explain. 
11. How do you think the people have been catering for their health care needs since the 
stoppage of the programme? 




12. How many years do you think it could take the State to achieve universal health coverage 
through CBHI? 
13. Majority of the CBHI schemes in the rural communities were established in 2015.  Is there 
any reason for that? Please explain. 
14. What was the role of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in the programme? 
Probe: Did it play any role from planning to the implementation as well as regulation of the 
programme? Please expatiate. 
SECTION D: Funding 
1. How would you describe the funding system of the CBHI programme by the State 
Government and the Dutch Health Insurance Fund (HIF)?  
Probe: Did the State Government abide by the funding agreement? 
2. What was the percentage of contribution provided by each party for the programme? Please 
explain. 
3. Was funding ever a challenge during the lifespan of the programme? 
4. What would you say regarding decision-making on the programme? 
Probe: Were decisions jointly made by the partners or not. Please explain. 
5. Do you think CBHI could be effective in a community with people who do not have stable 
income? Please explain. 
6. Was the premium increased at some point?   
Probe: What do you think about the increase or non-increase? Please explain. 
7. How much do you think will be affordable as premium by majority of the community 
members if health insurance programme is re-introduced? 
8. How viable is CBHI as a health care financing strategy? Please expatiate. 
9. What informed the CBHI policy option implemented in Kwara State? Please explain. 
10. Do you think the government does not have the financial capacity to provide free healthcare 
services to the citizens? Please explain. 
SECTION E: Factors leading to stoppage of the Programme 
1. What were the challenges of the programme when it was operational? Probe: What were 
those things you believed could affect the growth of the programme? Please explain. 
2. How were the challenges tackled? 
Probe: Which other challenges do you think were not well not fully resolved?  
3. Do you think the programme was characterized by bad management? 
4. What factors led to the stoppage of the programme? Probe: what do you think went wrong? 
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5. Were there disagreements or clash of interest between the partners implementing the 
programme? 
6. How has the stoppage affected the health care situation of the rural communities? 
7. Were the enrolees formally informed that the programme would be winding up? If yes, what 
were the reasons given?  
Is there any other thing you will like to discuss with me on this issue? 
Thank you very much for participating in this research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
